Judgment : 1. These three writ petitions have been heard together since the question of law involved therein is common. This common judgment and order shall govern the same. 2. The four petitioners in W.P. 92 of 2012, presented before the Court on February 3, 2012, are police personnel of the West Bengal Police Force. They are also office bearers of the West Bengal Police Association (hereafter the WBPA). It is claimed in the writ petition that much prior to India attaining independence, the Governor-in-Council was pleased to accord official recognition to the Bengal Police Association, since rechristened as WBPA, vide Bengal Government, Political Department Order No.1616 Pl.,dated May 21, 1923. The same was conveyed to the Honorary Secretary of the Bengal Police Association by the Assistant Inspector General of Police, vide memo dated May 25, 1923. 3. W.P. 2301(W) of 2012 has been preferred by Paschim Banga Non-Gazetted Police Karmachari Samiti (hereafter the Samiti) and its President and General Secretary on February 1, 2012. As the name of the Samiti would suggest, it consists of members who are non-gazetted police personnel of the West Bengal Police Force. The Samiti is a society registered in terms of the provisions of the West Bengal Societies Registration Act, 1961. It had applied for recognition before the Government of West Bengal on or about November 28, 1969 together with an amendment proposed by letter dated January 10, 1970. In response thereto, the Deputy Secretary, Home (Police) Department, Government of West Bengal, vide letter dated February 12, 1970, duly conveyed to the President of the Samiti according of recognition by the Governor of the State of West Bengal to the Samiti on the basis of its constitution furnished to the Government. 4. Kolkata Police Association (hereafter the KPA) and its General Secretary are the petitioners in W.P. 2995(W) of 2012, which was presented before the Court on February 13, 2012. The KPA comprises of several police personnel of Kolkata Police as its members. It is alleged in the writ petition that an application for recognition made by the KPA was approved on or about August 17, 1977 but the petitioners are not in a position to annex any document with regard to its recognition since the respondents have barred their access to the registered office and other offices of the KPA. 5. It is alleged in the writ petition that an application for recognition made by the KPA was approved on or about August 17, 1977 but the petitioners are not in a position to annex any document with regard to its recognition since the respondents have barred their access to the registered office and other offices of the KPA. 5. It is the common claim of the WBPA, the Samiti and the KPA (hereafter the three Associations, wherever referred to collectively) have been involved in multifarious activities including, inter alia, activities to espouse the legitimate grievances of its respective members and to press for redress in a manner known to law, and their existence and involvement in the system for seeking relief for victimized police personnel have been accepted by the Government without demur till January 10, 2012. On that date, the impugned resolution contained in No. 233-PL came to be issued by the Additional Chief Secretary, Home Department, Government of West Bengal. It sought to convey the decision of the Government to substitute the Joint Consultative Committees for Police at different levels, enunciated vide Resolution No. 5543-PL dated July 2, 1979, with Police Welfare Boards for the West Bengal Police and the Kolkata Police. Most importantly, it recorded that recognition accorded in favour of the three Associations was to be treated as withdrawn. 6. It is noticed that the question of setting up a regular machinery for examining the grievances of police personnel and for taking action for redressal had been under consideration of the Government. For such purpose, vide resolution contained in No. 5543-PL dated July 2, 1979 issued by the Home Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, decision of the Government to set up 3-tier Joint Consultative Committeesc at thelevels of the Superintendents of Police and Inspector-General of Police in the West Bengal Police, and Deputy Commissioners of Police and Commissioner of Police in the Calcutta Police, along with a State Committee, was notified. It appears from the composition of the Committees at different levels that representatives of the three Associations of police personnel recognized by the Government were included therein as members. 7. Close on the heels of the impugned resolution dated January 10, 2012, office bearers of the three Associations were called upon to vacate the rooms/accommodation belonging to the Government, which had earlier been made available to them for running its activities. 8. 7. Close on the heels of the impugned resolution dated January 10, 2012, office bearers of the three Associations were called upon to vacate the rooms/accommodation belonging to the Government, which had earlier been made available to them for running its activities. 8. In all the three writ petitions, prayers have been made for quashing the impugned resolution dated January 10, 2012 and for restraining the State respondents to interfere in the functions of the three Associations. Prayer has also been made for direction on the State respondents to make available access to the rooms/accommodation, which had been blocked prior to the Court being approached. 9. All the writ petitions had been listed for ‘admission’ before the Hon’ble Justice Jayanta Kumar Biswas on February 23, 2012. Appearing for the State respondents, learned senior advocate Mr. Bandopadhyay had raised preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petitions before this Court. It was contended that remedy of the petitioners lies in approaching the West Bengal State Administrative Tribunal at the first instance, in view of certain provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. By a detailed judgment dated February 23, 2012 recorded on the writ petition of the Samiti, the preliminary objection was overruled and the writ petition was held to be maintainable. In view of such judgment, the other two writ petitions were also held to be maintainable upon recording separate orders. All the writ petitions were admitted but hearing on interim relief was deferred. 10. Consequent to change in determination, the writ petitions were listed before this Court. While arguments were in progress, the relevant file was produced by Mr. Bandopadhyay. On April 26, 2012, the parties agreed to disposal of the writ petitions without filing of affidavits, but with liberty to the petitioners to inspect the relevant file produced on behalf of the State respondents. The State respondents subsequently provided photocopies of the documents in the file, whereafter the writ petitions have been heard finally. 11. It has been contended by Mr. Bhattacharya, learned senior advocate for the Samiti that the Governmental action impugned in its writ petition is absolutely illegal and arbitrary, thoroughly unreasonable and manifestly highhanded. The State respondents subsequently provided photocopies of the documents in the file, whereafter the writ petitions have been heard finally. 11. It has been contended by Mr. Bhattacharya, learned senior advocate for the Samiti that the Governmental action impugned in its writ petition is absolutely illegal and arbitrary, thoroughly unreasonable and manifestly highhanded. According to him, not only is the impugned resolution bereft of any reason indicating the necessity of withdrawing the recognition enjoyed by the Samiti, the same is in clear breach of the principles of natural justice in that none of the representatives of the Samiti was extended any opportunity of hearing. Reference was made to Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution and it was submitted that the right guaranteed by the Constitution could not have been curbed in the manner the Government proceeded to act. Referring to the file notings, Mr. Bhattacharya submitted that constitution of Police Welfare Boards was under consideration of the Government all through but without any rhyme or reason and suddenly, a note was placed that recognition should be withdrawn. In this connection, it was also urged by him by inviting the Court’s attention to a note dated November 2, 2011 that the decision to replace the Joint Consultative Committees by the Police Welfare Boards is not based on concrete evidence but on individual perception of some officer(s).The decision of the House of Lords reported in [1984] 3 All E R : Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister of the Civil Service was relied on by him for the proposition that even in a case involving national security, an aggrieved person was entitled to invoke judicial review if he showed that a decision of a public authority affected him by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which in the past he had been permitted to enjoy and which he could legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to enjoy either until he was given reasons for its withdrawal and the opportunity to comment on those reasons. According to him, there being no apparent good reason behind the change in policy, the ultimate decision based on the ipse dixit of the concerned officer(s) is unsustainable in law. 12. In this connection while referring to the file notings, Mr. Bhattacharya urged that a close scrutiny thereof would reveal tampering and the Court must take serious note of such act. 13. Mr. 12. In this connection while referring to the file notings, Mr. Bhattacharya urged that a close scrutiny thereof would reveal tampering and the Court must take serious note of such act. 13. Mr. Bhattacharya further argued that recognition to the Samiti was accorded by the Governor of the State but withdrawal of recognition has not been expressed in the name of the Governor. This, it was contended, is an incurable defect in the impugned resolution and in support thereof, he relied on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in (1986) 4 SCC 632 :State of Kerala v. A Lakshmikutty. 