1. The unsuccessful plaintiff preferred this appeal against the judgment and decree of the learned trial court (Addl. District Judge, Fast Track Court), Manipur West dated 28.6.2007 dismissing the O.S. No.6/2003/ 4/2006. 2. Heard Mr. N. Kerani, learned senior counsel assisted by Ms. Nandita, learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff and Mr. Kh. Mani, learned counsel for the respondents-defendants. 3. The crucial issue to be decided in the present First Appeal is "whether the appellant-plaintiff is the adopted son of one Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma". For deciding this issue, the concise pleaded case of the parties are to be looked into, and accordingly, briefly noted. The appellant-plaintiff filed O.S. No.6/2003 for the reliefs : "(a) A decree for declaration of his title over the suit lands described in schedule A and B on the strength of the family arrangement. (b) A decree for declaration that the plaintiff is the shebait of Radha Madhop Devata, which is worshipped inside the Suit Land-A. (c) A decree for cancellation of the name of Radha Madhop Debata Shebait Committee, Keirak Awang Leikai, from the land record of the suit land. (d) A decree for permanent injunction against the defendant Nos. 1 to 4 and their privies so as to restrain them to invade into the suit lands so that the plaintiff may enjoy the same peacefully and confortably. (e) Cost of litigation. (f) Any other reliefer reliefs which are appropriate and reasonable in the nature of the suit be awarded to the plaintiff." 4. The pleaded case of the appellant-plaintiff is that one Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma was the absolute owner and pattadar of the homestead measuring 1.15 acres, covered by Dag No. 88 of patta No.425 corresponding to old patta No.70 situated in revenue village No. 65 Keirak. The pleaded case of the appellant-plaintiff is that one Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma was the absolute owner and pattadar of the homestead measuring 1.15 acres, covered by Dag No. 88 of patta No.425 corresponding to old patta No.70 situated in revenue village No. 65 Keirak. Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma also owned and possessed paddy fields : (1) paddy field measuring an area of 1.43 acres covered by Dag No.581 of new patta No.421 corresponding to old patta No. 74 of revenue village No.65 Keirak; (2) paddy field measuring an area of 1.29 acres covered by Dag No.585 of new patta No.421 corresponding to old patta No.74 of revenue village No.65 Keirak; (3) paddy field measuring an area of 1,15 acres covered by Dag No.587 of new patta No.422 corresponding to old patta No.284 of revenue village No.65 Keirak; (4) a paddy field measuring an area of 1.29 acres covered by Dag No.588 o£patta No.422 corresponding to old patta No.284 of revenue village No.65 Keirak; (5) a paddy field measuring an area of 1.39 acres covered by Dag No.522 of new patta No.419 corresponding to old patta No.733/156, in revenue village No.65 Keirak; and (6) a paddy field measuring an area of 1.43 acres covered by Dag No.589 of new patta No.422 corresponding to old patta No.284 of revenue village No.65 Keirak. 5. The said Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma, died in the year 1995 and during his lifetime he did not have a male issue (son) and he adopted the appellant-plaintiff as his son when the appellant-plaintiff was aged about four years. The appellant-plaintiff was aged about 32 years at the time of filing the OS No.6/2003. The pro forma respondent/pro forma defendant No.5 is the wife and pro forma respondent/pro forma defendant Nos.6 and 7 are the daughters of late Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma. At the time of adoption, the appellant-plaintiff was actually given by his natural parents to late Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma (adoptive father) in the presence of local elders. Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma and his wife, pro forma respondent/pro forma defendant No.5 taken the appellant-plaintiff from his natural parents to became the adopted son of Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma. The appellant-plaintiff had been staying in the house of his adoptive parents till the death of late Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma. Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma and his wife, pro forma respondent/pro forma defendant No.5 taken the appellant-plaintiff from his natural parents to became the adopted son of Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma. The appellant-plaintiff had been staying in the house of his adoptive parents till the death of late Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma. Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma brought up the appellaut-plaintiff as his son and performed Nahutpa ceremony and Upanayan (lugun thangba) ceremony of the appellant-plaintiff. On 26.9.1987 the appellant-plaintiff married with one Km. Tampakleima Devi and the marriage ceremony was performed by his adoptive father. 6. During the lifetime of late Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma, he constructed a pucca temple and katcha mandap on the eastern portion of his homestead and worshiped Radha Madhop Deyata in the said temple and performed rituals of the deity. When his adoptive father became old and weak, the appellant-plaintiff performed the ritual for the deities and management of the affairs of the said deity. The appellant-plaintiff also resided on the western portion of the homestead land in a dwelling house constructed by late Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma. His adoptive parent also resided in the said house. The pro forma respondent/pro forma defendant Nos.6 and 7 were already married before the adoption of the appellant-plaintiff and they lived with their respective husbands. 