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2012 DIGILAW 1013 (RAJ)

Mangu Singh v. State of Rajasthan

2012-04-20

R.S.CHAUHAN

body2012
JUDGMENT 1. - Having been caught allegedly accepting a bribe of Rs. 200/-, having been convicted for offences under Sections 7, and 13(1)(d)(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ('the Act', for short), having been sentenced to six months of rigorous imprisonment and imposed with a fine of Rs. 500/-, and directed to further undergo fifteen days of simple imprisonment in default thereof for offence under Section 7 of the Act, and having been sentenced to one year of rigorous imprisonment, and imposed with a fine of Rs. 1000/-, and directed to further undergo one month's simple imprisonment in default thereof, for offence under Section 13(1)(d)(2), vide judgment dated 14.12.2001 passed by Special Judge, A.C.D. cases, jodhpur, the appellant, Mangu Singh, a patwari, has approached this Court. 2. Briefly, the facts of the case are that on 30.10.1998, Prakash Chandra (PW-10) submitted a written report (Ex.P-6) before Om Prakash Joshi (PW-9), the Deputy Inspector, Rajasthan Anti-Corruption Bureau, Nagaur, wherein he claimed that having lost his father, on 15.2.1996 he had obtained the death certificate of his father from the A.D.M. He submitted the death certificate to Patwari Halka Khakholi and gave a copy to the Patwari, Banwasa, Halka Deendarpura. Although the Patwari of Khakholi had made the necessary mutation, in the revenue records, in his name about one and half year back, so Tar the patwari of Banwasa, Mangu Singh, has not carried out the said mutation in the revenue records. On 28.10.1998, he met Mangu Singu for recording the mutation. However, Mangu Singh demanded an illegal gratification of Rs. 500/- Mangu Singh told him that he has misplaced the death certificate given earlier by the complainant to him. Therefore, he requires another death certificate from the Sarpanch. According to the complainant, on 29.10.1998, he received another death certificate from the Sarpanch and submitted it before Mangu Singh. Mangu Singh told him that he should pay him a bribe of Rs. 300/- otherwise even this death certificate is likely to be lost. The complainant stated that he did not wish to give Rs. 300/- as illegal gratification to Mangu Singh, the appellant. 3. In order to verify the allegations made in the complaint, on 31.10.1998, Om Prakash Joshi (PW-9) sent Prem Chand (PW-6) alongwith the complainant to the Patwarghar (the office of Patwari). The complainant stated that he did not wish to give Rs. 300/- as illegal gratification to Mangu Singh, the appellant. 3. In order to verify the allegations made in the complaint, on 31.10.1998, Om Prakash Joshi (PW-9) sent Prem Chand (PW-6) alongwith the complainant to the Patwarghar (the office of Patwari). Convinced of the demand made by the appellant, Om Prakash Joshi (PW-9) decided to carry out the trap proceeding. For this purpose, Om Prakash Joshi (PW-9) noted the fact that according to the complainant, on 31.10.1998 he had already given Rs. 100/- to the appellant. Therefore, he gave him four notes of 50/-, totalling an amount of Rs. 200/-, after covering the notes with phenolphthalein powder. On 1.11.1998, around 11:00 AM, the trap party reached the village Deendarpura. From the bus stand, Prem Chand (PW-6) and the complainant were told to proceed to the Patzoarghar. Around 11:30AM, when the trap party received the pre-determined signal, they entered the office of the Patwari. They discovered a man, in trouser and shirt, standing in the room. The complainant told Om Prakash Joshi (PW-9) that the person who is standing is Mangu Singh, the Patwari, who has taken Rs. 200/- as illegal gratification for the purpose of mutating his name in the revenue record." He further told the officer that "Mangu Singh has kept the money in front pocket of his shirt." When Om Prakash Joshi (PW-9) asked Mangu Singh about his explanation, Mangu Singh told him "that everyone gives money for the purpose of doing the mutation. The complainant has given the money out of his own volition, which I have kept in the pocket of my shirt. Even yesterday, this man had given me one hundred rupees." After receiving the said explanation, the appellant's hand were washed with water containing Sodium Carbonate. The solution turned pink. The solution was kept in four different bottles. The bottles were duly sealed. The Bureau registered a formal F.I.R., F.I.R. No. 232/1998 for offences under Sections 7, and 13(1)(d)(2) of the Act. Subsequently, charge-sheet was filed against the appellant for the aforementioned offences. 4. In order to support its case, the prosecution examined ten witnesses and submitted number of documents. In turn, the defence examined two witnesses and submitted a few documents. The Bureau registered a formal F.I.R., F.I.R. No. 232/1998 for offences under Sections 7, and 13(1)(d)(2) of the Act. Subsequently, charge-sheet was filed against the appellant for the aforementioned offences. 4. In order to support its case, the prosecution examined ten witnesses and submitted number of documents. In turn, the defence examined two witnesses and submitted a few documents. After going though the oral and documentary evidence, vide judgment dated 14.12.2001, the learned Judge convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned above. Hence, this appeal before this Court. 