14. The Court’s attention was also drawn to Article 33 of the Constitution, the Police Forces (Restriction of Rights) Act, 1966 (hereafter the Act) and the Police Forces (Restriction of Rights) Rules, 1966 (hereafter the Rules) together with its amendments to buttress the contention that though Parliament has by a valid piece of enactment restricted the unbridled freedom enjoyed by the members of the police force in West Bengal prior to introduction of the Act and the Rules, the said provisions have not authorised the Government to act whimsically or capriciously. Mr. Bhattacharya further submitted that even the doctrine of pleasure does not give license to act with unfettered discretion and withdrawal of benefit, on invocation of the ‘at pleasure’ doctrine, cannot be at the sweet will, whim and fancy of the authority, but can only be for valid reasons. The decision reported in (2010) 6 SCC : B. P. Singhal v. Union of India was referred to in this context. Referring to the decision reported in (2004) 4 SCC 714 : State of U.P. v. Johri Mal, he urged that a policy decision does not enjoy absolute immunity from judicial review although the grounds for interference may be limited. The decision reported in AIR 1963 SC 812 : O.K. Ghosh v. E.X. Joseph was referred to support the contention that restriction imposed on the right to form an association ‘in the interest of public order’ has to be reasonable and the connection between the restriction and the public order proximate and direct; a far-fetched or unreal connection would not fall within the purview of such expression. For the proposition that wide and far-reaching power ought not to be exercised purely on subjectivesatisfaction without even consulting the interests concerned when the language of the provision is not plain and unambiguous, attention of the Court was drawn to the decision reported in AIR 1967 SC 1766 : State of Assam v. Bharat Kala Bhandar Ltd. The Constitution Bench decision reported in AIR 1971 SC 1667 : The State of Bihar v. K. K. Misra was relied on to drive home the point that a restriction, to be considered reasonable, must not be arbitrary or excessive and the procedure and manner of imposition of the restriction must also be fair and just. Based on such decisions, the address was ultimately concluded by him by submitting that the impugned resolution is one that deserves to be set aside. 15. Mr. Bose, learned advocate representing the four office bearers of the WBPA also highlighted the point of breach of natural justice canvassed byMr. Bhattacharya. In addition, he invited the Court to peruse the ‘Case for Cabinet Approval’ on Police Welfare Board as contained in Memorandum bearing No.5151-PL/PA-01/2011 dated December 12, 2011 and the corresponding “Decision in Cabinet held on December 30, 2011”. According to him, “the proposal contained in para-1 of the Cabinet Memo” was approved by the cabinet and such paragraph did not relate to withdrawal of recognition accorded in favour of the Police Associations. Such proposal was contained in paragraph 3 of the cabinet memorandum and the cabinet not having approved paragraph 3 of the memorandum, he expressed wonder as to how the Additional Chief Secretary could, on his own, direct withdrawal of recognition. 16. Mr. Bose further urged, on the authority of the decision reported in AIR 1982 SC 33 : Bishamber Dayal Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P., that the State or its executive officers cannot interfere with the rights of its subjects unless they could point to some specific rule of law authorizing the act of interference. In the facts of the present case, the State lacked the legislative authority to withdraw recognition that has been enjoyed by the WBPA for nearly 90 years. 17. Next, the decision reported in AIR 1963 SC 1295 : Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. was referred to by Mr. Bose for the proposition that restrictions imposed by executive or departmental instructions are not laws. 18. 17. Next, the decision reported in AIR 1963 SC 1295 : Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. was referred to by Mr. Bose for the proposition that restrictions imposed by executive or departmental instructions are not laws. 18. Apart from these decisions, Mr. Bose also referred to the decisions reported in AIR 1993 SC 1601 : Food Corporation of India v. M/s. Kamdhenu CattleFeed Industries, AIR 1967 SC 1427 : S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 1016 : P.P. Enterprises v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594 : S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, (2004) 5 SCC 568 : State of Orissa v.Dhaniram Lohar, (2003) 5 SCC 437 : Union of India v. International Trading Co., (2005) 1 SCC 625 : Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, (2006) 4 SCC 517 : State of Tamilnadu v. P.Krishnamurthy, (1985) 1 SCC 641 : Indian Express Newspapers Private Limited v. Union of India, (1990) 3 SCC 223 : Shri Sitaram Sugar Company Limited v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 851 : Mohinder Singh Gill v. Election Commissioner, (2009) 17 SCC 329 : Prakash Singh v. Union of India, (1971) 1 SCC 678 : Damyanti Naranga Hindi Sahitya Sammelan v. Union of India, and O.K. Ghosh (supra), in support of his contentions that every State action must conform to Article 14 of the Constitution, meaning thereby it must be free from non-arbitrariness, satisfy the tests of fairness in action and informed by reasons. Inviting the Court’s attention to the file notings, Mr. Bose iterated that the Governmental action is per se arbitrary and bereft of reasons. 19. Mr. Sanyal, learned advocate for the KPA adopted the submissions advanced on behalf of the other petitioners. 20. Per contra, Mr. Bandopadhyay urged that the writ petitions are not maintainable inasmuch as no judicially enforceable right of the petitioners that is legally protected has been infringed by the impugned Governmental action. According to him, with the advent of the Act and in particular Section 3 thereof, no member of a police force could be a member of or be associated in any way with any union or association of the nature mentioned therein without the express sanction of the Central Government or of the prescribed authority. According to him, with the advent of the Act and in particular Section 3 thereof, no member of a police force could be a member of or be associated in any way with any union or association of the nature mentioned therein without the express sanction of the Central Government or of the prescribed authority. Since the prescribed authority was neither defined in the Act or the rules framed thereunder till such time the Inspector General of Police was recognized as the prescribed authority, sanction was required to be obtained from the Central Government. It is not the claim of any of the three Associations that they obtained the sanction of the Central Government. It is also not their case either that they had obtained sanction of the prescribed authority i.e. the Inspector General of Police or any functionary exercising similar powers. The recognition that was granted in favour of the Bengal Police Association in 1923 did not survive once the Act was introduced. Alternatively, recognition granted to the Bengal Police Association ceased once India attained independence and with creation of the new State of West Bengal, there could not be automatic recognition of the WBPA. Since fresh recognition in favour of the WBPA has not been granted either before the Act came into force or thereafter, the recognition granted in 1923 is of no worth. 21. Reference was then made to Rule 8 of the Rules. It was his contention that members of a police force belonging to the same rank and desiring to form an association are only entitled to make an application for recognition under Section 3(1)(b) of the Act. None of the three Associations which are before the Court comprise of members of the same rank and, therefore, the articles of association of each of them being inconsistent and not in conformity with the Rules, recognition granted in favour of the WBPA and the Samiti, assuming that the same were validly granted, stood revoked on expiry of the period of 30 days from December 19, 1970. 22. 22. Referring to Rule 11 of the Rules, as amended, it was contended that only those cases of recognition where recognition was granted between enforcement of the Act from the appointed day i.e. November 1, 1970 (the day on which the Act was enforced in the State of West Bengal) and amendments in the Rules were effected by the notification dated December 19, 1970 i.e. the day of publication of the same in the gazette, were saved to the extent the articles of association of such recognized association are in conformity with the Rules, and not otherwise. None of the three Associations were granted recognition during the relevant period i.e. between November 1, 1970 and December 19, 1970 and, thus, cannot claim the status of an association recognized in terms of the provisions of the Act. 23. Next, referring to the resolution dated July 2, 1979, Mr. Bandopadhyay contended that the same was not adopted in exercise of either any statutory power or in exercise of power conferred by Article 166 of the Constitution. It was an administrative decision taken by the Government embodying a particular policy and that the impugned resolution is one that substitutes the earlier policy with a new policy. According to him, it is not the requirement of law that before a policy decision is adopted, parties affected thereby are required to be heard or that they should be made parties to the discussion. Hence, the new policy framed without negotiations with the three Associations cannot be rendered non-est and the claim of breach of natural justice is baseless. 24. In regard to the policy decision embodied in the impugned resolution, it was also his submission that the Police Welfare Boards have been formed including members from the grass root level for proper representation of all categories of police personnel. Such policy decision does not attract the vice of unreasonableness and not being arbitrary, and on the contrary having been conceived in the interest of all the police personnel in the State, is beyond the pale of judicial review. 25. Insofar as the claim of the Samiti is concerned, it was contended that after the Act was enacted, the Governor had no power or authority to grant recognition and such recognition for all intents and purposes is a nullity, being contrary to law. 26. 25. Insofar as the claim of the Samiti is concerned, it was contended that after the Act was enacted, the Governor had no power or authority to grant recognition and such recognition for all intents and purposes is a nullity, being contrary to law. 26. The claim of the KPA was sought to be countered by submitting that it has no recognition at all. Attention of the Court was drawn to the fact that the writ petition does not contain any evidence of grant of recognition to the KPA. The averment that due to unavailability of access to the office of the KPA the members thereof could not get hold of the documentary evidence in support of recognition was categorically denied by him. 27. Responding to the contention of the petitioners that the impugned resolution does not contain any reason, Mr. Bandopadhyay specifically argued that the reasons leading to the impugned resolution may be gathered on a meaningful reading of the file notings and if some reason is manifest, the Court ought not to embark on a process of examination as to whether such policy is sound or in public interest or not, since governance is a matter that has been entrusted by the Constitution to the executive and not to the judiciary. 