7. Before his death, late Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma on 8.7.1993 appointed the appellant-plaintiff as shebait of Radha Madhop Devata. On the same day, a family arrangement of his landed properties was also made amongst the appellant-plaintiff and the pro forma respondents. The said family arrangement was made in the presence of the local elders so as to avoid future litigations amongst the appellant-plaintiff and pro forma defendants. Under the said family arrangement, pro forma respondent/pro forma defendant No. 5, Smt. Angousana Devi (widow of late Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma) got the paddy field measuring an area of 1.39 acres covered by Dag No.522 of new patta No.419 corresponding to old patta No.733/156 of revenue village No.65 Keirak. The pro forma respondent/pro forma defendant Nos.6 and 7 got the paddy field measuring an area of 3.87 acres covered by Dag Nos.587, 588 and 589 of new patta No.422 corresponding to old patta No.284 of revenue village N6.65 Keirak. The pro forma respondent/pro forma defendant Nos.6 and 7 got the paddy field measuring an area of 3.87 acres covered by Dag Nos.587, 588 and 589 of new patta No.422 corresponding to old patta No.284 of revenue village N6.65 Keirak. The pro forma respondent/pro forma defendant No.6 also got a paddy field measuring an area of 1.29 acres covered by Dag No. 585 of new patta No.421 corresponding to old patta No.74 of revenue village No.65 Keirak. The appellant-plaintiff got a part of the homestead measuring an area of .82 acre in which the said temple and mandap were constructed within the homestead measuring an area of 1.15 acres covered by Dag No. 88 of new patta No.425 corresponding to old patta No. 70 of revenue village No.65 Keirak and a paddy field measuring an area of 1.43 acres covered by Dag No.581 of new patta No.421 corresponding to old patta No.74 of revenue village No.65 Keirak. The pro forma respondent/pro forma defendant Nos.5 to 7 got the remaining part of the homestead after exclusion of the shared portion of the appellant-plaintiff after the said family arrangement. 8. The respondent/defendant Nos.1 to 4 are the villagers of the Keirak village who had no right and title over the suit land. Respondent/ defendant Nos. 1 to 4 claimed themselves to be the members of the Radha Madhop Devata shevait committee of the said Radha Madhop Devata installed by the appellant-plaintiff's adoptive father late Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma. The said committee is a nonexistent and fictitious committee. 9. On 6.8.1999 when the appellant-plaintiff obtained a certified copy of jamabandi patta of the suit land, i.e., shared portion of the land of the appellant-plaintiff, i.e., Schedule-A a piece of homestead under Dag No.88/589 covered by new patta No.421, 425/589 (1268) corresponding to old patta Nos.70, 74 comprising an area of .82 acre and Schedule-B, a paddy field covered by Dag No.581 of new patta Nos.421, 425/1268 corresponding to old patta Nos.70, 74 comprising an area of 1.43 acres of revenue village No.65 Keirak, from the Settlement Department, to his utter surprise, the name of the appellant-plaintiff was found cancelled from the relevant land records and name of the fictitious committee called "Radha Madhop Devata Shebait Committee" Keirak Awang Leikai and name of late Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani. Sharma, was found recorded in the relevant land record of the suit land. Sharma, was found recorded in the relevant land record of the suit land. It was also learnt that late Shri Thouchom Sangai Singh in collusion with the respondent/defendant Nos.1 to 4 produced a false and fabricated katcha Sale Deed purported to have been made by late Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma in favour of the said nonexistent committee before the Revenue Officers and thus, names of the appellant-plaintiff was cancelled from the revenue records of the suit land. 10. The appellant-plaintiff filed an application in the court of the learned AS and. SO-III Manipur for cancellation of the name of the adoptive father, late Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma and name of the said fictitious committee from the land record of the suit land. He also filed another application for mutation of his name in the revenue record of the suit land. Accordingly, name of the appellant-plaintiff was again recorded in the revenue record of the suit land vide order dated 15.11.1999 passed in Revenue Misc. Case No.314 of 1999. 11. On 12.3.2003, around 10 a.m. the defendant Nos.1 to 4 committed trespass to the suit land and they claimed that the suit land belong to the said committee. They warned the appellant-plaintiff to stop performance of ritual and management of the affairs of the Radha Madhop Devata. They forcibly tried to keep the said temple of the deity under lock and key. Therefore, the appellant-plaintiff has reasonable apprehension in his mind that the respondent/defendant Nos.1-4 may, at any point of time invade the suit land and would keep the temple of the deity under lock and key by restraining the appellant-plaintiff from worshipping and performing the ritual of the Deity. 12. The respondent/defendant Nos.1 to 4 filed joint written statement wherein they categorically denied that the appellant-plaintiff is adopted son of late Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma. The defendant/respondent Nos.1 to 4 also categorically denied that the appellant-plaintiff performed the ritual for the said deity and also managed the affairs of the deity and also further denied that the appellant-plaintiff resided in the dwelling house constructed by late Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma on the western portion of his homestead. Respondent/defendant Nos. The defendant/respondent Nos.1 to 4 also categorically denied that the appellant-plaintiff performed the ritual for the said deity and also managed the affairs of the deity and also further denied that the appellant-plaintiff resided in the dwelling house constructed by late Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma on the western portion of his homestead. Respondent/defendant Nos. 1 to 4 further pleaded in their written statement that the appellant-plaintiff did not perform the shradha ceremony and annual shradha ceremony of late Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma and also that the appellant-plaintiff was never appointed as shebait of the said diety of Radha Madhop Devata of late Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma. Respondent/defendant Nos.1 to 4 further pleaded in their written statement that there was no family arrangement as alleged by the appellant-plaintiff in his written statement. The appellant-plaintiff is not a member of the family of late Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma and as such, there is no question of family arrangement with the appellant-plaintiff in the family of late Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma. 13. In their written statement, respondent/defendant Nos. 1 to 4 pleaded that the Radha Madhop Devata Shebait Committee, Keirak Awang Leikai, was formed by the villagers of Koirak Awang Leikaia for the welfare of Radha Madhop Devata and worshipped the diety according to the Hindu customs/law. The suit land had been recorded in the name of the said Radha Madhop Devata Shebait Committee, Keirak Awang Leikai since 21.7.1993. The suit land has been owned and in physical possession of the said Committee, i.e., Radha Madhop Devata Shebait Committee, Keirak Awang Leikai without any interference from any quarter by constructing temple over the suit land and usufruct of the suit land was also used for the rituals of the deity. The pro forma respondents/pro forma defendants did not file written statement. The learned trial court framed ten issues : "1. Whether late B. Nilamani Sharma was the original owner of the suit lands or not? 2. Whether the plaintiff is the adoptive son of late B. Nilamani Sharma? 