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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2012 DIGILAW 1010 (MP)

Radhacharan Sharma v. State of M. P.

2012-10-08

SUJOY PAUL

body2012
ORDER 1. By invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, the petitioner has called in question the order dated 25.7.2012 passed by the Administrative Member of Board of Revenue. 2. By the impugned order, the Board has allowed an application for condonation of delay filed by the State Government. It is relevant to mention here that the impugned order Annexure P-1 is passed in a proceeding which were insituted by the State Government under section 50 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code (M.P.L.R.C.) after 23 years. In other words, the main matter was decided by the Board of Revenue 23 years back and review is filed after 23 years along with an application for condonation of delay. The said application was allowed by the authority below on the singular ground that prima facie it appears that a public interest is involved in this matter and, therefore, delay needs to be condoned. By condoning the delay, the matter is posted for arguments. 3. Shri V.K. Bharadwaj, learned senior counsel criticized this order by submitting that the order is bad in law and delay of almost 23 years could not have been condoned by the authority below. He relied on various judgments on this subject. 4. Shri Newaskar, learned Dy. G.A., on the other hand, supported the order and placed reliance on certain provisions of the M.P.L.R.C. to submit that application for condonation of delay can be filed in proceedings under section 50 of the M.P.L.R.C. He further submits that provisions of Limitation Act are made applicable for proceedings of section 50 of the Act. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. This is not in dispute between the parties that the authority below has condoned the delay of 23 years. In view of the rival contentions of the parties, the question is whether at this stage when main matter is pending before the authority below, any interference is warranted? More so, when it is always open for the petitioner to challenge the final order by appropriate proceedings in which he can always raise the objection regarding condonation of delay as well. 7. Secondly, whether reason assigned for condonation of delay, i.e., public interest after 23 years amounts to ‘sufficient cause’? More so, when it is always open for the petitioner to challenge the final order by appropriate proceedings in which he can always raise the objection regarding condonation of delay as well. 7. Secondly, whether reason assigned for condonation of delay, i.e., public interest after 23 years amounts to ‘sufficient cause’? A Division Bench of this Court in 1992 JLJ 458 (Laxmi Bai and others v. Nagaram Khilawands) held as under:- “In the our opinion, the apprehension is without any foundation. The appellants were litigating within time throughout upto this Court. In our opinion, the right of the appellants to challenge the orders of the appellate Court rejecting their applications under section 5 of the Limitation Act by petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not, in an manner, hampered or prejudiced merely because of the long pendency of the second appeals, which we are dismissing as incompetent. We, therefore, reject these second appeals as incompetent under section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. We also reject the applications for conversion of memo of appeal into writ petition.” 8. In (2008) 17 SCC 448 (Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by Lrs. Vs. Executive Engineer. Jalgaon Medium Project and another), the Apex Court held that a party cannot be permitted to invoke any right after long time because the time elapsed because of his own negligence. 9. In AIR 1998 SC 2276 (P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala and another), it was held that in absence of any reasonable or satisfactory explanation, delay cannot be mechanically condoned. 10. In (2010) 8 SCC 685 (Balwant Singh (dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh and others), the Apex Court held as under:- “Even if the term “sufficient cause” has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of “reasonableness” as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstanes of a given case. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstanes of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particulaly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been throughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of its acting vigilantly.” 11. In (2011) 3 SCC 563 (Postmaster General and others Vs. Living Media India Limited and another), the Apex Court declined to condone the delay of 427 days on the ground that “sufficient cause” is not shown. In 2012 AIR SCW 2412 (Maniben Devraj Sah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai), the Apex Court held as under:- “In cases involving the State and its agencies/instrumentalities, the Court can take note of the fact that sufficient time is taken in the decision making process but no premium can be given for total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of the officers of the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalites and the applications filed by them for condonation of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of course by accepting the plea that dismissal of the matter on the ground of bar of limitation will cause injury to the public interest.” (emphasis supplied) 12. On the basis of these judgments, it is clear that” sufficient cause” is required to be specifically established.Twenty three years delay is not an ordinary delay and, therefore, such delay can be condoned only if specific reasons with accuracy and precision are shown for condonation of delay. It cannot be condoned on a bald statement that matter has a public interest element. It cannot be condoned on a bald statement that matter has a public interest element. If this bald statement or reason is accepted mechanically, then delay can be condoned even after 25 years or 50 years, The Apex Court in Maniben (supra) held that even when “public interest” is pleaded, the State is required to show the “sufficient cause”. The delay cannot be condoned as a matter of course by accepting the plea of public interest. 13. In a similar issue this Court in 2000 (ILR) 1329 (Ravi Narayan Vs. State and others) held as under:- “The Courts cannot ignore the fact that public at large deposes confidence in the Judicial system and they wish to say that some end should be brought to the litigation. Though from the plain language of section 51 it does not appear that length of time would curtail or curb the powers of the authority to review its order but by the judicial dictum it has been circumscibed. The words ‘at any time’ in view of the judgments of the Supreme Court, this Court and other Courts will have to mean ‘within reasonable time’. The period in which powers can be exercised should be reasonable period. A man is entitled to feel that after a final order in his favour he is free and is entitled to use and enjoy his property and chattel. If it enters in his mind that some authority on some day may exercise suo-motu review or revisional powers then it would be almost impossible for such person to enjoy the property which is in his possession. There must be some end to the litigation. If the things are kept in suspension and no finality is attached even to a final order it is going to shatter the public faith in the system. The law nowhere provides that the things may be kept in animated suspension so that someone or the other whenever wants transfusion of life into the suspended article may bring it back to life. The law is to be respected and justice is to be done by those who have authority to dispense justice. One cannot forget that interpretation of the law should be in accordance with equity, fair play and justice. At some point somebody is entitled to say that enough is enough. Somebody must permit the deads to remain burried in their graves.” 14. One cannot forget that interpretation of the law should be in accordance with equity, fair play and justice. At some point somebody is entitled to say that enough is enough. Somebody must permit the deads to remain burried in their graves.” 14. On the basis of aforesaid analysis, I am unable to hold that the petition under Article 226/227 is not maintainable against order Annexure P-1. This Court can exercise the power of judicial review against an order by which delay is mechanically condoned after more than 2 decades. When the order impugned is passed mechanically without there being any “sufficient cause” petitioner cannot be made to face the entire litigation. On the basis of reason shown, delay of 23 years could not have been condoned. Consequently, the impugned order cannot be permitted to stand. The same is accordingly set aside. No cost.