28. Finally, it was contended that unless permission under Section 3 of the Act exists, members of a police force cannot form any association and if any administrative decision has been taken that runs counter to a statute, the same cannot stand since the statute has overriding effect. 29. In support of his submissions, Mr. Bandopadhyay relied on several authorities. The citations and the proposition of law laid down therein are noted below: (1991) 3 SCC 38 : Union of India v. E.G. Nambudiri, (1995) 6 SCC 289 : M.J. Sivani v. State of Karnataka, and (2006) 1 CHN 110 : Registrar General of H.C., Cal v. Chitra Biswas, for the proposition that in the absence of any statutory or administrative requirement to record reason, the order of the administrative authority is not rendered illegal for absence of reason; if any challenge is made to the order, such reasons persuading the authority to pass the order may be placed before the court. (2007) 10 SCC 684 : Indian Airlines Officers’ Association v. Indian Airlines Ltd., where it was held that in policy matters, principles of natural justice cannot be brought in (2002) 2 SCC 333 : BALCO Employees’ Union v. Union of India, for driving home the point that in the matter of dis-investment, workers do not have a right of hearing. (1976) 2 SCC 844 : State of Haryana v. Des Raj Sangar, holding that if a decision to abolish a post is taken in good faith, the Court cannot go behind the wisdom of the decision maker, and abolition of post and consequent termination of service of the incumbent of the post would not attract Article 311. (1991) 3 SCC 263 : Andhra Steel Corporation Ltd. v. APSEB, in support of the contention that a concession given can be withdrawn at any time and without compliance with the principles of natural justice. AIR 2002 SC 322 : M/s. Sharma Transport v Government of Andhra Pradesh, for tracing what arbitrary means i.e. in an unreasonable manner as fixed or done capriciously or at pleasure without adequate determining principle, not founded in the nature of things, non-rational, not done or acting according to reason or judgment, depending on the will alone. (1974) 2 SCC 630 : Saraswati Industrial Syndicate Ltd. v. Union of India, wherein it was laid down that price fixation is more in the nature of a legislative measure and rules of natural justice are not applicable in the case of price fixation. (2000) 10 SCC 664 : Narmada Bachao Andolan v Union of India, to remind the Court that in exercise of its jurisdiction, the Court should not transgress into the field of policy decision. (2007) 14 SCC 517 : Jagdish Mondal v State of Orissa, to contend that judicial review of administrative action is intended to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and mala fides, and its purpose is to check whether choice or decision is made lawfully and not to check whether choice or decision is sound. (2007) 4 SCC 54 : Ashok Kumar Sonkar v Union of India, for the point that court does not insist on compliance with useless formality and would not issue any direction where the result would be the same. (2007) 4 SCC 54 : Ashok Kumar Sonkar v Union of India, for the point that court does not insist on compliance with useless formality and would not issue any direction where the result would be the same. (2004) 4 SCC 281 : Escorts Farms Ltd. v. Commissioner, Kumaon Division, laying down the principle that natural justice is followed for doing substantial justice and not for completing a mere ritual of hearing withoutpossibility of any change in the decision. 76 CWN 61 : R.N. Chandra v Damodar Valley Corporation, to highlight that court has no scope of interference in respect of consequences arising out of a bona fide administrative decision. (2007) 8 SCC 212 : Chief Commercial Manager, South Central Railway v G. Ratnam, holding that administrative instructions which have no statutory force do not give rise to any legal right in favour of the aggrieved party and cannot be enforced in a court of law against the administration. (2004) 1 SCC 592 : Suresh Chandra Singh v Fertilizer Corpn. of India Ltd., for laying emphasis that court cannot issue a writ to enforce an administrative instruction not having the force of law. AIR 1967 SC 1753 : G.J. Fernandez v The State of Mysore & ors., for the principle that non observance of non-statutory administrative instruction does not confer any right on any member of the public and no writ againstGovernment can be asked for by a petition under Article 226. (2011) 7 SCC 397 : Union of India v Arulmozhi Iniarasu re-stating elementary principles that a writ of mandamus can be issued by the High Court only when there exists a legal right in the writ petitioner and corresponding legal obligation on the State, and only because an illegality has been committed, the same cannot be directed to be perpetuated, for, it is trite law that there cannot be equality in illegality. 30. In reply, Mr. 30. In reply, Mr. Bhattacharya reiterated that the file notings do not reflect any reason for the change in policy; that admittedly, the members of the Samiti were not given any hearing prior to taking away the advantage, which hitherto before was being enjoyed by them; that gazetted and non-gazetted police personnel belong to different ranks and, thus, the submission of his adversary that the articles of association of the Samiti are not in conformity with the Rules is not a valid contention; and that the records produced on behalf of the respondents lead to the inescapable conclusion that an arbitrary and unreasonable policy decision has replaced a policy decision, which was in force for more than three decades without creating any difficulty in governance, for no good reason except that it has been pushed through by the wind of change that is noticeable with the present Government assuming power to rule the State. 31. Mr. Bose, in reply, referre d to the Indian Independence Act, 1947. Attention of the Court was invited to Section 3 to contend that from the appointed day the Province of Bengal, as constituted under the Government of India Act, 1935, ceased to exist and in lieu thereof two new provinces, viz. East Bengal and West Bengal were constituted. Referring to the Bengal General Clauses Act, 1899, it was contended that reference to Bengal in any Act, order, notification, instrument, etc. ought to be construed as West Bengal, unless a different intention appears, and this is precisely the reason as to why the successive Governments in the State have accepted the recognition granted in favour of the Bengal Police Association and treated the WBPA as a recognized association. He contended that besides the same, the file notings neither reflect recognition granted in favour of the Bengal Police Association not being regarded as recognition granted to the WBPA, nor has it gone down in the minutes/proceedings contained in the file that the WBPA is not a recognized association. Also, it was urged that there is not a single finding that the articles of association of the WBPA do not conform to the Rules. Referring to the initial note in the file, he contended that the entire process lacks transparency. Also, it was urged that there is not a single finding that the articles of association of the WBPA do not conform to the Rules. Referring to the initial note in the file, he contended that the entire process lacks transparency. It is not clear as to who asked the Director General and Inspector General of Police to submit report and there is no indication that he recommended withdrawal of recognition. Had the report been produced, the picture would have become clear. The contentions urged byMr. Bandopadhyay, according to Mr. Bose being without merit, he appealed to the Court to decide the claim of the WBPA treating it to be a recognized association. 32. All the parties have been extensively heard. The file notings and other documents have been perused. The principal issue arising for consideration on these writ petitions is whether the impugned resolution contained in No. 233-PL dated January 10, 2012 issued by the Additional Chief Secretary, Home Department, Government of West Bengal, conveying withdrawal of recognition of the three Associations, is sustainable in law or not. Incidentally, it ought to exercise the consideration of the Court as whether the change in policy adopted by the Government to substitute the Police Welfare Boards for the Joint Consultative Committees is justiciable and if so, whether the same is liable to interference. 33. The authorities cited by the learned advocates for the parties have duly been perused. Law declared by the Supreme Court in the cited decisions is undoubtedly binding on this Court, but it needs examination as to whether such law has application in the light of the factual scenario that has been presented here. 34. Separation of powers is discernible, in the very scheme of the Constitution. It has entrusted the executive or the administrative wing the exclusive domain of formulating policies for governance, which is regarded by it to be in the best interest of the nation and its people. What is good and right for the people rest or their decision and all their actions must be directed towards achieving the same, with the caveat that the executive power of the State must be exercised in tune with the constitutional norms and principles. It is also open to the executive to change its policy according to the demands of the time and situation, and also in public interest, for justifiable reasons. It is also open to the executive to change its policy according to the demands of the time and situation, and also in public interest, for justifiable reasons. However, it is not the law that a policy decision enjoys immunity and can never be the subject of judicial review. The grounds based whereon scrutiny could be made are undoubtedly limited and thejudicial review court may, in its discretion, decline to interfere unless anexceptional case warranting exercise of writ powers is set up. A change inpolicy by itself does not vitiate the action taken. If the change is based onproper materials and is considered rational or reasonable, there may not be scope for interference. But it would be a perfectly legitimate exercise of