8. Whether B. Nilamani Sharma before his death had appointed the plaintiff on 8.7.1993 as the shebait of Radha Madhop Devata? 4. Whether B. Nilamani Sharma made any family arrangement on 8.7.1993 with regard to his landed properties amongst the plaintiff and the pro forma defendants in the presence of local elders? If so whether the plaintiff got the suit lands as his share;? 5. 4. Whether B. Nilamani Sharma made any family arrangement on 8.7.1993 with regard to his landed properties amongst the plaintiff and the pro forma defendants in the presence of local elders? If so whether the plaintiff got the suit lands as his share;? 5. Whether the so called Radha Madhop Devata shebait committee, Keirak Awang Leikai" is a fictitious Committee or not? 6. Whether the plaintiff has been in physical possession of the suit lands since during the life time of late B. Nilamani Sharma? 7. Whether the plaintiff has any locus standi to file the present suit? 8. Whether there is any cause of action? 9. Whether the suit is maintainable or not? 10. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs as claimed?" 14. The appellant-plaintiff, in support of his pleaded case for deciding the issues in his favour had examined six PWs, namely : (1) K. Ibomcha Sharma - PW1 (appellant-plaintiff), (2) N. Mani Singh, PW2, (3) L. Tomba Singh - PWS, (4) Th. Komol Singh-PW4, (5) A.K. Khomei Singh, PWS and (6) Y. Thambalyaima Singh-PW6; and exhibited 8 documents, i.e., (1) Ext.A/1-Jamabandi, (2) Ext.A/2-Jamabandi, (3) Ext.A/3-Jamabandi, (4) Ext.A/4-Jamabandi, (5) Ext.A/5-Jamabandi, (6) Ext.A/ 6-Jamabandi, (7) Ext.A/7-Invitation Card and (8) Ext.A/8-Invitation Card. To the contra, respondent/defendant Nos.1 to 4, in support of their pleaded case, had examined five DWs namely: (1) H. Noyon Singh, DW1 (respondent/defendant No.1), (2) N. Bokul Singh, DW.2 (respondent/defendant No.2), (3) Th. Thonglen Singh, DW3 (respondent/defendant No.3); (4) Th. Shadadas, DW4 and (5) Th. Biren Singh, DWS; and exhibited four documents, i.e., jamabandies. The learned trial court after appreciation of the oral as well documentary evidences came to the finding that the appellant-plaintiff is not an adopted son of late Shri Brahmacharimayuni Nilamani Sharma. The reasons for coming to such finding by the trial court are as under : "The plaintiff is claiming that he is the adopted son of late Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma and on the other hand the defendants are denying the fact of adoption of the plaintiff by late Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma. The crux of the suit is as to whether the plaintiff is the adopted son of late Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma as he is claiming that he becomes the owner of the suit lands as inherited from late Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma being an adopted son of him. The crux of the suit is as to whether the plaintiff is the adopted son of late Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma as he is claiming that he becomes the owner of the suit lands as inherited from late Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma being an adopted son of him. The plaintiff while examining as PW1 has stated that Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma has no son and he and his wife Smt. Angousana Devi adopted him as their son since his childhood. He lived wjth the adoptive parents at their house. lie was brought up and performed Nahutpa Ceremony and Lugun Thangba Ceremony and also married with his wife Tampaklcima Devi by the adoptive parents. In support of his claim the plaintiff produced a copy of invitation card (Ext. A/7) of his marriage invited by Brahmachariniayuin Nilamani Sharma and Smt. Angousana Devi and a copy of invitation card (Ext.A/8) of his Upanyan (Lugun Thangba) invited by Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma and Smt. Angousana Devi as their son. His such version is supported by Naorem Mani Singh (PW2), Teihaorungbam Tomba Singh (PW3), Thongam Komol Singh (PW4), Akhom Khomei Singh (PW5) and Yambem Thambalyaima Singh (PW6). From the record, it is evident that the defendant No.5 Smt. Angousana Devi, the alleged adoptive mother is still alive. She is the most competent person to give evidence that the plaintiff is their adopted son. But she is not examined as plaintiff's witness and there is no explanation why she is not examined as PW in case she is the adoptive mother. The defendants while examining as the DWs No.1, No.2, No.3 and No.4 have stated that late Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma and his wife Smt. Angousana Devi never adopted the plaintiff as their son which is supported by Thongam Biren Singh (DW5). Interestingly, apart from oral evidence, one aspect ought to be considered is that though the plaintiff is claiming that he is an adopted son of late Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma, in the cause title of the suit his name is shown as Kakchingtabam Ibomcha Sharma, s/o Kakchingtabam Nandalal Sharma quite different from his claiming to be the adopted son of late Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma. Not only in cause title, in the certified copies of Jamabandi (Ext.A/1, Ext.A/2, Ext.A/3 and Ext.A/4) produced and filed by the plaintiff show the name of the plaintiff recorded as Kakchingtabam Ibomcha Sharma, s/o Kakchingtabam Nandalal Sharma. Not only in cause title, in the certified copies of Jamabandi (Ext.A/1, Ext.A/2, Ext.A/3 and Ext.A/4) produced and filed by the plaintiff show the name of the plaintiff recorded as Kakchingtabam Ibomcha Sharma, s/o Kakchingtabam Nandalal Sharma. Admittedly, the plaintiff is a Hindu Brahmin governed by Dayabhagh System of Hindu Law. Under section 12 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, it has laid down that "'Effect of adoption : An adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of the adoption and from such date all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family : Provided : (a) the child cannot marry any person whom he or she had continued in the family of his or her birth; (b) any property which vested in the adopted child before the adoption shall continue to vest in such person subject to the obligation, if any, attaching to the ownership of