1. A proceeding was initiated by the appellant for grant of probate of the ‘Will’ dated 02.02.2007 and 17.12.2009 as executed by Rohnuni, W/o Lalmangteka Sailo (1), Sihphir, Vengthar, being Probate Case No. 1/2012 in the court of the Senior Civil Judge, Aizawl, Mizoram. 2. It appears from the pleadings that the proceeding was initiated in the Court of the District Judge, being Probate Case No. 2/2011, which was subsequently transferred to the court of the Addl. District Judge for trial and disposal. The respondents herein, by filing the written statement in the said probate case, stated that the testator ‘was from the Mizo tribe and the plaintiff and the defendants are also governed by the Mizo Hnam Dan and execution of the ‘Wills’ and probate of the ‘Wills’ are only governed by the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956. 3. As per Section 11 of the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956, the Subordinate District Council Courts have jurisdiction to grant or revoke probate in all cases. The provisions of Sections 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the said Act provide about how the Subordinate District Council Courts shall probate the Will. Section 11 of the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956 is gainfully reproduced hereunder: “11. Jurisdiction of Subordinate District Council Court in granting and revoking probates, etc.- The Subordinate District Council Court shall have jurisdiction in granting and revoking probates’ in all cases within its territorial jurisdiction.” It has been further laid in the Pleadings that after the Mizoram Civil Courts Act, 2005 came into force, by operation of Section 10 of the said Act, the Court of the Court of the Addl. District Magistrate (Judicial) the District Council) Court and Sub-District Council Courts and Addl. Sub-District Council Courts have been converted to the Civil Courts. For reference, Section 10 of the Mizoram Civil Courts Act, 2005 is extracted hereunder: “10. Existing courts, their location and seal to be deemed to be established fixed and determined under this Act. (1) The courts of Additional District Magistrate(Judicial) existing immediately prior to the appointed date shall, with effect from the appointed date, be converted to be Courts of District Judges established under this Act until they are reconstituted in accordance with this Act. Existing courts, their location and seal to be deemed to be established fixed and determined under this Act. (1) The courts of Additional District Magistrate(Judicial) existing immediately prior to the appointed date shall, with effect from the appointed date, be converted to be Courts of District Judges established under this Act until they are reconstituted in accordance with this Act. (2) The District Council Court existing immediately prior to the appointed date shall, with effect from the appointed date be deemed to be court of Senior Civil Judges under this Act until they are constituted in accordance with this Act. (3) Sub-District Council Courts and Additional Sub-District Council Courts at Aizawl, Kolasib, Champhai and Lunglei existing immediately prior to the appointed date shall with effect from the appointed date deemed to be court of Junior Civil Judge under this Act until they are constituted in accordance with this Act. (4) The seal in use, in a civil court deemed to be established under sub-sections (10) to (4), immediately prior to the appointed date may continue to be used until an order is made by the High Court under Section 9.” 4. On the face of such opposition from the respondents, the said Addl. District Judge, Aizawl heard the parties on maintainability of the proceeding and by the order dated 07.10.2011, dismissed the Probate Case No. 2/2011, observing that: “The Mizoram Civil Court Act, 2005 was notified in the Mizoram Gazette Extra Ordinary on 24.10.2005 and as per Section 2(a) the appointed date was 26.4.2006 vide Mizoram Gazette dt. 28.4.2006. As rightly pointed out by Pu Sam Joseph the Id. Counsel for the opposite party the Junior Civil Judge is the right court to probate the Will and this court is not having jurisdiction to entertain the application in view of the provision of Section 10(3) of the Mizoram Civil Court Act. Hence, the application is dismissed and the applicant is at liberty to approach the proper forum, if so, advised.” 5. Thereafter, the appellant filed a petition for review of the said order dated 07.10.2011 being Review Case No. 3/2011 in the court of the Addl. District Judge, Aizawl, but the said prayer for review was disposed of by the order dated 29.11.2011, holding that: “I heard the Id. Thereafter, the appellant filed a petition for review of the said order dated 07.10.2011 being Review Case No. 3/2011 in the court of the Addl. District Judge, Aizawl, but the said prayer for review was disposed of by the order dated 29.11.2011, holding that: “I heard the Id. counsels for the parties and as per the Minutes of the Administrative Committee Meeting held on 2.11.2011 at 4.30 p.m. in the office chamber of Hon’ble Chief Justice and as per the provision of the Mizoram Civil Court Act, the valuation of the property is beyond the jurisdiction of the Junior Civil Judge and as agreed to by the parties the appropriate forum shall be Senior Civil Judge.” 