power for the Court to examine as to whether the change in policy decisionattracts the vice of unreasonableness and arbitrariness or not, or whether it is patently malafide or not. Preservation of the rule of law must be of paramount importance for every responsible citizen of the country, whatever is his capacity. Justice is not to be administered by the judiciary alone; it is also the constitutional resolve of the people that the executive must reach out to the masses by framing policies that are fair, just and reasonable and intended to promote public good. None can, however, possibly dispute that while an executive officer looks at things from thestandpoint of policy and expediency, a judge looks at things objectivelyuninfluenced by considerations of policy and expediency. Quite often,absence of a statutory mandate to record reasons in support of a policy decision is used as a shield to guard against judicial interference. The executive ought to realize that recording of reasons serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness and transparency in the decision making process. To look for reasons that compelled the executive to change its policy would also be a just approach on the part of the Court in dispensing justice to the parties. None of the decisions cited by Mr. Bandopadhyay on the scope of interference in policy matters sound a note inconsistent with what has been observed above. The decision taken by the Government embodied in the impugned resolution is definitely justiciable. None of the decisions cited by Mr. Bandopadhyay on the scope of interference in policy matters sound a note inconsistent with what has been observed above. The decision taken by the Government embodied in the impugned resolution is definitely justiciable. However, bearing in mind that in the perception of the executive constitution of the Police Welfare Boards (upon discontinuation of the Joint Consultative Committees) would serve the interest of the police personnel in the State better, the process of decision making leading to the impugned decision is liable to be put under the judicial scanner and an adjudication must necessarily follow either in favour of or against interdiction. 35. Insofar as the other decisions cited by Mr. Bandopadhyay regarding the right of hearing that could be claimed is concerned, it is undeniable that with the advent of the Constitution, fundamental right to form an association (subject to reasonable restrictions) was guaranteed and that right necessarily includes the right of an association to work for achievement of the objectives for which it was formed. Recognition granted to the three Associations was not an act of grace, charity or concession; it was part of the guarantee of freedom that the people of the nation gave unto themselves. The fundamental rights that the Constitution envisions are sacred and enable the people to engage in multifarious lawful activities not only in self-interest but also in the interest of the public, some of whom to their utter misfortune do not have the minimum resources to enforce their right for obtaining that, which otherwise ought to legitimately accrue to them. Right to obtain a permit or a license or recognition or exemption would follow if the pre-conditions therefor are found to have been fulfilled or adhered to, which is widely at variance from a concession that may have been granted in special circumstances. Certainly, by granting recognition to the three Associations, the Government did not grant any concession. Also, law seems to be well settled that the rule that administrative orders confer no justiciable right is a general rule and alike all general rules, is subject to exceptions. To say that an administrative order can never confer any right is too wide a proposition. There are administrative orders that confer rights and impose duties. Also, law seems to be well settled that the rule that administrative orders confer no justiciable right is a general rule and alike all general rules, is subject to exceptions. To say that an administrative order can never confer any right is too wide a proposition. There are administrative orders that confer rights and impose duties. It is because an administrative order can take away or abridge rights that the principle of audi alteram partem can be imported into this area. Also, it is settled law that since by reason of a policy vested or accrued rights cannot be taken away, such a right, a fortiorari, cannot be taken away by an amendment thereof [see: (2006) 13 SCC 542 : Union of India v. Asian Food Industries]. While respectfully noting the law declared by the Supreme Court in the cited decisions to the effect that unless there is likelihood of a change in decision even ifopportunity of hearing were extended and thus it may not be directed to be extended as a mere ritual, for, in the ultimate analysis, it would be a futile exercise, this Court is of the considered view that the ‘useless formality theory’ ought not to be applied mechanically. In a case where a person is charged with misdemeanour by another and facts have been investigated whereupon only one conclusion could be reached by the latter despite granting opportunity of hearing to the former, who might be affected by any decision based on such facts that have surfaced on investigation, nongrant of hearing per se may not invalidate the decision (unless other extenuating circumstances emerge) on the principle that granting opportunity would not have resulted in any change in the decision and the court would not direct a ritual to be completed. The court, in such a case, records that although there has been a breach of the audi alteram partem rule, the person affected by the decision has not suffered any prejudice. It is in such an exceptional case that the court may not remand the matter for a hearing. However, such an order ought to be sparingly passed, for, it is not always an easy task to assess what change in the ultimate decision a hearing may bring about. It is in such an exceptional case that the court may not remand the matter for a hearing. However, such an order ought to be sparingly passed, for, it is not always an easy task to assess what change in the ultimate decision a hearing may bring about. In the considered view of this Court, in a case where an order (which is otherwise justiciable) is challenged by the party aggrieved on the ground of non-grant of hearing and the court nurses a doubt as to whether grant of hearing would at all have a material bearing on the ultimate decision resulting in real prejudice to the party or not, it ought to set aside such order with a direction to hear him and then pass an order, by erring on the side of hearing to obliterate a claim that he has been condemned unheard. 36. Bearing in mind the above, this Court now proposes to consider the principal issue formulated above. 37. It would not detain the Court too long to answer the issue in favour of the petitioners. 38. While dealing with the contention of Mr. Bose pertaining to the cabinet memorandum dated December 12, 2011 and the decision dated December 30, 2011 of the cabinet, Mr. Bandopadhyay, on instructions received from an officer present in Court, submitted that only paragraph 1 of the memorandum was placed before the cabinet on December 30, 2011 and the same was, accordingly, approved. 39. This Court had immediately pointed out the frivolity in such submission. The proposal for withdrawing recognition not being contained in paragraph 1, which was ultimately approved by the cabinet, the Additional Chief Secretary obviously acted in excess of jurisdiction by directing withdrawal of recognition despite there being no approval of such proposal by the cabinet. 40. On this limited ground, the writ petitions ought to succeed; however, since arguments touching breach of the audi alteram partem rule have been advanced together with other points, this Court is duty bound to deal with that much of the arguments, which are relevant. 41. On the date hearing was concluded, Mr. Bandopadhyay submitted that the cabinet has since decided to approve the proposal for withdrawal of recognition but the ultimate decision had not yet been signed by the Chief Minister due to her preoccupation. 42. 41. On the date hearing was concluded, Mr. Bandopadhyay submitted that the cabinet has since decided to approve the proposal for withdrawal of recognition but the ultimate decision had not yet been signed by the Chief Minister due to her preoccupation. 42. The Court refused to look into any evidence in connection with the aforesaid submission of Mr. Bandopadhyay for two reasons, viz. (i) no leave had been obtained from the Court for reconsideration of the memorandum dated December 12, 2011 and (ii) the decision was admittedly not signed by the Chief Minister. 43. In its decision reported in AIR 1976 SC 49 : Rameshwar v. Jot Ram, the Supreme Court speaking through Hon’ble V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. (as His Lordship then was) ruled as follows: “6. The philosophy of the approach which commends itself to us is that a litigant who seeks justice in a perfect legal system gets it when he asks for it. But because human institutions of legal justice function slowly, and in quest of perfection, appeals and reviews at higher levels are provided for, the end product comes considerably late. But these higher Courts pronounce upon the rights of parties as the facts stood when the first Court was first approached. The delay of years flows from the infirmity of the judicial institution and this protraction of the Court machinery shall prejudice no one. Actus curiae neminem gravabit*. Presidential support invoked by the appellant's counsel also lets him down provided we scan the fact situation in each of those cases and the legal propositions therein laid down. ‘An act of the Court shall prejudice no one’ --Latin for lawyers -Sweet and Maxwell. 7. *** 8. In P. Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders, AIR 1975 SC 1409 , 1410 this Court dealt with the adjectival activism relating to post-institution circumstances. Two propositions were laid down. Firstly, it was held that 'it is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding.' This is an emphatic statement that the right of a party is determined by the facts as they exist on the date the action is instituted. Granting the presence of such facts, then he is entitled to its enforcement. Granting the presence of such facts, then he is entitled to its enforcement. Later developments can not defeat his right because, as explained earlier, had the court found his facts to be true the day he sued he would have got his decree. The Court's procedural delays cannot deprive him of legal justice or rights crystallised in the initial cause of action. This position finds support in Bhajan Lal v. State of Punjab, (1971) 1 SCC 34 . 