such property, including the obligation to maintain relatives in the family of his or her birth; (c) the adopted child shall not divest any person of any estate which vested in him or her before the adoption." As such when a child is adopted by any person to be his child, the relationship of the adopted child with his natural parents shall be deemed to be severed at the moment when he is adopted and shall be deemed to be replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family. As such, in case the plaintiff was adopted by Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma and his wife Smt. Angousana Devi, he should be Brahmacharimayum Ibomcha Sharma s/o Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma and should not be Kakchingtabam Ibomcha Sharma, s/o Kakchingtabam Nandalal Sharma. The plaintiff cannot retain his relationship with his natural father in case he was adopted by late Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma as his son. The plaintiff cannot retain his relationship with his natural father in case he was adopted by late Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma as his son. Further, under section 15 of the Act, it has also laid down that "No adoption which has been validly made can be cancelled by the adoptive father or mother or any other person, nor can the adopted child renounce his or her status as such and return to the family of his or her birth." As such, even if, Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma died, the plaintiff is debarred from renouncing to be the adopted son of him. He should remain as the son of Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma has to look after the old aged alleged adoptive mother being her son. It is also evident from the record that Smt. Angousana Devi is not living with the plaintiff with the unexplained reason best known to the plaintiff. In such plausible circumstances, the claim of the plaintiff that he is an adopted son of Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma is lack of trustworthy. As such the claim of the plaintiff to be the adopted son of Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma is on the contrary of the prescribed statute. That cannot be acceptable in the eyes of law. Hence, this issue is decided against the plaintiff. 15. The pleaded case in the civil proceedings are to be proved by a preponderance of probabilities. In a civil suit the plaintiff is not expected to prove his title beyond any reasonable doubt. A high degree of probability of his case or his title would be enough to shift the onus on the defendant and if the defendant does not succeed in shifting back the onus, the plaintiff's burden of proof can safely be deemed to have been discharged. 16. The first Appellate Court is duty bound to make a critical analysis of the matter before it. It cannot make affirm or reverse the findings of the trial court without due and proper application of mind - Ref. State of Rajasthan v. Harphool Singh (I) through his LRs, (2000) 5 SCC 652 . The finding of fact of the trial court mainly based on oral evidence or documentary evidence are not ordinarily be disturbed by the first appellate court unless the trial court's approach in appraisal of the evidence appears materially erroneous. State of Rajasthan v. Harphool Singh (I) through his LRs, (2000) 5 SCC 652 . The finding of fact of the trial court mainly based on oral evidence or documentary evidence are not ordinarily be disturbed by the first appellate court unless the trial court's approach in appraisal of the evidence appears materially erroneous. The Apex Court in Madhusudan Das v. Smt. Narayanibai (Deceased) by LRs., (1983) 1 SCC 35 held that: "In an appeal against a trial court decree, when the appellate court considers an issue turning on oral evidence, it does not enjoy the advantage which the trial court had in having the witnesses before it and of observing the manner in which they gave their testimony. When there is a conflict of oral evidence on any matter in issue and its resolution turns upon the credibility of the witnesses, the general rule is that the appellate court should permit the findings of fact rendered by the trial court to prevail unless it clearly appears that some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness has escaped the notice of the trial court or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace its opinion as to where the credibility lies or the appraisal of the evidence by the trial court suffers from a material irregularity or is based on inadmissible evidence or on a misreading of the evidence or on conjectures and surmises. This approach should be placed in the forefront in considering whether the High Court proceeded correctly in the evaluation of the evidence before it when deciding to reverse the findings of tin1 trial court. The principle is one of the practice and governs the weight to be given to a finding of fact by the trial court." 17. This court, incidentally this very Bench, Justice T.NK Singh, in Jutika Paul and Ors. v. Bhubaneswari Sheet and Ors., 2007 (4) GLT 26 held that judgment of the first appellate court must display conscious application of mind and record finding on all issues supported by reasons. Para 14 of the GLT in Jutika Paul's case (supra) read as follows : "14. The Apex Court in Santosh Flazari v. Purushottam Tlwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 held that the judgment of the 1st appellate court must display conscious application of mind and the record findings supported by reasons on all issues. Para 14 of the GLT in Jutika Paul's case (supra) read as follows : "14. The Apex Court in Santosh Flazari v. Purushottam Tlwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 held that the judgment of the 1st appellate court must display conscious application of mind and the record findings supported by reasons on all issues. The 1st appellate court being a final court of facts, the pure findings of fact by the 1st Appellate Court shall remain immune from challenging before the High Court in Second Appeal, the Apex Court in Santosh Hazari (supra) observed that - "The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along'with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. The task of an appellate court affirming the findings of the trial court is an easier one. The appellate court agreeing with the view of the trial court need not restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial court, expression of general agreement with reasons given by the court, decision of which is under appeal, would ordinarily suffice (see Girijanandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain Choudhury). We would, however, like to sound a note of