Judgment : (A.P. Bhangale, J) : 1. Prayer in this petition under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India is to quash & set aside order dated 13.12.2011 passed by the Respondent 2 Divisional Caste Certificate Scrutiny Committee at Akola in case no. 3184/2011 invalidating caste claim of Petitioner as belonging to Chhaparband -VJ(A). Said order is under Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, De notified Tribes, (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Classes and Special Backward Category (Regulation of Issuance and Verification of) Caste Certificate Act, 2000, hereinafter referred to as Act 23 of 2001 for short. On 11.01.2012, while vacating ad-interim relief granted on 28.12.2011, this Court has subjected elections to the post of Sarpanch to the result of petition. When the matter was taken up for further consideration, Adv. Haq for Respondent 3 raised a preliminary objection & urged that petition must be placed before Single Judge of this Court in the light of Chapter XVII Rule 18 sub-rule 3 (as amended) of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960 read with judgment of Hon. Apex Court in (2012) 1 SCC 333 = 2011 AIR SCW 6781 “Dayaram v. Sudhir Batham” decided on 11.10.2011 by the Hon. 3 judge-bench clarifying the direction no. 13 in Kumari Madhuri Patil and anr. vs. Additional Commissioner, Tribal Development and others, AIR 1995 SC 94 . 2. In view of the objection raised and as requested, we adjourned its consideration to a later date. Accordingly, we have heard Adv. Sohoni for petitioner, Adv. Z.A. Haq for Respondent 3, AGP Shri Kothari for Respondent 1 & 2. Adv. R.S. Parsodkar, S.P. Narnaware and N.B. Kalwaghe have assisted the Court as amicus-curie. 3. Brief legislative history of Chapter XVII of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960 can be conveniently gathered from Patru s/o Kanuji Ghodmare vs. Scheduled Tribes Caste Certificate Scrutiny Committee – 2004 (3) Mh.L.J. 1055 . We wish to reproduce it here: “'15. It may be stated here that Chapter XVII of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules") deals with "Petitions under Articles 226 and 227 and applications under Article 228 of the Constitution and Rules for the issue of writs and orders under the said Articles". We wish to reproduce it here: “'15. It may be stated here that Chapter XVII of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules") deals with "Petitions under Articles 226 and 227 and applications under Article 228 of the Constitution and Rules for the issue of writs and orders under the said Articles". Rule 18 of Chapter XVII ("Single Judge's powers to finally dispose of applications under Article 226 or 227") enables a Single Judge to deal with and decide applications under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution arising out of decrees or orders passed by subordinate Courts, tribunals or quasi-judicial authorities under Special or Local Laws as also under certain enactments referred to in the said rule (Rule 18). 16. It is not in dispute that before 1999, petitions against orders passed by Caste Scrutiny Committees adjudicating caste claims were placed before a Division Bench. The Rule, however, was amended in 1999 and after entry (41), entries (42), (43) and (44) came to be inserted. Entry (44) which is material, reads thus; "Orders passed by the different Committees constituted by the State Government for verification of the claims of Scheduled and Scheduled Tribe candidates." 17. Thus, after 1999, such petitions challenging orders passed by Caste Scrutiny Committees used to be placed before a single Judge. 18. In view of direction (No.13) in Kumari Madhuri Patil and the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Milind Balkrishna Langhi, the Hon'ble the Chief Justice, thought it proper to place such petitions before a Division Bench and accordingly, entry (44) was deleted with effect from November 29, 2002. It is not in dispute that all the petitions were decided prior to deletion of entry (44). It, therefore, cannot be said that the Single Judge could not have decided the petitions nor it can successfully be contended that the orders passed by the learned Single Judge were without jurisdiction.” Reference to a “practice note” issued as per orders by Hon. The Chief Justice requiring all such challenges to be placed before the Division Bench is also contained in this judgment. One important event is addition of quasi-judicial authorities in Rule 3 of Chapter XVII of Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules,1960 on 15.07.1999. 4. In this background, Adv. One important event is addition of quasi-judicial authorities in Rule 3 of Chapter XVII of Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules,1960 on 15.07.1999. 