5. Mr. Sunil Joshi, the learned counsel for the appellant, has vehemently raised the following contentions before this Court: firstly, in order to prove its case for commission of offences under Sections 7 and 13 (1)(d)(2) of the Act, the prosecution is required to establish three distinct elements, namely (a) demand, (b) acceptance; and (c) recovery of illegal gratification. However, in the present case, the prosecution has failed to prove demand made by the appellant for illegal gratification. 6. Secondly, Prakash Chandra (PW-10), the complainant, has turned hostile and has not supported the case of the prosecution. Similarly, Atma Ram (PW-4), the independent recovery witness, has also turned hostile. Moreover, both according to Prem Chand (PW-6) and according to Om Prakash (PW-9), on 31.10.1998, the conversation which had taken place, between the complainant and the appellant, was tape recorded. However, the prosecution has failed to produce the original cassette and the transcript thereof. Therefore, an adverse inference under Section 114 of the Evidence Act should be drawn against the prosecution. Hence, the prosecution has failed to prove the element of demand. Hence, the entire case of the prosecution falls apart. 7. Thirdly, that according to the revenue record, the mutation was already made prior to 1.11.1998, therefore, on the date when the trap proceedings were carried out, there was no work pending with the appellant. Hence, there was no reason for the appellant to demand, or to accept illegal gratification from the complainant. 8. Fourthly, according to the testimony of Vijaydan (PW-8), he had taken sample bottles to the F.S.L. on 11.11.1998. However, the same could not be deposited with F.S.L. at Udaipur. Thereafter, he had again taken the sample bottles back to the F.S.L. on 16.11.1998 and had deposited the same with the F.S.L. on 17.11.1998. 8. Fourthly, according to the testimony of Vijaydan (PW-8), he had taken sample bottles to the F.S.L. on 11.11.1998. However, the same could not be deposited with F.S.L. at Udaipur. Thereafter, he had again taken the sample bottles back to the F.S.L. on 16.11.1998 and had deposited the same with the F.S.L. on 17.11.1998. According to the learned Counsel, the prosecution has not produced any evidence to show that these bottles were safely kept between 11.1.1998 to 17.11.1998, Therefore, the possibility that the sample may have been tampered with by the investigating agency cannot be ruled out. 9. Fifthly, the learned Judge was not justified in invoking the presumption under Section 20 of the Act as the appellant has forcefully rebutted the presumption by offering a valid explanation in his statement recorded under Section 313 Criminal Procedure Code and by producing two defence witnesses, namely Chain Singh (DW-1) and Balveer Singh (DW-2) in his favour. According to the appellant, he had clearly informed the Court that on the fateful day, while he was in his office, a stranger walked into his office, shook his hand, inserted Rs. 200/- in the pocket of his short, which was hanging on a peg (Khooti) on the wall. Immediately, the officers from the Bureau entered his room and arrested him. Moreover, both the defence witnesses, Chain Singh (DW-1) and Balveer Singh (DW-2), have clearly stated in their testimony that there was some animosity between the complainant's brother, Durga Ram, and the appellant. Therefore, the appellant has been falsely implicated at the behest of Durga Ram. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the appellant had rebutted the presumption under Section 20 of the Act. Hence, the learned Judge was not justified in concluding that the appellant had failed to rebut the presumption under Section 20 of the Act. In order to buttress his contentions, the learned counsel has relied upon the following case: V. Venkata Subbarao v. State represented by Inspector of Police, A.P. 2007 (3) SCC (Cr.) 175 , State of Maharashtra v. Dnyaneshzoar Laxman Rao Wankhede, 2009 RCC (SC) 84 , C.M. Girish Babu v. C.B.I, Cochin, High Court of Kerala, 2009 Rajasthan Criminal Decisions 181 (SC) , Punjabrao v. State of Maharashtra, 2004 SCC (CR.) 1130 , Ramesh Thete v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2010 Criminal Law journal 2300 , and A. Subair v. State of Kerala, 2009 Cr.L.J. 3450. 10. 