caution. Expression of general agreement with the findings recorded in the judgment under appeal should not be a device or camouflage adopted by the appellate court for shirking the duty cast on it. While writing a judgment of reversal the appellate court must remain conscious of two principles. Firstly, the findings of fact based on conflicting evidence arrived at by the trial court musty weigh with the appellate court, more so when the findings are'based on oral evidence recorded by the same Presiding Judge who authors the judgment. This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies, on facts, the appellate court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Judge. This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies, on facts, the appellate court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Judge. As a matter of law if the appraisal of the evidence by the trial court suffers from a material irregularity or is based on inadmissible evidence or on conjectures and surmises, the appellate court is entitled to interfere with the finding of fact. (See Madhusudan Das v. Narayanibai). The rule is and it is nothing more than a rule of practice — that when there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the credibility of witnesses, then unless there is some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness which has escaped the trial Judge's notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lie, the appellate court should not interfere with the finding of the trial Judge on a question of fact. (See Sarju Pershad Ramdeo Sahu v. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh). Secondly, while reversing a finding of fact the appellate court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the court hearing a further appeal that the first appellate court had discharged the duty expected of it. We need only remind the first appellate courts of the additional'obligation cast on them by the scheme of the present section 100 substituted in the Code. The first appellate court continues, as before, to be a final court of facts; pure findings of fact remain immune from challenging before the High Court in second appeal. Now the first appellate court is also a final court of law in the sense that its decision on a question of law even if erroneous may not be vulnerable before the High Court in second appeal because the jurisdiction of the High Court has now ceased to be available to correct the errors of law or the erroneous findings of the first appellate court even on questions of law unless such question of law be a substantial one." 18. The Apex Court in Rahasa Pandiani v. Gokulananda Panda, (1987) 2 SCC 338 observed as follows : "An adoption would divert the normal and natural course of succession. Therefore, the court has to be extremely alert and vigilant to guard against being ensnared by schemers who indulge in unscrupulous practices out of their lust for property. If there are any suspicious circumstances, just as the propounder of the Will is obliged to dispel the cloud of suspicion, the burden is on one who claims to have been adopted to dispel the same beyond reasonable doubt. In the case of an adoption which is claimed on the basis of oral evidence and is not supported by a registered document or any other evidence of a clinching nature, if there exist suspicious circumstances, the same must be explained to the satisfaction of the conscience of the court by the party contending that there was such an adoption." The Apex Court also observed in Kishori Lal v. Chaltibai, AIR 1959 SC 504 : "As an adoption results in changing the course of succession, depriving wives and daughters of their rights and transferring properties to comparative strangers or more remote relations it is necessary that the evidence to support it should be such that it is free from all suspicion of fraud and so consistent and probable as to leave no occasion for doubting its truth. Failure to produce accounts, in circumstances such as have been proved in the present case, would be a very suspicious circumstance. The importance of accounts was emphasized by the Privy Council in Sootrugun v. Sabitra in Diwarkar Rao v. Chandanlal Rao; in Kishori Achariya v. Fakira Debya." 19. Under the Hindu Law, the giving and receiving of a boy is absolutely necessary to the validity of an adoption; they are the operative part of the ceremony being that part of it which transfer the boy from one family to another; but the Hindu Law does not require that there should be a particular form so far as giving and acceptance are concerned and for a valid adoption all that law requires is that natural father shall be asked by the adoptive parent to give his son in his adoption and the boy shall be handed over and taken over for this purpose. The decision of the Apex Court in L. Debi Prasad (Dead) by LRs v. Smt. Tribeni Devi and Ors., AIR 1970 SC 1286 (para 7 and 8 of the AIR) read as follows : "7. While considering the question of proof of the adoption pleaded, we must bear in mind the fact that the; same is alleged to have taken place in 1892 nearly 54 years before the present suit was instituted. Therefore, naturally, it was extremely difficult for Shyam Bchari Lal to adduce any oral evidence in proof of that adoption. All the persons who could have known about the adoption are likely to have died. Shyam Behari Lal himself could not speak to that adoption. His evidence1 is at best hearsay. It is true, as observed by this court inAddagadaRaghayamtna andAnr. v. Addagada Chenchamma, (1964)2 SCR 933 ; All 1964 SC 136) that it is settled that a person, who seeks to displace the natural succession to property by alleging an adoption must discharge the burden that lies upon him by proof of the factum of adoption and its validity'). Again as held by this court in Lakshman Singh Kothari v. Smt. Rup Kanwar, (1962)1 SCR 477 ; AIR 1961 SC1378 that in order that an adoption may be valid under the Hindu law, there must be a formal ceremony of diving and taking. This is true of the regenerate castes as well as of the Sudras. Although no particular form is prescribed for the ceremony, the law requires that the natural parent should hand over the adoptive boy and the adoptive parent must receive him, the nature of the ceremony varying according to the circumstances. In the course of the judgment Subba Rao, J (as he then was) who spoke for the, court quoted with approval the following observations of Gopalchandra Sarkar in his book on Hindu Law, 8th edn.. : 'The ceremonies of giving and taking are absolutely necessary in all cases. These ceremonies must be accompanied by the actual delivery of the child; symbolical or constructive delivery by the mere parol expression of intention on the part of the giver and the taker without the presence of the boy is not sufficient. : 'The ceremonies of giving and taking are absolutely necessary in all cases. These ceremonies must be accompanied by the actual delivery of the child; symbolical or constructive delivery by the mere parol expression of intention on the part of the giver and the taker without the presence of the boy is not sufficient. Nor are deeds of gift and acceptance executed and registered in anticipation of the intended adoption nor acknowledgment, sufficient by themselves to constitute legal adoption, in the absence of actual gift and acceptance accompanied by actual delivery; a formal ceremony being essential for that purpose." 