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2012 DIGILAW 101 (KER)

Thattuparambath Govindan Asari v. Tharammal Sureshan

2012-01-19

C.T.RAVIKUMAR, THOTTATHIL B.RADHAKRISHNAN

body2012
Judgment : 1. This appeal filed under Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (since rechristened “the Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923”), for short, the “Act”, comes up for consideration for admission. 2. Perusing the file, we notice the following facts: i. The memorandum of appeal was presented on 14.12.2010. It was not accompanied by a certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellants have deposited with him, the amount payable under the order appealed against. ii. The Registry recorded the non-production of the certificate as one of the defects and returned the appeal for curing defects. iii. Appellants, thereafter, deposited the amount on 22.11.2011 before the commissioner; produced certificate and sought for condonation of delay in “representing” the appeal. By order dated 8.12.2011, that application was granted on condition of payment of Rs. 350/- as costs to the Kerala High Court Legal Service Authority. On payment of such costs, the delay in re-presentation stood condoned. 3. The questions for determination now are: (a) Does the presentation of the memorandum of appeal, without it being accompanied by the Commissioner’s certificate as to deposit, amount to institution of the appeal in terms of the Act? (b) If not, whether such an appeal is barred by limitation on account of non-production of the Commissioner’s certificate within the period prescribed for institution of the appeal? (c) If the answer to query (b) is in the affirmative, does the condonation of delay in representation of the memorandum of appeal along with such certificate, amount to condonation of delay in instituting the appeal? 4. On the aforesaid questions raised by the Bench, the learned counsel for the appellants argued that the delay in re-presentation of the appeal having been condoned, the appeal is to be treated as validly presented and hence, maintainable. He also says that the appeal has come up for consideration for admission only after production of the Commissioner’s certificate as to deposit. 5. The third proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Act provides that no appeal by an employer under clause (a) shall lie, unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against. The phrase “no appeal ……… shall lie” explicitly provides an inhibition to the institution of the appeal. The phrase “no appeal ……… shall lie” explicitly provides an inhibition to the institution of the appeal. If a memorandum of appeal to which Section 30 (1)(a) of the Act applies is presented without it being accompanied by the certificate by the Commissioner as to deposit, such presentation of the memorandum of appeal does not amount to institution of the appeal because such an appeal does not lie. A memorandum of appeal presented without producing the Commissioner’s certificate in terms of the third proviso to Section 30(1) of the Act would remain as not maintainable. The memorandum of appeal so presented can only be treated as not properly filed. Sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the Act provides that the period of limitation for an appeal under that section shall be sixty days. This prescription as to the period of limitation read in conjunction with the third proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 30 would show that a period of limitation is fixed in filing the appeal accompanied by the Commissioner’s certificate as to payment. The date of institution of the appeal, for all intents and purposes, in terms of Section 30 (1)(a) of the Act, is the date on which the appeal memorandum and the certificate of deposit are, together, available before the appellate court, namely, the High Court. Unless the certificate as to remittance of the amount before the Commissioner is presented within the period of limitation prescribed for filing the appeal, the appeal would be barred by limitation. An appeal presented without producing the Commissioner’s certificate in accordance with the third proviso to Section 30(1) of the Act, though presented, would remain as incompetent, and with the efflux of period of limitation prescribed for the appeal, would turn out to be not maintainable making it liable to be rejected on ground that it is barred by limitation. Then, the question that would arise for decision is as to whether there was sufficient cause for condonation of delay. This is the well settled position in law. For support, see I.T. Commr. Versus Filmistan Ltd. (AIR 1961 SC 1134). If no application for condonation of delay, showing sufficient cause therefore is filed, the appeal has to meet the face of rejection. Obviously, such rejection can be made only by a judicial order and not by the Registry. 6. This is the well settled position in law. For support, see I.T. Commr. Versus Filmistan Ltd. (AIR 1961 SC 1134). If no application for condonation of delay, showing sufficient cause therefore is filed, the appeal has to meet the face of rejection. Obviously, such rejection can be made only by a judicial order and not by the Registry. 6. The presentation of the memorandum of appeal in hand on 14.12.2010 without producing therewith, the Commissioner’s certificate as to deposit, does not amount to institution of the appeal under section 30 of the Act, having regarding to the third proviso to sub-section 1 thereof. It was no appeal in the eye of law because of the infraction of the aforesaid pre-condition as to deposit. Such incompepence continued till the production of the Commissioner’s certificate, in the light of what is stated above. By that time, the appeal was barred by limitation in terms of Section 30(2) of the Act, as interpreted above. 