10. On the other hand, Mr. O.P. Singaria, the learned Public Prosecutor, has contended that merely because Prakash Chandra (PW-10), the complainant, has turned hostile and the independent recovery witness, Atma Ram (PW-4) has also turned hostile, would not be fatal to the case of the prosecution. A case under the Act need not be proved only through direct evidence, but can also be proved through circumstantial evidence. Relying on the case of Surender Singh v. State of Haryana, (2006) 9 SCC 247 , the learned Public Prosecutor has contended that even if the complainant and the recovery witnesses were to turn hostile, but in case they admit the signature on the documents prepared by the Investigating agency, then reliance can be placed on the contents of the documents in order to convict the accused persons. In the present case, Prakash Chandra (PW-10) has admitted his signature on the complaint (Ex.P-6) submitted by him, the memo showing the dousing of power (Ex.P-7). The memo of trap proceeding (Ex.P-8), the arrest memo (Ex.P-9), recovery memo of the mutation register (Ex.P-10), and the site plan (Ex.P-11). Moreover, even Atma Ram (PW-4) has admitted his signature on the complaint Ex.P-6 and on Ex.P-7 to Ex.P-11 mentioned above. Therefore, the contents of these documents can be read against the appellant. For, all these documents are in connection with the carrying out of the trap proceedings. All these documents narrate the story as it unfolded itself during the trap proceedings. Hence, although "Man may lie, circumstances and documents do not. On the basis of this doctrine, the learned Judge was certainly justified in concluding that the prosecution has, indeed, established the three elements of demand, acceptance and recovery. 11. Secondly, even if the complainant and the independent recovery witness have not supported the case of the prosecution, then too there is ample evidence of the trap officers and his party members. Merely because these persons happen to be the officers of the Bureau, their testimonies cannot be disbelieved on this ground alone. After all, the appellant has not claimed that these officers have any animosity against him. Therefore, he has not pleaded that he has been implicated falsely due to animosity. Moreover, the testimonies of these officers have not been shattered in the cross-examination. Hence, the learned Judge was justified in relying upon their testimonies in order to convict the appellant. 12. After all, the appellant has not claimed that these officers have any animosity against him. Therefore, he has not pleaded that he has been implicated falsely due to animosity. Moreover, the testimonies of these officers have not been shattered in the cross-examination. Hence, the learned Judge was justified in relying upon their testimonies in order to convict the appellant. 12. Thirdly, relying on the case of Dhanvantrai Balwantrai Desai v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1964 SC 575 the learned 'Public Prosecutor has argued that merely by offering an explanation by the accused, the Presumption is not rebutted. The explanation has to be supported by valid "proof". After all, the presumption under Section 20 of the Act is a presumption of law, and not of fact. Once the element of acceptance was firmly established by the prosecution, the learned Judge was justified in invoking the presumption under Section 20 of the Act. Once the burden of proof shifts to the appellant, it was for him to rebut the presumption. Furthermore, a mere denial is not sufficient for rebutting the said presumption. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, the accused has "to prove" his defence through sufficient evidence to probablise his defence. However, in the present case, the appellant has not "proven" his defence. He has merely claimed in his statement under Section 313, Criminal Procedure Code that a stranger had come into his office, had shaken his hand, and had stuffed Rs. 200/- in his shirt, which was hanging on the wall. However, he has not been able to even name the person who had entered into his room. He has not been able to explain why a person came inside his room and stuffed Rs. 200/- in his shirt. Furthermore, his explanation in his statement under Section 313 Criminal Procedure Code is contrary to the initial explanation given by him during the trap proceedings. According to Om Prakash, Joshi (PW-9) and according to the recovery memo of the trap proceeding (Ex.P- 8), at the time of trap proceedings, he had stated that "everyone gives money to the Patwari for the purpose of mutation. Even earlier, the complainant had even him Rs. 100/- and today out of his free will he has given him Rs. 200/-". Even earlier, the complainant had even him Rs. 100/- and today out of his free will he has given him Rs. 200/-". Further, such an explanation given by the appellant at the initial stage not fall within the definition of "legal remuneration" contained in Explanation (c) of Section 7 which defines the term "legal remuneration" as being "not restricted to remuneration which a public servant can lawfully demand, but include all remuneration which he is permitted by the Government or the organisation which he serves, to accept." Moreover, according to Chain Singh (DW-1), the shirt was hanging on a peg in the wall. However, considering the fact that the trap was carried out on 1.11.1998, when the winter had already set in, it is rather surprising that the appellant would take off his shirt and hang it on the wall. Therefore, the learned Judge is justified in concluding that the appellant has failed to rebut the presumption under Section 20 of the Act. 13. Lastly, that the learned Judge has meticulously examined and critically analyzed the evidence produced both by the prosecution and the defence. Therefore, the learned Public Prosecutor has supported the impugned judgment. 14. Heard the learned counsel for the parties, examined the record, perused the impugned judgment. 