8. That is also the view expressed in Mayne's Hindu Law wherein it is observed that the giving and receiving are absolutely necessary to the validity of an adoption; they are the operative part of the ceremony, being that part of it which transfers the boy from one family to another; but the Hindu law does not require that there shall be any particular form so far as giving and acceptance are concerned; for a valid, adoption all that the law requires is that the natural father shall be asked by the adoptive parent to give his son in adoption, and that the boy shall be handed over and taken for this purpose." 20. A person who seeks to displace the natural succession to property by alleging an adoption must discharge the burden that lies upon him by proof of the factum of adoption and its validity. Evidence in proof of the adoption should be free from all suspicion of fraud and so consistent and probable as to give no occasion for doubting its truth. The decision of the Apex Court in Madhusudan Das v. Smt. Narayani Bai and Ors., AIR 1983 SC 114 (paras 19 and 20 of the AIR) read as follows : "19. It is well settled that a person who seeks to displace the natural succession to property by alleging an adoption must discharge the burden that lies upon him by proof of the factum of adoption and its validity. A. Rughavamma v. A. Chanchamma, AIR 1964 SC 136 . It is also true that the evidence in proof of the adoption should be free from all suspicion of fraud and so consistent and probable as to give no occasion for doubting its truth. Kishori Lal v. Chaltibai, (1959) Supp 1 SCR 698: AIR 1959 SC 504. A. Rughavamma v. A. Chanchamma, AIR 1964 SC 136 . It is also true that the evidence in proof of the adoption should be free from all suspicion of fraud and so consistent and probable as to give no occasion for doubting its truth. Kishori Lal v. Chaltibai, (1959) Supp 1 SCR 698: AIR 1959 SC 504. Nonetheless the fact of adoption must be proved in the same way as any other fact. 20. For a valid adoption, the physical act of giving and taking is an essential requisite, a ceremony imperative in all adoptions, whatever the caste. And this requisite is satisfied in its essence only by the actual delivery and acceptance of the boy, even though there exists an expression of consent or an executed deed of adoption. Shoshinath v. Krishnasunder, (1980) 7 Ind App 250. InLakshman Singh v. Smt. Rupkanwar, (1962) 1 SCR 447, 490: AIR 1961 SC 1378 at p. 1381, this court briefly stated the law. Thus : "Under the Hindu Law, whether among the regenerate caste or among Sudras, there cannot be a valid adoption unless the adoptive boy is transferred from one family to another and that can be done only by the ceremony of giving and taking. The object of the corporeal giving and receiving in adoption is obviously to secure due publicity. To achieve this object it is essential to have a formal ceremony. No particular form is prescribed for the ceremony, but the law requires that the natural parent shall hand over the adoptive boy and the adoptive parent shall receive him. The nature of the ceremony may vary depending upon the circumstances of each case. But a ceremony there shall be, and giving and taking shall be part of it." In some cases, to complete the adoption a "datta homam" has been considered necessary, but in the case of the twice-born classes no such ceremony is needed if the adopted boy belongs to the same gotra as the adoptive father. Bal Gangadhar Tilak v. Shrlniwas Pandit, (1915) 42 Ind App 135: AIR 1915 PC 7. In the present case, the appellant has pleaded the custom of his community that the act of giving and taking suffices to effect a valid adoption, and nothing has been shown to us to indicate that the further ceremony of "datta homam" was necessary." 21. Bal Gangadhar Tilak v. Shrlniwas Pandit, (1915) 42 Ind App 135: AIR 1915 PC 7. In the present case, the appellant has pleaded the custom of his community that the act of giving and taking suffices to effect a valid adoption, and nothing has been shown to us to indicate that the further ceremony of "datta homam" was necessary." 21. The Apex Court also reiterated the essential requirements of valid adoption propounded by the Apex Court in L. DebiPrasad's case (supra) in Madhusudan Das's case (supra) that for a valid adoption pin sical act of giving and taking is an essential requirement; a ceremony imperative in all adoptions, whatever the caste. The Apex Court in M. Gurudas and Ors. v. Rasaranjan and Ors., AIR 2006 SC 3275 reiterated the requirement of a valid adoption mentioned in L. Debi Prasad's case (supra) and Madhusudan Das's case (supra). Paras 27 and 28 of the AIR in M. Gurudas case (supra) read as follows : "27. To prove valid adoption, it would be necessary to bring on records that there had been an actual giving and taking ceremony. Performance of'datta homam' was imperative, subject to just exceptions. Above all, as noticed hereinbefore, the question would arise as to whether adoption of a daughter was permissible in law. 28. In Malta's Principles of Hindu Law, 17th edn., p. 710, it is stated : "488. Ceremonies relating to adoption. - (1) The ceremonies relating to an adoption are - (a) the physical act of giving and receiving, with intent to transfer the boy from one family into another; (b) the datta homam, that is, oblations of clarified butter to fire; and (c) other minor ceremonies, such as putresti jag (sacrifice for male issue). (2) They physical act of giving and receiving is essential to the validity of an adoption; As to datta homam it is not settled whether its performance is essential to the validity of an adoption in every case. As to the other ceremonies, their performance is not necessary to the validity of an adoption. (3) No religious ceremonies, not even datta homam, are necessary in the case of Shudras. Nor are religious ceremonies necessary amongst Jains or in the Punjab." 