Judgment HARISH TANDON, J. All these writ petitions are taken up together as the point as to whether the writ petitions should be dismissed on the ground of gross delay and latches is involved therein. 2. For convenience sake, the facts of one of the writ petitions is elaborately and in details, are narrated herein-below for arriving at the decision on the point as indicated above. 3. The reasons which occasioned the delay are identical and verbatim reproduction in all the writ petitions. The facts of writ petition in W.P. 24754 (W) of 2010 are narrated herein-below. 4. The petitioner has challenged the pensionary payment order being Memo No. 3831/P dated February 16, 2002 issued by the office of the Director of Pension Provident Fund and Group Insurance deducting a sum of Rs.70,362/- as overdrawal, in this writ petition. 5. The petitioner lastly worked as a head teacher in Bisharband Primary School, District Paschim Medinipore and was superannuated on and from June 30, 1994. During the tenure of the service, the petitioner was granted an increment in scale of pay by the authorities which was recorded in the service book. Despite being superannuated on June 30, 1994, the impugned pensionary payment order was issued on February 16, 2002. A demand of justice was made by the petitioner on September 17, 2010 which being unattended have constrained the petitioner to file the instant writ petition before this court. 6. Although, the respondents were permitted to file the affidavit-in-opposition, but no affidavit-in-opposition is filed and the learned Advocate appearing for the respondent proceeded to argue the matter on the averments made in the writ petition as according to him even on the basis of the facts stated in the writ petition, the petitioner is not entitle to the relief claimed therein. 7. A point arose in the midst of the argument whether the delay in latches in approaching the Court would defeat the claim of the petitioner. 8. Mr. Sourav Mitra, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner submits that delay in approaching the Court cannot be fatal if no third party interest is effected thereby and placed reliance upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Union of India and Ors. Vs. Tarsem Singh reported in (2008) 8 SCC 648 . 8. Mr. Sourav Mitra, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner submits that delay in approaching the Court cannot be fatal if no third party interest is effected thereby and placed reliance upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Union of India and Ors. Vs. Tarsem Singh reported in (2008) 8 SCC 648 . He further submits that if the action of the authorities infringes the fundamental right, the writ petition should not be dismissed on the ground of delay and placed reliance upon a division bench judgment of this High Court in case of Smt. Padma Rani Thakur vs. The Secretary, Departmetn of Home & Ors. reported in 2007 (1) CLJ (Cal) 21. In support of the contention that the authorities are bound to pay the interest on the delayed payment of retrial benefits, he placed reliance upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in case of S.K. Dua vs. State of Haryaana and anr. reported in (2008) 3 SCC 44 . 9. Lastly, he submits that there is a sufficient explanation offered in the petition for such delay and as such the writ petition should not be dismissed on such score alone and placed reliance upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. vs. Ghanshyam Dass & ors. (2) and Ors. reported in (2011) 4 SCC 374 , Leelawanti & ors. vs. State of Haryana & Ors. reported in (2012) 1 SCC 66 and in case of State of Madhya Pradesh & anr. Vs. Bhailal Bhai & ors. reported in AIR 1964 SC 1006 and in case of U.P. Jal Nigam & anr vs. Jaswant Singh and anr. reported in (2006) 11 SCC 464 . 10. Mr. Susobhan Sengupta, the learned Advocate appearing for the respondent authorities refutes the contention of the petitioner by submitting that the writ petition does not contain the sufficient explanation for such delay and, therefore, is liable to be dismissed. He further submits that none of the judgment cited by the petitioner speaks of the non-dismissal of the writ petition even if there is a delay and latches apparent on the face of the record and, therefore, those cannot help the petitioner but rather goes against him. He further submits that none of the judgment cited by the petitioner speaks of the non-dismissal of the writ petition even if there is a delay and latches apparent on the face of the record and, therefore, those cannot help the petitioner but rather goes against him. Lastly, he submits that between the period from the issuance of the pensionary payment order and the demand justice, there is a delay of approximate 8 years which is unexplained in the writ petition. 