15. It is, indeed, a misnomer that merely because the complainant has turned hostile, the prosecution case would fall apart. For, one of the settled principle of criminal jurisprudence is that "while Man may lie, circumstances and documents do not. Hence, even if direct evidence is not available, the prosecution is free to rely upon the documentary evidence to prove its case. Even if the complainant has turned hostile, the Court is still expected to appreciate the evidence in a holistic manner. There may be other witnesses, there may be documentary evidence, which prove the case of the prosecution. In the case of Snrender Singh (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court was faced with a case where both the complainant and the recovery witnesses had turned hostile. Yet still, the trial Court had convicted the appellant, Surender Singh. The Apex Court upheld the conviction on the ground that even if the complainant and the recovery witnesses have turned hostile, but they had admitted their signature on the documents. The documents were sufficient to prove the commission of the crime by the accused appellant. Yet still, the trial Court had convicted the appellant, Surender Singh. The Apex Court upheld the conviction on the ground that even if the complainant and the recovery witnesses have turned hostile, but they had admitted their signature on the documents. The documents were sufficient to prove the commission of the crime by the accused appellant. The Hon'ble Apex Court opined that even if the complainant and recovery witnesses were to turn hostile, in case they admit their signatures on the documents, then the contents of the documents should be accepted as true. The same principle would be applicable to the present case. Thus, on the basis of documentary evidence, the accused can still be convicted. 16. Indeed, it is true that Prakash Chandra (PW-10) has turned hostile. Although he has claimed that he was forced to submit the complaint (Ex.P-6) under duress, but he has failed to tell the Court as to who had threatened him, or compelled him to sign blank pieces of papers. Thus, his statement that he had signed blank papers under threat is clearly an after-thought. Hence, unbelievable. Moreover, he has admitted his signature on the complaint (Ex.P-6) Furthermore, he has also admitted his signatures on the memo showing the "dousing of power (Ex.P-7), the memo of trap proceeding (Ex.P-8), the arrest memo (Ex.P-9), recovery memo of the mutation register (Ex.P-10), and the site plan (Ex.P-11). Undoubtedly, all these documents record the proceedings as they progressed. Therefore, these documents contain the actual occurrences as they happened. Thus, even if Prakash Chandra (PW-10) has resiled and has not supported the prosecution, the documents signed by him can be accepted as revealing the truth. 17. Similarly, although Atma Ram (PW-4) has also turned hostile, but nonetheless he too has admitted his signature on the complaint Ex.P-6 and on the other documents mentioned above. Therefore, the learned Judge was certainly justified in relying on these documents in order to convict the appellant. 18. Admittedly, the prosecution has failed to produce the cassette and the transcription thereof, which according to Prem Chand (PW-6) and Om Prakash Joshi (PW-9), was prepared during the proceedings carried out on 31.10.1998. Even if the said cassette has not been produced by the prosecution, it would not be fatal to the prosecution by the prosecution, it would not be fatal to the prosecution case. Even if the said cassette has not been produced by the prosecution, it would not be fatal to the prosecution by the prosecution, it would not be fatal to the prosecution case. For, the said casette and the transcript of the conversation would only be a corroborative piece of evidence. Since there is a substantive piece of evidence in the form of testimony of Prem Chand (PW-6), it is not necessary for the prosecution to produce the cassette and the transcript thereof. 19. The moot questions before this Court are: Firstly, whether the prosecution has been able to establish the three elements of demand, acceptance and recovery or not? Secondly, whether the learned Judge was justified in invoking the presumption under Section 20 of the Act or not? Thirdly, whether the appellant has succeeded in rebutting the presumption under Section 20 of the Act or not? 20. As far as the demand is concerned, according to the complaint (Ex.P- 6) submitted by Prakash Chandra (PW-10), he has clearly stated that after the death of his father the mutation of the land was to be made in his favour for which the appellant had initially demanded a bribe of Rs. 500/-. Subsequently, the appellant had demand a bribe of Rs. 300/-. In fact, the appellant had told him that in case he does not pay Rs. 300/-, the death certificate submitted by the complainant could be lost again. According to the complaint (Ex.P-6), the complainant did not wish to pay a bribe of Rs. 300/- to the appellant, Therefore, he had requested the Bureau to carry out the trap proceedings. 