Research › Search › Judgment

Gauhati High Court · body

2012 DIGILAW 1029 (GAU)

Silk Point v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.

2012-08-31

T.VAIPHEI

body2012
JUDGMENT T. Vaiphei, J. 1. The legality of the repudiation made by the insurer-respondent in respect of the claim for indemnification of the damage caused to the shop of the petitioner and the entire goods stocked therein due to the impact created by an explosion, on the ground that such an act of terrorism was not covered by the insurance policy, is under challenge in this writ petition. The facts giving rise to this writ petition, as pleaded by the petitioner, may be briefly noted before proceeding further. The petitioner is the proprietor of the cloth shop under the name and style of "M/s Silk Point", which is located at H.B. Road, Kamarpatty, Guwahati, and is engaged in selling Assamese cloth such as Pat, Muga, Assam Silk, etc. with the loan taken from the respondent No. 3 (Punjab National Bank, Guwahati) in the year 2005. As required by Bank-respondent, the petitioner duly insured his shop and the goods stocked therein with the respondent No. 1 in accordance with the tie-up arrangement made between the Bank and the respondent No. 1: Insurance Policy bearing No. 321100/48/2009/836 being risk against fire and special perils, burglary and house breaking and money in transit was issued to him covering the period from 26.9.2008 to 25.9.2009. The petitioner already had Shopkeepers Insurance Coverage from the date of establishment of the shop i.e. from 2005 onwards. The case of the petitioner is that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 neither in the Shopkeepers' Insurance Policy Proposal Form-cum-Policy Schedule nor the Shopkeepers' Insurance Policy ever informed if the need to pay extra premium for availing a cover against an act of terrorism and/or classified terrorism as a special peril. On 30.10.2008 at about 11.25 AM, a powerful bomb exploded in front of the shop of the petitioner instantly killing one of its employees and damaging the entire goods stocked in its shop together with the shop due to the impact created by such explosion. 2. On 30.10.2008 at about 11.25 AM, a powerful bomb exploded in front of the shop of the petitioner instantly killing one of its employees and damaging the entire goods stocked in its shop together with the shop due to the impact created by such explosion. 2. The petitioner further states that it duly informed the insurer-respondents about the incident for assessing the damage sustained by it to claim damages/indemnification thereof Similarly, the respondent No. 3 also wrote to them to that effect Much to the consternation of the petitioner, the insurer-respondents by their letter dated 9.2.2009 repudiated the claim on the ground that no terrorism cover had been taken by it by paying additional premium and that the FIR lodged by it, the police report, investigation report and survey report revealed that the damage had been caused by bomb blast, which is an act of terrorism and is not included among the perils thus insured, and the same was, accordingly, treated as "No Claim". According to the petitioner, the question of not taking terrorism-cover could never arise when the insurer never offered to insure an act of terrorism by payment of additional premium: neither was it aware of the need for taking such cover. It is the specific case of the petitioner that when there was no terrorism cover in existence or the same having not been offered to it by the insurer at the time of taking the insurance policy by it, the insurer-respondents cannot be permitted to repudiate the claim of the petitioner. The fact that the insurance policy issued by the insurer-respondents was a comprehensive policy covering all kinds of risks including the act of terrorism is evident from the letter dated 29.1.2009 issued by the respondent No. 3 with whom the insurer had a tie-up arrangement. In fact, subsequent to this incident, the insurer-respondents issued to one Nilamani Malakar a new policy or renewal providing for terrorism cover without any additional premium. It is, therefore, prayed that the impugned letter of repudiation of the claim of the petitioner is liable to be quashed, and the insurer-respondents be directed to entertain the claim of the petitioner and settle the same in accordance with law. 3. It is, therefore, prayed that the impugned letter of repudiation of the claim of the petitioner is liable to be quashed, and the insurer-respondents be directed to entertain the claim of the petitioner and settle the same in accordance with law. 3. The writ petition is opposed by the insurer-respondents, who, in their affidavit-in-opposition, have taken the stance that the option of availing cover against act of terrorism as a separate peril vested with the petitioner and not with them: such offer has to come from the petitioner. As the petitioner did not choose to take insurance cover against act of terrorism as a separate peril, they are not liable to indemnify it for the loss incurred by such act of terrorism. While taking the shopkeepers' Insurance Policy, the petitioner could have asked for providing terrorism coverage had it really wanted, in which case, they would have allowed it to take insurance cover for act