11. Having considered the respective submissions of the parties, the facts enumerated hereinabove are admitted. The petitioner was superannuated on and from June 30, 1994 whereas the pensionary payment order was issued on February 16, 2002. Between the four corners of the writ petition, my endeavour has failed to find out any explanation offered therein which occasioned the delay in moving the writ petition before this court. The only explanation which could be deciphered from Paragraph 16 of the writ petition is that the delay in filing the writ petition cannot be a ground for rejection of the claim because of the deprivation of the enjoyment of the usufruct of the money for its delayed payment which is quoted as below: “16. That under the pension scheme, the petitioner become entitled to pension on and from the date after superannuation but in the instant case there had been a delay towards the disbursement of such pensionary benefits in as much as through the petitioner was retired on 30.06.1994, the pensionary benefits was actually sanctioned by issuance pension payment Order on 16.02.2002 and for the said delay perpetrated by the respondents, the petitioner is entitle to penal interest. That the delay in filing the writ application cannot be ground for rejection of the claim of the petitioner because the persons who has wronged or deprived of legitimate use of money by way of nonpayment or deduction from the terminal benefits within time. As due to delay caused by the petitioners in invoking writ jurisdiction, the respondents, particularly the authorities under the Scheme are not being prejudiced, thus the delay, even there be any, is not at all fatal. Under the scheme even under modified scheme no provision has been laid down for seeking interest on retrial benefits at the instance of beneficiaries. As due to delay caused by the petitioners in invoking writ jurisdiction, the respondents, particularly the authorities under the Scheme are not being prejudiced, thus the delay, even there be any, is not at all fatal. Under the scheme even under modified scheme no provision has been laid down for seeking interest on retrial benefits at the instance of beneficiaries. By not paying the deducted amount with interest to which the retiring employee was legally and legitimately entitled to the deducted amount with interest amount as a matter of fact remained with the Government and it is the Government which has used this amount of interest and is continuing to do so. Any money not belonging to the government cannot legally be kept in its custody and utilized by it. It cannot be said that the said money is lying stagnant. The benefit of such utilization of money by the Government must therefore go to the writ petitioners since it is the money belonging to the writ petitioners. Your petitioner craves leave to refer or to produce the judgment of the Supreme Court and the recent order of the Hon’ble High Court in this subject matter at the time of hearing if necessary.” 12. In the backdrop of the above factual matrix, let me pondered the core issue as indicated above. Five judges bench of the Apex Court in case of Bhailal Bhai (supra), laid down that generally the unreasonable delay in approaching the Court would ordinarily disentitle the petitioner to get the relief by way of mandamus. The Supreme Court again addressed the said issue in case of Jalanigam (supra) and observed : “9. Similarly in Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana this Court reaffirmed the rule if a person chose to sit over the matter and then woke up after the decision of the court, then such person cannot stand to benefit. In that case it was observed as follows: (SCC p. 542) “The delay disentitles a party to discretionary relief under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. The appellants kept sleeping over their rights for long and woke up when they had the impetus from Virpal Singh Chauhan case. The appellants' desperate attempt to redo the seniority is not amenable to judicial review at this belated stage.” 10. The appellants kept sleeping over their rights for long and woke up when they had the impetus from Virpal Singh Chauhan case. The appellants' desperate attempt to redo the seniority is not amenable to judicial review at this belated stage.” 10. In Union of India v. C.K. Dharagupta it was observed as follows: (SCC p. 398, para 9) “9. We, however, clarify that in view of our finding that the judgment of the Tribunal in R.P. Joshi gives relief only to Joshi, the benefit of the said judgment of the Tribunal cannot be extended to any other person. The respondent C.K. Dharagupta (since retired) is seeking benefit of Joshi case. In view of our finding that the benefit of the judgment of the Tribunal dated 17-3-1987 could only be given to Joshi and nobody else, even Dharagupta is not entitled to any relief.” 