7. The learned counsel for the appellants say that the delay of 336 days in re-presenting the appeal has been condoned as per a separate order. We looked into that. Even going by the affidavit filed in support of that application, the delay in re-presenting the memorandum of appeal is attributed to the delay in making the deposit and producing the certificate of the Commissioner. Rule 15 of the Rules of the High Court of Kerala, 1971, hereinafter referred to as the “Rules”, provides, among other things, that the Registrar shall have the duty and power, subject to any special or general order made by the Chief Justice, inter alia, to return any memorandum of appeal, the presentation of which is defective by reason of failure to comply with the prescribed procedure or which requires any amendment to conform to the procedure or practice of the Court; for being represented within a period not exceeding 15 days, after supplying the deficiency, curing the defect or making the amendment, or to require that the deficiency be applied, the defect cured or the amendment made within a period not exceeding 15 days of the presentation. Rule 16 of the Rules authorizes the Registrar to hear and determine an application for excusing, inter alia, the delay in remedying any defect or in representation. Rule 16 of the Rules authorizes the Registrar to hear and determine an application for excusing, inter alia, the delay in remedying any defect or in representation. Such applications are placed on the judicial side, if it is beyond a period of 15 days, going by the relevant directions, practice and procedure followed by this Court. Such opportunity for re-presentation is only in relation to matters attendant to compliance with the prescribed procedure and to confirm to the procedure or practice of the Court. The effect of the third proviso of the Section 30(1) of the Act is not one that is part of procedure or practice. It cannot be treated merely as “prescribed procedure” or “practice or procedure of the Court”. The embargo contained in the third proviso to Section 30(1) of the Act is not dependent on any provision contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1958 or the Rules or the provisions empowering and enabling the making of those Rules, including Article 225 of the Constitution and Section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is an embargo created by the Legislature whereby a condition is prescribed for the institution of an appeal. It means that without satisfying the condition so prescribed, such an appeal shall not lie. “Re-presentation” and “Condonation of delay in re-presentation”, in terms of the provisions of the Kerala High Court Rules, cannot be countenanced as answer to the question as to the maintainability of an appeal; the institution of which is inhibited, explicitly, by the statutory provision which creates and provides the right of appeal. Pre-conditions as to institution of such an appeal have to be satisfied to sustain the appeal. “Re-presentation” of a returned appeal memorandum and “condonation of delay in re-presentation” do not make an appeal maintainable, if it is not otherwise. Such an exercise also does not amount to condonation of delay in exercise of the judicial power in terms of the Act, to condone delay. 8. In cases where there is delay in the institution of the appeal in terms of the aforesaid law, the only available course is to invoke sub-section (3) of Section 30 of the Act, which makes Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to appeals under Section 30mof the Workmen’s Compensation Act. 8. In cases where there is delay in the institution of the appeal in terms of the aforesaid law, the only available course is to invoke sub-section (3) of Section 30 of the Act, which makes Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to appeals under Section 30mof the Workmen’s Compensation Act. For support, see Filmistan Ltd. (supra).In such a case, the period of delay would run till the production of the Commissioner’s certificate as to deposit, as already noticed. The appellants have to show sufficient cause for condonation of delay in instituting the appeal until that day. Such condonation of delay cannot be had under the guise of an application seeking condonaton of delay in representing the appeal. 9. In the light of the above, we answer the questions posed in paragraph no. 3 above as follows: (a) The presentation of a memorandum of appeal under Section 30(1) of the Act, without it being accompanied by the Commissioner’s certificate as to deposit, does not amount to institution of the appeal in terms of the Act. (b) If a memorandum of appeal is filed without it being accompanied by the Commissioner’s certificate as to deposit, that appeal would be barred by limitation, if the certificate as to deposit is not produced before the period of limitation prescribed for the appeal. (c) The condonation of delay in re-presentation of the memorandum of appeal along with such certificate does not amount to condonation of delay in instituting the appeal. The appellants have to show sufficient cause of condonation of the delay in institution of the appeal. Such an application could be filed invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 read with the Section 30(3) of the Act. 10. Applying the aforesaid, as it now stands, this appeal is barred by limitation and the same is hence liable to be rejected on that ground.11. However, acceding to the request of the appellants’ learned counsel, without rejecting the appeal, we adjourn the matter by three weeks from the issuance of a copy of this order, enabling the appellants to file appropriate application seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal. The appellants will be at liberty to file such application and bring up the matter. Post when moved again.