4. In this background, Adv. Z.A. Haq has submitted that Rule 18 sub-rule 3 of Chapter XVII necessitates placing of such challenge before the Learned Single Judge as Respondent 2 Committee is a quasi-judicial authority. Entry 44 or its deletion does not make any difference and as Act 23 of 2001 is not mentioned in sub-rule 3, petition challenging adjudication by Scrutiny Committee must be considered only by the Single Judge. The mode & manner in which the directions in Kumari Madhuri Patil and anr. vs. Additional Commissioner, Tribal Development and others (supra) were applied by this Court in Patru s/o Kanuji Ghodmare vs. Scheduled Tribes Caste Certificate Scrutiny Committee (supra), is no longer a valid exercise because of later larger bench judgment of Hon. Apex Court in Dayaram v. Sudhir Batham (supra). Adv. Narnavare adopts the same line and submits that direction 13 in Ku. Madhuri Patil (supra) is not holding the field due to clarification by larger bench of Hon. Apex Court in Dayaram v. Sudhir Batham (supra). As Respondent 2 is quasi-judicial body, its orders must be challenged before the Learned Single Judge as per scheme of Appellate Side Rules so that statutory remedy of filing LPA is not lost. He submits that reasons prompting larger bench of Hon. Apex Court to restore remedy of LPA in State of Madhya Pradesh are also valid in Maharashtra. Adv. Sohoni, AGP Shri Kothari as also Adv. Parsodkar oppose this submission. According to them law is well settled by the Division Bench in Patru s/o Kanuji Ghodmare vs. Scheduled Tribes Caste Certificate Scrutiny Committee (supra) and Dayaram v. Sudhir Batham (supra) does not bring about any change. Unless & until entry 44 is restored to Appellate Side Rules, the present position has to continue. They also point out observations by Hon. Apex Court in paragraphs 30,31 & 35 of Dayaram v. Sudhir Batham (supra) to urge that Respondent 2 does not exercise quasi judicial powers. As it is an administrative body, as per Appellate Side Rules, petitioner has correctly approached the Division Bench. View taken by Learned Single Judge in Diego Gracias vs. State of Goa reported at 2011(50 Mah.L.J. 949 is also pressed into service by them. As it is an administrative body, as per Appellate Side Rules, petitioner has correctly approached the Division Bench. View taken by Learned Single Judge in Diego Gracias vs. State of Goa reported at 2011(50 Mah.L.J. 949 is also pressed into service by them. Shri Parsodkar, drawing support from (1998)1 SCC 1State of Rajasthan vs. Prakash Chand & Others, contends that the Hon. Chief Justice has correctly directed such matters to be placed before the Division Bench. Adv. Haq in reply invites attention to Full Bench Judgment of this Court at (2009 (8) LJSOFT 34 = 2009(3) Mah.L.J. 995) Shilpa Vishnu Thakur Vs. State of Maharashtra through its Secretary, Tribal Development Department & ors., and argues that function of Respondent 2 is already held to be quasi-judicial and in Dayaram v. Sudhir Batham (supra), the Hon. Apex Court has looked into the functioning of a Scrutiny Committee constituted not under any State enactment. He submits that in Diego Gracias vs. State of Goa (supra), the Learned Single Judge was not considering challenge to a decision by Committee functioning under any enactment. 5. (In 2002 (8) LJSOFT 95=2002 (4) Mah.L.j. 664)-Prabhakar Sadasheo Nandanwar Vs. State of Maharashtra & others, the Division Bench of this Court has considered Bombay High Court (Appellate Side) Rules, 1960 & did interpret Rule 18 entry 44 (then available) & entries 1, 4, 17. It accepted the well settled position that Rule 18 creates an exception permitting the challenge to orders mentioned therein to be heard by the Single Bench & created an exception to the general rule of hearing by Division Bench for speedy disposal and needed to be interpreted liberally. Mention of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe in entry 44 was only illustrative and not exhaustive & orders passed by the different committees for verification of the claim of all castes and not only the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe, were treated identically. Division Bench had directed the registry not to classify the orders passed by the different committees constituted by the State Government for verification of caste claims and list such petitions before the Hon'ble Single Bench of High Court. Logic for this approach is contained in paragraph 9 but then in present facts we are not concerned with it. Entry or item 44 is deleted by this Court on 29th Nov, 2002. 6. Logic for this approach is contained in paragraph 9 but then in present facts we are not concerned with it. Entry or item 44 is deleted by this Court on 29th Nov, 2002. 