Judgment :- Babu Mathew P. Joseph, J. 1. This Original Petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution challenging Ext.P16 order dated 13.7.2012 passed by the Family Court, Malappuram on I.A.No.31 of 2012 in O.P.No.1074 of 2009. The petitioner/mother and the respondent/father were the respondent and the petitioner respectively in I.A. No.31 of 2012. Allowing the application filed by the respondent, the permanent custody of the child was given to him. The petitioner was allowed visitation right over the child at the house of the respondent once in a month i.e., on second Saturdays from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. Aggrieved by the order so passed by the learned Judge of the Family Court, the petitioner has preferred this Original Petition. 2. Heard Shri. K.M. Sathyanatha Menon, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Smt. V.P. Seemanthini, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent. 3. The facts necessary for the disposal of this O.P. are briefly stated as follows: The petitioner and the respondent got married on 10.8.2003. A child, Juma Kadin, was born to them on 25.11.2004. While so, the petitioner filed O.P. No. 278 of 2009 before the Family Court, Malappuram for dissolving her marriage with the respondent. That O.P. was allowed on 28.8.2009. The respondent has filed an appeal in this Court challenging that order. Subsequently, the respondent filed O.P.No.1074 of 2009 before the Family Court, Malapuram. Thereafter, Ext.P1 settlement between the parties has been arrived at by which the custody of the child was given to the petitioner. The respondent was entitled to custody of the child from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. on every Sunday as per this settlement. Accordingly, O.P.No.1074 of 2009 has been disposed of by the court below in terms of the settlement as per Ext.P2 order dated 30.12.2009. During the pendency of the appeal filed by the respondent before this Court against the order granting divorce, the respondent divorced the petitioner on 30.1.2010 and Ext.P3 agreement has been entered into between the parties on that day. As per Ext.P3, the respondent has given Rs.15,00,000/-to the petitioner towards reasonable and fair provision and Rs.15,000/-for the period of iddath and he has also agreed to pay Rs. 5000/-per mensem towards expenses for maintenance and education of the child. It was also specifically noted in Ext.P3 that from 2007 onwards the respondent has paid Rs. 1,10,000/-towards maintenance of the petitioner and the child. 5000/-per mensem towards expenses for maintenance and education of the child. It was also specifically noted in Ext.P3 that from 2007 onwards the respondent has paid Rs. 1,10,000/-towards maintenance of the petitioner and the child. Specific provisions for the custody of the child by the petitioner and the respondent have also been incorporated in Ext.P3 agreement. Since the respondent has divorced the petitioner, it was also agreed to withdraw the appeal preferred by the respondent against the order granting divorce passed by the Family Court. 4. The petitioner has remarried one Mr. Razeen Abdu Rasaq, who is also a divorcee with a son, on 13.5.2010. While the matters were going so, disputes arose between the petitioner and the respondent in respect of the custody of their child. The parties approached the court below also for orders regarding the custody of the child. Against an order passed by the Family Court in respect of the custody of the child, the respondent has filed O.P.(FC) No.4327 of 2011 before this Court. 5. The respondent filed I.A.No.31 of 2012 in O.P.No.1074 of 2009 under Sections 7, 12 and 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act before the court below praying for full and permanent custody of the child raising various contentions. Ext.P10 is a copy of that I.A. The petitioner has contested that I.A. disputing and denying the averments of the respondent by filing her objections. Ext.P11 is a copy of her objections. The court below examined the respondent as PW1 and the petitioner as RW1. Exts.A1 to A10 were marked on the side of the respondent and Exts.B1 to B4 were marked on the side of the petitioner. After considering various contentions raised by both the sides, the court below has passed the impugned order. 6. Learned Judge of the Family Court entered the following findings in the impugned order: The petitioner has clearly admitted before the court that the child had lost one year for the reason that he was not admitted to L.K.G. by her. This itself shows the absence of interest on her part in the studies of the minor child. The respondent is a graduate in science and he holds a Diploma in Computer Software Engineering. His father is also a graduate. Whereas the petitioner has studied only upto matriculation and her parents are educated only upto 8th and 10th standards. This itself shows the absence of interest on her part in the studies of the minor child. The respondent is a graduate in science and he holds a Diploma in Computer Software Engineering. His father is also a graduate. Whereas the petitioner has studied only upto matriculation and her parents are educated only upto 8th and 10th standards. Therefore, it is quite evident that the respondent and his family will be able to teach the minor child. The petitioner herself admitted that the respondent hails from an aristocratic rich family. They have 25 acres of rubber estate and other undertakings. She also admitted that she was not having any source of income or job. She is fully depending upon her father and husband for her livelihood. From the evidence, it is apparent that the members of the respondent's family are financially much higher than the members of the petitioner's family. The evidence shows that there was absence of attention on the part of the petitioner to the child who is aged only about 8 years. The life of the child in the house of the petitioner had caused much pressure and strain to him. It was seen that the respondent has taken more care and interest in the welfare of the minor child than the petitioner. 