21. Moreover, in order to verify this complaint, on 31.10.1998 the complainant and Prem Chand (PW-6) were sent to the Patwargarh. According to Prem Chand (PW-6), complainant and he had gone to the office of Patwari. While he stood outside the office, he heard the conversation which took place between Prakash Chandra (PW-10) and the appellant. According to him, when Prakash Chandra (PW-10) asked the appellant, the Patwari, to complete the mutation, the appellant told him that he should be paid Rs. 300/-. The complainant told the appellant that since he has come from outside, he has only Rs. 100/- with him. He promised to pay him the remaining amount of Rs. 200/- later on. According to him, when Prakash Chandra (PW-10) asked the appellant, the Patwari, to complete the mutation, the appellant told him that he should be paid Rs. 300/-. The complainant told the appellant that since he has come from outside, he has only Rs. 100/- with him. He promised to pay him the remaining amount of Rs. 200/- later on. According to him, the appellant told the complainant that he will meet him at the same place on the next day. The testimony of Prem Chand (PW-6) has not been demolished in the cross-examination. Therefore, there is no reason to disbelieve his testimony only on the ground that he happens to be an officer of the Bureau.- Moreover, in his statement recorded under Section 313 Criminal Procedure Code, the appellant has not claimed that there is any animosity between him and Prem Chand (PW-6). Furthermore, the appellant has not pleaded that he is being falsely implicated by the officers of the Bureau. Hence, the learned Judge was certainly justified in concluding that the testimony of Prem Chand (PW-6) and the contents of the complaint (Ex.P-6) are sufficient to prove the element of demand made by the appellant. 22. As far as the allegation of acceptance is concerned, according to the memo of the trap proceeding (Ex.P-8), the explanation given by the appellant at the time of the trap proceeding was that "everyone gives money for the purpose of mutation. Even yesterday, Prakash Chandra had given him Rs. 100/-. Today, out of his own volition, he has given him Rs. 200/- which he has kept in the front pocket of his shirt." This explanation given by the appellant clearly proves the element of acceptance. 23. Moreover, the acceptance of this amount does not fall within the definition of "legal remuneration" as contained is Section 7 of the Act. Explanation (c) of Section 7 of the Act defines legal remuneration as under: Explanation (C):-"legal remuneration". The words "legal remuneration" are not restricted to remuneration which a public servant can lawfully demand, but include all remuneration which he is permitted by the Government or the organization, which he serves, to accept. 24. The Rs. 200/- accepted by the appellant is neither an amount which he could have "legally demanded", nor an amount which the Government would permit him "to accept." Thus, the amount given by the complainant is not by way of "legal remuneration". 24. The Rs. 200/- accepted by the appellant is neither an amount which he could have "legally demanded", nor an amount which the Government would permit him "to accept." Thus, the amount given by the complainant is not by way of "legal remuneration". Moreover, according to the memo of trap proceeding (Ex.P-8) while identifying the appellant Prakash Chandra (PW-10) had clearly stated that "he has just taken Rs. 200/- by way of a bribe." Therefore, the explanation given by the appellant clearly does not fall within the delimitation of "legal remuneration". 25. As far as the recovery of the said amount is concerned, the same has been proven both by recovery memo of trap proceeding (Ex.P-8) and by the testimony of Om Prakash Joshi (PW-9) and further strengthened by the F.S.L. Report (Ex.P-19). According to the F.S.L. Report (Ex.P-19), the sample of the wash sent to it contained phenolphthalein and Sodium Carbonate powder. 26. Although the learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the prosecution has failed to prove the safe custody of the sample of the wash, but the learned Judge is justified in noticing the fact that according to Gordhan Singh (PW-7), the Malkhana in-charge, and Vijaydan (PW-8), they had clearly claimed that as long as the sample was in their possession, it was kept safely, Moreover, according to the F.S.L. Report (Ex.P-19), the seal on the sample matched the seal impression sent to it. Furthermore, there is no reason for the Bureau officers to tamper with the sample of the wash especially when they have no grudge. or animosity towards the appellant, Hence, the learned Judge was certainly justified in concluding that as long as the sample was in the custody of the Bureau, it was safely kept. Thus, the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the three elements of demand, acceptance and recovery. 27. Although the learned counsel for the appellant has claimed that the mutation was already made prior to 1.11.1998, therefore no work was pending with the appellant on the date of the trap proceeding. However, according to the explanation (d) appended to Section 7, It is not necessary that at the time of asking for illegal gratification, 'work' should be pending with the person who has sought the gratification. However, according to the explanation (d) appended to Section 7, It is not necessary that at the time of asking for illegal gratification, 'work' should be pending with the person who has sought the gratification. Relevant portion of Section 7 and Explanation (d) read as under: Public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official Act.