Judgment This Writ Petition is filed for issue of a writ of certiorari to quash proceedings No.PRS/AGM/HYD/2002/48, dated 31-7-2002 of respondent No.1. The facts leading to the filing of this Writ Petition are briefly summarized as under: The petitioner, at the relevant time, was working as a Clerk in the Syndicate Bank, Bahadurpura branch, Hyderabad (for short “the Management”). Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him for the alleged misconduct leading to his suspension on 16-4-1998. Charge sheet dated 3-8-1998 was issued by respondent No.1 where under the following charges were framed against the petitioner: (i) That you were working as a Clerk at our Bahadurpura Branch, Hyderabad from 7-10-1992 before you were placed under suspension by the then Disciplinary Authority on 13-4-1998 vide Memorandum No.701/254(7)/IRS, dated 13-4-1998. While working in your said position, you caused opening of an S.B. account No.9419 in the name of “Sri Shiva Sai Kumar” on 23-5-1997 and transferred sums aggregating to Rs.2,64,000/-from the said S.B. a/c.9419 to your S.B. account 5550 and caused withdrawal of amounts aggregating to Rs.3.20 lakhs from the S.B. account 9419 on 27-3-1998 and 28-3-1998. (ii) That you availed a vehicle loan of Rs.30,000/-from Bahadurpura branch on 27-1-1998 for purchasing a second hand motor cycle from one Sri P. Shailendranath. The basis of the charges was mentioned in great detail in the charge sheet. In the context of the present case, it is not necessary to refer to the same. Feeling aggrieved by the order of suspension, the petitioner filed W.P.No.29662/1998. A learned single Judge of this Court dismissed the same by order dated 27-10-1998. W.A.No.2089/1998 filed by the petitioner against the said order was also dismissed by the Division Bench on 11-12-1998 with a direction to complete the enquiry within four months and pass a final order after affording reasonable opportunity to the petitioner. By the time of disposal of the said Writ appeal, the Management examined four witnesses before the Enquiry Officer. After disposal of the Writ Appeal, the Management examined its 5th and 6th witnesses on 7-1-1999 and concluded the evidence on its side. The Enquiry Officer posted the enquiry to 5-2-1999 while sending certain copies of the enquiry proceedings dated 5-1-1999, 6-1-1999 and 7-1-1999 to the petitioner’s last known address. As the petitioner did not attend the enquiry on 5-2-1999, the proceedings were adjourned to 10-2-1999. The Enquiry Officer posted the enquiry to 5-2-1999 while sending certain copies of the enquiry proceedings dated 5-1-1999, 6-1-1999 and 7-1-1999 to the petitioner’s last known address. As the petitioner did not attend the enquiry on 5-2-1999, the proceedings were adjourned to 10-2-1999. Though the petitioner has received the communication of adjournment of the enquiry on 6-2-1999, he did not attend the enquiry proceedings on 10-2-1999 also. The Enquiry Officer has closed the enquiry and submitted his report, based on which respondent No.1 has passed order dated 8-4-1998 dismissing the petitioner from service. The petitioner has filed C.C.No.163/99 alleging violation of the order in W.A.No.2089/1998. He has also filed W.P.No.18162/1999 questioning the order dismissing him from service. The said Writ Petition was allowed by this Court by order dated 12-11-1999 where under the order of dismissal was set-aside and the respondents were directed to give an opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses and to put forth his rebuttal evidence and complete the enquiry within three months from the date of the order. The Special Leave Petition i.e., S.L.P.(Civil) No.3175-3176/2000 filed by the Management against the said order was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 19-3-2001 with the direction to complete the enquiry within three months. Following the Judgments of this Court and of the Supreme Court, the enquiry proceedings were resumed. The petitioner has again refused to attend the enquiry on the ground that his request for permitting him to visit Bahadurpura and Housing Finance branches to inspect the documents, was not accepted. Some correspondence ensued between the parties wherein the petitioner insisted that he should not only be permitted to inspect the whole record but also be permitted to be represented by his co-employee. The Enquiry Officer rejected the said request vide his letter dated 4-5-2001 by stating that as per the order of this Court, the Enquiry Officer has to furnish a copy of the preliminary investigation report and copies of statements of the witnesses already examined, within 15 days to enable the petitioner to cross-examine them and that therefore the petitioner cannot make further requests relating to the aspects in respect of which no direction was given by this Court in its order dated 12-11-1999. Feeling aggrieved by the rejection of his request for permitting him to inspect the documents, the petitioner has filed W.P.No.9279/2001. Feeling aggrieved by the rejection of his request for permitting him to inspect the documents, the petitioner has filed W.P.No.9279/2001. This Court, while