6. Thereafter, the proceeding was instituted in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Aizawl. The Senior Civil Judge, Aizawl, by the impugned judgment and order dated 28.02.2012 decided the questions relating to the maintainability, as it appears, as the preliminary issues as reproduced hereunder without allowing the appellant to have the benefit of the full extent of the adjudication as provided in the Code, which is defined in Section 2(d) of the Mizoram Civil Courts Act, 2005: “(i) Whether the plaintiff (the appellant herein) has got locus standi to institute the proceeding? and (ii) Whether there is any cause of action for filing the said proceeding?” It has been adverted that the said preliminary hearing had been taken up in the light of Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC, which provides for rejection of the plaint, where the suit does not disclose the cause of action and the suit appears to be barred by any other law. 7. On consideration of the rival submissions, the “terms of rivalry” as formulated are extracted hereunder: “(i) There is no other choice for proceedings of Probate Case except under the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956 as it remains in force. In the submitted two Wills, left thumb impression was given by the deceased Smt. Rohnuni whilst section 7 of the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956 specifically insisted to put right thumb impression by a women/female testatrix which is clearly invalid as per the rigour of section 8 of the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956. Mr. In the submitted two Wills, left thumb impression was given by the deceased Smt. Rohnuni whilst section 7 of the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956 specifically insisted to put right thumb impression by a women/female testatrix which is clearly invalid as per the rigour of section 8 of the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956. Mr. W. Sam Joseph had taken reliance in the case of Smt. Mualvumi v. Shri Dolaia decided on 14.6.2005 in connection with RSA No. 15 of 2003 delivered by Hon’ble Gauhati High Court, Aizawl Bench. (ii) More so, the applicability of Indian Succession Act, 1925 in Mizoram is specifically barred by notification. (iii) The provisions of the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956 specifically empowered/authorised only the Subordinate District Council Court to adjudicate the probate case and now equivalent to court of Civil Judge under Rule 34 of the Mizoram Family Courts Rules, 2008.” 8. It appeared to the Senior Civil Judge, Aizawl that the proceeding was initiated under the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and as such the competent court should be the court of the District Judge by virtue of Section 2(bb) read with Section 171 of the Indian Succession Act. It has been further observed that for purpose of separating the judiciary from the executive and as per the policy as laid down under Article 50 of the Constitution of India, the Mizoram Civil Courts Act, 2005 has been enacted. The Senior Civil Judge, Aizawl further observed that in view of Article 371-G of the Constitution of India, the Indian Succession Act, 1925 was not in force in the then Union Territory of Mizoram and unless the Legislative Assembly of Mizoram by resolution so decides, the said Act, 1925 cannot be operationalised. The Senior Civil Judge, Aizawl further observed that in view of Article 371-G of the Constitution of India, the Indian Succession Act, 1925 was not in force in the then Union Territory of Mizoram and unless the Legislative Assembly of Mizoram by resolution so decides, the said Act, 1925 cannot be operationalised. For appreciation, Article 371-G of the Constitution of India is reproduced hereunder:-- “371-G. Special provision with respect to the State of Mizoram -- Notwithstanding in this Constitution,-- (a) no Act of Parliament in respect of -- (i) religious or social practices of the Mizos, (ii) Mizo customary law and procedure, (iii) administration of civil and criminal justice involving decisions according to Mizo customary law, (iv) ownership and transfer of land, shall apply to the State of Mizoram unless the Legislative Assembly of the State of Mizoram by a resolution so decides: Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to any Central Act in force in the Union Territory of Mizoram immediately before the commencement of the Constitution (Fifty-third Amendment) Act, 1986: (b) the Legislative Assembly of the State of Mizoram shall consist of not less than forty member.” 9. The Senior Civil Judge further observed that Section 7 of the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956 specifically insisted to put right thumb impression by a women/female testatrix which is cogently invalid as per the rigour of Section 8 of the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956, which is also held as mandatory in the case of Smt. Mualvumi v. Shri Dolaia, decided on 14.06.2005 in connection with RSA No. 15/2003 by this Court at Aizawl Bench. According to the Senior Civil Judge, under the aegis of the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956, the law has remained unchanged. Sections 11 and 12 of the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956 authorised only the Subordinate District Council Court in granting and revoking the probates and all matters connected therewith, pertinently, akin to the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The Senior Civil Judge further observed that the jurisdiction of the said court remained empowered to sit as the appellate court. Sections 11 and 12 of the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956 authorised only the Subordinate District Council Court in granting and revoking the probates and all matters connected therewith, pertinently, akin to