22. The statement of the adoptive son, i.e., PW1, regarding his adoption, while he was aged about four years, at the best is only hearsay. (3) No religious ceremonies, not even datta homam, are necessary in the case of Shudras. Nor are religious ceremonies necessary amongst Jains or in the Punjab." 22. The statement of the adoptive son, i.e., PW1, regarding his adoption, while he was aged about four years, at the best is only hearsay. None of the PWs mention any sort of ceremony for physical act of giving of the appellant-plaintiff by his parent to the alleged adoptive father, late Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma. Further, none of the PWs stated that the natural father of the appellant-plaintiff was asked by the adoptive parent, i.e., late Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma to give his son (appellant-plaintiff) in adoption. Natural father of the appellant-plaintiff (Shri Kakchingtabam Nandalal Sharmn) did not even come forward to give his statement as PW that the adoptive parent of the appellant-plaintiff (Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma) asked him for giving the appellant-plaintiff in adoption. Over and above, the appellant-plaintiff's natural mother was not examined as PW. Since consent of the natural parents are essential in adoption of the appellant-plaintiff by the adoptive parent, late Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma, the parents of the appellant-plaintiff are very important witnesses. But no reason is given for not producing the appellant-plaintiff's natural parents as PWs. 22. It is well settled that if the best possible evidence which would have been produced by the appellant-plaintiff, is not produced, there should be adverse inference. Regarding this settled position of law it will be sufficient to refer to the decisions of the Apex Court in (1) M.S. Narayana Menon alias Mani v. State of Kerala and Anr., (2006) 6 SCC 39 , (2) Ashok Kumar v. State of T.N., (2006) 10 SCC 157 and (3) State Inspector of Police, Vishakhapatnam v. Surya Sankaram Karri, (2006) 7 SCC 172 . 23. In assessing the value of oral evidence a judge can call into aid of his experience of life: Ref.: Chaturbhuj Pande and Ors. v. Collector, Raigarh, AIR 1969 SC 255 . Para 6 of the SCC in Chaturbhuj Pande case (supra) read as follows : "6. But that is of no assistance to the appellants. As mentioned earlier, the High Court has refused to rely on the oral testimony adduced in support of the appellants' claim as regards the value of the orchard. It is true that the witnesses examined on behalf the appellants have not been effectively cross-examined. But that is of no assistance to the appellants. As mentioned earlier, the High Court has refused to rely on the oral testimony adduced in support of the appellants' claim as regards the value of the orchard. It is true that the witnesses examined on behalf the appellants have not been effectively cross-examined. It is also true that the Collector had not adduced any evidence in rebuttal; but that does not mean that the court is bound to accept their evidence. The Judges are not computers. In assessing the value to be attached to oral evidence, they are bound to call into aid their experience of life. As judges of fact, it was open to the appellate Judges to test the evidence placed before them on the basis of probabilities." 24. It is also equally well settled; in order to determine whether a fact has been proved or otherwise, the court has to look the surrounding circumstances in addition to the evidence of witnesses. Ref.: L. Debi Prasad's case (supra). In the present case, surrounding circumstances to the statements of the witnesses (PWs) are against the appellant-plaintiff for the simple reason that the appellant had exhibited revenue records of the landed properties to show that those landed properties were inherited by him from late Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma (adoptive father); in those revenue records, name, surname and clan of the appellant's father are shown as 'Kakchingtabam Nandalal Sharma' but the surname and name of the adoptive father are 'Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma'. The appellant-plaintiff did not even produce any public document or/ reliable document, such as admission register of the School where he had undergone schooling or any School Certificate or any Certificate showing that the father of the appellant-plaintiff is his adoptive father, i.e. late Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma. 25. As discussed by the trial court in the impugned judgment and decree, the name of the appellant's father is shown as Shri Kakchingtabam Nandalal Sharma, i.e., his natural father having the surname "Kakchingtabam" different from that of "Brahmacharimayum" of the adoptive father, Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma. 25. As discussed by the trial court in the impugned judgment and decree, the name of the appellant's father is shown as Shri Kakchingtabam Nandalal Sharma, i.e., his natural father having the surname "Kakchingtabam" different from that of "Brahmacharimayum" of the adoptive father, Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma. What is the effect of the adoption is mentioned in section 12 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 and section 15 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 clearly provides that "no adoption which has been validly made can be cancelled by the adoptive father or mother or any other person, nor can the adoptive child renounce his or her status as such and return to the family of his or her birth. For the foregoing reasons and discussions, this court is in complete agreement with the finding of the trial court in the impugned judgment and decree that the appellant-plaintiff had failed to prove that he had been adopted by late Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma. The surrounding circumstances, clearly negated the alleged adoption of the appellant-plaintiff by late Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma. 26. Section 5(2) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 clearly provides that an adoption which is void shall neither create any right in the adoptive family in favour of any person which he or she could not have acquired except by the reason of adoption nor destroy the right of any person in the family of his or her birth. Family arrangement could only be amongst the members of the family for the property belonging to the family. Therefore, only the individuals having antecedent title to the property of the family can be a party to the family settlement. The appellant-plaintiff who utterly failed to prove that he is the adoptive son of late Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma, cannot be a party in the family settlement of the family of late Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma for the properties belonging to late Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma. 27. The Apex Court in Kyle and Ors. