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2012 DIGILAW 1036 (PNJ)

Mela Singh v. State of Punjab

2012-08-02

INDERJIT SINGH, SATISH KUMAR MITTAL

body2012
JUDGMENT Mr. Satish Kumar Mittal, J.: - This Letters Patent Appeal has been filed by Mela Singh, President of Municipal Council, Longowal, Tehsil and District Sangrur, challenging the interim order dated 30.5.2012 (Annexure A-1), passed by the learned Single Judge in Civil Writ Petition No. 6015 of 2012 filed by the appellant, whereby the stay granted in his favour vide order dated 2.4.2012 (Annexure A-3) passed in the said writ petition, has been vacated. 2. After notice, we have heard learned counsel for the parties. 3. The brief facts of the case are that Municipal Council, Longowal, consists of 14 members (13 elected Municipal Councilors and one ex officio member, i.e. Member of the Legislative Assembly of the Municipal area). The election of Municipal Council, Longowal, was held in the year 2008. The appellant was elected as Municipal Councilor from Ward No.6. Thereafter, on 23.7.2008, in the first meeting of the Municipal Councilors, he was elected as President of the Municipal Council. 4. In the month of March, 2012, 10 members of the Municipal Council, i.e. 9 Municipal Councilors and one ex officio member, moved a requisition requesting to convene meeting of the Municipal Council for considering ‘no confidence motion’ against the President. On the said requisition, vide letter dated 26.3.2012 (Annexure P-1), meeting of the Municipal Council was convened on 28.3.2012 at 11.30 AM. However, vide letter dated 27.3.2012 (Annexure P-2), i.e. one day prior to the convening of the meeting, Deputy Commissioner, Sangrur (respondent No.3 herein), requested the Executive Officer, Longowal, to intimate all the members of the Municipal Council that since different organisations had given a call for Punjab Bandh on 28.3.2012, it would be difficult to depute observer, therefore, in order to avoid any untoward incident, the said meeting be post-poned after 2.4.2012. On 27.3.2012 itself, intimation regarding postponing of the meeting by the Deputy Commissioner was duly conveyed by the Executive Officer to all the members of the Municipal Council, including the appellant. In spite of having the knowledge regarding postponing of the meeting, the appellant convened the meeting on 28.3.2012 at 11.30 AM, which was attended by only four Municipal Councilors, including the appellant. The meeting was convened without any intimation to the other Municipal Councilors and without any Observer being appointed by the Deputy Commissioner and even without getting the proceeding book from the Executive Officer. The meeting was convened without any intimation to the other Municipal Councilors and without any Observer being appointed by the Deputy Commissioner and even without getting the proceeding book from the Executive Officer. In the said meeting, a resolution (Annexure P-3) was passed showing confidence in the President and none of the members, present in the meeting, supported the ‘no confidence motion’ against the President. 5. Thereafter, on 29.3.2012, the appellant, by filing Civil Writ Petition No. 6015 of 2012, challenged the postponing of the meeting dated 28.3.2012 by the Deputy Commissioner vide his letter dated 27.3.2012 (Annexure P-2). Vide order dated 2.4.2012 (Annexure A-3), passed in the said writ petition, notice of motion was issued and convening of the meeting to consider the ‘no confidence motion’ was stayed till further orders. 6. In the meanwhile, the Regional Deputy Director, Local Bodies Government, Patiala (respondent No.1 herein), vide order dated 12.4.2012 (Annexure P-5) suspended the aforesaid resolution (Annexure P-3) passed in the meeting convened on 28.3.2012, on the ground that firstly the meeting was contrary to the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner postponing the meeting, and secondly, the said meeting was attended by only four members, therefore, the quorum for the said meeting was not complete. In view of this fact, the appellant amended the writ petition and also challenged the aforesaid order dated 12.4.2012, passed by respondent No.1. 7. Separate written statements were filed by respondents No. 3; 4; 6 to 14; and respondent No.15. 8. The learned Single Judge, after hearing learned counsel for the parties, vide interim order dated 30.5.2012, vacated the aforesaid stay order dated 2.4.2012, while observing that the meeting held on 28.3.2012 was in contravention of the direction of the Deputy Commissioner and therefore, the resolution passed in that meeting is illegal and nullity. 9. The aforesaid interim order dated 30.5.2012 has been challenged by the appellant in this Letters Patent Appeal. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that the learned Single Judge, while vacating the stay order, has acted illegally. According to him, the order dated 12.4.2012, passed by the Regional Deputy Director, Local Bodies Government, Patiala, is totally illegal and contrary to the provisions of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). 10. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that the learned Single Judge, while vacating the stay order, has acted illegally. According to him, the order dated 12.4.2012, passed by the Regional Deputy Director, Local Bodies Government, Patiala, is totally illegal and contrary to the provisions of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). Firstly, the learned counsel argued that the Deputy Commissioner has no power to postpone the meeting scheduled to be convened for the purpose of considering ‘no confidence motion’. Secondly, according to him, the meeting convened for considering the ‘no confidence motion’ is a statutory meeting and for such meeting, no quorum is required. In support of his first contention, learned counsel relies upon a decision of this Court in Baldev Mittar Khullar and others v. The State of Punjab and others, 1984 PLJ 264 ; and a Division Bench decision of this Court in Kala Ram v. State of Punjab and others, AIR 1995 Punjab and Haryana 98. In support of the second contention, learned counsel relies upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in Babu Lal Aggarwal v. The Commissioner and Secretary to Government of Haryana, Local Bodies Department, Chandigarh and others, 1994 (1) Punjab Law Reporter 653; and another Division Bench decision of this Court in Harbans Lal v. State of Punjab and others, [2009(1) Law Herald (P&H) (DB) 46] : AIR 2009 Punjab and Haryana 76. 11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties on the aforesaid two contentions. 12. The question for consideration in this case is : Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Deputy Commissioner was justified in postponing the meeting scheduled to be convened on 28.3.2012 for the purpose of considering ‘no confidence motion’ against the President of the Municipal Council? 13. To answer this question, first of all, we have to go through Sections 22, 25, 26, 27, 232 and 236 of the Act, which read as under : “22. 13. To answer this question, first of all, we have to go through Sections 22, 25, 26, 27, 232 and 236 of the Act, which read as under : “22. Resignation or removal of President and Vice- President :- Whenever a President or Vice-President vacates his seat or tenders in writing to the committee his resignation of his office, he shall vacate his office; and any President or Vice- President may be removed from office by the State Government on the ground of abuse of his powers or of habitual failure to perform his duties or in pursuance of a resolution requesting his removal passed by two-thirds of the members of the committee : Provided that if a resolution requesting the removal of the President or the Vice-President is passed by two-thirds of the members of the committee, the President or, as the case may be, the Vice-President shall be deemed to be under suspension immediately after such resolution is passed : Provided further that before the State Government notifies his removal, the reason for his proposed removal shall be communicated to him by means of a registered letter in which he shall be called upon to tender within twenty-one days an explanation in writing, and, if no such explanation is received in the office of the appropriate Secretary to Government within twenty-one days of the despatch of the said registered letter, the State Government may proceed to notify his removal.” 25. Times of holding Meetings :- (1) Every committee shall meet for the transaction of business at least once in every month at such time as may, from time to time, be fixed by the bye-laws. (2) The President or, in the absence or during the vacancy of his office or during his suspension under section 22 a Vice- President may, whenever he thinks fit and shall on a requisition specifying the purpose of the meeting made in writing by not less than one fifth of the members of the committee, convene either an ordinary or a special meeting at any other time. (3) If the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, fails to call a meeting of the committee within a period of fourteen days from the date of receipt of requisition, the members who had signed the requisition may convene a meeting of the committee in accordance with the bye-laws of the committee within a period of thirty days of the making of such requisition and notwithstanding anything contained in this Act such meeting shall be deemed to be a validly convened meeting : Provided that no business other than that specified in the requisition shall be transacted in such meeting and the quorum for such a meeting shall be as provided for a special meeting under sub-section (1) of section 27. 26. Ordinary and special meeting :- (1) Every meeting of committee shall be either ordinary or special. (2) Any business may be transacted at an ordinary meeting unless required by this Act or the rules to be transacted at a special meeting. (3) When a special and an ordinary meeting are called for the same day, the special meeting shall be held as soon as necessary quorum is present. 27. Quorum :- (1) The quorum necessary for the transaction of business at a special meeting of a committee shall be one-half of the number of the committee actually serving at the time, but shall not be less than three. (2) The quorum necessary for the transaction of business at an ordinary meeting of a committee shall be such number of proportion of the members of the committee as may, from time to time, be fixed by the bye-laws, but shall not be less than three : Provided that, if at any ordinary or special meeting of a committee a quorum is not present, the chairman shall adjourn the meeting to such other day as he may think fit, and the business which would have been brought before the original meeting if there had been a quorum present shall be brought before, and transacted at, the adjourned meeting, whether there be a quorum present thereat or not. 232. 