7. It is the petitioner's case that she is residing in her paternal home and looking after the child. But the oral as well as the documentary evidence in this case show that she has been residing permanently with her husband at Vilathoor. She has also admitted this fact during cross-examination. It is the respondent's case that while the petitioner is living with her husband, the minor child is let alone with her sick parents. The parents of the petitioner have been undergoing treatment for chronic ailments. According to him, the parents of the petitioner are not at all healthy to look after the child. It has come out from the evidence of the petitioner that her parents are diabetic and the father had undergone surgery on his knee. Therefore, their physical condition is not good and hence they cannot give better care and attention to the child. 8. The minor child was brought to the court below and it had an occasion to talk with him. He appeared to be quite intelligent. Therefore, their physical condition is not good and hence they cannot give better care and attention to the child. 8. The minor child was brought to the court below and it had an occasion to talk with him. He appeared to be quite intelligent. While seeking his opinion, the child has stated to the learned Judge of the Family Court that he did not want to go to the house of his mother, but would like to continue with his father. The refusal of the minor child to go to the house of the petitioner shows that he was not treated properly in her house. The evidence of the respondent clearly shows that the child was not getting sufficient attention and care from the petitioner. The petitioner has remarried and she is living with her husband. She wanted the custody of the child only for three years. The respondent has not remarried so far. The respondent is the natural guardian of the child and he could give more care and attention to the child than the petitioner. The petitioner is not entitled to permanent custody of the child. She is entitled to visitation right over him. Accordingly, allowing the petition, the permanent custody of the child was given to the respondent. The petitioner was granted visitation right over the child at the house of the respondent once in every month i.e., on second Saturdays from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. 9. Learned counsel on both the sides have advanced detailed arguments before us. We have been taken through the evidence. We have also carefully gone through the impugned order. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that I.A.No.31 of 2012 flied by the respondent in O.P.No.1074 of 2009 was not maintainable as O.P.No.1074 of 2009 was finally disposed of by the Family Court in terms of Ext.P1 settlement by passing Ext. P2 order. Since Ext.P2 is an order finally disposing of O.P.No.1074 of 2009, the respondent cannot file an interlocutory application in that O.P. for the purpose of getting custody of the child. A fresh Original Petition alone will lie before the Family Court for that purpose. Therefore, on that ground alone, the impugned order is liable to be set aside, learned counsel submitted. The petitioner has not raised or agitated such a contention before the court below. A fresh Original Petition alone will lie before the Family Court for that purpose. Therefore, on that ground alone, the impugned order is liable to be set aside, learned counsel submitted. The petitioner has not raised or agitated such a contention before the court below. She has fully taken part in the proceedings in that interlocutory application and invited a decision on the matter by the court below. Thus, she has subjected herself to the jurisdiction of the court below in this matter. Moreover, a Division Bench of this Court in the judgment rendered in O.P.(FC) No.4327 of 2011 between the parties in respect of the custody of the child has directed the Family Court, Malappuram, to take up I.A.No.31 of 2012 and pass orders on the same with full opportunity of being heard to the parties as early as possible. 11. The Supreme Court in Rosy Jacob v. Jacob (AIR 1973 SC 2090) held as follows: "........All orders relating to the custody of the minor wards from their very nature must be considered to be temporary orders made in the existing circumstances. With the changed conditions and circumstances, including the passage of time, the Court is entitled to vary such orders if such variation is considered to be in the interest of the welfare of the wards. It is unnecessary to refer to some of the decided cases relating to estoppel based on consent decrees, cited at the bar. Orders relating to custody of wards even when based on consent are liable to be varied by the Court, if the welfare of the wards demands variation." The Supreme Court in Nil Ratan Kundu v. Abhijit Kundu [(2008) 9 SCC 413], dealing with the principles governing the custody of minor children, held as follows: "........A court while dealing with custody cases, is neither bound by statutes nor by strict rules of evidence or procedure nor by precedents. In selecting proper guardian of a minor, the paramount consideration should be the welfare and well-being of the child. In selecting a guardian, the court is exercising parens patriae jurisdiction and is expected nay bound, to give due weight to a child's ordinary comfort, contentment, health, education, intellectual development and favourable surroundings. In selecting proper guardian of a minor, the paramount consideration should be the welfare and well-being of the child. In selecting a guardian, the court is exercising parens patriae jurisdiction and is expected nay bound, to give due weight to a child's ordinary comfort, contentment, health, education, intellectual development and favourable surroundings. But over and above physical comforts, moral and ethical values cannot be ignored....." The Supreme Court in Ashish Ranjan v. Anupma Tandon [(2010) 14 SCC 274] held as follows: ".......Mutual settlement reached between the parties cannot come in the way of the well established principles in respect of the custody of the child and, therefore, a subsequent application for custody of a minor cannot be thrown out at the threshold being not maintainable. It is a recurring cause because the right of visitation given to the applicant under the agreement is being consistently and continuously flouted. Thus, doctrine of res judicata is not applicable in matters of child custody." 