9. The impact of subsequent happenings may now be spelt out. First, its bearing on the right of action, second, on the nature of the relief and third, on its impotence to create or destroy substantive rights. Where the nature of the relief, as originally sought has become obsolete or unserviceable or a new form of relief will be more efficacious on account of developments subsequent to the suit or even during the appellate stage, it is but fair that the relief is moulded, varied or reshaped in the light of updated facts. Patterson v. State of Alabama, (1934) 294 U.S. 600. 607, illustrates this position. It is important that the party claiming the relief or change of relief must have the same right from which either the first or the modified remedy may flow. Subsequent events in the course of the case cannot be constitutive of substantive rights enforceable in that very litigation except in a narrow category (later spelt out) but may influence the equitable jurisdiction to mould reliefs. Conversely, where rights have already vested in a party, they cannot be nullified or negated by subsequent events save where there is a change in the law and it is made applicable at any stage. Lachmeshwar Prasad v. Keshwar Lal, 1940 FCR 84 = AIR 1941 FC 5 falls in this category. Courts of justice may, when the compelling equities of a case oblige them, shape reliefs -cannot deny rights -to make them justly relevant in the updated circumstances. Where the relief isdiscretionary, courts may exercise this jurisdiction to avoid injustice.Likewise, where the right to the remedy depends, under the statute itself, on the presence or absence of certain basic facts at the timethe relief is to be ultimately granted, the Court, even in appeal, cantake note of such supervening facts with fundamental impact. Venkateswarlu, AIR 1979 8C 1409 read in its statutory setting, fallsin this category. Venkateswarlu, AIR 1979 8C 1409 read in its statutory setting, fallsin this category. Where a cause of action is deficient but later events have made up the deficiency, the Court may, in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation, permit amendment and continue the proceeding, provided no prejudice is caused to the other side. All these are done only in exceptional situations and just cannot be done if the statute, on which the legal proceeding is based, inhibits, by its scheme or otherwise such change in cause of action or relief. The primary concern of the court is to implement the justice of the legislation. Rights vested by virtue of a statute cannot be divested bythis equitable doctrine (See Choklingam Chetty: 54 Mad LJ 88= (AIR1927 PC 252)). The law stated in Ramji Lal v. State of Punjab, ILR (1986) 2 Punj 125 = (AIR 1986 Punj 374 FB) is sound : ‘Courts do very often take notice of events that happen subsequent to the filing of suits and at times even those that have occurred during the appellate stage and permit pleadings to be amended for including a prayer for relief on the basis of such events but this is ordinarily done to avoid multiplicity of proceedings or when the original relief claimed has, by reason of change in the circumstances, become inappropriate and not when the plaintiffs, suit would bewholly displaced by the proposed amendment (see Steward v. The North Metropolitan Tramways Company, (1886) 16 QBD 178) and a fresh suit by him would be so barred by limitation.’ One may as well add that while taking cautious judicial cognizance of 'post-natal' events, even for the limited and exceptional purposes explained earlier, no court will countenance a party altering, by his own manipulation, a change in situation and plead for relief on the altered basis.” (underlining for emphasis by me) 44. The Supreme Court in (2003) 1 SCC 726 :Beg Raj Singh v. State of UttarPradesh, observed as follows: “7. *** The ordinary rule of litigation is that the rights of the parties stand crystallized on the date of commencement of litigation and the right to relief should be decided by reference to the date on which the petitioner entered the portals of the court. *** The ordinary rule of litigation is that the rights of the parties stand crystallized on the date of commencement of litigation and the right to relief should be decided by reference to the date on which the petitioner entered the portals of the court. A petitioner, though entitled to relief in law, may yet be denied relief in equity because of subsequent or intervening events i.e. the events between the commencement of litigation and the date of decision. The relief to which the petitioner is held entitled may have been rendered redundant by lapse of time or may have been rendered incapable of being granted by change in law. There may be other circumstances which render it inequitable to grant the petitioner any relief over the respondents because of the balance tilting against the petitioner on weighing inequities pitted against equities on the date of judgment. Third-party interests may have been created or allowing relief to the claimant may result in unjust enrichment on account of events happening in-between. Else the relief may not be denied solely on account of time lost in prosecuting proceedings in judicial or quasi-judicial forum and for no fault of the petitioner. A plaintiff or petitioner having been found entitled to a right to relief, the court would as an ordinary rule try to place the successful party in the same position in which he would have been if the wrong complained against would not have been done to him. The present one is such a case. The delay in final decision cannot, in any manner, be attributed to the appellant.***”(underlining for emphasis by me) 45. It is, therefore, clear that a subsequent act on the part of the respondents (that does not bring about a change in law applicable to all alike) touching the controversy that the court is in seisin of without obtaining its leave and resulting in alteration of the status that prevailed on the date of presentation of the writ petitions cannot operate to the detriment of the petitioners. The subsequent decision of the cabinet, thus, is of no worth for the purpose of a decision on these petitions. 46. This Court now proposes to examine the other points raised at the bar. 47. The subsequent decision of the cabinet, thus, is of no worth for the purpose of a decision on these petitions. 46. This Court now proposes to examine the other points raised at the bar. 47. For ascertaining as to whether a justifiable reason for the change in policy is revealed from the file notings, one has to read the same in between lines. The notings, all handwritten, start with a note dated September 8, 2011, reading as follows: “The D.G. & I.G.P., West Bengal has furnished a report on the history and current status of the Police Unions in West Bengal i.e. West Bengal Police Association and Paschimbanga Non-Gazetted Police Karmachari Samity along with certain suggestions for incorporating changes of the said associations. It has been stated that the office bearers and members of these associations are posted in headquarters and are assigned lighter duties. These associations are allegedly functioning like trade unions and at times they have tried to interfere into the administrative matters such as promotion, transfer, recruitment etc. Under such circumstances the D.G. & I.G.P., West Bengal has sought approval of the Govt. for setting up a Police Welfare Board for the WestBengal Police to look after the matters as mentioned at Para 5/1 (C.P. 19-17). The members of the Board will be nominated by the D.G. & I.G.P. W.B., as proposed. Now, the file is placed before the higher authority for decision.” 48. The next note in the file, which is considered relevant, is dated September 22, 2011. It reads: “It appears that the purpose for the proposed formation of a ‘Police Welfare Board’ is to monitor the welfare matters for the police personnels like health care, medical assistance to the injured police personnels on duty, financial security for NOK of those dying in harness, post retirement financial security, housing, education/career counselling/training of the dependents of police personnel, legal facilities. In the existing system, there are three-tier Joint Consultative Committees – at District level, Directorate level and State level. Bottlenecks standing on the way of police-welfare matters which do not call for financial sanction or policy decision exceeding the limits of powers of District or Directorate authorities, can be resolved by these District or Directorate authorities if the Joint Consultative Committees(J.C.C.) at District and Directorate levels function properly as perapproved guidelines. Bottlenecks standing on the way of police-welfare matters which do not call for financial sanction or policy decision exceeding the limits of powers of District or Directorate authorities, can be resolved by these District or Directorate authorities if the Joint Consultative Committees(J.C.C.) at District and Directorate levels function properly as perapproved guidelines. It is, however, admitted that there are some important matters of police welfare which should be decided upon at State level. Most of these matters call for reference to Finance Deptt and some also to Health Deptt and Labour Deptt. Inter-departmental communication of files on these matter takes a long time to arrive at a decision as those other Deptts get the references without any previous enlightment over it. This Deptts. i.e. Finance Deptt, Health Deptt and Labour Deptt can be co-opted in the State Level J.C.C. which is to meet once in 3 (three) months. Strengthening the State Level J.C.C. in this way, most of the important welfare matters of police personnels can be resolved promptly and in that event formation of another Police Welfare Board engaging precious time of a Sr. Police officer in the rank of DIG.P along with his other assistance may not be necessary. Alternatively, such formation of a further new wing in that name of ‘Police Welfare Board’ may not serve the desired purpose if at least Finance Deptt be not included in the welfare meetings. Rather, a strengthened State level J.C.C. will perhaps be more fruitful causing prompt disposal of police-welfare-matters and thereby keeping the various police organisations in well-control. Submitted.” 