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and Ors., AIR 1976 SC 807 held that the family settlement must be a bona fide one so as to resolve family disputes and rival claims by a fair and equitable division or allotment of properties between the various members of the family. 27. The Apex Court in Kyle and Ors. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and Ors., AIR 1976 SC 807 held that the family settlement must be a bona fide one so as to resolve family disputes and rival claims by a fair and equitable division or allotment of properties between the various members of the family. The appellant-plaintiff, who is not a member of the family of late Shri Brahmacharimayum Nilamani Sharma, cannot be a party to the family settlement of members of the family. Paras 9 and 10 of the AIR in Kale case (supra) read as follows : "9.......... The object of the arrangement is to protect the family from long drawn litigation or perpetual strifes which mar the unity and solidarity of the family and create hatred and bad blood between the various members of the family. Today when wo are striving to build up an egalitarian society and are trying for a complete reconstruction of the society, to maintain and uphold the unity and homogeneity of the family which ultimately results in the unification of the society and, therefore, of the entire country, is the prime need of the hour. A family arrangement by which the property is equitably divided between the various contenders so as to achieve an equal distribution of wealth instead of concentrating the same in the hands of a few is undoubtedly a milestone in the administration of social justice. That is why the term "family" has to be understood in a wider sense so as to include within its fold not only close relations or legal heirs but even those persons who may have some sort of antecedent title, a semblance of a claim or even if they have a spes successions so that future disputes are sealed for ever and the family instead of fighting claims inter se and wasting time, money and energy on such fruitless or futile litigation is able to devote its attention to more constructive work in the larger interest of the country. The courts have, therefore, leaned in favour of upholding a family arrangement instead of disturbing the same on technical or trivial grounds. The courts have, therefore, leaned in favour of upholding a family arrangement instead of disturbing the same on technical or trivial grounds. Where the courts find that the family arrangement suffers from a legal lacuna or a formal defect the rule of estoppel is pressed into service and is applied to shut out plea of the person who being a party to family arrangement seeks to unsettle a settled dispute and claims to revoke the family arrangement under which he has himself enjoyed some material benefits. The law in England on this point is almost the same. InHalsbury's Laws of England, vol. 17, 3rd edn., at pp. 215-216, the following apt observations regarding the essentials of the family settlement and the principles governing the existence of the same are made : "A family arrangement is an agreement between members of the same family, intended to be generally and reasonably for the benefit of the family either by compromising doubtful or disputed rights or by preserving the family property or the peace and security of the family by avoiding litigation or by saving-its honour. The agreement may be implied from a long course. Of dealing, but it is more usual to embody or to effectuate the agreement in a deed to which the term "family arrangement" is applied. Family arrangements are governed by principles which are not applicable to dealings between strangers. The court, when deciding the rights of parties under family arrangements or claims to upset such arrangements, considers what in the broadest view of the matter is most for the interest of families, and has regard to considerations which in dealing with transactions between persons not members of the same family, would not be taken into account. Matters which would be fatal to the validity of similar transactions between strangers are not objections to the binding effect of family arrangements." 10. Matters which would be fatal to the validity of similar transactions between strangers are not objections to the binding effect of family arrangements." 10. In other words to put the binding effect and the essentials of a family settlement in a concretized form, the matter may be reduced into the form of the following propositions : (1) The family settlement must be a bona fide one so as to resolve family disputes and rival claims by a fair and equitable division or allotment of properties between the various members of the family; (2) The said settlement must be voluntary and should not be induced by fraud, coercion or undue influence: (3) The family arrangement may be even oral in which case no registration is necessary; (4) It is well-settled that registration would be necessary only if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced into writing. Here also, a distinction should be made between a document containing the terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum pre pared after the family arrangement had already been made either for the purpose of the record or for in formation of the court for making necessary mutation. In such a case the memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in immovable properties and, therefore, does not fall within the mischief of section 17(2) of the Registration Act and is, therefore, not compulsorily registrable; (5) The members who may be parties to the family arrangement must have some antecedent title, claim or interest even a possible claim in the property. It which is acknowledged by the parties to the settlement. Even if one of the parties to the settlement has no title but under the arrangement the other party relinquishes all its claims or titles in favour of such a person and acknowledges him to be the sole owner, then the antecedent title must be assumed and the family arrangement will be upheld and the courts will find no difficulty in giving assent to the same; (6) Even if bona fide disputes, present or possible, which may not involve legal claims are settled by a bona fide family arrangement which is fair and equitable the family arrangement is final and biiT»mg on the parties to the settlement." For the foregoing reasons the present appeal is devoid of merit, accordingly dismissed. The parties are to bear their own costs. _____________