JUDGMENT Hon’ble S.U. Khan, J.—At the time of arguments on 13.3.2012, no one appeared on behalf of respondent even though the case was taken up in the revised list. Accordingly only arguments of learned counsel for the appellant were heard. 2. This is defendant’s First Appeal From Order preferred from order dated 20.10.2004 passed by Additional District Judge, Court No. 1, Agra in Civil Appeal No. 132 of 2003 which had been preferred by the plaintiff-respondent against decree dated 29.7.2002 passed in O.S. No. 503 of 1995. Through the impugned order matter has been remanded to the trial Court. Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Agra through decree dated 29.7.2002 had rejected the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. 3. The plaint was filed on 16.8.1995 with the allegation that defendant had executed an agreement for sale of his agricultural land in favour of the plaintiff on 17.10.1988 for Rs. 60,000/-, after receiving Rs. 50,000/- as earnest money and that the sale-deed was to be executed within a period of two years from the date of execution of agreement for sale dated 17.10.1988 after taking requisite permission from the Ceiling Department and receiving the balance sale consideration of Rs. 10,000/-. It was further pleaded that plaintiff- defendant with the consent of plaintiff extended the period of execution of sale-deed till 14.9.1992, through the agreement 14.9.1990. Thereafter it was stated in paragraph 4 onward that plaintiff several times requested the defendant to execute the sale-deed and plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement for sale dated 17.10.1988 but the defendant continuously avoided the matter on one pretext or other and that defendant seemed to be in no need at all to execute the sale-deed and he dishonestly wanted to sell the property to some other person. Thereafter in para 7 of the plaint it was stated that notice was also given by the plaintiff to the defendant to come to the office of the Sub-Registrar to execute the sale-deed on 14.9.1992, however on that date defendant did not come. Thereafter another notice was sent on 19.4.1994. The main relief originally claimed in the plaint is as follows : That the Hon’ble Court be pleased to pass a decree for declaration declaring that the plaintiff is entitled to specifically enforce the agreement to sell in accordance with the terms and conditions dated 17.10.1988 from the defendant. Thereafter another notice was sent on 19.4.1994. The main relief originally claimed in the plaint is as follows : That the Hon’ble Court be pleased to pass a decree for declaration declaring that the plaintiff is entitled to specifically enforce the agreement to sell in accordance with the terms and conditions dated 17.10.1988 from the defendant. Court fees was paid on the declaratory relief. 4. No prayer for specific performance of the agreement for sale dated 17.10.1988 had been made in the original plaint. Prayer No. 3 in the original plaint was general prayer to the effect that such other and further relief which the Hon’ble Court deemed fit and proper be also granted in favour of the plaintiff. 5. Before the trial Court plaintiff got the plaint amended twice, once through application dated 1.11.1996 and second time through application dated 19.3.2002. In the 1996 amendment prayer for specific performance of the agreement for sale was added and through the second amendment alternative prayer for refund of earnest money as well as for partition were added. 6. The trial Court, while rejecting the plaint placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority in Tarlok Singh v. B.K. Sabarwal, JT 1996(4) 245 and AIR 1997 SC 272 , for holding that the suit for specific performance would be deemed to have been filed on the date on which relief for specific performance was added through the amendment in the plaint. The trial Court in its order dated 29.7.2002 held that the suit was barred by time. 7. The Lower Appellate Court in the last paragraph of its judgment before the operative portion observed as fallows. I have considered all the above mentioned cases and considered over the matter because the amendment of the plaint was allowed without any condition, and it relates back to the date of the suit. It is not the case that the suit is barred by any other law hence the rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d) was improper. As far as the question of limitation is concerned it can be decided only after the evidence of parties, hence the appeal deserves to be allowed. Thereafter appeal was allowed and matter was remanded to the trial Court. 8. As far as the question of limitation is concerned it can be decided only after the evidence of parties, hence the appeal deserves to be allowed. Thereafter appeal was allowed and matter was remanded to the trial Court. 8. Apart from the above two mentioned authorities one more authority was cited before the Lower Appellate Court which is in Muni Lal v. The Oriental Fire & General Insurance Company Ltd. and another, AIR 1996 SC 642 . 9. I do not agree with the view of the Lower Appellate Court. The suit for specific performance is deemed to have been filed on the date on which prayer for the said relief is added in the plaint and not on the date on which original plaint is filed if in the original plaint, no relief for specific performance is asked for. There is no question of the amendment relating back to the date of the filing of original plaint. In para 8 of the original plaint it was categorically mentioned that after giving notice to the defendant, plaintiff remained in the office of the Sub Registrar, Agra on 14.9.1992 but the defendant did not come. That date will be taken as the date on which plaintiff got notice that defendant had refused to execute the sale-deed. Prayer for specific performance could therefore be made only till 14.9.1995. 10. Supreme Court in Van Vibhag K.G.N.S.S. Maryadit v. Ramesh Chander, AIR 2011 SC 41 , has held that if in the original plaint the prayer made is for declaration and injunction then the plaint cannot be permitted to be amended after expiry of three years from the date of accrual of cause of action for incorporating the prayer for specific performance of an agreement for sale as it would be barred by limitation under Article 54 of Limitation Act. The original prayer of declaration was meaningless and could not be granted. Accordingly, the impugned remand order cannot be sustained. F.A.F.O. is therefore allowed and impugned remand order is set aside. ——————