6. In "Dayaram v. Sudhir Batham" (supra), while upholding bar on approaching the Civil Court, Hon. Larger Bench observed that thus if a suit is to be filed in a civil court in regard to the decision of the Scrutiny Committee, the cause of action for such suit would not arise under any statute, but with reference to an order of a Committee constituted in pursuance of a scheme formulated by this court, by way of a stopgap quasi-legislative action. The principle underlying section 9 is that cognizance of any category of suits arising under a statute, can be barred (either expressly or impliedly) by that Statute. It also repelled the contention that in absence of any judicial member or “judicial mind”, challenge to order of such committee under Art. 226 can not be an efficacious substitute for a civil suit and observed:- “The Scrutiny Committee is not an adjudicating authority like a Court or Tribunal, but an administrative body which verifies the facts, investigates into a specific claim (of caste status) and ascertains whether the caste/tribal status claimed is correct or not. Like any other decisions of administrative authorities, the orders of the Scrutiny Committee are also open to challenge in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. Permitting civil suits with provisions for appeals and further appeals would defeat the very scheme and will encourage the very evils which this court wanted to eradicate.” Thus, it has considered the situation prevailing in State of Madhya Pradesh where stopgap quasi-legislative arrangement as guided in Ku. Madhuri Patil is prevailing and there is no state legislation like Maharashtra Act 23 of 2001. It then considers question no. (iii) and the fact that State of Madhya Pradesh has enacted the 'Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khandpeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005" which is deemed to have come into force from 1.7.1981. The said Adhiniyam confers a right of appeal before a Division Bench against the judgment of the single Judge exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Hon. Larger Bench, when it notices said vested right & a statutory intra-court appeal, overrules second sentence in direction no. 13 in Ku. Madhuri Patil & recognizes/restores such intra-court appeal. The said Adhiniyam confers a right of appeal before a Division Bench against the judgment of the single Judge exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Hon. Larger Bench, when it notices said vested right & a statutory intra-court appeal, overrules second sentence in direction no. 13 in Ku. Madhuri Patil & recognizes/restores such intra-court appeal. In Maharashtra, the stop gap quasi-legislation is not in force after Act. 23 of 2001 and Full Bench of this Court has already held Scrutiny Committees functioning thereunder to be quasi-judicial authorities. Thus, only later part of judgment of Hon. Larger bench of Apex Court overruling direction no. 13 due to vested right of intra-court appeal is relevant here. This discussion is also sufficient to hold Diego Gracias vs. State of Goa (supra) not relevan there as in Goa there is no enactment like Act 23 of 2001. Hence, Scrutiny Committee there can not be construed as quasi-judicial authority. 7. In Shilpa Vishnu Thakur Vs. State of Maharashtra through its Secretary, Tribal Development Department & ors., the Full Bench of this Court has considered Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Denotified Tribes, (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Classes and Special Backward Category (Regulation of Issuance and Verification of) Caste Certificate Act, 2000 & Maharashtra Scheduled Tribes (Regulation of Issuance and Verification of) Certificate Rules, 2003. In paragraph 40 while recording its conclusions, it has found that Committee is entitled to inquire into the question as to whether the applicant has established an affinity with the tribe as quasi-judicial authorities, each of these Authorities have to apply settled principles of law in the evaluation of evidence. Quasi-judicial function must focus on all relevant aspects such as whether the absence of documentary evidence is due to poverty, illiteracy and isolation or whether it is a plea in the nature of suppression to prevent the real status of the applicant from emerging before the authority. Competent Authority and the Scrutiny Committee have powers of a Civil Court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure particularly in summoning and enforcing the attendance of persons; requiring the discovery and production of documents; receiving evidence on affidavit, requisitioning any public record and issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or for the production of documents. Competent Authority and the Scrutiny Committee have powers of a Civil Court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure particularly in summoning and enforcing the attendance of persons; requiring the discovery and production of documents; receiving evidence on affidavit, requisitioning any public record and issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or for the production of documents. The Competent Authority, the Appellate Authority and the Scrutiny Committee exercise quasi-judicial powers in arriving at a determination with reference to a claim to belong to a Scheduled Tribe. 