of terrorism on payment on payment of additional premium. It was only after the occurrence of the incident that it sought to claim indemnification by blaming them of not offering terrorism cover. The letter dated 20.1.2009 issued by the respondent No. 3 to the respondent No. 2 was in the nature of a request to settle the claim of the petitioner on sympathetic considerations: no assistance can be taken by the petitioner from this letter. The mere fact that the proposal form formulated by the insurer-respondents did not have separate clause for terrorism cover does not mean that there was no provision for terrorism cover. The proposal form of United India Insurance do contain provision for terrorism cover, but some Insurance Companies do not have such provision in their proposal form, but that is merely incidental and has no bearing on the case of the petitioner. According to the answering respondents, while the loss incurred by the petitioner in that incident is not disputed, the same cannot, however, be compensated by them as it did not opt for terrorism cover. It is, therefore, contended that the writ petition has no merit, and is liable to be dismissed. 4. According to the answering respondents, while the loss incurred by the petitioner in that incident is not disputed, the same cannot, however, be compensated by them as it did not opt for terrorism cover. It is, therefore, contended that the writ petition has no merit, and is liable to be dismissed. 4. The respondent-Bank also filed their affidavit, which virtually supports the case of the petitioner and submits that the act of terrorism, namely, the bomb blast, occurred on the road side, which is beyond the footpath of the shop of the petitioner, and the fire which subsequently started engulfed the said shop. According to the answering respondent, such act of terrorism did not take place in the shop of the petitioner but at some other place near the shop premises, and the refusal of the insurer to entertain the claim of the petitioner is untenable in law. It is the contention of the respondent-Bank that the act of terrorism was on the road side and the shop was damaged by subsequent file and the insurer cannot turn down the claim of the petitioner merely by saying that an act of terrorism is not covered by the Insurance Policy. It is pointed out by the answering respondent that whenever officials of the respondent No. 1 visited the Bank, their official used to fill up the columns of the proposal form on behalf of the insured and asked the Bank official to sign on the proposal form and that it was the duty of the insurer to intimate its official that for terrorism cover, extra premium should be insisted upon, and since no instruction to that effect was given to the Bank official, they were under the impression that everything was covered Due to the non-payment of the insurance cover, the petitioner has failed to clear the installment amounts due to the Bank and, as such, a huge amount of debt is piling up and public money is at stake. Accordingly to the respondent-Bank, the insurer is under obligation to entertain the claim of the petitioner-firm. 5. Both Mr. G.N. Sahewalla, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner and Mr. S. Dutta, the learned counsel for the insurer were heard at length. Accordingly to the respondent-Bank, the insurer is under obligation to entertain the claim of the petitioner-firm. 5. Both Mr. G.N. Sahewalla, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner and Mr. S. Dutta, the learned counsel for the insurer were heard at length. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that the insurer has the duty to disclose that the insurance policy taken by the petitioner did not cover an act of terrorism, which is the fundamental principle of insurance law and when they did not admittedly make such disclosure to the petitioner-firm, they cannot claim the benefit of the exclusion clause and refuse to entertain the claim of the petitioner-firm. According to the learned senior counsel, the claim of the petitioner is covered by the specified perils more, particularly, by the peril "explosion", which irrespective of the source thereof, covers the resultant fire destroying the shop and goods of the petitioner, and the stance taken by the insurer is inconsistent with and contrary to the conditions of the insurance policy. He, therefore, strenuously urges this Court to quash the impugned letter and direct the insurer to entertain the claim of the petitioner for indemnification of the loss sustained by it due to fire. To buttress his contentions, the learned senior draws support from the following decisions of the Apex Court (i) United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Manubhai Dharmasinhhai Gajera, (2008) 10 SCC 404 ; (ii) National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Ishar Das Madan Lal, (2007) 4 SCC 705 ; (iii) Modern Insulators Ltd. Vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2000) 2 SCC 734 and (iv) B.V. Nagaraju Vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (1996) 4 SCC 647 . 