ordering notice before admission, granted stay of all further proceedings on 12-6-2001. The petitioner addressed letter dated 19-6-2001 to respondent No.1 to abandon the proceedings as the time stipulated by the Supreme Court in its order dated 19-3-2001 has lapsed. W.P.No.9279/2001 was dismissed by this Court on 9-4-2002. On 4-6-2002, the Enquiry Officer concluded the enquiry as the petitioner has not participated therein inspite of repeated opportunities given to him and submitted his report dated 12-6-2002 to respondent No.1 holding both the charges as proved. Thereafter, the petitioner filed W.A.No.892/2002 against order dated 9-4-2002 in W.P.No.9279/2001. A Division Bench of this Court dismissed the said Writ Appeal along with another Writ Appeal filed by another employee with the observation that if the Enquiry Officer has committed any procedural impropriety or caused violation of the principles of natural justice, the appellants therein shall be free to question the final order if it goes against them by initiating substantive proceedings in which they can raise all the pleas which they have raised in the Writ Appeals. Afterwards, respondent No.1 issued notice to the petitioner on 20-6-2002 enclosing a copy of the Enquiry Officer’s report. Instead of filing his explanation to the same, the petitioner has once again reiterated his request for supply of documents. Respondent No.1 has issued a second notice to the petitioner on 17-7-2002 fixing 24-7-2002 as the date of personal hearing. The petitioner appeared before respondent No.1 and took time till 3 p.m. for presenting his written submissions. Accordingly, the petitioner submitted his written submissions apart from making oral submissions. By order dated 31-7-2002, respondent No.1 has imposed the penalty of dismissal from service on the petitioner. This order is questioned in this Writ Petition. I have heard Sri J. Sudhir, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri A. Krishnam Raju, learned counsel representing the respondents-Management, at length. I have also perused the record. By order dated 31-7-2002, respondent No.1 has imposed the penalty of dismissal from service on the petitioner. This order is questioned in this Writ Petition. I have heard Sri J. Sudhir, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri A. Krishnam Raju, learned counsel representing the respondents-Management, at length. I have also perused the record. The learned counsel for the petitioner advanced the following submissions: (i) The impugned order passed after expiry of the time stipulated by the Supreme Court by its order dated 19-3-2001 in S.L.P.(Civil) No.3175-3176/2000 is not enforceable in law; (ii) that the petitioner was denied permission to peruse the documents/records disabling him from filing his defence and thereby the enquiry proceedings got vitiated by procedural illegality and irregularity; (iii) that the Management failed to examine the crucial material witnesses, and placing reliance on their statements recorded during the preliminary enquiry behind the back of the petitioner is in violation of the principles of natural justice; and (iv) that the petitioner was denied the defence assistance by his co-employee, which is in violation of the principles of natural justice. The learned counsel for the respondents-Management opposed the above submissions and contended that both the Enquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority have scrupulously followed the procedure prescribed and observed the principles of natural justice. He further submitted that from the inception, the petitioner was finding ways and means to evade the enquiry on one pretext or the other and that the grievances raised by him are completely illusory. The learned counsel further submitted that non-completion of the enquiry within the time stipulated by the Supreme Court was only due to the non-cooperation of the petitioner and that the enquiry proceedings and the punishment imposed on the petitioner will not be rendered invalid or unenforceable only on account of exceeding of the time limit stipulated by the Supreme Court in completing the enquiry. I have carefully considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and I would like to deal with each of these submissions hereunder: Re Submission No.(i):In support of his contention that the whole enquiry got vitiated on account of non-adherence to the time stipulated by the Supreme Court, the learned counsel placed reliance on the Judgment of the Allahabad High Court in P.N. Srivastava Vs. State of U.P. (1999 LBESR-1-742 (Lucknow Bench). State of U.P. (1999 LBESR-1-742 (Lucknow Bench). The facts in the said case are that the petitioner therein was dismissed from service by order dated 6-10-1996. The said order was set-aside by the High Court on 27-8-1996 with the direction to complete the enquiry afresh within a period of four months from the date of submission of the certified copy and to pay the petitioner his regular salary along with arrears. The Judgment of the Court was served by the petitioner on the management on 5-9-1996 and the latter reinstated the former into service, but