the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The Senior Civil Judge further observed that the jurisdiction of the said court remained empowered to sit as the appellate court. He further observed that unless and until the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956 is amended or repealed, the power to probate the ‘Will’ will be governed by the provisions of Rule 34 of the Mizoram Family Courts Rules, 2008 read with the Mizoram Civil Courts Act, 2005, irrespective of pecuniary crux as the matter confined to the jurisdiction. The Senior Civil Judge, referring a decision of the Apex Court as rendered in M/s Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr., as reported in AIR 2004 SC 2321 , held that for deciding the cause of action, the materials as laid at the first instance should disclose a clear cause of action for institution of the suit, else the plaint or the writ petition shall be rejected summarily. The Senior Civil Judge also referred a decision of the Delhi High Court in Deepali Dsigns & Exhibits Pvt. Ltd. v. Pico Deepali Overlays Consortium & Ors., as decided on 22.02.2011 in IA Nos. 16915-16916/2010 and IA No. 1218/2011 in CS(OS) No. 2528/2010. Thereafter, the plaint was rejected under Order VII, Rule 11(a) of the CPC at the threshold. Aggrieved by the said judgment and order, this appeal has been filed by the plaintiff in the proceeding. 10. Mr. M. Zothankhuma, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant categorically submitted that in terms of the provisions of Section 31(2) of the Mizoram Civil Courts Act, 2005, there is no existence of those Council Courts as referred. Sub-section (2) of Section 31 of the Mizoram Civil Courts Act, 2005 provides as under:-- “31(2). 10. Mr. M. Zothankhuma, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant categorically submitted that in terms of the provisions of Section 31(2) of the Mizoram Civil Courts Act, 2005, there is no existence of those Council Courts as referred. Sub-section (2) of Section 31 of the Mizoram Civil Courts Act, 2005 provides as under:-- “31(2). Notwithstanding anything in sub-section (1) or any other provisions of this Act or in any enactment repealed by sub-section (1) or in any other law or provision having the force of law, all suits, appeals and proceedings connected therewith, pending before any court, which under this Act have to be instituted or commenced in another court, shall, on appointed day stand transferred to such other court and shall be continued and disposed of by such other court in accordance with law as if such suit and proceedings had been instituted or commenced in such other court under this Act.” 11. In furtherance of the proper understanding of this provision and in exercise of the powers as conferred on the High Court under Section 32 of the Mizoram Civil Courts Act, 2005, the High Court has taken a resolution and published the same to provide the status of law in force. The said Resolution provides that: “For the removal of doubts it is made clear that since Section 10 of the Mizoram Civil Courts Act, 2005 is a transitory provision and in view thereof read with Section 31 of the Mizoram Civil Courts Act, 2005 the District Council Courts, the subordinate District Council Courts and the Addl. subordinate District Council Courts (other than in Chakma district, Mara district and Lai district) stand dissolved, all cases pending in these Courts stand transferred to the Civil Courts in Mizoram by operation of law, namely, the Mizoram Civil Courts Act, 2005. It is also made clear that on the transfer of these cases as above, Section 10 of the Mizoram Civil Courts Act, 2005 loses its significance.” On the basis of this development, Mr. M. Zothankhuma, learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 can be availed of by the appellant even though there is no express repeal of the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956. 12. Refuting the submissions of Mr. M. Zothankhuma, learned senior counsel for the appellant, Mr. M. Zothankhuma, learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 can be availed of by the appellant even though there is no express repeal of the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956. 12. Refuting the submissions of Mr. M. Zothankhuma, learned senior counsel for the appellant, Mr. C. Lalramzauva, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that unless the State of Mizoram adopts the Indian Succession Act, 1925, it shall not be automatically applicable in the State of Mizoram. Wherever the Indian Succession Act came into operation there has been a subsidiary legislation by the State for adopting the Indian Succession Act. He further submitted that the Mizoram Civil Courts Act, 2005, has in no way either by the express provision or by necessary implications repealed the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956. 13. For appreciation of the rival contentions as projected by the learned senior counsel for the parties, it requires a brief journey towards the legislative development as occurred regarding the law of inheritance in the State of Mizoram. 14. At the outset, however, this Court with surprise notes that even though the Senior Civil Judge has referred the provisions of Rule 34 of the Mizoram Family Courts Rules, 2008, no such rule, however, is in existence. It appears that the Senior Civil Judge intended to refer the sub-rules (1) and (2) of Rule 33 of the Mizoram Family Courts Rules, 2008, which are gainfully extracted: “33. Repeal and savings : The provisions of these Rules will be supplemental and not in derogation of the Family Courts (Gauhati High Court) Rules, 1989. (1) The Lushai Hills Autonomous District (Administration of Justice) Rules, 1953, is so far as they relate to the matter dealt under the Family Courts Act, 1984 (66 of 1984) and these Rules are hereby repealed from the appointed day. (1) The Lushai Hills Autonomous District (Administration of Justice) Rules, 1953, is so far as they relate to the matter dealt under the Family Courts Act, 1984 (66 of 1984) and these Rules are hereby repealed from the appointed day. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal, every suit, appeal, application for revision, proceedings and other business relating to both Civil and Criminal Justice pending on the appointed day with the village judicial functionaries or before the Mizo District Court at Aizawl and its sub-ordinate Courts, if such matter or cases fall within the scope of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (66 of 1984) shall stand transferred for disposal to the Family Court which would have been competent to entertain and dispose of such suit, appeal, application for revision, proceeding or business, had the Family Courts Act, 1984 and the Rules thereunder been brought into force on the date of institution or commencement of the same and the latter Court or Courts shall deal with and dispose of the same in accordance with law; Provided that any other suit, appeal, application for revision, proceedings and other business relating to both Civil and Criminal justice and pending before the Mizo District Court and its subordinate Courts on the appointed day, which do not fall within the scope of the Family Courts Act, 1984 and the Rules thereunder, shall be transferred for disposal to the courts constituted under the Mizoram Civil Courts Act, 2005, which would have been competent under Section 10 of the said Act or to the Courts constituted under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, as the case may be, to entertain and dispose of such suit, appeal, application for revision, proceedings or business, in accordance with law.” Provided further that until a new Central or State law on the subject comes into force, the village courts as constituted under the Lushai Hills Autonomous District (Administration of Justice) Rules, 1953 shall continue to function as such and in accordance with the provisions of the Lushai Hills Autonomous District (Administration of Justice) Rules, 1953, as if the said Rules have not been repealed only to this extent, subject to the modification that the Courts of Civil Judges as constituted under the Mizoram Civil Courts Act, 2005 or the Courts of Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, as the case may be, shall be the competent appellate and revisional court in respect of any appeal or revision, as the case may be, from any decree, order or sentence passed by such Village Court.” 15. This Court is constrained to observe that this rule has no relevance to the laws of inheritance or testamentary succession. For that purpose, Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 under Chapter III, may be referred to. Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 provides the area of jurisdiction of the Family Court as under : “7. Jurisdiction - (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall: (a) have and exercise all the jurisdiction exercisable by any district Court or any subordinate civil Court under any law for the time being in force in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature referred to the Explanation; and (b) be deemed, for the purposes of exercising such jurisdiction under such law, to be a district Court or, as the case may be, such sub-ordinate civil Court for the area to which the jurisdiction of the Family Court extends. Explanation.-- The suits and proceedings referred to in this sub-section are suits and proceedings of the following nature, namely:-- (a) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage for a decree of nullity of marriage (declaring the marriage to be null and void or, as the case may be, annulling the marriage) or restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation or dissolution of marriage: (b) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the validity of a marriage or as to the matrimonial status of any person; (c) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property of the parties or of either of them; (d) a suit or proceeding for an order or injunction in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship; (e) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the legitimacy of any person; maintenance; (f) a suit or proceeding for maintenance; (g) a suit or proceeding in relation to the guardianship of the person or the custody of, or access to, any minor. (2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall also have and exercise -- (a) the jurisdiction exercisable by a Magistrate of the First Class under Chapter IX (relating to order for maintenance of wife, children and parents) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974); and (b) such other jurisdiction as may be conferred on it by any other enactment.” Under sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, there is no provision for deciding the dispute in respect of inheritance or the testamentary succession. However, sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the said Act, 1984 provides that such other jurisdiction as may be conferred on it by any other enactment that would be within the jurisdiction of the Family Court. No such enactment has so far surfaced to grant any authority to the Family Court to adjudicate the dispute relating to inheritance or testamentary succession. As such, that observation is of no legal value and accordingly is discarded. 