8. In Patru s/o Kanuji Ghodmare vs. Scheduled Tribes Caste Certificate Scrutiny Committee, a preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the contesting respondents that Letters Patent Appeals as instituted by the appellants against the orders passed by the learned single Judge in writ petitions were not maintainable. Decision of the Supreme Court in Kumari Madhuri Patil and anr. vs. Additional Commissioner, Tribal Development and others, AIR 1995 SC 94 was relied upon & in it while streamlining the procedure for the issuance of a social status certificate, their scrutiny and their approval, the Hon. Apex Court has issued certain directions. The direction relevant and material for the purpose of deciding the controversy raised was direction No.13 which reads: "The High Court would dispose of these cases as expeditiously as possible within a period of three months. In case, as per its procedure, the writ petition/ miscellaneous petition/ matter is disposed of by a single Judge, then no further appeal would lie against that order to the Division Bench but subject to Special Leave under Article 136." (emphasis supplied) The appellants had urged that direction No.13 in Kumari Madhuri Patil could neither be construed as taking away a right of appeal granted by Letters Patent as applicable to the High Court of Bombay nor it would create a bar to the jurisdiction of the Division Bench in entertaining such Letters Patent Appeals & such a direction would be per incurium as Clause 15 of the Letters Patent was neither referred to nor considered. It was also urged that Kumari Madhuri Patil was decided on September 2, 1994. It was also urged that Kumari Madhuri Patil was decided on September 2, 1994. Thereafter a special statute, namely, the Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Denotified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Classes and Special Backward Classes Categories (Regulation of Issuance and Verification) of Caste Certificates Act, 2001 (Maharashtra Act No.XXIII of 2001) came into force with effect from October 18, 2001. After legislation by a competent legislature (State Legislature), the direction of the Supreme Court would not operate as bar to the jurisdiction of the Division Bench of this Court under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against a "judgment" of a single Judge and an intra-Court appeal would be competent and maintainable. It was also submitted that some petitions were disposed of by a single Judge after a "practice note" was issued as per the order of the Hon. Chief Justice of this Court directing the Registry to place such matters before a Division Bench. The Division Bench also noted that in Letters Patent Appeal No.304 of 2000 (Milind Balkrishna Langhi vs. State of Maharashtra and ors.) decided on November 27, 2000, it was contended on behalf of the respondent-State that a Letters Patent Appeal was not maintainable in the light of direction No.13 in Kumari Madhuri Patil. The Court upheld the contention and dismissed the appeal as not maintainable. Again in Letters Patent Appeal No.91 of 2002 in Writ Petition No.1012 of 2002, decided on April 11, 2002, a similar question came up for consideration. The attention of the Court was invited to direction No.13 in Kumari Madhuri Patil and the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Milind Balkrishna Langhi. The Court noted the contention of the appellant that Clause 15 of the Letters Patent as applicable to this Court conferred right of appeal on the aggrieved party against "judgment" rendered by a single Judge and the said right could not have been curtailed by a judgment or decision of any Court. An intra-Court appeal, therefore, was maintainable. It was also submitted that the decision in Milind Balkrishna Langhi holding Letters Patent Appeal not maintainable was taken to the Supreme Court. An intra-Court appeal, therefore, was maintainable. It was also submitted that the decision in Milind Balkrishna Langhi holding Letters Patent Appeal not maintainable was taken to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court disposed of the matter and observed; “Leaving the question of law, namely, whether an LPA is maintainable against the order of the learned Single