6. Unfolding his arguments, Mr. S. Dutta, the learned counsel for the insurer-respondents, raises preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petition and submits that the dispute involves in this writ petition is essentially one for the enforcement of the contractual right of the petitioner in terms of the contract of insurance, which cannot be decided by this Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution: the petitioner should be relegated to a competent civil Court of jurisdiction to enforce his contractual right, if it has any. It is the further contention of the learned counsel that when the petitioner did not choose to avail of the separate peril under the head of "act of terrorism", the claim of the insured was rightly repudiated by the insurer, for which no legitimate grievance can be raised by it According to the learned counsel, the proximate cause of the loss/damage sustained by the insured was bomb blast, which is a terrorist activity, for which no additional premium was paid by it thereby warranting the repudiation of its claim. He also contends that the insurance policy is contractual in nature, and a person who signs a document which contains the contractual terms is normally bound by them even if he does not read them or is ignorant of the precise legal effect thereof. The insured, who signed the contract of insurance with his eyes wide open and who did not bother to enquire the extent of the risk covered by the same before signing the same, cannot later on turn around and claim that he is not bound by the contractual obligations therein. To fortify his submissions, the learned counsel relies on the following decision of the Apex Court: (i) Amravati District Central Coop. Bank Ltd. Vs. United Fire & General Insurance Co. Ltd., (2010) 5 SCC 294 : (ii) Life Insurance of India & Ors. Vs. Asha Goel, (2001) 2 SCC 160 ; (iii) Bihar S.E.B. Vs. Green Rubber Industries, (1990) 1 SCC 731 and (vi) General Assurance Society Vs. Chandmall Jain, AIR 1966 SC 1642. He, therefore, contends that writ petition is not only without merit but is also otherwise not maintainable for non-exhaustion of an alternative remedy of civil suit. 7. It may be noted that the parties are not in dispute that the insurer did not inform the petitioner that there is a clause in the contract of insurance requiring the insured to pay additional premium for an act of terrorism. 7. It may be noted that the parties are not in dispute that the insurer did not inform the petitioner that there is a clause in the contract of insurance requiring the insured to pay additional premium for an act of terrorism. This is evident from paragraph 10 of their counter wherein they categorically stated that "the petitioner could have asked the Insurance Company for providing terrorism coverage if they really wanted and in that event, the respondent company would have definitely facilitated the petitioner with terrorism cover on payment of additional premium." On the other hand, a specific plea, which is not denied, is made by the petitioner in paragraph 9 of the writ petition that" [I]n the instant case, a perusal of the proposal Form-cum-Policy Schedule would clearly reveal that at the time when the petitioner submitted its proposal to the respondent insurance company, the respondent insurance company offered no terrorism cover and to the knowledge of the petitioner at the time when petitioner obtained the insurance, no such terrorism cover was offered by the respondent insurance company. In fact, it is also pointed out by the petitioner in paragraph 14 of the writ petition that in the insurance policy issued by the insurer-respondents in favour of one Nilamani Malakar subsequent to the bomb blast which occurred on 30.10.2008, no additional premium was paid by him for terrorism cover vide the Insurance Policy dated 16.3.2009 at Annexure XII to the writ petition. This assertion of fact is also not denied by the insurer. The principle for construing a beneficent legislation such as insurance law came up for consideration in Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Kokilaben Chandravadan, (1987) 2 SCC 654 , which was subsequently followed in B.V. Nagaru case (supra), the relevant para is reproduced at the latter judgment, which said: (See pp. 650-651, para 7) ... When the option is between opting for a view which will relieve the distress and misery of the victims of accidents or their dependants on the one hand and the equally plausible view which will reduce the profitability of the insurer in regard to the occupational hazard undertaken by way of business activity, there is hardly any choice. The Court cannot but opt for the former view. The Court cannot but opt for the former view. Even if one were to make a strictly doctrinaire approach, the very same conclusion would emerge in obeisance to the doctrine of 'reading down' the exclusion clause in the light of the 'main purpose' of the provision so that the 'exclusion clause' does not cross swords with the 'main purpose' highlighted earlier. The effort must be to harmonize the two instead of allowing the exclusion clause o snipe successfully at the main purpose. The theory which needs no support is supported by Carter's 'Breach Contract' vide paragraph 251. To quote: Notwithstanding the general ability of contracting parties to agree to exclusion clauses which operate to define obligations there exists a rule, usually referred to as the 'main purpose rule', which may limit the application of