ORDER Heard Mr. Nitya Nand, learned Advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Jay Prakash Sharma, learned Assistant Counsel to G.P.-XI for the State. 2. The present writ application has been filed challenging the order dated 5.11.2002 passed by the Chief Engineer, Water Resource Development Department, Deoghar, whereby he had rejected the petitioner’s claim for second time bound promotion with effect from 1.4.1993. 3. From the pleadings of the writ petition, it appears that the petitioner joined his service as Fuse Man in Water Resources Department pursuant to his appointment to the post in the office of the Executive Engineer, Mechanical Division Koshi Project, Birpur in the year 1965. He was promoted to the post of Electrician Grade-2 on 1.121973. It has been asserted in the writ petition that after more than 12 years of his service on the post of Electrician, he was granted first time bound promotion with effect from 1.4.1981 vide an order dated 6.1.1994. His grievance is that after completion of 12 years from the effective date of first time bound promotion he became entitled for second time bound promotion with effect from 1.4.1993. The time bound promotion was however, not given to him and in spite of repeated representations he was made to retire after attaining the age of his superannuation on 31.12.1999. 4. It has further been alleged that as he was not paid his all retiral benefits which he was entitled to even after retirement, he had to approach this Court by filing CWJC No. 6754 of 2001 for a direction to the respondents to pay all the retiral dues and also to grant second time bound promotion with further consequential reliefs. The said writ petition was disposed of by an order dated 18.5.2001 in terms of general direction of this Court issued in the case of Most. Rukmini Devi Vs. the State of Bihar reported in 1996(2) PLJR 348. By virtue of the said order the petitioner was required to file his claim in detail before the Authority concerned, which was required to be dealt with by the respondents in accordance with the general direction given in the case of Most. Rukmini Devi (supra). In the opening sentence of the order of this Court itself, it has been mentioned that the general direction of this Court with respect to the claim relating to post retiral dues. Rukmini Devi (supra). In the opening sentence of the order of this Court itself, it has been mentioned that the general direction of this Court with respect to the claim relating to post retiral dues. Pursuant to the said order dated 18.5.2001 of this Court the petitioner represented before the concerned respondents. The grievance of the petitioner is that though the retiral dues was paid to the petitioner, his claim for second time bound promotion was refused vide order dated 5.11.2002 which is under challenge in the present writ application. Further plea of the petitioner is that similarly circumstanced Ajejur Rahman has been granted the benefit of second time bound promotion in the year 2002 itself. It has further been asserted that on 11.6.2003 petitioner had submitted an application before the Commissioner-cum-Secretary, Water Resources Departmenta, Patna stating all the facts to support his claim for second time bound promotion but the same has not been considered so far. 5. I don’t intend to go into the merits of the claim of the petitioner at this stage as in my view, the writ petition cannot be entertained and deserves to be dismissed on the ground of unexplained delay of several years in approaching this Court. It has been repeatedly held by this Court as well as the Supreme Court that in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court cannot entertain belated claims unless the petitioner offers tangible explanation. 6. The Supreme Court in case of S.S. Balu Vs. State of Kerala and others reported in (2009) 2 SCC 479 categorically held that delay defeats equity and where a petitioner approaches the Court after a long delay, relief prayed for may be denied on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of fact that he is similarly situated to other candidates who obtained benefit of a judgment. 7. Reference may be made to paragraph 17 of the judgment which is quoted hereinbelow for quick reference:– “17. It is also well-settled principle of law that “delay defeats equity”. The Government Order was issued on 15.1.2002. The appellants did not file any writ application questioning the legality and validity thereof. Only after the writ petitions filed by others were allowed and the State of Kerala preferred an appeal there against, they impleaded themselves as party-respondents. It is also well-settled principle of law that “delay defeats equity”. The Government Order was issued on 15.1.2002. The appellants did not file any writ application questioning the legality and validity thereof. Only after the writ petitions filed by others were allowed and the State of Kerala preferred an appeal there against, they impleaded themselves as party-respondents. It is now a trite law that where the writ petition approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment. It is, thus, not possible for us to issue any direction to the State of Kerala or the Commission to appoint the appellants at this stage. In NDMC Vs. Pan Singh 9 this Court held: (SCC p.283, para 16) “16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the Court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction:” (See alo Virender Chaudhary Vs. Bharat Petroleum Corpn. 10 at SCC P.302, para 17.)” 8. In case of Naresh Kumar Vs. Department of Atomic Energy also reported in (2010) 7 SCC 525 , dismissal of the writ petition on the ground of unexplained delay and laches was upheld as the rejection of the appellant’s representation was challenged eight years after the date of rejection. 9. Similar view has been taken in case of State of Jharkhand Vs. K.N. Farms & Industries (P) Ltd. Reported in (2012) 5 SCC 297 as well as Delhi Administration Vs. 9. Similar view has been taken in case of State of Jharkhand Vs. K.N. Farms & Industries (P) Ltd. Reported in (2012) 5 SCC 297 as well as Delhi Administration Vs. Kaushalya Thakur reported in (2012) 5 SCC 412 where there was delay of four years in approaching the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India from the rejection of an application for allotment of plot. 10. In view of the above, this writ petition is dismissed on the ground that belated claim of the petitioner can not be entertained at this stage in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.