11. In Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy their Lordships considered delay as serious factor and have not granted relief. Therein it was observed as follows: (SCC pp. 359-60, para 34) “34. The respondents furthermore are not even entitled to any relief on the ground of gross delay and laches on their part in filing the writ petition. The first two writ petitions were filed in the year 1976 wherein the respondents herein approached the High Court in 1992. In between 1976 and 1992 not only two writ petitions had been decided, but one way or the other, even the matter had been considered by this Court in Debdas Kumar. The plea of delay, which Mr. Krishnamani states, should be a ground for denying the relief to the other persons similarly situated would operate against the respondents. Furthermore, the other employees not being before this Court although they are ventilating their grievances before appropriate courts of law, no order should be passed which would prejudice their cause. In such a situation, we are not prepared to make any observation only for the purpose of grant of some relief to the respondents to which they are not legally entitled to so as to deprive others therefrom who may be found to be entitled thereto by a court of law.” 13. In view of the statement of law as summarised above, the respondents are guilty since the respondents have acquiesced in accepting the retirement and did not challenge the same in time. In view of the statement of law as summarised above, the respondents are guilty since the respondents have acquiesced in accepting the retirement and did not challenge the same in time. If they would have been vigilant enough, they could have filed writ petitions as others did in the matter. Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or whiled it away and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such cases, the court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be taken into consideration the question of acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent whether other parties are going to be prejudiced if the relief is granted. In the present case, if the respondents would have challenged their retirement being violative of the provisions of the Act, perhaps the Nigam could have taken appropriate steps to raise funds so as to meet the liability but by not asserting their rights the respondents have allowed time to pass and after a lapse of couple of years, they have filed writ petitions claiming the benefit for two years. That will definitely require the Nigam to raise funds which is going to have serious financial repercussions on the financial management of the Nigam. Why should the court come to the rescue of such persons when they themselves are guilty of waiver and acquiescence?” 13. It has been held in case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (supra) that delay disentitles the party to the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution who slept over their rights for the long. However, in Leelawanti & ors. (supra) the Supreme Court while reiterating the principles that the delay would defeat the just claim in absence of any explanation, further held that if the delay is more than the period of limitation prescribed in the civil action for the remedy, it would be termed as unreasonable in the following words: “13. We have considered the respective submissions and examined the records. We have considered the respective submissions and examined the records. In our view, the High Court did not commit any error by not entertaining the appellants’ challenge to the acquisition of land because they did not offer any explanation for the long time gap of more than three decades between the issue of notifications under Sections 4 and 6 i.e. 1976 and filing of the writ petition i.e. 2007. 14. In State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai a Constitution Bench of this Court held that even though no period of limitation has been prescribed for filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court can non-suit the petitioner who is guilty of laches. The Constitution Bench also observed that if the delay is more than the period prescribed for filing a suit then the same would ordinarily be treated as unreasonable and the High Court will be fully justified in denying relief to the petitioner unless cogent explanation is offered for the delay. 15. These propositions are borne out from the following extracts of the judgment: (Bhailal Bhai case, AIR pp. 1011-12, paras 17 & 21) “17. … It has been made clear more than once that the power to give relief under Article 226 is a discretionary power. This is specially true in the case of power to issue writs in the nature of mandamus. Among the several matters which the High Court rightly takes into consideration in the exercise of that discretion is the delay made by the aggrieved party in seeking this special remedy and what excuse there is for it. Another is the nature of controversy of facts and law that may have to be decided as regards the availability of consequential relief. Thus, where, as in these cases, a person comes to the Court for relief under Article 226 on the allegation that he has been assessed to tax under a void legislation and having paid it under a mistake is entitled to get it back, the court, if it finds that the assessment was void, being made under a void provision of law, and the payment was made by mistake, is still not bound to exercise its discretion directing repayment. Whether repayment should be ordered in the exercise of this discretion will depend in each case on its own facts and circumstances. Whether