- Whoever, being, or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any. person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person or for rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person, with the Central Government or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State or with any local authority, corporation or Government company referred to in clause (c) of Section 2, or with any public servant, whether named or otherwise, shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall be not less than six months but which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation: (d) " A motive or reward for doing." A person who receives a gratification as a motive or reward for doing what he does not intend or is not in a position to do, or has not done, comes within this expression. 28. Therefore, according to the Act, it is not necessary that at the time of demand or acceptance or recovery of the legal gratification some "work" should be pending with the person. Therefore, the said contention is legally untenable. 29. In the case of Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with presumption in general. It observed as under: Presumptions are devices by use of which the Courts are enabled and entitled to pronounce on an issue notwithstanding that there is no evidence or insufficient evidence. Under the Indian Evidence Act all presumptions must come under one or the other class of the three classes mentioned in the Act, namely, (1) "may presume" (rebuttable), (2) "shall presume" (rebuttable) and (3) "conclusive presumptions" (irrebuttable). Under the Indian Evidence Act all presumptions must come under one or the other class of the three classes mentioned in the Act, namely, (1) "may presume" (rebuttable), (2) "shall presume" (rebuttable) and (3) "conclusive presumptions" (irrebuttable). The term 'presumption' is used to designate an inference, affirmative or disaffirmative of the existence a fact, conveniently called the "presumed fact" drawn by a judicial Tribunal, by a process of probable reasoning from some matter of fact, either judicially noticed or admitted or established by legal evidence to the satisfaction of the Tribunal. Presumption literally means "taking as true without examination or proof". Section 4 of the Evidence Act inter alia defines the words 'may presume' and 'shall-presume as follows: "(4.) 'may presume' - Whenever it is provided by this Act that the Court may presume a fact, it may either regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved or may call for proof of it. 'shall presume' - Whenever it is directed by this Act that the Court shall presume a fact, it shall regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved." In the former case the Court has an option to raise the presumption or not, but in the latter case, the Court must necessarily raise the presumption. If in a case the Court has an option to raise the presumption and raises the presumption, the distinction between the two categories of presumptions ceases and the fact is presumed, unless and until it is disproved. 30. The presumptions falling under the former category are compendiously known as "factual presumptions" or "discretionary presumptions"; those falling under the latter, as "legal presumptions" or "compulsory presumptions". 30. The presumptions falling under the former category are compendiously known as "factual presumptions" or "discretionary presumptions"; those falling under the latter, as "legal presumptions" or "compulsory presumptions". Section 20 of the Act is under: Presumption where public servant accepts gratification other than legal remuneration.-(1) Where, in any trial of an offence punishable under Section 7 or Section 11 or clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 it is proved that an accused person has accepted or obtained or has agreed to accept or attempted to obtain for himself, or for any other person, any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing from any person, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he accepted or obtained or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain that gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in Section 7 or, as the case may be, without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be Inadequate. i. [Not relevant.] (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) and (2), the Court may decline to draw the presumption referred to in either of the said sub-sections, if the gratification or thing aforesaid is, in its opinion, so trivial that no inference of corruption may fairly be drawn. 31. The interpretation of this provision is no longer revs integra. It has been discussed and debated and expounded upon in large number of cases. Thus, the presumption under Section 20 of the Act can be invoked when an accused is charged with offence under Section 7 of the Act. 32. In the case of M. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P., (2001) 1 SCC 691 , the Apex Court observed that, "When the expression 'shall be presumed' is employed in Section 20(1) of the Act it must have the same import of compulsion." It further observed as under. When the sub-section deals with legal presumption it is to be understood as in terrorem i.e. in tone of a command that it has to be presumed that the accused accepted the gratification as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act etc., if the condition envisaged in the former part of the section is satisfied. The only condition for drawing such a legal presumption under Section 20 is that during trial it should be proved that the accused has accepted or agreed to accept any gratification. The section does not say that the said condition should be satisfied through direct evidence. Its only requirement is that it must be proved that the accused has accepted or agreed to accept gratification. Direct evidence is one of the modes through which a fact can be proved. But that is not the only mode envisaged in the Evidence Act. The word "proof" need be understood in the sense in which it is defined in the Evidence Act because proof depends upon the admissibility of evidence. A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or consider its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. This is the definition given for the word proved in the Evidence Act. What is required is production of such materials on which the Court can reasonably act to reach the supposition that a fact exists. Proof of the fact depends upon the degree of probability of its having existed. The standard required for reaching the supposition is that of a prudent man acting in any important matter concerning him. 33. In the case of Dhanvantrai Bahvatttrai Desai (supra), it was observed that in order to raise the presumption under Section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 is similar to Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988) what the prosecution has to prove is that the accused person has received 'gratification other than legal remuneration' and when it is shown that he has received a certain sum of money which was not a legal remuneration, then, the condition prescribed by this section is satisfied and the presumption there under must be raised in V.D. Jhingan v. State of U.P., AIR 1966 SC 1762 , it was observed that mere receipt of money is sufficient to raise the presumption under Section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. In C.I. Etnden v. State of LI.P., AIR 1960 SC 548 , and V.D. Jhingan (supra) it was observed that if any money is received and no convincing, credible and acceptable explanation is offered by the accused as to how it came to be received by him, the presumption tinder Section 4 of the old Act is available. When the receipt is admitted it is for the accused to prove as to how the presumption is not available as perforce the presumption arises and becomes operative. Lastly, in the case of Dhanvantrai Bahvantrai Desai (supra) the Apex Court clearly held as under: The burden resting on the accused person in such a case would not be as light as it is where a presumption is raised under Section 114 of the Evidence Act and cannot be held to be discharged merely by reason of the fact that the explanation offered by the accused is reasonable and probable. It must further be shown that the explanation is a true one. The words 'unless the contrary is proved' which occur in this provision make it clear that the presumption has to be rebutted by 'proof' and not by a bare explanation which is merely plausible. A fact is said to be proved when its existence is directly established or when upon the material before it the Court finds its existence to be so probable that a reasonable man would act on the supposition that it exists. Unless, therefore, the explanation is supported by proof, the presumption created by the provision cannot be said to be rebutted. (Emphasis added) 34. The ratio of Dhanzvantrai Balzvantrai Desai (Supra) has been reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of P.N. Krishna Lal v. Govt. of Kerala, AIR 1995 Supp (2) SCC 187 , and T. Shankar Prasad v. State of A.P., (2004) 3 SCC 753 . 35. The section uses the words, "shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved". Thus, the section creates a presumption of law and not of fact. Secondly, it is a compulsory presumption which the Court is legally bound to invoke after "the prosecution proves that an accused person has accepted or obtained or has agreed to accept or attempted to obtain for himself, or for any other person, any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing from any person". Secondly, it is a compulsory presumption which the Court is legally bound to invoke after "the prosecution proves that an accused person has accepted or obtained or has agreed to accept or attempted to obtain for himself, or for any other person, any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing from any person". Thirdly, the prosecution can prove the fact that illegal gratification has been accepted either through direct or circumstantial evidence. Fourthly, the presumption is not an inviolable one, but is a rebuttable one, Fifthly, the presumption is rebutted not by merely offering an explanation, but most importantly by proving