wide exclusion clauses defining a promisor's contractual obligations. For example, in Glynn v. Margetson & Co., (AC at p. 357), Lord Halsbury, LC stated: It seems to me that in construing this document, which is a contract of carriage between parties, one must in the first instance look at the whole instrument and not at one part of it only. Looking at the whole instrument, and seeing what one must regard... as its main purpose, one must reject words, indeed whole provisions, if they are inconsistent with what one assumes to be the main purpose of the contract. Although this rule played a role in the development of the doctrine of fundamental breach, the continued validity of the rule was acknowledged when the doctrine was rejected by the House of Lords in Suisse Atlantique Societe d' Armament Maritime SA v. NV Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale. Accordingly, wide exclusion clauses will be read down to the extent to which they inconsistent with the main purpose, or object, of the contract. 8. The question to be determined now is, whether it was the duty of the insurer to enquire the existence of clause requiring additional payment of premium for "act of terrorism" or the duty of the insurer to inform the insured about the need to toke terrorism cover by payment of extra premium. In Modern Insulators Ltd case (supra), an issue of somewhat similar nature came up for consideration before the Apex Court wherein it was observed at paragraphs 8 and 9 of the judgment: 8. In Modern Insulators Ltd case (supra), an issue of somewhat similar nature came up for consideration before the Apex Court wherein it was observed at paragraphs 8 and 9 of the judgment: 8. It is the fundamental principle of insurance law that utmost good faith must be observed by contracting parties and good faith forbids either party from non-disclosure of the facts which the parties know. The insured has the duty to disclose and similarly it is the duty of the insurance company and its agents to disclose all materials in their knowledge since the obligation of good faith applies to both equally. 9. In view of the above settled position of law we are of the opinion that the view expressed by the National Commission is not correct. As the above terms and conditions of the standard policy wherein the exclusion clause was included, were neither a part of the contract of insurance nor disclosed to the appellant, the respondent cannot claim the benefit of the said exclusion clause. Therefore, the finding of the National Commission is untenable in law. Similar is the view taken by Apex Court in the subsequent decision of Ishar Das Madan Lal (supra) at paragraphs 7 and 8. To quote (SCC, p. 109) 7. It is not in dispute that an insurance cover against theft was granted by the appellant. The insurance policy, thus, covered the risk of theft also. An insurer determines the extent of its risk. It floats the policy knowing fully well the risk it seeks to cover. Having regard to the determination of the risk only he fixes the quantum of premium. The insured while entering into a contract of insurance must precisely know the extent of his cover so that he may take out additional insurance if it is so required. 9. In the case at hand also, the undisputed fact on record is that the insurer-respondents did not inform the petitioner of the exclusion clause nor was the latter aware of the existence of such a clause. Moreover, the respondent-Bank also in their affidavit corroborated this version of the petitioner. Under the circumstances, the exclusion clause on "act of terrorism", assuming that there is any, cannot be held applicable to the case of the petitioner. The matter can be looked at from a different angle also. Moreover, the respondent-Bank also in their affidavit corroborated this version of the petitioner. Under the circumstances, the exclusion clause on "act of terrorism", assuming that there is any, cannot be held applicable to the case of the petitioner. The matter can be looked at from a different angle also. No doubt, the shop of the petitioner was damaged by the splinters of a bomb due to the explosion in the front of the shop of the petitioner vide Fire Attendance Certificate dated 2.5.2009 issued by the Director of Fire Service, Assam Fire Service Organization, Guwahati (Annexure-IV). The shop and the goods were insured in respect of "Fire and Special Perils". The term "peril" is defined by P. Ramanantha Aiyar's Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd Edn. as follows: Peril. 'Peril' means exposure to injury, loss, or destruction; imminent or impending danger; risk, hazard, or jeopardy. In insurance, any event that causes a loss and which may be included or excluded on an insurance policy, e.g. an insured peril in a fire policy is fire; and excluded peril is war. (Insurance) In Section 1, which is in respect of Building and Contents (Excluding Money and Valuables), the scope of insurance cover is given. The term "Special Peril" means 1. Fire excluding destruction or damage caused to the property insured by a) (i) its own fermentation, natural heating or spontaneous combustion, (ii) its undergoing any heating or drying process; b) burning of property insured by any Public Authority. 2. Lighting. 