16. It appears that the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956 is enacted in exercise of powers as provided under para-3 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India. In clause (1)(h) of the said para-3 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India provides that the Autonomous District Counsel shall have the power to make laws in respect to the inheritance of property subject to the assent of the Governor. In the said Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956, the provision for grant of probate of the Will has been provided from Section 4 to Section 23, but there is no provision for granting the letter of administration as provided under Chapter IV of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. 17. The Mizo District Council was dissolved by incorporating para 20-A to the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution of India w.e.f. 29.04.1972. Prior to that, on 21.01.1972, Mizoram became the Union Territory and thereafter on 20.02.1987, Mizoram attained its statehood. Even after attaining the statehood, the State of Mizoram adopted certain existing laws by the State of Mizoram Adaptation of Laws Order (No. 1), 1987 and the State of Mizoram Adaptation of Laws Order (No. 2) 1987. Prior to that, on 21.01.1972, Mizoram became the Union Territory and thereafter on 20.02.1987, Mizoram attained its statehood. Even after attaining the statehood, the State of Mizoram adopted certain existing laws by the State of Mizoram Adaptation of Laws Order (No. 1), 1987 and the State of Mizoram Adaptation of Laws Order (No. 2) 1987. With the dissolution of the Mizo District Council the said provisions would have been given a decent go-bye as the said statute had its extent within the Mizo Autonomous District Council as per the provisions of para-3 to the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution of India. 18. It has been adverted that the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956 (Mizoram District Council Act No. 1 of 1956) was adapted by virtue of paragraph 20-A of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India read with paragraph 8 of the Dissolution of the Mizo District Council (Miscellaneous Provisions) Order, 1972 and by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 33 of the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956 read with the State of Mizoram Adaptation of Laws Orders, 1987 as stated. 19. The adaptation orders were undoubtedly issued under Article 162 of the Constitution of India and not under authority from the other sources, even though it has adverted otherwise, Article 162 provides as under:-- “Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive power of a State shall extend to the matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has power to make laws : Provided that in any matter with respect to which the Legislature of a State and Parliament have power to make laws, the executive power of the State shall be subject to, and limited by, the executive power expressly conferred by this Constitution or by any law made by Parliament upon the Union or authorities thereof.” 20. It appears that the Indian Succession Act has been adopted by the Union of India under the provisions of Article 13(3)(b) of the Constitution of India. By way of Act 3 of 1951, the Indian Succession Act, 1925 was amended making some pertinent modifications in Section 2 and Section 3. It appears that the Indian Succession Act has been adopted by the Union of India under the provisions of Article 13(3)(b) of the Constitution of India. By way of Act 3 of 1951, the Indian Succession Act, 1925 was amended making some pertinent modifications in Section 2 and Section 3. In Section 2, the following provision has been inserted as Section 2(cc) : “2(cc) “India” means the territory of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir.” In sub-section (3) of Section 3, the following has been reframed:-- “(3) Persons exempted under this section or exempted under the operation of any of the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1865 under Section 332 of that Act are in this Act referred to as “exempted persons”.” Thus, the Legislature obviated the requirement of adoption by the State any longer. 21. Therefore, even though there is no provision in the Indian Succession Act, 1925 regarding its extent but by the provision as provided under Section 3 of the Indian Succession Act, the State Governments have been enabled to exempt any race, caste or tribe from the operation of the said Act. As per entry 5, list III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, the wills, intestacy and succession are the subject-matters of the concurrent list. Even the State can make the law on those subjects. But, as per Article 254(1) of the Constitution of India, it has been provided that if any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of an existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the concurrent list, then, subject to the provisions of clause (2), the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of such State, or, as the case may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void. Article 246(2) also provides as follows:-- “Notwithstanding anything in clause (3), Parliament and, subject to clause (1), the Legislature or any State also, have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the “Concurrent List”). Article 246(2) also provides as follows:-- “Notwithstanding anything in clause (3), Parliament and, subject to clause (1), the Legislature or any State also, have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the “Concurrent List”). 