it. 36. Since it is a presumption of law and not of the fact, Section 20 shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the accused to rebut the presumption. Although the burden of proof is not as heavy as on the prosecution, although the accused can discharge his burden of probablising his defence, but nonetheless a mere denial is not sufficient for rebutting the presumption. In fact, the accused is required to "prove" his defence by submitting cogent evidence in order to probablise his defence. However, in the present case, the appellant has merely denied that he has ever demanded or accepted any illegal gratification from the complainant. He has further claimed in his statement recorded under Section 313 Criminal Procedure Code that a stranger had walked into his office, had shaken his hand and had placed Rs. 200/- in the front pocket of his shirt which was hanging on a peg on the wall. But he has failed to explain under what circumstances a stranger had walked in, why a stranger had shaken his hand, and why did the stranger, out of blue, placed Rs. 200/- into the pocket of the shirt hanging on the wall, and who that stranger was Although it is true that Chain Sing (DW-1) also claims that at the relevant time the appellant's shirt was hanging on the wall, but it is very unlikely that a Patwari, while discharging his official duty, would take off his shirt, that, too, in November when winter had started setting in, and would hang his shirt on the wall. Therefore, the learned judge is certainly justified in concluding that the appellant has failed to "prove" his defence. Thus, he had failed to forcefully rebut the presumption drawn under Section 20 of the Act. Therefore, the learned judge is certainly justified in concluding that the appellant has failed to "prove" his defence. Thus, he had failed to forcefully rebut the presumption drawn under Section 20 of the Act. 37. The learned counsel has relied on the case of V. Venkata Subbarao (supra) in order to buttress his contention that a presumption under Section 20 of the Act cannot be raised if the element of demand has not been proven by the prosecution. Moreover, the burden of proof on the accused is not as harsh as it is on the prosecution. As far as these two principles are concerned, no issues can be raised against them, as these are the settled principles of law. However, the case is distinguishable from the present case as in the present case the prosecution has succeeded in proving the three elements of demand, acceptance and recovery, as discussed above. Therefore, the case of V. Venkata Subbarao (supra) does not come to the aid of the appellant. 38. Similarly, the principle stated in the case of Dn yaneshzvar Laxnian Rao Wankhede (supra), is an accepted position of law that the burden of proof upon the accused while trying to rebut the presumption under Section 20 is not as heavy as it is on the prosecution. However, as pointed out in the decision of Dhanzvantrai Balzvantrai Desai (supra) the explanation offered by the accused needs to be supported by proof. Unless the proof of the explanation is given, the presumption created by Section 20 of the Act cannot be said to be rebutted. Similarly, the principle stated in the case of C.M. Girish Babn (supra) cannot be questioned with regard to the burden of proof on the accused. However, the principle Laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dhanzvantrai Balzvantrai Desai (supra) cannot be overlooked either. 39. Similarly, the learned counsel has relied on the case of Pion jabrao (supra) in order to buttress his contention that if the explanation offered by the accused under Section 313 Criminal Procedure Code is found to be reasonable, then it cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that he did not offer the said explanation at the time when the amount was seized. However, in the present case, the explanation offered by the appellant in his statement recorded under Section 313 Criminal Procedure Code has not been found to be reasonable for the reasons stated above. Therefore, the case of Punjabrao (supra) does not rush to the rescue of the appellant. 40. Lastly, the learned counsel has relied on the case of Ramesh Thete (supra) in order to buttress his contention that if the explanation furnished by the accused is substantiated to probablize his defence, it discharges the burden of accused. However, as discussed above, the appellant has failed to substantiate his defence. Therefore, he has failed to rebut the. presumption under Section 20 of the Act. Hence, the case of Ramesh Thete (supra) does not help the appellant. 41. Lastly, a bare perusal of the impugned judgment clearly reveals that the learned Judge has threadbare discussed the evidence produced by the prosecution and the defence, has minutely analyzed the evidence in order to convict the appellant. Therefore, this Court does not find any illegality or perversity in the impugned judgment.For the reasons stated above, this appeal is devoid of any merit; it is, hereby, dismissed. Since the appellant is out on bail, his bail bonds stand cancelled. He is directed to surrender before the learned trial Court, forthwith, and to serve the remaining part of his sentence.Appeal dismissed. *******