3. Explosion/Implosion: Excluding loss, destruction of or damage a) to boilers (other than domestic boilers) economizers or other vessels, machinery or apparatus (in which steam is generated) or their contents resulting from their own explosion/implosion, b) caused by centrifugal forces. 10. Undoubtedly, the shop and goods of the petitioner were destroyed by fire from the explosion which, in turn, was caused by the bomb blast. It may be noted here that the parties had proceeded on the assumption that the bomb blast was, in turn, caused by the act of terrorism. As the bomb blast causing the explosion resulting in the destruction of the shop and goods of the petitioner was caused by the act of terrorism, so argued the learned counsel for the insurer, such destruction caused by the act of terrorism is not covered by the insurance cover. In my judgment, the argument of the insurer-respondents sounds like legalistic hair-splitting. In my judgment, the argument of the insurer-respondents sounds like legalistic hair-splitting. When destruction by explosion by itself is covered by the contract of insurance, I do not think that the cause of the explosion or, for that matter, of the bomb blast is really important: the cause of the explosion or the author of the bomb blast which causes the explosion is rather immaterial. The fact remains that the properties admittedly insured by the petitioner have been destroyed/damaged by the explosion from a bomb blast in front of the shop of the petitioner. There is no evidence that the shop of the petitioner was the target of the act of terrorism. On the contrary; there is every reason to believe that the shop and goods of the petitioner were the unintended or were innocent victims of the act of terrorism. In my judgment, irrespective of the cause of the explosion, the explosion which destroyed the insured properties falls within the four comers of the term "Special Perils" as defined in Section 1 of the Shopkeepers' Insurance Policy. In Fire and Motor Insurance by E.T. Hardy Ivamy (1973 Edition) under the heading of "Immateriality of Cause of Fire", the legal position was sought to be explained in the Mowing manner: The object of the contract is to provide for payment of a sum of money, or for some corresponding benefit, to meet a loss or detriment which may be suffered by the insured on the happening of a fire. To carry the investigation, therefore, beyond the cause of the loss, and to cast upon the insured the burden of establishing that the cause of the tire was covered by his contract, would largely defeat this object. When it is once established that the loss is due to fire within the meaning of the contract, the cause of the fire is, as a general rule, immaterial. The fact that the fire was occasioned by negligence does not exempt the insurer from liability, for one of the objects of the contract of fire insurance, is to provide against the consequences of negligence. It is, therefore, immaterial whether a fire which causes a loss is lighted improperly, or, after being properly lighted, is negligently attended, since the insured both cases is entitled to recover. It is, therefore, immaterial whether a fire which causes a loss is lighted improperly, or, after being properly lighted, is negligently attended, since the insured both cases is entitled to recover. It is equally immaterial whether the fire is caused by the negligence of servants or strangers, or even by the negligence of the insured himself. The legal position is succinctly explained by Lord Atkinson, J. in Harris v. Poland, 1841 King's Bench Division, in the following few words: It mattered not whether the property had gone to the fire or the fire had gone to the property. There had been ignition of insured property not intended to be ignited, and the loss fell within the plain words of the policy. In my judgment, with due respect, the aforesaid observations in the context of English cases are consistent with the principles for construction of beneficent legislation like insurance law. The principles for construing a beneficent legislation such as insurance law also came up for consideration before the Apex Court in Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Kokilaben Chandravadan, (1987) 2 SCC 654 which was subsequently followed in B.V. Nagaru case (supra), wherein it was held at para 7 of the judgment: (See pp. 650-651, para 7) ... When the option is between opting for a view which will relieve the distress and misery of the victims of accidents or their dependants on the one hand and the equally plausible view which will reduce the profitability of the insurer in regard to the occupational hazard undertaken by way of business activity, mere is hardly any choice. The Court cannot but opt for the former view. Even if one were to make a strictly doctrinaire approach, the very same conclusion would emerge in obeisance to the doctrine of 'reading down' the exclusion clause in the light of the 'main purpose' of the provision so that the 'exclusion clause' does not cross swords with the 'main purpose' highlighted earlier. The effort must be to harmonize the two instead of allowing the exclusion clause o snipe successfully at the main purpose. The theory which needs no support is supported by Carter's "Breach Contract' vide paragraph 251. The effort must be to harmonize