49. It is followed by another note dated September 23, 2011, recording that the report on the history and current status of the police unions along with some suggestions for incorporating changes has been forwarded to the Director General and Inspector General of Police, West Bengal to the Government for perusal and taking necessary action. The note subsequent to it is dated September 28, 2011, and part thereof is extracted hereunder: “***** In regard to streamlining the activities of the police associations, the recognized ones in WBP & KP may be asked to limit their activities within the scope and extent of the ‘Model Guidelines for Police Associations’ framed as per provisions of the Police Force (Restriction of Rights) Act, 1966 (CPs 13-11) and DGP and CP may be requested to monitor regularly to strictly enforce the same.” 50. Five notes follow the above note. The last two notes appear to have been squeezed in, on the concerned page. According to Mr. Bhattacharya, these are instances of interpolation. The allegation is indeed serious, but evidence is required to be received for rendering a decision thereon. This Court is disinclined to embark on an inquiry in this behalf, for, that would delay disposal of the writ petitions. 51. The note that the Chief Minister approved leading to placement of the proposal before the cabinet is dated November 2, 2011. The same isreproduced in its entirety, reading as follows: “The matter has been discussed in the Chief Secy’s chamber on 02.11.11. The proposal is for setting up of a Police Welfare Board separately for Kolkata Police and West Bengal Police. It appears, from the particulars placed in the file, that the then Benga Govt. (Political Deptt) vide order no. 1616-PL dt. 21.5.1923, accorded official recognization to the Bengal Police Association. Afterwards, the Govt. of India, Law Ministry, in ‘The Police Forces (Restriction of Rights) Act, 1966’ (publication made on 02.12.1966) imposed restriction upon Police Force to the effect that no member of a Police Force shall, without the express sanction of the Central Govt. or the prescribed authority, be a member of or be associated in anyway with, any other society, institution, association or organization that is not recognized as part of the force of which he is a member or is not of a purely social, recreational or religions nature. Home (Police) Deptt., in its Resolution vide No. 5543-PL dt. 02.7.1979, decided to set up 3-Tier Joint Consultative Committee (JCC) at SP and IG level of WBP and DC, CP level of Kolkata Police (for welfare of policepersonnel). This JCC is still in existence. Afterwards, Home (Police) Deptt. vide No. 101(2)-PLS dt. 04.5.1987 issued Model Guidelines for police association. As per particulars available in the file, Paschim Banga Non-GazettedPolice Karmachari Samity was formed under Society Registration Act, on 01.12.1969 and duly recognized by Govt. of West Bengal on 12.2.1970. As discussed in the meeting, no members of Police Force attached to the police associations, have due concurrence/sanction of the authority as specified in The Police Forces (Restriction of Rights) Act,1966 for their participation in the associations. of West Bengal on 12.2.1970. As discussed in the meeting, no members of Police Force attached to the police associations, have due concurrence/sanction of the authority as specified in The Police Forces (Restriction of Rights) Act,1966 for their participation in the associations. Besides, the formation of police associations, in reality, created more differences among the police personnel which gave rise to great indiscipline and corruption in the force. In the circumstances, the existing system of JCC may be discontinued and we may consider setting up of Police Welfare Board separately for Kolkata Police and West Bengal Police. The existing police associations may duly be derecognized. Structure of the Police Welfare Board will be: for KP : Unit level Board ---to be headed by DC. Central Board ---to be headed by CP, Kol. for WBP : Welfare Committees ---to be headed by SP/CO. Central Board ---to be headed by officer not below the rank of DIG. The Central Welfare Board shall have financial grant for the Govt., Govt. Bodies and other registered Sports Organisations conducting matches. The file is placed before the authority for kind approval to ‘A’ prepage. Further procedure will follow. Draft resolution for constitution of Welfare Boards and laying down their roles are under preparation and will be placed in the Cabinet forapproval.” 52. It is noticed that the paragraph starting with the words “In the circumstances” and ending with the words “be derecognized” in the above extract was side-marked with the letter “A” and was approved. 53. This Court again agrees with Mr. Bhattacharya that the last paragraph of the above extracted note is in a handwriting that differs from the handwriting of the preceding contents. However, for the same reason in paragraph 50 (supra), the Court feels disinclined to accept Mr. Bhattacharya’s prayer to take action. 54. Be that as it may, does one find on perusal of the file notings any reason for the Police Welfare Boards to be constituted upon discontinuance of the Joint Consultative Committees? The Court’s endeavour would be to answer the question. 55. A report of the Director General and Inspector General of Police, West Bengal appears to be the genesis of the ultimate decision approved by the cabinet on December 30, 2011. The Court’s endeavour would be to answer the question. 55. A report of the Director General and Inspector General of Police, West Bengal appears to be the genesis of the ultimate decision approved by the cabinet on December 30, 2011. Apart from the fact that the report was not placed before this Court for consideration of its contents and thus it could not even be ascertained at whose instance the same was prepared, regard being had to its author it is presumed that the same must have been confined to the affairs of the West Bengal Police Force. The penultimate paragraph of the note dated September 8, 2011, extracted above, bears testimony that approval of the Government for setting up a Police Welfare Board for the West Bengal Police was sought for. The file notings do not suggest that any report from the Commissioner of Police, Kolkata Police was obtained in relation to the affairs of the Kolkata Police Force. The report of the Director General and Inspector General of Police, West Bengal could be considered for taking a decision in respect of the force that he heads but how could the same form the basis for replacement of the Calcutta Police Joint Consultative Committee by the Kolkata Police Welfare Board has not been explained. Next, the file notings reveal suggestions for and against the proposed change. No deliberation appears to have taken place in respect of the suggestion against the change in policy that was proposed. Besides, the contention of Mr. Bhattacharya that perception of officers writing the report/notes (i.e. the office bearers and members are posted in headquarters and assigned lighter duties, the associations are allegedly functioning as trade unions and interfering in administrative matters, and formation of the associations have in reality been creating differences, giving rise to great indiscipline and corruption in the force) has been given primacy without supporting evidence cannot be totally brushed aside. If indeed these have been regarded as vital for constitution of the Police Welfare Boards, it has to be concluded that those at the helm of affairs have walked awry. If indeed these have been regarded as vital for constitution of the Police Welfare Boards, it has to be concluded that those at the helm of affairs have walked awry. The instances noted above within brackets, if true, could be tackled by a strict administrator at the head and it follows, as a corollary, that such administrator be invested with the independence to take decisions according to the demands of the situation without any interference from quarters who have only their narrow self-interest to protect. The Joint Consultative Committees have been in existence for more than three decades and it would require genuine grounds based on facts, principle, rationale and reason, as distinguished from mere will or pleasure or fancy or whim, to bring about a radical change and displace the same. The focus of all actions must be directed towards promoting justice, which it must be remembered is not the constitutional mandate only for the courts of law, but also the executive in its varied sphere of activity. The vision must be clear and the goal to be achieved well defined. It has often been acknowledged that wider the power, greater is the responsibility. A change for the sake of change amounts to misuse of power. Any action in pursuit of a private satisfaction, at the cost of public interest, has to be eschewed. If the change is a camouflage for abuse of power, the courts must rise to the occasion and strike it down. Unfortunately, the decision to change can neither be sustained on precept nor principle. 56. The observations of the Supreme Court in the decision reported in (2011) 9 SCC 286 : Andhra Pradesh Dairy Development Corporation Federation v. B. Narasimha Reddy are considered here to be apt, and quoted hereunder: “40. In the matter of the Government of a State, the succeeding Government is duty-bound to continue and carry on the unfinished job of the previous Government, for the reason that the action is that of the ‘State’, within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, which continues to subsist and therefore, it is not required that the new Government can plead contrary to the State action taken by the previous Government in respect of a particular subject. The State, being a continuing body can be stopped from changing its stand in a given case, but where after holding enquiry it came to the conclusion that action was not in conformity with law, the doctrine of estoppel would not apply. Thus, unless the act done by the previous Government is found to be contrary to the statutory provisions, unreasonable or against policy, the State should not change its stand merely because the other political party has come into power. ‘Political agenda of an individual or a political party should not be subversive of rule of law.’ The Government has to rise above the nexus of vested interest and nepotism, etc. as the principles of governance have to be tested on the touchstone of justice, equity and fair play. The decision must be taken in good faith and must be legitimate. ***” 57. Taking a cue from the aforesaid statement of law, Mr. Bandopadhyay’s other contention vis-a-vis the remark in the note dated September 2, 2011 extracted supra that the three Associations do not enjoy recognition in terms of the provisions of the Act, which is one other ground that might have influenced the Government in changing the earlier decision, requires this Court’s attention now. 58. Section 1(3)(b) of the Act ordains that it shall come into force on such day as may be appointed in this behalf by notification in the Official Gazette in a State, by the Government of that State. From the documents that were submitted in course of hearing of the preliminary objection of maintainability of these three writ petitions, the Court found copy of the Kolkata Gazette Extraordinary dated October 22, 1970. The Gazette bears a notification dated October 22, 1970, whereby it was sought to be notified that in exercise of the power conferred by clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act, the Governor has been pleased to appoint November 1, 1970 as the day on which the Act shall come into force in the State of West Bengal. It is, therefore, clear that prior to November 1, 1970, the Act had no application in so far as West Bengal is concerned. 59. The facts presented before this Court reveal an interesting feature of grant of recognition to the three Associations at three different time periods. It is, therefore, clear that prior to November 1, 1970, the Act had no application in so far as West Bengal is concerned. 59. The facts presented before this Court reveal an interesting feature of grant of recognition to the three Associations at three different time periods. While recognition in favour of the Bengal Police Association, now the WBPA, was granted during the pre-independence days, the Samiti obtained recognition between the day the Act was born and the day on which the Act was made applicable in the State of West Bengal. The KPA was recognized by the Government nearly 7 (seven) years after the Act became applicable in the State. Since the Act had come into force in the State from November 1, 1970, recognition in favour of the KPA could have been granted either by the Central Government, or by the Inspector General of Police or a functionary exercising similar powers. It is indeed strange that recognition was granted in favour of the KPA, not in accordance with the Act and the rules framed thereunder. Also, if indeed the WBPA and the Samiti comprised of police personnel of varying ranks as members, and hence its constitution were inconsistent with the provisions of the Rules, an order conveying that the recognition earlier granted to them would be of no worth ought to have followed. Significantly, there was no such order. On the contrary, it is clear from the materials on record that the Government time and again issued letters and/or memoranda accepting that the three Associations are recognized associations. One may usefully fall back upon No.5543-PL dated July 2, 1979 referred to in paragraph 6 (supra), whereby constitution of the Joint Consultative Committees were notified. It is also worth noticing that the impugned resolution contained in No. 233-PL dated January 10, 2012 also speaks of withdrawal of recognition of the three Associations. 60. In course of hearing, having regard to the undeniable facts that the recognition granted in favour of the three Associations were accepted and allowed to continue uninterrupted till January 10, 2012, it seemed to the Court that the Act had been allowed to grow in age by the State Government in desuetude. Mr. Bandopadhyay was called upon to advance arguments as to why the Act may not be held to have lost its efficacy by reason of the doctrine of desuetude. Mr. Bandopadhyay was called upon to advance arguments as to why the Act may not be held to have lost its efficacy by reason of the doctrine of desuetude. The only submission raised by him was that the Court was making out a third case, not traceable in the pleadings and in this connection he placed reliance on several decisions. Reference to each one of them is not considered necessary since law is well settled in this behalf. 61. One finds an enlightening discussion on the doctrine of desuetude in the decision of the Supreme Court reported in (1995) 3 SCC 434 : Municipal Corpn. for City of Pune v. Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. Hon’ble B.L. Hansaria, J. (as His Lordship then was) observed thus: “31. In Craies Statute Law (7th Edn.) it has been stated at p. 7 that desuetude is a process by which an Act of Parliament may lose its force without express repeal. It does not, however, consist merely of obsolescence or disuse; there must also be a contrary practice, which must be of some duration and general application. Lord Mackay's view in Brown v. Magistrate of Edinburgh, 1931 SLT (Scots Law Times Reports) 456, 458, has also been noted, which is as below: ‘I hold it clear in law that desuetude requires for its operation a very considerable period, not merely of neglect, but of contrary usage of such a character as practically to infer such completely established habit of the community as to set up a counter law or establish a quasi-repeal.’ A perusal of this judgment shows that Lord Mackay ventured to prefer the Scottish system to that of England regarding which Lord Eldon, as a member of House of Lords, had stated thus in Johnstone v. Scott, (1802) 4 Pat 274, at p. 285: “The English lawyer feels himself much at a loss here; he cannot conceive at what period of time a statute can be held as commencing to grow in desuetude, nor when it can be held to be totally worn out. All he can do is to submit to what great authorities have declared the Law of Scotland to be.’ Lord Mackay thereafter enunciated the afore-quoted test of desuetude for it to permit quasi-repeal. 32. All he can do is to submit to what great authorities have declared the Law of Scotland to be.’ Lord Mackay thereafter enunciated the afore-quoted test of desuetude for it to permit quasi-repeal. 32. It would be useful to note what has been stated in this regard in the chapter headed ‘Repeal and Desuetude of Statutes’ by Aubrey L. Diamond, printed in Current Legal Problems (1975), Vol. 28 at pp. 107 to 124. Diamond has quoted on this subject what Lord Denning, M.R. observed in Buckoke v. Greater London Council, 1971 Ch 655, at p. 668, which reads: ‘It is a fundamental principle of our Constitution, enshrined in the Bill of Rights, that no one, not even the Crown itself, has ‘the power of dispensing with laws or the execution of laws’. But this is subject to some qualification. When a law has become a dead letter, the police need not prosecute, nor need the Magistrates punish. They can give an absolute discharge.’ 33. Diamond has thereafter referred to the Scottish approach to desuetude at pp. 122 and 123 and has noted some decisions wherein an Act of Scottish Parliament was not enforced because of desuetude. It would be of interest to note that when an argument was advanced that the particular Act (which was of 1606) had been left unrepealed by the Statute Law (Repeals) Act, 1906, and must, therefore, be regarded as still in force, the reply given by one of the Law Lords was that ‘it was for the Court and not for the Statute Law Revision (sic Repeal) Act to determine whether Act of 1606 was or was not in desuetude’. 34.Though in India the doctrine of desuetude does not appear to have been used so far to hold that any statute has stood repealed because of this process, we find no objection in principle to apply this doctrine to our statutes as well. This is for the reason that a citizen should know whether, despite a statute having been in disuse for long duration and instead a contrary practice being in use, he is still required to act as per the ‘dead letter’. We would think it would advance the cause of justice to accept the application of doctrine of desuetude in our country also. We would think it would advance the cause of justice to accept the application of doctrine of desuetude in our country also. Our soil is ready to accept this principle; indeed, there is need for its implantation, because persons residing in free India, who have assured fundamental rights including what has been stated in Article 21, must be protected from their being, say, prosecuted and punished for violation of a law which has become ‘dead letter’. A new path is, therefore, required to be laid and trodden.” 62. A few years later, the Supreme Court was again considering the principle of desuetude. In its decision reported in (1997) 9 SCC 450 : Cantonment Board v. M.P. SRTC., it observed as follows: “16. *** That apart to apply the principle of desuetude it is necessary to establish that the statute in question has been in disuse for long and the contrary practice of some duration has evolved.***” 63. This Court is not oblivious of the legal position that in the early eighties of the past century, the Supreme Court in its decision reported in (1982) 3 SCC 519 : State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Shamrao Puranik, did not approve of repeal of a statute by the doctrine of desuetude and took a view that is different from the view taken in the decisions of more recent origin. It was ruled therein as follows: “15. It is a matter of common knowledge that Parliament considered it necessary to reorganise the existing States in India and to provide for it and other matters connected therewith and with that end in view, the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 was enacted. As a result of reorganisation, boundaries of various States changed. Some of theStates merged into other States in its entirety, while some States got split and certain parts thereof merged into one State and other parts into another. These provisions were bound to give rise, and did give rise, to various complex problems. These problems are bound to arise from time to time. The Act is a permanent piece of legislation on the statutebook. Section 14 of the General clauses Act, 1897 provides that, where, by any Central Act or Regulation, any power is conferred, then unless a different intention appears, that power may be exercised from time to time as occasion arises. The Section embodies a uniform rule of construction. The Act is a permanent piece of legislation on the statutebook. Section 14 of the General clauses Act, 1897 provides that, where, by any Central Act or Regulation, any power is conferred, then unless a different intention appears, that power may be exercised from time to time as occasion arises. The Section embodies a uniform rule of construction. That the power may be exercised from time to time when occasion arises unless a contrary intention appears is therefore well settled. A statute can be abrogated only by express or implied repeal. It cannot fall into desuetude or become inoperative through obsolescence or by lapse of time. In R v. London County Council, LR (1931) 2 KB 215 (CA), Scrutton, L.J. put the matter thus: “The doctrine that, because a certain number of people do not like anAct and because a good many people disobey it, the Act is therefore ‘obsolescent’ and no one need pay any attention to it, is a very dangerous proposition to hold in any constitutional country. So long as an Act is on the statute-book, the way to get rid of it is to repeal or alter it in Parliament, not for subordinate bodies, who are bound to obey the law, to take upon themselves to disobey an Act of Parliament.’ As to the theory of desuetude, Allen in his Law in the Making, 5th Edn., p. 454 observes: ‘Age cannot wither an Act of Parliament, and at no time, so far as I am aware, has it ever been admitted in our jurisprudence that a statute might become inoperative through obsolescence.’ The learned author mentions that there was at one time a theory which, in the name of ‘non-observance’, came very near to the doctrine of desuetude, that if a statute had been in existence for any considerable period without ever being put into operation, it may be of little or noeffect. The rule concerning desuetude has always met with such general disfavour that it seems hardly profitable to discuss it further.***” 64. Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. (supra) did not notice Narayan Shamrao Puranik (supra). Both the decisions were rendered by benches having equal strength and presents difficulties for this Court. Although divergent views appear to have been taken, it would not be an unsound exercise of choice if this Court were to prefer Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. (supra) to Narayan Shamrao Puranik (supra). Ltd. (supra) did not notice Narayan Shamrao Puranik (supra). Both the decisions were rendered by benches having equal strength and presents difficulties for this Court. Although divergent views appear to have been taken, it would not be an unsound exercise of choice if this Court were to prefer Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. (supra) to Narayan Shamrao Puranik (supra). The earlier decision in Narayan Shamrao Puranik (supra) viewed the doctrine with disdain based on the observation of Scrutton, L.J. and the opinion of an author (Allen). Although the learned Judges observed that the doctrine of desuetude has always met with general disfavour, it does not really appear to be so. Should the authorities referred to in Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. (supra) be considered of any worth, there is no reason as to why the doctrine may not have any application. This Court’s understanding of the law is that application of the doctrine of desuetude does not have the effect of repeal of a statute. The statute remains as if it were not repealed, but the situation emerging from application of the doctrine is that a court would be slow in penalizing the violator of the statute or in holding against the interest of an individual who has not acted according to the statute, which has never been enforced. 65. The facts on record bear ample testimony that because of governmental action a practice had developed over the years to involve each of the three Associations in matters relating to general welfare of police personnel in the State of West Bengal, despite the three Associations’ articles not being in strict conformity with the Rules framed under the Act. Law laid down in the decisions in Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. (supra) and M.P. SRTC. (supra) are of utmost relevance on facts and in the circumstances here. Not only has there been no enforcement of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder in this State, a contrary practice of recognizing the three Associations developed over the years and has continued since long. The three Associations, on the basis of their recognition till the impugned resolution was issued, have claimed involvement in multifarious activities for the greater benefit of the police personnel. That is not a tall claim, having regard to the materials on record. The same do suggest involvement of the three Associations by the Government, accepting their status as recognizedassociations. The three Associations, on the basis of their recognition till the impugned resolution was issued, have claimed involvement in multifarious activities for the greater benefit of the police personnel. That is not a tall claim, having regard to the materials on record. The same do suggest involvement of the three Associations by the Government, accepting their status as recognizedassociations. Thus recognition could not have been revoked on thespecious ground that recognition in terms of the Act had not been obtained. 66. This Court is further of the view that if at all recognition accorded in favour of the three Associations were to be revoked, that ought to have been preceded by an opportunity of hearing to the authorized representatives ofeach of the three Associations. Non-grant of opportunity of hearing inconformity with the principles of natural justice, on facts and in thecircumstances, also renders the impugned resolution vulnerable. 67. Since it was argued by Mr. Bandopadhyay that an association of police personnel seeking recognition of the prescribed authority in terms of theAct must be formed comprising personnel of equal rank, it is considerednecessary at this stage to deal with the same. Mr. Bhattacharya urged thatrank would mean either gazetted rank or non-gazetted rank. Consideringthe provisions of the Police Regulations of Bengal and the PoliceRegulations of Calcutta, it appears to this Court that constables, subinspectors, inspectors, etc. belong to different ranks. It would, therefore, bereasonable to hold that whether a policeman is a gazetted or non-gazetted officer is not really material for the purpose of formation of an associationof police personnel; an association, for obtaining recognition, under the Act must be an association of constables, or sub-inspectors or inspectors, etc.and no single association comprising of constables, sub-inspectors, inspectors, etc. could be formed deserving recognition. The argument ofMr. Bandopadhyay deserves acceptance, with the rider that this ground cannot be applied to the prejudice and detriment of the members of the three Associations unless the Government informs the police personnel to whom the Act applies that henceforth the provisions of the Act would bestrictly enforced and the members of the three Associations are extended adequate time thereafter in accordance with the statutory mandate to bring their respective articles of association in conformity with the Act and therules framed thereunder. 68. A word or two about the contention of Mr. Bandopadhyay regarding a third case being made out by the Court needs to be said. 68. A word or two about the contention of Mr. Bandopadhyay regarding a third case being made out by the Court needs to be said. The rule of pleadings ensures that a party to the proceedings knows the claim he has to meet, which has been set up by the party approaching the court. Once the opposing party denies a factual assertion and counters a legal submission by filing his own pleading, it is the duty of the Court to find out the points of facts and law on which the parties have joined issue. It is thereafter that the parties lead evidence in support of their respective claims and on completion thereof, arguments are advanced. If a court of law decides the lis between the parties relying on some facts or based on grounds not traceable in the pleadings, it would amount to illegal exercise of power, for, the party at the receiving end would be deprived of the opportunity to meetthe third case. However, the situation is not the same here. Mr.Bandopadhyay referred to the file notings for demonstrating the reasons behind the change in policy decision. When the writ petitions were presented, the petitioners did not have access to the file notings. On perusal thereof submissions were advanced on certain points, which could not have been taken in the petitions. It is true that the petitioners could have applied for amending the petitions, but omission to apply therefor is not regarded as fatal. Writ remedy is after all a remedy in public law. The technical rules of pleadings, in an appropriate case, may not be insisted upon if the public authority (being the respondent) is extended full opportunity to justify its own decision and to counter not only the points raised by the petitioners on perusal of the records but also to answer the queries of the court. This Court has taken care to ensure that decision is given on those points only that Mr. Bandopadhyay was given opportunity to meet. 69. In the result, the impugned resolution stands set aside. The respondents shall be entitled to substitute the Joint Consultative Committees by the Police Welfare Boards, but in accordance with law. If representatives fromthe three Associations are not to be included in the Police Welfare Boards, their views must be invited and in case responses are received, the same must receive due consideration. The respondents shall be entitled to substitute the Joint Consultative Committees by the Police Welfare Boards, but in accordance with law. If representatives fromthe three Associations are not to be included in the Police Welfare Boards, their views must be invited and in case responses are received, the same must receive due consideration. The three Associations shall be entitled tofunction as the same were functioning before the impugned resolution was issued. If any dispossession has been effected in terms of the impugned resolution, possession shall be restored within a week from date of receipt of an authenticated copy of this judgment and order. Should the State respondents wish to revoke recognition on any ground (other than the ground mentioned in Rule 11), proper notice has to be issued calling upon the noticee to explain why recognition shall not be revoked. This must be followed by according of adequate and reasonab le opportunity of hearing to each of the three Associations and a reasoned order. Failure to comply with any provision of the Act and the rules framed thereunder shall not be a ground for revocation of recognition, unless of course by a prior notification in the Official Gazette the Government makes its position clear that irrespective of previous events it intends to enforce the provisions of the Act strictly, and thereafter calls upon the three Associations to abide thereby in such manner to be indicated in separate notices to be issued to them. 70. The writ petitions stand allowed to the extent as observed above, without any order for costs. 71. Photocopy of this judgment and order, duly countersigned by the Assistant Registrar (Court), Appellate Side shall be retained with the records of W.P. No. 2301(W) of 2010 and W.P. No. 2995(W) of 2010.