posted him to a lower Post. The petitioner requested the management to modify the said order on the ground that the same was against the spirit of the High Court’s order. As the management did not revise its order, the petitioner filed a Contempt Case. After receipt of notice from the Court in the Contempt Case, the management has issued a revised order on 7-2-1997 and in pursuance thereof, the petitioner has joined at Agra on 13-2-1997 and he was also paid his salary for 35 months. The petitioner was thereafter transferred to Lucknow. When the enquiry was continued further, the petitioner protested the same as the four months’ period stipulated by the High Court had expired. He also issued a notice to the management specifically indicating that if it proceeds with the enquiry without obtaining extension of time from the High Court, the same would amount to committing contempt of the Court. However, the Enquiry Officer, without holding regular enquiry, submitted his report on 19-4-1997, on the basis of which a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner by the management proposing imposition of major penalty on the former. Thereupon, the petitioner filed another Contempt Case. During the pendency of the Contempt Case, the management passed order reverting the petitioner from the Post of Up-Nagar Adhikari to Sahayak Adhikari without the approval of the Public Service Commission as required under the extant Rules. Questioning the said order, the petitioner filed a Writ Petition before the High Court. The High Court, purporting to consider the Judgments of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. Vs. Sri Krishna Pande ( 1996(9) SCC 395 ), A.I.R. Karmachari Sangh Vs. A.I.R. Limited (1998 Supp. SCC 472) and M.L. Sachdev Vs. Questioning the said order, the petitioner filed a Writ Petition before the High Court. The High Court, purporting to consider the Judgments of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. Vs. Sri Krishna Pande ( 1996(9) SCC 395 ), A.I.R. Karmachari Sangh Vs. A.I.R. Limited (1998 Supp. SCC 472) and M.L. Sachdev Vs. Union of India ( 1991(1) SCC 605 ) opined that before proceeding with the enquiry further after expiry of the time stipulated by the Court, the management ought to have applied for extension of time. The Court also took exception to the conduct of the management that when the Contempt Case filed complaining of continuance of the enquiry after expiry of the time stipulated by it was pending, the management has hurriedly passed the impugned order. The High Court also found that the order imposing penalty on the petitioner suffers from legal infirmity as the management failed to obtain approval of the proposed punishment from the Public Service Commission as required under Section 37 of the U.P. Palika (Centralised Service) Rules, 1966. On account of the cumulative reasons referred to above, the High Court has set-aside the order of reversion of the petitioner therein. On a careful consideration of the Judgment of the Allahabad High Court referred to above, I am of the opinion that the same did not lay down a legal principle that wherever time limit is stipulated by the Courts for completing the enquiry and passing of a final order, the order passed after the expiry of such time limit will automatically get vitiated. Indeed, the facts in the present case are substantially at variance with that in the case decided by the Allahabad High Court. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the Enquiry Officer after resuming the enquiry following the dismissal of W.P.No.18162/1999, issued notice to the petitioner for commencement of the enquiry by fixing 7-5-2001 as the date of hearing. The petitioner did not attend the enquiry on the said date. Instead, he filed W.P.No.9279/2001 during the summer vacation in May 2001. As observed in the order dated 9-4-2002 passed by the learned single Judge while dismissing the said Writ Petition, having moved the vacation Court, the learned counsel for the petitioner has not chosen to be present in the Court leading to adjournment of the case to 12-6-2001, on which date interim stay was granted. As observed in the order dated 9-4-2002 passed by the learned single Judge while dismissing the said Writ Petition, having moved the vacation Court, the learned counsel for the petitioner has not chosen to be present in the Court leading to adjournment of the case to 12-6-2001, on which date interim stay was granted. It is only thereafter that the petitioner has raised the plea for the first time on 19-6-2001 to abandon the enquiry proceedings as the time stipulated by the Supreme Court has lapsed. When the enquiry was fixed on 7-5-2001, there were nearly six weeks left for completion of the enquiry as stipulated by the Supreme Court. It is significant to note that by the time this Court has granted interim stay on 12-6-2001 in W.P.No.9279/2001, six days were left for expiry of the time stipulated by the Supreme Court for completion of the enquiry. The same situation continued when the said Writ Petition was dismissed on 9-4-2002. The petitioner did not make any endeavour to bring the said fact