22. Therefore, even though the Indian Succession Act has to be placed in the list III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, since the Parliament has adopted this law by operation of the Constitutional provisions as stated wherever the State Laws are in repugnancy or silent, the Central legislation so long it continues, the State legislation be inoperative. Nowhere, it has been found that creation of Will was part of the religious or the social practices of the Mizos or of the customary laws and procedures since it is well settled that the Will is a testament to regulate the succession subject to the provisions of the statute and competence of the testator. Therefore, Article 371-G of the Constitution of India cannot abrogate the extent of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 in the State of Mizoram in view of the provisions as engrafted in Article 371-G of the Constitution of India that nothing in this clause shall apply to any Central Act in force in the Union Territory of Mizoram immediately before the commencement of the Constitution (Fifty-third Amendment) Act, 1986. However, in exercise of the powers as provided under Section 3 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, the States have been enabled to declare some categories of persons as the ‘exempted persons’. The citizens or the class which are not exempted by the State Government shall be governed by the Indian Succession Act, if they do not belong to the religious groups which are excluded from operation of this Act, inasmuch as the Indian Succession Act, 1925 has been adopted to continue with the object of consolidating the laws as applicable to the intestate and testamentary succession. 23. Since an act of Parliament in view of Section 2(cc) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 is in force unless exempted by the State in exercise of powers as provided under Section 3 of the Indian Succession Act, the Central Act shall occupy the dominant position. 23. Since an act of Parliament in view of Section 2(cc) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 is in force unless exempted by the State in exercise of powers as provided under Section 3 of the Indian Succession Act, the Central Act shall occupy the dominant position. Article 162 of the Constitution of India is also subject to any law made by the Parliament upon the Union or authorities thereof. As such, the State of Mizoram Adaptation of Laws Order, 1987 cannot abridge or abrogate the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. Moreover, if the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956 does not provide any provision for grant of letters of administration of the Will, in that circumstances the citizen would be remediless so far the letters of administration as provided under the Indian Succession Act, 1925 are concerned. The incongruity as created for not repealing the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956 is expected to be addressed properly by the State. This Court, however, refrains from making any declaration that the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956 has been repealed by operation of the Mizoram Civil Courts Act, 2005 in any manner. For elucidation, further dilation would be beneficial. 24. There is no dispute that barring a few pitfalls in pith and substance, the provisions of the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956 are generally not inconsistent to the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, but the said Act is not at all comprehensive and exhaustive as the Indian Succession Act, 1925 is. 25. In Deep Chand & Ors. 25. In Deep Chand & Ors. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., as reported in AIR 1959 SC 648 , a Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court held as under:-- “Nicholas in his Australian Constitution, 2nd Edition, page 303, refers to three tests of inconsistency or repugnancy:-- “(1) There may be inconsistency in the actual terms of the competing statutes; (2) Though there may be no direct conflict, a State law may be inoperative because the Commonwealth law, or the award of the Commonwealth Court, is intended to be a complete exhaustive Code; and (3) Even in the absence of intention, a conflict may arise when both State and Commonwealth seek to exercise their powers over the same subject-matter.” This Court in Tika Ramji v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1956 SCR 393 : AIR 1956 SC 676 accepted the said three rules, among others, as useful guides to test the question of repugnancy. In Zaverbhai Amaidas v. State of Bombay, 1955-1 SCR 799 : ( AIR 1954 SC 752 ), this Court laid down a similar test. At page 807 (of SCR) : (at p.757 of AIR), it is stated:-- “The principle embodied in section 107(2) and Article 254(2) is that when there is legislation covering the same ground both by the centre and by the Province, both of them being competent to enact the same, the law of the Centre should prevail over that of the State.” Repugnancy between two statutes may thus be ascertained on the basis of the following three principles : (1) Whether there is direct conflict between the two provisions; (2) Whether Parliament intended to lay down an exhaustive Code in respect of the subject-matter replacing the Act of the State Legislature; and (3) Whether the law made by Parliament and the law made by the State Legislature occupy the same field.” 