repayment should be ordered in the exercise of this discretion will depend in each case on its own facts and circumstances. It is not easy nor is it desirable to lay down any rule for universal application. It may however be stated as a general rule that if there has been unreasonable delay the court ought not ordinarily to lend its aid to a party by this extraordinary remedy of mandamus. * * * 21. … Learned counsel is right in his submission that the provisions of the Limitation Act do not as such apply to the granting of relief under Article 226. It appears to us however that the maximum period fixed by the legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured. This Court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy but where the delay is more than this period, it will almost always be proper for the court to hold that it is unreasonable. The period of limitation prescribed for recovery of money paid by mistake under the Limitation Act is three years from the date when the mistake is known. If the mistake was known in these cases on or shortly after 17-1-1956 the delay in making these applications should be considered unreasonable.” (emphasis supplied) 16. The doctrine of laches has been invoked in Bhagat Singh v. State of U.P., Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh, Haryana State Handloom & Handicrafts Corpn. v. Jain School Society and Govt. of A.P. v. Syed Akbar for negating challenge to the acquisition of land.” 14. Therefore, as a general rule, in absence of any explanation, the Court would deny the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground of delay and latches. There is an exception to the general rule. One of the exception is the case relating to the infringement of fundamental right guaranteed under the constitution. 15. To overcome the above legal principle, the petitioner took shelter under the principle of continuing wrongs. There is an exception to the general rule. One of the exception is the case relating to the infringement of fundamental right guaranteed under the constitution. 15. To overcome the above legal principle, the petitioner took shelter under the principle of continuing wrongs. It is contended that the illegal and unreasonable withholding of a legitimate claim in the garb of overdrawal and nonpayment of an interest on the belated payment of the retrial benefit, is a continuing wrong and, therefore, the writ petition is saved under Section 22 of the Limitation Act. A continuing wrong is noting but a single wrongful act of a doer causing continuous injury giving rise to a distinct and separate cause of action. The Supreme Court in case of Tarsem Singh (supra) restricted the claim of the interest for a period of 3 years before the institution of the writ petition so far as the relief relates to the arrear but deny the claim of an interest. In the given case, the point in issue relates to the payment of arrears for a period of 16 years. It is held that the cause of action relating to pension continues from month to month and, therefore, the relief should be restricted to the reasonable period of 3 years. However, in the facts and circumstances of the said case, the relief against the payment of interest was denied. It is no doubt true that the pension is not a bounty but is a deferred payment of a salary. In the instant case, the petitioner not only accepted the payment under the impugned pensionary payment order but have further acquiesced in appropriating the same by his conduct in not raising an alarm against the wrongful deduction of a sum as overdrawal. The demand justice sees the light of the day only on September 17, 2010 and there is no explanation offered for such enormous delay either in the said demand justice or in the writ petition itself. Delay and latches is one of the cannon which is well-founded on the sound legal principles. 16. Before I conclude it would be apt to deal the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court which is heavily relied upon by the petitioner. Delay and latches is one of the cannon which is well-founded on the sound legal principles. 16. Before I conclude it would be apt to deal the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court which is heavily relied upon by the petitioner. In case of Smt. Padma Rani Thakur (supra), the Division Bench was foisted with the issue of awarding the compensation for custodial death because of the torture being inflicted by the police officials. Although, a ground of delay in approaching the Court was taken therein but in Paragraph 13 thereof, the Division Bench held that there was no delay in presenting the writ petition. Even otherwise, the Division Bench has not laid down that the delay is not a ground to deny the relief in absence of any proper explanation. 17. In view of the discussion made above, I do not find any merit in all these writ petitions. 18. The all writ petitions are, therefore, dismissed. 19. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Urgent Photostat certified copy of the judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties on priority basis.