232. Powers to suspend any resolution or order of committee :- The Deputy Commissioner may, by order in writing, suspend the execution of any resolution or order of a committee, or joint committee, or prohibit the doing of any act which is about to be done, or is being done in pursuance of or under cover of this Act, or in pursuance of any sanction or permission granted by the committee in the exercise of its powers under the Act, if, in his opinion, the resolution, order or act is in excess of the powers conferred by law or contrary to the interests of the public or likely, to cause waste or damage of municipal funds or property, or the execution of the resolution or order, or the doing of the act, is likely to lead to a breach of the peace to encourage lawlessness or to cause injury or annoyance to the public or to any class or body of persons. 236. Power to State Government and its officers over committees :- (1) The State Government and Deputy Commissioners, acting under the orders of the State Government, shall be bound to require that the proceedings of the committees shall be in conformity with law and with the rules in force under any enactment for the time being, applicable to Punjab generally or the area over which the committee have authority. (2) The State Government may exercise all powers necessary for the performance of this duty, and may among other things, by order in writing, annul or modify any proceeding which it may consider not to be in conformity with law or with such rules as aforesaid, or for the reasons which would in its opinion justify an order by the Deputy Commissioner under section 232. (3) The Deputy Commissioner may within his jurisdiction for the same purpose exercise such powers as may be conferred upon him by rule made in this behalf by the State Government. 14. A perusal of Section 22 reveals that a President of the Municipal Committee/Municipal Council can be removed from his office in pursuance of passing of a resolution requesting his removal by two-thirds of the members of the Committee/Council. 14. A perusal of Section 22 reveals that a President of the Municipal Committee/Municipal Council can be removed from his office in pursuance of passing of a resolution requesting his removal by two-thirds of the members of the Committee/Council. Under the Act and the Punjab Municipal (President and Vice-President) Election Rules, 1994, no procedure has been prescribed as to how the meeting for considering ‘no confidence motion’ should be convened and conducted, as has been provided under the Haryana Municipal Act, 1973 and under the Haryana Municipal Election Rules, 1978. Thus, for convening the meeting for considering ‘no confidence motion’, the provisions of Sections 25 to 27 of the Act are applicable. Sub-section (1) of Section 25 of the Act provides that every committee shall meet for the transaction of business at least once in every month at such time as may, from time to time, be fixed by the byelaws. Sub-section (2) of Section 25 of the Act provides that on a requisition made in writing by not less than one fifth of the members of the Municipal Committee/Council, the President may convene an ordinary or special meeting at any other time. In his absence, such meeting can be convened by the Vice-President. Sub-section (3) further provides that in case, President or the Vice-President fails to call a meeting within a period of fourteen days from the date of receipt of requisition, the members who had signed the requisition may convene a meeting of the committee in accordance with the bye-laws of the Municipal Committee/Council within a period of thirty days of the making of such resolution. Section 26 of the Act defines the ‘Ordinary and special meeting’, and Section 27 provides for quorum. The necessary quorum for the transaction of business at a special meeting of the Municipal Committee/ Council shall be one-half of the members actually serving at the time, but shall not be less than three. Proviso to this Section further provides that if at any ordinary or special meeting, quorum is not present, the chairman shall adjourn the meeting to such other day as he may think fit. 15. Section 232 of the Act gives wide supervisory powers to the Deputy Commissioner to suspend any resolution or order of the committee. A Deputy Commissioner can suspend the execution of any resolution or order of a committee, or joint committee. 15. Section 232 of the Act gives wide supervisory powers to the Deputy Commissioner to suspend any resolution or order of the committee. A Deputy Commissioner can suspend the execution of any resolution or order of a committee, or joint committee. He can prohibit the doing of any act which is about to be done, or is being done in pursuance of or under cover of this Act, or in pursuance of any sanction or permission granted by the committee in the exercise of its powers under the Act. The Deputy Commissioner can pass such order, if in his opinion, the resolution, order or act is (i) in excess of the powers conferred by law; or (ii) contrary to the interests of the public; or (iii) likely to cause waste or damage of municipal funds or property; or (iv) the execution of the resolution or order; or (v) the doing of the act is likely to lead to a breach of the peace to encourage lawlessness or to cause injury or annoyance to the public or to any class or body of persons. 