the two instead of allowing the exclusion clause o snipe successfully at the main purpose. The theory which needs no support is supported by Carter's "Breach Contract' vide paragraph 251. To quote: Notwithstanding the general ability of contracting parties to agree to exclusion clauses which operate to define obligations there exists a rule, usually referred to as the 'main purpose rule', which may limit the application of wide exclusion clauses defining a promisor's contractual obligations. For example, in Glynn v. Margetson & Co. (AC at p. 357), Lord Halsbury, L.C. stated: It seems to me that in construing this document, which is a contract of carriage between parties, one must in the first instance look at the whole instrument and not at one part of it only. Looking at the whole instrument, and seeing what one must regard... as its main purpose, one must reject words, indeed whole provisions, if they are inconsistent with what one assumes to be the main purpose of the contract. Although this rule played a role in the development of the doctrine of fundamental breach, the continued validity of the rule was acknowledged when the doctrine was rejected by the House of Lords in Suisse Atlantique Societe d' Armament Maritime SA v. NV Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale. Accordingly, wide exclusion clauses will be read down to the extent to which they inconsistent with the main purpose, or object of the contract. 11. The question to be determined now is, whether it was the duty of the insured to enquire the existence of a clause in the contract of insurance requiring additional payment of premium for "act of terrorism" or it was the other way round. In Modem Insulators Ltd case (supra), an issue somewhat similar to this issue came up for consideration before the Apex Court wherein it was observed at paragraphs 8 and 9 of the judgment: 8. It is the fundamental principle of insurance law that utmost good faith must be observed by contracting parties and good faith forbids either party from non-disclosure of the facts which the parties know. The insured has the duty to disclose and similarly it is the duty of the insurance company and its agents to disclose all materials in their knowledge since the obligation of good faith applies to both equally. 9. The insured has the duty to disclose and similarly it is the duty of the insurance company and its agents to disclose all materials in their knowledge since the obligation of good faith applies to both equally. 9. In view of the above settled position of law we are of the opinion that the view expressed by the National Commission is not correct. As the above terms and conditions of the standard policy wherein the exclusion clause was included, were neither a part of the contract of insurance nor disclosed to the appellant, the respondent cannot claim the benefit of the said exclusion clause. Therefore, the finding of the National Commission is untenable in law. Similar is the view taken by Apex Court in the subsequent decision of Ishar Das Madan Lal (supra) at paragraphs 7 and 8. To quote: (SCC, p. 109)- 7. It is not in dispute that an insurance cover against theft was granted by the appellant. The insurance policy, thus, covered the risk of theft also. An insurer determines the extent of its risk. It floats the policy knowing fully well the risk it seeks to cover. Having regard to the determination of the risk only he fixes the quantum of premium. The insured while entering into a contract of insurance must precisely know the extent of his cover so that he may take put additional insurance if it is so required. True, in Amravati case (supra), the case cited by the learned counsel for the insurer, it is stated by the Apex Court that in interpreting documents relating to a contract of insurance, the duty of the Court is to interpret the words in which the contract is expressed by the parties, because it is not for the Court to make anew contract, howsoever reasonable, if the parties have not made it themselves. Moreover, the terms of the agreement have to be strictly construed to determine the extent of liability of the insurer. However, in the instant case, as already found by me, the term "Special Perils" clearly takes in within its sweep destruction by explosion, and does not expressly exclude explosion by an act of terrorism. Consequently, the construction placed by this Court on this particular clause does not run counter to the principles of construction reiterated in Amravati (supra). However, in the instant case, as already found by me, the term "Special Perils" clearly takes in within its sweep destruction by explosion, and does not expressly exclude explosion by an act of terrorism. Consequently, the construction placed by this Court on this particular clause does not run counter to the principles of construction reiterated in Amravati (supra). Any other interpretation is inconsistent with or will otherwise frustrate the object or purpose of a beneficent legislation like the law of insurance. On the contention of the learned counsel for the insurer that the petitioner is bound by the terms of the contract of insurance signed by it with its eyes wide open, my simple answer is that as the petitioner was admittedly not informed by the insurer about the need to