to the notice of the learned Judge when the same was heard on 9-4-2002. Instead of attending the enquiry fixed on 7-5-2012, the petitioner made a request vide his letter dated 13-5-2002 to permit him to visit Bahadurpura and Housing Finance branches to peruse the records without specifying the documents which he wanted to peruse. When the Enquiry Officer declined the said request vide his letter dated 28-5-2002 and requested the petitioner to attend the enquiry on 3-6-2002, the latter did not attend the enquiry and stuck to his stand taken by him in his earlier letter. Therefore, the Enquiry Officer has adjourned the enquiry to 4-6-2002 and sent telegraphic communication dated 3-6-2002, besides serving a letter on the petitioner through a messenger. Having received the said letter and notice, the petitioner did not attend the enquiry on 4-6-2002 and instead he sent a telegram stating that he has returned from Chennai only on 3-6-2002 and therefore he is unable to attend the enquiry. Had the petitioner co-operated with the Enquiry Officer by participating in the enquiry, it would have been possible for the former to complete the enquiry and submit his report within the time stipulated by the Supreme Court. Instead of doing so, the petitioner ventured into a fresh litigation by filing W.P.No.9279/2001. Had the petitioner co-operated with the Enquiry Officer by participating in the enquiry, it would have been possible for the former to complete the enquiry and submit his report within the time stipulated by the Supreme Court. Instead of doing so, the petitioner ventured into a fresh litigation by filing W.P.No.9279/2001. As noted above, having filed the Writ Petition in summer vacation 2001, he did not evince interest in pursuing the same, leading to its adjournment to 12-6-2001. These undisputed facts would clearly demonstrate that the petitioner was just waiting for the expiry of three months’ period for raising the bogey that in view of the expiry of the time stipulated by the Supreme Court for completion of the enquiry, the same shall not be proceeded with. In my opinion, this conduct of the petitioner utterly lacks bonafides and if this plea is accepted, it amounts to placing premium on his dilatory tactics to somehow pass the time prescribed by the Supreme Court for completion of the enquiry with the sole aim of creating a ground for avoiding the same and the consequential disciplinary action. No direct legal authority is placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner before this Court laying down a legal proposition that the disciplinary proceedings automatically get terminated if the same are not completed within the time stipulated by the Court. Unless a statutory provision prescribes limitation for completion of disciplinary proceedings, the same would not come to a grinding halt only on the ground of their non-completion within the time stipulated by the Courts. It is indeed true when the Court stipulates a time limit for completion of the enquiry proceedings, it is the bounden duty of the Management which is unable to adhere to the same, to seek extension of time. While non-adherence by the Management to the time limit stipulated by the Court may expose the former to contempt proceedings and it may be liable for punishment under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, if it is proved that such non-adherence was due to the deliberate acts of the delinquent, the disciplinary proceedings would not get vitiated only on account of crossing of the time limit fixed by the Court in completing the enquiry. The Management can always justify its exceeding the time limit on the strength of the reasons which disabled it from completing the proceedings within the stipulated time. The Management can always justify its exceeding the time limit on the strength of the reasons which disabled it from completing the proceedings within the stipulated time. In other words, while the liability of the Management under the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 for exceeding the time limit stipulated by the Court for completion of the enquiry is one thing, its entitlement to continue such proceedings against the delinquent even beyond the time limit prescribed by the Court and passing of appropriate order therein, is yet another thing. Unless the Court makes it clear in its order that failure to complete the enquiry proceedings within the stipulated time would result in termination of the disciplinary proceedings, the Management is entitled to continue the proceedings against the delinquent, subject however, to its liability to be proceeded against for committing contempt of the Court by not completing the enquiry within the time stipulated. In the light of the facts of this case as discussed above, I am of the considered opinion that by reason of the Management exceeding the time limit stipulated by the Supreme Court in the present case, the disciplinary proceedings have not automatically got terminated and the petitioner is not absolved of the charges framed against him. This contention of the learned counsel is accordingly rejected. Re Submission No.