16. Section 236 (1) of the Act provides that the State Government and the Deputy Commissioners, acting under the orders of the State Government, shall be bound to require that the proceedings of the committees shall be in conformity with law and with the rules in force under any enactment for the time being, applicable to Punjab generally or the area over which the committee have authority. Sub-section (2) provides that the State Government may exercise all powers necessary for the performance of this duty, and may among other things, by order in writing, annul or modify any proceeding which it may consider not to be in conformity with law or with such rules as aforesaid, or for the reasons which would in its opinion justify an order by the Deputy Commissioner under Section 232. 17. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that under the aforesaid provisions, the Deputy Commissioner cannot postpone the convening of the meeting for the purpose of consideration of ‘no confidence motion’ against the President, which according to the learned counsel is a statutory meeting. In support of his contention, learned counsel has relied upon Baldev Mittar Khullar’s case (supra) and Kala Ram’s case (supra). 18. We have gone through both the aforesaid decisions and these are not applicable in the present situation. In support of his contention, learned counsel has relied upon Baldev Mittar Khullar’s case (supra) and Kala Ram’s case (supra). 18. We have gone through both the aforesaid decisions and these are not applicable in the present situation. In Baldev Mittar Khullar’s case (supra), meeting for considering ‘no confidence motion’ was convened on September 16, 1983. However, on the day of meeting, the Deputy Commissioner, in exercise of his powers under Section 232 of the Act, passed an order prohibiting the holding of meeting on the ground that the date fixed for convening of meeting was beyond fourteen days of the receipt of requisition, hence it was in violation of the mandatory provision of Section 25 (3) of the Act. The order of the Deputy Commissioner prohibiting the Municipal Committee to convene the meeting for considering ‘no confidence motion’ against the President was held to be illegal on the ground that the Municipal Committee cannot be prohibited to exercise a statutory right. But in the present case, the Municipal Council was not prohibited to convene the meeting for considering ‘no confidence motion’ against the President. Keeping in view the fact that on 28.3.2012, the day of convening the meeting, different organisations had given a call for Punjab Bandh and it was difficult to depute observer, the Deputy Commissioner, vide letter dated 27.3.2012, had requested the Executive Officer to postpone the meeting after 2.4.2012, to avoid any untoward incident. Accordingly, the Executive Officer on 27.3.2012 itself had intimated all the members of the Municipal Council regarding the postponing of the meeting after 2.4.2012. Similarly, in Kala Ram’s case (supra), the District Magistrate, exercising the powers of the Deputy Commissioner, issued a prohibitory order under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure not to hold the meeting for considering ‘no confidence motion’. In that situation, this Court had held that Section 144 of the Code does not give any power to the District Magistrate to prohibit the holding of meeting within the Municipal premises. This is not the position in the present case. In our opinion, under Section 232 of the Act, the Deputy Commissioner, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, is fully empowered to make such a request to the Municipal Committee/ Council. In the present case, no malafide has been alleged against the Deputy Commissioner. This is not the position in the present case. In our opinion, under Section 232 of the Act, the Deputy Commissioner, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, is fully empowered to make such a request to the Municipal Committee/ Council. In the present case, no malafide has been alleged against the Deputy Commissioner. It is not the case that the Deputy Commissioner has exercised his power under Section 232 of the Act under some political influence with malafide object or for some extraneous consideration. 19. In spite of the fact that on the request of the Deputy Commissioner, the Executive Officer had issued letters to all the members of the Municipal Council regarding the postponing of the meeting after 2.4.2012, the appellant and his three supporters convened the meeting on 28.3.2012 and got passed the resolution in his favour. The said resolution has been set aside by respondent No.1 in exercise of his power under Section 232 read with Section 236 (2) of the Act, on the ground that in the meeting, the quorum was not complete. According to learned counsel for the respondents, the said meeting was a special meeting convened under Section 25 (2) of the Act and for such special meeting, quorum has been prescribed under Section 27 (1) of the Act, which shall be one-half of the members of the committee actually serving at the time, but shall not be less than three. In the present case, the total number of members of the Municipal Council were 14, therefore, 7 members should have been present in the meeting. But in the meeting convened on 28.3.2012, there were only four members, therefore, the resolution passed in that meeting was not valid. 20. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the meeting for considering ‘no confidence motion’ is not a special meeting, rather it is a statutory meeting, for which no quorum is required. He relies upon two Division Bench decisions of this Court in Babu Lal Aggarwal’s case (supra) and Harbans Lal’s case (supra). 21. We have considered the aforesaid submission of learned counsel for the appellant. In our opinion, this contention of learned counsel is not tenable. In the aforesaid two judgments, provisions of the Punjab and the Haryana Municipal Act, 1973, and the Rules framed thereunder came for consideration. 21. We have considered the aforesaid submission of learned counsel for the appellant. In our opinion, this contention of learned counsel is not tenable. In the aforesaid two judgments, provisions of the Punjab and the Haryana Municipal Act, 1973, and the Rules framed thereunder came for consideration. Section 21 of the Haryana Municipal Act, 1973, which provides for motion of no-confidence against the President or Vice- President, reads as under : “21. Motion of no-confidence against president or vice-president – A motion of no-confidence against the president or vice-president may be made in accordance with the procedure laid down in the rules. (2) The Deputy Commissioner or such other officer not below the rank of an Extra Assistant Commissioner, as the Deputy Commissioner may authorise, shall convene a meeting for the consideration of the motion referred to in sub-section (1), in the manner laid down in the rules, and shall preside at such meeting. (3) If the motion is carried with the support of not less than two-thirds of the elected members of the committee, the president or vice-president, as the case may be, shall be deemed to have vacated his office. (4) If a no-confidence motion is passed against the president and the vice-president simultaneously or otherwise, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil) of the area in which the municipality is situated or any other officer not below the rank of an Extra Assistant Commissioner authorised by the Deputy Commissioner shall henceforth exercise the powers and discharge the functions of the president till the election of a president is notified or a vice-president is elected. (5) A meeting referred to in sub-section (2) shall be presided over by the Deputy Commissioner or the officer authorised by him, but neither he nor such officer shall have the right to vote at such meeting.” A perusal of the aforesaid provision clearly indicates that the Deputy Commissioner or an officer authorised by him not below the rank of an Extra Assistant Commissioner shall convene a meeting for consideration of no confidence motion in the manner laid down in the rules and he shall preside over such meeting. Rule 72-A of the Haryana Municipal Election Rules, 1978 provides the procedure for considering and passing ‘no confidence motion’ against the President and the Vice-President, which reads as under : “72-A- No confidence motion against president or vicepresident – (1) A motion of no confidence against the president or vice-president of a committee may be made through a requisition given in writing addressed to the Deputy Commissioner, signed by not less than one third of the total number of the members of committee : Provided that the members who have made such a motion may withdraw the same before the meeting is convened for the purpose. Explanation – Any fraction under this rule shall be taken as a whole. (2) The Deputy Commissioner or such other officer not below the rank of an Extra Assistant Commissioner, as the Deputy Commissioner may authorise, shall circulate to each member a copy of the requisition for the use of the members. (3) The Deputy Commissioner or such other office not below the rank of Extra Assistant Commissioner, as the Deputy Commissioner may authorise, shall convene a special meeting by giving a notice of not less than fifteen days for the consideration of the motion referred to in sub-rule (1), and shall preside over at such meetings : Provided that no such meeting for the purpose shall be convened unless a period of six months has elapsed since the date of last meeting convened for this purpose. (4) If the motion is carried out with the support of not less than two-third of the members of the committee, the President or vice-president, as the case may be, shall be deemed to have vacated his office.” Thus, in Haryana, under the statute itself, a provision has been made for requisitioning, considering and holding meeting to consider ‘no confidence motion’ against the President. In the light of these provisions, in Babu Lal Aggarwal’s case (supra), the Deputy Commissioner, who was presiding over the meeting, adjourned the meeting for consideration of no confidence motion on the ground that the quorum was not complete. The said order of the Deputy Commissioner was set aside by this Court, while observing as under : “We have considered the submissions of the respective counsel in the light of the material on record. Facts are, in fact, not in dispute. The said order of the Deputy Commissioner was set aside by this Court, while observing as under : “We have considered the submissions of the respective counsel in the light of the material on record. Facts are, in fact, not in dispute. The members opposing the petitioner as President of the Municipal Committee expressed no confidence in him and so sought a direction from this Court against the Deputy Commissioner, Narnaul, to convene such a meeting. The desired relief having been granted by the Court yet did not choose to pursue the matter any further as has been noticed in Annexure P-2 when only two members out of 21 members of the Municipal Committee came present pursuance to the notice issued to them to attend such a meeting. It is the admitted case of the parties that all the 21 members of the Municipal Committee were duly served for a meeting to be held on 1.12.1993.Strictly speaking, the meeting called to consider noconfidence motion does not come within the ambit of an ordinary meeting or special meeting as matter does not relate to the transaction of the business of the Municipal Committee. Motion for no-confidence cannot be considered an ordinary business of the Municipal Committee. Since no rules have been framed under sub-section (1) of Section 21, the provision with regard to quorum is not attracted in the case of no confidence motion meeting. This Court in the case of Surjit Mehta v. The State of Haryana, 1992 (2) PLR 143, had the occasion to consider the provisions of Sections 21 and 25 of the Act. After exhaustively examining the provisions contained in Sections 21, 25 of the Act and Rule 70 of the Haryana Municipal Election Rules, 1978, the motion against the President could be passed by 23rd member of the Committee, minor infraction of some procedural provision would not invalidate any such motion as the person who has been voted out can still claim majority as and when such a meeting is called to elect a person in his place. In that case, the Court was considering the effect of non-service of some of the petitioners who thus complained of insufficiency of time for canvassing. In the present case, all the twenty-one members were intimated of the intended meeting who somehow did not come present except the two. Natural inference would be that motion stood rejected. In that case, the Court was considering the effect of non-service of some of the petitioners who thus complained of insufficiency of time for canvassing. In the present case, all the twenty-one members were intimated of the intended meeting who somehow did not come present except the two. Natural inference would be that motion stood rejected. We do not find any merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the meeting called to consider no confidence motion could be adjourned for lack of alleged quorum as we are of the definite view that no such quorum is envisaged by the provisions of the Act. Resultantly, we all this writ petition and quash the order Annexure P-2. No order as to costs.” In Harbans Lal’s case (supra), the Government had refused to notify the name of the person, who was elected as President of the Municipal Council in the first meeting, on the ground that the meeting, in which he was elected as President, was not validly conducted, as quorum was not complete. An issue came for consideration as to whether the first meeting of the members of the Municipal Council under Section 20 (1) of the Act was a special meeting or a statutory meeting and whether any quorum is required for the said meeting. This Court made the following observations : “In our opinion, from the bare reading of Section 20 of the Act and Rule 3 of the 1994 Rules, there is no requirement of quorum for the first meeting, in which the President and Vice- President of the Municipality are to be elected. A stand has been taken by the respondents that since the first meeting is a special meeting for the purpose of election of the President and Vice-President, therefore, as per Section 27 of the Act, one-half of the number of the committee actually serving at the time shall be the quorum. Learned counsel for the respondents have also referred the Business bye-laws, which were formulated under Section 31 of the Act. Clause (e) of these bye-laws requires that a special or emergent meeting of the committee shall be called by the Secretary, when required to do so by the President or in his absence by the Vice-President or on a requisition in writing signed by at least one fifth of the members of the committee. Clause (e) of these bye-laws requires that a special or emergent meeting of the committee shall be called by the Secretary, when required to do so by the President or in his absence by the Vice-President or on a requisition in writing signed by at least one fifth of the members of the committee. Clause 3 of these bye-laws further provides that the quorum for a special and emergent meeting should be one-half of the members of the Committee. In view of these 2 clauses, it has been argued that the first meeting was a special meeting, for which quorum was one-half of the number of the committee actually serving at the time, and since there were only 21 elected members and the said meeting