26. For inconsistency or repugnancy as interpreted having regard to the provisions of Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India, the Law of the State would be inoperative because the Law of the Centre intended to be a complete exhaustive Code. It is not merely for the inconsistency or the conflicts of the provisions. This law has been further developed in State of Orissa & Anr. It is not merely for the inconsistency or the conflicts of the provisions. This law has been further developed in State of Orissa & Anr. v. M/s M.A. Tulloch & Company, as reported in AIR 1964 SC 1284 , where the Apex Court held as under:-- “But even if the matter was res integra, the argument cannot be accepted. Repugnancy arises when two enactments both within the competence of the two Legislatures collide and when the Constitution expressly or by necessary implication provides that the enactment of one Legislature has superiority over the other then to the extent of the repugnancy the one supersedes the other. But two enactments may be repugnant to each other even though obedience to each of them is possible without disobeying the other. The test of two legislations containing contradictory provisions is not, however, the only criterion of repugnancy, for, if a competent legislature with a superior efficacy expressly or impliedly evinces by its legislation an intention to cover the whole field, the enactments of the other legislature whether passed before or after would be overborne on the ground of repugnance. Where such is the position, the inconsistency is demonstrated not by a detailed comparison of provisions of the two statutes but by the mere existence of the two pieces of legislation. In the present case, having regard to the terms of Section 18(1) it appears clear to us that the intention of Parliament was to cover the entire field and thus to leave no scope for the argument that until rules were framed, there was no inconsistency and no supersession, of the State Act.” 27. Deep Chand ( AIR 1959 SC 648 ) (supra) and M.A. Tulloch & Company ( AIR 1964 SC 1284 ) (supra) had fallen for consideration of the Apex Court in Thirumuruga Kirupananda Variyar Thavathiru Sundara Swamigal Medical Educational & Charitable Trust v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., as reported in (1996) 3 SCC 15 : ( AIR 1996 SC 2384 ), where the Apex Court in no uncertain terms held:-- “It cannot, therefore, be said that the test of two legislations containing contradictory provisions is the only criterion of repugnance. Repugnancy may arise between two enactments even though obedience to each of them is possible without disobeying the other if a competent legislature with a superior efficacy expressly or impliedly evinces by its legislation an intention to cover the whole field. The contention of Shri Sanghi that there is no repugnancy between the proviso to Section 5(5) of the Medical University Act and Section 10-A of the Indian Medical Council Act because both can be complied with, cannot, therefore, be accepted. What has to be seen is whether in enacting Section 10-A of the Indian Medical Council Act, Parliament has evinced an intention to cover the whole field relating to establishment of new medical colleges in the country.” 28. In the touchstone of the law as decided by the Apex Court in Thirumuruga Kirupananda Variyar Thavathiru Sundara Swamigal Medical Educational & Charitable Trust ( AIR 1996 SC 2384 ) (supra), even if the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956 by its provision not repugnant to the Indian Succession Act, 1925 as enacted by way of adoption as stated, by the Union of India, it cannot be accepted that the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956 can have its efficacy in parallel to the Indian Succession Act, 1925 inasmuch as the intention of Indian Succession Act was quite categorical to cover the whole field relating to the intestate and testamentary succession and to consolidate the said law for the territory of India except the State of Jammu & Kashmir. Therefore, even if the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956 was not repealed, it cannot be accepted to be in force for any purpose. 29. In view of this, the impugned judgment and order is set aside and the Probate Case is remitted back for re-adjudication. Since, this Court has categorically held that for purpose of grant of the letters of administration the Indian Succession Act, 1925 will be applicable in the State of Mizoram, the Senior Civil Judge, Aizawl shall return the plaint to the appellant in exercise of powers as provided under Order VII, Rule 10 of the CPC with a direction to the plaintiff (the appellant herein) to file the same before the Court of the District Judge, Aizawl for adjudication within a time frame as would be stipulated. The plaintiff may make necessary amendments in the pleadings, if so required in view of the observations made by this Court. It is needless to say that the adjudication on grant of the letters of administration would be carried out as per the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and the Code of Civil Procedure, wherever the provisions of that Code are applicable. 30. Before parting, this Court would like to place on record appreciation for Mr. M. Zothankhuma, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr. C. Lalramzauva, learned senior counsel for the respondents for giving valuable assistance. 31. As corollary to the above observations, this appeal stands allowed to the extent as indicated. Appeal allowed. __________