12. An order passed by the Family Court relating to the custody of a minor shall be treated to be a temporary order made on the basis of circumstances existing then. When conditions and circumstances are changed, the Family Court is entitled to vary the orders already passed in respect of the custody of the minor if such variation is necessary in the interest of the welfare of the minor. In other words, the cause of action for approaching the Family Court for the custody of a minor is recurring in nature. Moreover, in the matter of selecting a guardian for the minor, the Family Court is exercising parens patriae jurisdiction. Therefore, an application filed by the mother or the father in respect of the custody of the minor in a finally disposed of Original Petition is maintainable. In that view of the matter, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that I.A.No.31 of 2012 in O.P.No.1074 of 2009 is not maintainable cannot be accepted. Hence, the contention is rejected. Moreover, the petitioner subjected herself to the jurisdiction of the Family Court and invited an order on the I.A. filed by the respondent. For that reason also, the contention is liable to be rejected. 13. Hence, the contention is rejected. Moreover, the petitioner subjected herself to the jurisdiction of the Family Court and invited an order on the I.A. filed by the respondent. For that reason also, the contention is liable to be rejected. 13. It is stated in the impugned order that the learned Judge of the Family Court has ascertained the opinion of the child when he stated that he did not want to go to the house of his mother, but would like to continue with his father. Learned counsel for the petitioner disputed this statement and submitted that such a thing did not take place. During the course of arguments in this case, we have ascertained from the child whether the learned Judge of the Family Court asked about his wishes with regard to his custody. He answered in the affirmative. Therefore, we find no reason to disbelieve the statement so made by the learned Judge of the Family Court in the impugned order. 14. We have carefully considered the rival contentions raised by the parties in this case. We have noticed the fact that during cross-examination, the petitioner claimed custody of the child only till he attains the age of 10. If she is keen in the welfare of the child why she is not claiming custody of the child till he attains majority. In a case for custody of the child, the paramount consideration shall be the welfare of the child. The court below has considered the matter in the light of the well recognized parameters concerning the welfare of the child. The court below has appreciated the evidence in its right perspective and entered the findings. The jurisdiction we are exercising under Article 227 of the Constitution is supervisory in nature. Unless the petitioner is able to show that the impugned order is perverse or illegal or detrimental to the welfare of the child, this Court will not interfere with the order exercising the visitorial jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. We find no reason to interfere with the impugned order granting permanent custody of the child to the respondent. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the court below has allowed visitation right over the child to the petitioner only once in a month from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. and that too, at the house of the respondent. We find no reason to interfere with the impugned order granting permanent custody of the child to the respondent. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the court below has allowed visitation right over the child to the petitioner only once in a month from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. and that too, at the house of the respondent. The petitioner cannot go to the house of the respondent and remain there from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. for exercising her visitation right over the child as it will be very unpleasant for her. Therefore, he prayed for suitable modification including more opportunity for visiting the child. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent fairly submitted that the respondent has no objection in taking the child to the house of the petitioner and to take him back from there as directed by this Court enabling the petitioner to exercise her visitation right conveniently. The court below has allowed visitation right over the child to the petitioner only once in a month. In the circumstances, we are of the view that it should be enhanced to twice in a month. Now, the child is in the custody of the petitioner. For executing the order granting permanent custody of the child to the respondent, the child has to be produced by the petitioner before the court below as directed in this judgment. In the result, the impugned order passed by the Family Court, Malappuram, granting permanent custody of the child to the father, the respondent, is confirmed with the following modifications: (1) The petitioner shall produce the child before the Family Court, Malappuram, at 11 a.m. on 5.12.2012 and handover him to the respondent. (2) The petitioner will have visitation right over the child on every alternate Friday from 7 p.m. till 5 p.m. on the next coming Sunday. (3) The respondent shall handover the child at 7 p.m. on every alternate Friday to the petitioner at her house and he shall take back the child from the house of the petitioner at 5 p.m. on the next coming Sunday. This O.P.(FC) is dismissed with the above modifications.