was attended by 10 elected members, therefore, the quorum was not complete. This contention of learned counsel for the respondents cannot be accepted for two reasons. Firstly, the requirement of quorum of a special meeting, as provided under Section 27 of the Act and Business bye-laws cannot be imported as requirement in the first meeting of the Municipal Council, which is to be held under Rule 3 of the 1994 Rules for the purpose of administering oath of allegiance and electing President and Vice-President. Section 26 of the Act, which provides for ordinary and special meeting is being re-produced hereunder : 26. Ordinary and special meeting – (1) Every meeting of committee shall be either ordinary or special. (2) Any business may be transacted at an ordinary meeting unless required by this Act or the rules to be transacted at a special meeting. (3) When a special and an ordinary meeting are called for the same day the special meeting shall be held as soon as the necessary quorum is present. Section 27 of the Act, which provides for quorum is being reproduced hereunder : “27. Quorum – (1) The quorum necessary for the transaction of business at a special meeting of a committee shall be one-half of the number of the committee actually serving at the time, but shall not be less than three. Section 27 of the Act, which provides for quorum is being reproduced hereunder : “27. Quorum – (1) The quorum necessary for the transaction of business at a special meeting of a committee shall be one-half of the number of the committee actually serving at the time, but shall not be less than three. (2) The quorum necessary for the transaction of business at an ordinary meeting of a committee shall be such number or proportion of the members of the committee as may, from time to time, be fixed by the bye-laws, but shall not be less than three : Provided that, if at any ordinary or special meeting of a committee a quorum is not present, the chairman shall adjourn the meeting to such other day as he may think fit, and the business which would have been brought before the original meeting if there had been a quorum present shall be brought before, and transacted at, the adjourned meeting, whether there be a quorum present thereat or not.” A perusal of the aforesaid provisions reveals that the ordinary or special meeting is being called only for the transaction of the business of the committee, whereas the first meeting of the committee, which is to be convened under Rule 3 of the 1994 Rules, is not for the purpose of the business of the committee, but for the purpose of administering oath of allegiance to the newly elected members and for electing the President and Vice- President. Therefore, the said meeting, in our opinion, cannot be termed either an ordinary or a special meeting, but the said meeting is a statutory meeting, which the convener is duty bound to convene within fourteen days of the publication of the notification of the election of members of a newly constituted Municipality. A Division Bench of this Court in Babu Lal Aggarwal v. The Commissioner and Secretary to Government of Haryana, Local Bodies Department, Chandigarh and others, 1994 (1) Punjab Law Reporter 653 has considered the similar contention raised as to whether for a meeting convened for the consideration of no confidence motion, a quorum is required as required for the special meeting. In that case, the meeting for consideration of no confidence motion was adjourned, on the ground of quorum, as only two members out of 21 members attended the meeting. In that case, the meeting for consideration of no confidence motion was adjourned, on the ground of quorum, as only two members out of 21 members attended the meeting. In these circumstances, this Court observed that a meeting called for consideration of no confidence motion cannot be said as ordinary or special meeting, as provided under Section 21 of the Haryana Municipal Act, 1973. This judgment supports aforesaid view taken by us.” So far as the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 is concerned, neither under the Act nor under the Rules framed thereunder, any provision has been made for requisitioning, convening and holding of the meeting for considering ‘no confidence motion’. Section 22 of the Act only provides that the President of the Municipal Committee/Council can be removed from his office in pursuance of a resolution requesting his removal by two-thirds of the members of the Committee/Council. No procedure has been provided under this Section how to convene the meeting. The meeting for this purpose is to be convened only under Section 25 of the Act and such meeting will be a special meeting. It cannot be said that the meeting convened for considering ‘no confidence motion’ against the President is a statutory meeting. It is only a special meeting, for which the condition of quorum is applicable. Therefore, in our opinion, respondent No.1 was fully justified in passing the order dated 12.4.2012 (Annexure P-5), in exercise of his powers under Section 232 of the Act, whereby the resolution (Annexure P-3) passed in the meeting convened on 28.3.2012 was suspended. In these circumstances, in our opinion, the learned Single Judge has rightly vacated the stay order. In view of the above, we do not find any merit in this appeal and the same is hereby dismissed.