Judge, open, the Special Leave Petitions are dismissed on the facts and in the circumstances of this case." (emphasis supplied) The Division Bench then noted some other judgments holding that LPA were not maintainable. In the light of these facts and enunciation of law by the Supreme Court followed by the Division Bench of this Court and reiterated from time to time, the Division Bench in Patru s/o Kanuji Ghodmare vs. Scheduled Tribes Caste Certificate Scrutiny Committee (supra), concluded that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable and they should be dismissed observing that no such Letters Patent Appeals could have been instituted. Keeping in view clear, express and unequivocal direction of the Supreme Court in Kumari Madhuri Patil (direction No.13), it was found not open to this Court to take a view that Letters Patent Appeals are maintainable upholding the contention of the appellants that the right to prefer an intra Court appeal conferred by Clause 15 of the Letters Patent as applicable to this Court could not have been taken away by the Apex Court by issuing the said direction. Relevant findings recorded at the end of para 14 are”- “It is equally not open to us to hold Letters Patent Appeals maintainable on the ground that direction No.13 in Kumari Madhuri Patil, is per incurium inasmuch as it does not refer to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent as applicable to this Court.” 9. In the light of discussion above, it follows that this reasoning with direction no. 13 does not take away the right to file LPA against the adjudication by Learned Single Judge of this Court. Moreover, here due to enactment of Act no. 23 of 2001 and Full Bench judgment in Shilpa Vishnu Thakur Vs. State of Maharashtra through its Secretary, Tribal Development Department & ors. (supra), the Respondent 2 is a quasi-judicial authority. This Maharashtra Act is not included in list of excluded enactments in sub-rule 3 of Rule 18 in Chapter XVII of Appellate Side Rules. 23 of 2001 and Full Bench judgment in Shilpa Vishnu Thakur Vs. State of Maharashtra through its Secretary, Tribal Development Department & ors. (supra), the Respondent 2 is a quasi-judicial authority. This Maharashtra Act is not included in list of excluded enactments in sub-rule 3 of Rule 18 in Chapter XVII of Appellate Side Rules. Hence, due to operation of Rule 18 itself, the challenge to any adjudication by Respondent 2 has to be before the Single Judge of this Court. Addition of item or entry 44 in Chapter XVII on 8.3.1999 was when Act 23 of2001 was not in vogue. Its deletion on 29.11. 2002 is after 15.7.1999 & therefore hardly relevant. Addition of words “or by any quasi-judicial authority” in sub-rule 3 on 15.7.1999 is sufficient to sustain such challenge before the Learned Single Judge. Hon. Apex Court itself had left earlier the question of tenability of LPA against such adjudication by Learned Single Judge expressly open. Views of this Court to the contrary or then requiring petition itself to be placed before the Division Bench were due to direction no. 13 in Ku, Madhuri Patil (supra). However, as later part in direction 13 in quasi-judicial legislation is overruled in Dayaram vs. Sudhir Batham (supra), the statutory scheme emanating from sub-rule 3 of Rule 18 of Chapter XVII of Appellate Side Rules,1960 must be restored by following this Larger Bench decision of the Hon. Apex Court. As per explanation appearing at the end of Chapter XVII Rule 18 read with sub-rule 3 of Rule 18, adjudication by quasi-judicial authority like Respondent 2 needs to be assailed before the Learned Single Judge only. Full Bench of this Court in paragraph 15 in 2004 (3) Mah.L.J. 706-Rahul Sharad Awasthi Vs. Ratnakar Trimbak Pandit and ors. has held that "Letters Patent Appeal is a substantive right is not in dispute. Merely because Letters Patent Appeal is intra court appeal, it does not cease to be substantive right or for that matter a vested right." 10. Judgment of Hon. Apex Court in State of Rajasthan vs. Prakash Chand & Others, (supra) relied upon by Adv. Parsodkar considers judicial acts which violated roster assignment and finds that the Chief Justice is master of roster. It has no application in present situation where field is occupied by the Appellate Side Rule & Letters Patent, 1865 of this High Court. 11. Parsodkar considers judicial acts which violated roster assignment and finds that the Chief Justice is master of roster. It has no application in present situation where field is occupied by the Appellate Side Rule & Letters Patent, 1865 of this High Court. 11. Accordingly, we uphold preliminary objection raised by Adv. Haq & supported by Adv. Narnavare. We direct the registry to place the matter before appropriate Single Judge as per roster assignment.