(ii): The undisputed facts are that till 27-3-2001, the petitioner has not requested for his inspection of the record. He has neither made such a request prior to the filing of C.C.No.163/99 and W.P.No.18162/1999 nor raised any plea in either of the said cases regarding his right to peruse the record. While allowing W.P.No.18162/1999, the Division Bench of this Court gave a two-fold direction to the Enquiry Officer, namely, to furnish a copy of the preliminary investigation report and copies of statements of the witnesses already examined on behalf of the Management and permit the petitioner to cross-examine them, which should be over in one sitting in a day and if not the next day. The Division Bench has specifically directed that no further proceedings should be held for the said purpose. It has further directed that the petitioner shall be given an opportunity of adducing rebuttal evidence and the entire exercise shall be completed within a period of three months. The petitioner never raised a whisper before the Division Bench regarding his right to look into the record. It has further directed that the petitioner shall be given an opportunity of adducing rebuttal evidence and the entire exercise shall be completed within a period of three months. The petitioner never raised a whisper before the Division Bench regarding his right to look into the record. Having regard to the specific directions issued by the Division Bench, the Enquiry Officer has scrupulously adhered to the same by supplying the preliminary investigation report and the statements of the Management’s witnesses. If the petitioner felt that he needed any documents, it was his duty to specify the same. Instead of mentioning the documents which he needed to peruse, he made an omnibus request to permit him to go through the entire records of the two branches of the Bank referred to above. Such a right, in my opinion, is not available to any delinquent. On the contrary, even when the Enquiry Officer has asked him to specify the documents which he required, either to cross-examine the Management’s witnesses or prepare for his defence, the petitioner failed to point-out the same. As observed by the learned Judge in the order dated 9-4-2002 in W.P.No.9279/2001, the petitioner was entitled only to supply of relevant documents required by him and that he has no right to insist that he should be permitted to peruse each and every document irrespective of whether it is relevant or not. I am therefore fully in agreement with the above noted opinion expressed by the learned Judge that the petitioner has adopted dilatory tactics for prolonging the enquiry by taking the shelter under the plea that he was not permitted to peruse the documents. Therefore, this submission of the learned counsel is without any merit and the same is accordingly rejected. Re Submission No.(iii):This submission can be referred only to be rejected. A perusal of the enquiry report reveals that the Management has examined six witnesses. The petitioner failed to avail the opportunity of cross-examining them. While the basis for the submission of the petitioner appears to be the letters of Y. Satish Kumar and I.K. Sarma, addressed to the Disciplinary Authority, which were exhibited in the enquiry proceedings, it is not his pleaded case that the Enquiry Officer referred to and relied upon those letters. Despite being given repeated opportunities to the petitioner, he failed to cross-examine the witnesses examined by the Management. Despite being given repeated opportunities to the petitioner, he failed to cross-examine the witnesses examined by the Management. Even in the absence of the Management examining the said two persons who gave the above mentioned two letters, the Enquiry Officer, on the basis of the material available on record, has found the petitioner guilty of the charges. It is trite that sufficiency or otherwise of the evidence does not constitute a ground for judicial review. In fact, the learned counsel for the petitioner has not even ventured to submit that without examining the said Y. Satish Kumar and I.K. Sarma, the evidence let-in by the Management is either insufficient or incomplete to hold the petitioner guilty of the charges framed against him. This submission of the learned counsel is accordingly rejected. Re Submission No.(iv):Clause 19(12) of the Bipartite Settlement provides that a delinquent employees can be defended by a representative of a registered Trade Union of Bank employees of which he is a member on the date first notified for the commencement of the enquiry, or where the employee is not a member of any Trade Union of Bank employees on the aforesaid date, by a representative of a Trade Union of employees of the Bank in which he is employed, or at the request of the said Union by a representative of the State Federation or All India Organisation to which such Union is affiliated, or with the Bank’s permission, by a Lawyer. The petitioner has not disputed that the co-employee whom he proposed to defend him does not satisfy the requirement of the above mentioned clause of the Bipartite Settlement. However, the petitioner has alleged discrimination by raising the plea that in case of Smt. Y. Syamala, her co-employee was permitted to defend her even though the latter was not an office bearer of the recognized Trade Union of the Bank employees. It is the pleaded case of the Management that in case of Smt. Y. Syamala, she has engaged one of the office bearers of her Union as her defence representative and that later on he disassociated himself from the enquiry and that on the request of the said Smt. Y. Syamala, she was permitted to engage another employee who was working in the same branch and who was also a member of the Union in which Smt. Y. Syamala was a member. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed heavy reliance on the Judgment of this Court in K. Mohan Rao Vs. Assistant General Manager and Disciplinary Authority (1996(4) ALT 602)wherein an identical clause in the Bipartite Settlement was read down by a learned single Judge of this Court by construing the same as not only permitting the representatives of the Trade Union but also any co-employee chosen by the charged employee as his representative of the Union for the limited purpose of defending the employee in terms of clause 521(10)(a) of the Sastri Award r/w. Clause 18.28 of the Desai Award. Per contra, Sri A. Krishnam Raju, learned counsel appearing for the Management relied upon the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Vs. Maharashtra General Kamgar Union and others ( 1999(1) SCC 626 = AIR 1999 S.C. 401 ). In Kalindi Vs. Tata Locomotive and Engineering Company Limited ( AIR 1960 S.C. 914 ), a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court distinguished between a Departmental enquiry and a Court proceeding and held that when the general practice adopted by the domestic tribunals is that the person accused conducts his own case, the argument that natural justice demands that in the case of enquiries into a charge sheet of misconduct against a workman, he should be represented by a member of his Union, cannot be accepted. While summarizing the discussion on the aspect, the Supreme Court held as under: “Our conclusion therefore is that a workman against whom an enquiry is being held by the management has no right to be represented at such enquiry by a representative of his Union; though of course an employer in his discretion can and may allow his employee to allow himself of such assistance.” While referring to the said Judgment and the subsequent Judgments in Dunlop Rubber Co. Vs. Workmen ( AIR 1965 S.C. 1392 )and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltd. Vs. Ram Naresh Tripathi (1993) 2 SCC 115 ), the Supreme Court in Bharat Petroleum Corporation (6-supra) held at paras 27 and 28 as under: “The basic principle is that an employee has no right to representation in the departmental proceedings by another person or a lawyer unless the Service Rules specifically provide for the same. The right to representation is available only to the extent specifically provided for in the Rules. The right to representation is available only to the extent specifically provided for in the Rules. For example, Rule 1712 of the Railway Establishment Code provides as under: “The accused railway servant may present his case with the assistance of any other railway servant employed on the same railway (including a railway servant on leave preparatory to retirement) on which he is working”. The right to representation, therefore, has been made available in a restricted way to a delinquent employee. He has a choice to be represented by another railway employee, but the choice is restricted to the Railway on which he himself is working, that is, if he is an employee of the Western Railway, his choice would be restricted to the employees working on the Western Railway. The choice cannot be allowed to travel to other Railways.” Having regard to the well settled principle of law that the right to be represented through a lawyer or a co-employee in the Departmental proceedings is not an inherent right of a delinquent unless the same is conferred by a statute or under an agreement, the Judgment of this Court in K. Mohan Rao (5-supra) which has gone to the extent of reading down the Bipartite Settlement in order to concede an absolute right in the delinquent to be represented by an authorized representative of the trade union or by a co-employee, does not reflect the correct position in law. Therefore, I have no option except to hold that the said Judgment is per incurium. In the present case, as the co-employee proposed by the petitioner to represent him in the enquiry proceedings does not fulfill the criteria prescribed by the Bipartite Settlement, the Management has rightly rejected his request and therefore the latter cannot be said to have violated the principles of natural justice. The learned counsel has not advanced any other submission in general, or touching the findings of the Enquiry Officer or the Disciplinary Authority with regard to the guilt of the petitioner or on the quantum of penalty imposed on him. For the above mentioned reasons, I do not find any merit in the Writ Petition and the same is accordingly dismissed.