pay extra premium for an act of terrorism cover, assuming that there is any, which is hotly contested by the petitioner, the maxim "nodum pactum ex quo non oritur action" applied in M/s Green, Rubber Industries (supra) is not applicable to the facts of this case. Coming now to the question of non-maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the petitioner has an alternative remedy of a civil suit for enforcement of its contractual liabilities, this contention also does not, on the facts of this case, stand close scrutiny. It is now a settled law that where a disputed question of fact pertaining to the interpretation/meaning of a documents or a part thereof are involved, the Court can very well go into the same and decide the objections if the facts permit. In the instant case also, the dispute involved in this writ petition is about interpretation of the terms of the contract of insurance, which requires no oral evidence. If at all any decision is needed in this behalf, I may refer to paragraphs 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36 and 37 of the decision in ABL International Ltd. Vs. Export Credit Guarantee Corpn. of India Ltd., (2004) 3 SCO 553: 27. From the above discussion of ours, the following legal principles emerge as to the maintainability of a writ petition: (a) In an appropriate case, a writ petition as against a State or an instrumentality of a State arising out of a contractual obligation is maintainable. Export Credit Guarantee Corpn. of India Ltd., (2004) 3 SCO 553: 27. From the above discussion of ours, the following legal principles emerge as to the maintainability of a writ petition: (a) In an appropriate case, a writ petition as against a State or an instrumentality of a State arising out of a contractual obligation is maintainable. (b) Merely because some disputed questions of fact arise for consideration, same cannot be a ground to refuse to entertain a writ petition in all cases as a matter of rule. (c) A writ petition involving a consequential relief of monetary claim is also no maintainable. * * * * 28. However, while entertaining an objection as to the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Court should in mind the fact that the power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provisions of the Constitution. The High Court having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. The Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions in the exercise of this power. (See Whirpool Corpn. V. Registrar of Trade Marks.) This plenary right of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ will not normally be exercised by the Court to the exclusion of other available remedies unless such action of the State or its instrumentality is arbitrary or unreasonable so as to violate the constitutional mandate of Article 14 or for other valid or legitimate reasons, for which the Court thinks it necessary to exercise the said jurisdiction. * * * 31. The fact that the appellant to the extent covered by the contract of insurance had agreed to insure the risk of non-payment of its consideration for the tea exported to Kazak Corporation is also not disputed. 32. The fact that the appellant had exported 8.70 lakh kilograms of tea to Kazakhstan between 8.10.1993 and 30.10.1993 is also not disputed. 33. The fact that the Kazak Corporation did not pay the consideration for the tea received by it in cash in US dollars is also not disputed. 34. 32. The fact that the appellant had exported 8.70 lakh kilograms of tea to Kazakhstan between 8.10.1993 and 30.10.1993 is also not disputed. 33. The fact that the Kazak Corporation did not pay the consideration for the tea received by it in cash in US dollars is also not disputed. 34. The fact that the Kazakhstan Government stood as a guarantor for prompt payment for the goods received by the Kazak Corporation and that the said Government railed to honour its guarantee is also not disputed. 35. The fact that the Reserve Bank of India permitted the appellant to receive cash consideration in the form of US $ instead of barter payment is also not disputed. 36. What is disputed is the obligation of the first respondent to cover the risk of non-payment of consideration by cash in US currency on the ground that the risk covered by the first respondent is a risk arising out of non-supply of goods by the barter method only. 37. In our opinion, this limited area of dispute can be settled by looking into the terms of the contract of insurance as well as the export contract, and the same does not require consideration of any oral evidence or any other documentary evidence other than what is already on record. The claim of the contesting parties will stand or fall on the terms of the contract, interpretation of which, as stated above, does not require any external evidence. (Underlined for emphasis) No other issue survives for consideration. For the afore-mentioned reasons, this writ petition is allowed. The impugned letters dated 9.2.2009 (Annexure IX) and 20.2.2009 (Annexure-XIII) issued by the respondents No. 2 are hereby quashed. Consequently, the respondents No. 1 and 2 are directed to entertain the claim of the petitioner in respect of the Insurance Policy No. 321100/48/2009/836 and settle the same in accordance with law. No costs.