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2012 DIGILAW 1038 (GAU)

Bijit Roy v. Khokan Debnath

2012-09-03

UTPALENDU BIKAS SAHA

body2012
JUDGMENT Utpalendu Bikas Saha, J. 1. The instant revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is filed by the petitioner, admittedly a tenant under the respondent, challenging the order dated 11.4.2012 passed by the learned Rent Control Revisional Authority, (the District Judge, West Tripura, Agartala), in case No. RCC (revision) No. 04 of 2010, whereby and whereunder, the revision application filed by the petitioner, against the judgment and order, dated 7.7.2010, passed by the appellate Court of the Rent Control Cases (Civil Judge, Senior Division, Court No. 2, West Tripura, Agartala), in RCC (Appeal) No. 6 of 2008 affirming the judgment and order dated 3.9.2008 passed by the Rent Control Court, Agartala, West Tripura in RCC case No. 14 of 2006 directing the petitioner to put the respondent land lord in vacant possession of the premises in question, was rejected. Heard Mr. D.R. Choudhury, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner tenant as well as Mr. S.M. Chakraborty, learned senior Counsel assisted by Ms. P. Sen, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-land lord. 2. As agreed to by the learned Counsel for the parties, the instant revision petition is taken up for final disposal at the admission stage. 3. The facts needed to be discussed, in a nut shell, are as follows: The respondent-landlord instituted a proceeding bearing No. RCC 14 of 2006 in the Rent Control Court, Agartala, West Tripura impleading the present petitioner as O.P. Tenant under Section 12(3) of Tripura Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1975 (for short hereinafter referred to as 'the Act, 1975') with a prayer for eviction of the petitioner tenant from the tenanted premises owned by the landlord respondent on the ground that the respondent-landlord was running transport business, but in the said business, he was facing loss for the last few years. So he was thinking to start a fixed business to save himself and others dependent on him from starvation. Accordingly, he approached his mother and brother-in-law to purchase the tenanted premises from them who were the joint owners of the said premises, on which they also agreed to sell the same to him. 4. So he was thinking to start a fixed business to save himself and others dependent on him from starvation. Accordingly, he approached his mother and brother-in-law to purchase the tenanted premises from them who were the joint owners of the said premises, on which they also agreed to sell the same to him. 4. On purchase of the said tenanted premises on 4.2.2005 and 4.5.2005 by two sale deeds, he issued notice to the petitioner tenant on 3.8.2005 expressing his bona fide need to start his business therein, as he has no alternative scope to maintain his family. The petitioner tenant who was the O.P. in the aforesaid rent control case replied to the said notice on 2.5.2006 where he did not say anything regarding his intention for vacating the premises in question. Ultimately, the respondent land lord filed the aforesaid rent control case under Section 12(3) of the Act, 1975. The petitioner tenant contested the aforesaid case wherein he denied the bona fide need of the respondent landlord. 5. The learned Rent Control Court examined the two witnesses- the respondent landlord as P.W. 1 and his brother as P.W. 2 as well as the petitioner-tenant as O.P.W. 1. 6. Upon consideration of the evidence of the aforesaid witnesses and other relevant records, the learned Rent Control Court allowed the petition filed by the respondent landlord on the ground that the petitioner tenant-O.P. has an option by taking the vacant shop which is on the eastern side of the suit premise on rental basis for which the O.P. could have approached P.W. 2 to run his business if his only means of livelihood is the said grocery shop, but the O.P. has not exercised that option, nor has he given any reason as to why he had not opted for the option available to him. 7. Being aggrieved by the said judgment of the Rent Control Court, the petitioner tenant O.P. preferred an appeal under Section 20 of the Said Act, 1975 before the Court of the learned Civil Judge, (senior division), Court No. 1, West Tripura, Agartala, i.e., the Appellate Authority of the Rent Control Cases. Later on, the said case was transferred to the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Court No. 2, West Tripura, Agartala for disposal of the said appeal in accordance with law. 8. Later on, the said case was transferred to the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Court No. 2, West Tripura, Agartala for disposal of the said appeal in accordance with law. 8. The learned Appellate authority dismissed the RCC (appeal) case No. 06 of 2008 vide his judgment dated 7.7.2010 affirming the judgment and order dated 3.9.2008 passed by the Rent Control Court in RCC 14 of 2006. In the appellate judgment, the appellate authority also directed the petitioner tenant opposite party to vacate the possession of the suit premises and hand over the same to the respondent landlord in good condition within three months from the date of passing of the order and judgment, failing which, the respondent landlord was given liberty to execute the same as per provision of law. 9. Not being happy and aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said judgment and order dated 7.7.2010, the petitioner tenant has preferred a Revision petition under Section 22 of the Act, 1975 before the District Judge, West Tripura, Agartala, i.e., learned Rent Control Revisional Authority. The said Revision petition was registered as RCC (Revision) 4 of 2010. The learned Revisional Authority vide its judgment dated 11.4.2012 dismissed the Revision petition and affirmed the order of the Appellate Authority as well as of the learned Rent Control Court. Hence the instant Revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. 10. Mr. The said Revision petition was registered as RCC (Revision) 4 of 2010. The learned Revisional Authority vide its judgment dated 11.4.2012 dismissed the Revision petition and affirmed the order of the Appellate Authority as well as of the learned Rent Control Court. Hence the instant Revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. 10. Mr. Choudhury, learned Counsel, while urging for setting aside the order of the Revisional Authority, i.e., the District Judge and the order of the appellate authority as well as the order of the Rent Control Court, would contend that the Courts below, i.e., from the Rent Control Court to Appellate Authority as well as Revisional Authority, committed error while considering the first and second proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Act, 1975 wherein the Legislature in its wisdom cast a duty on the Rent Control Court not to give any direction if the landlord has another building of his own in his possession in the same town or village except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for special reason in any particular case it will be just and proper to do so and also was not give any direction to the tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business. 11. He further submits that the Rent Control Court also failed to consider the evidence on record which has been given seal subsequently by the Revisional Authority. He also submits that bona fide requirement of the landlord is required to be considered in consonance with the statutory provisions, i.e., when the landlord has some other building or premises for his livelihood, then the tenant should not be asked to put the landlord in the premises. 12. In the instant case, the Courts below did not consider the said aspect and in support of his aforesaid contention, he has placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Deena Nath Vs. Pooran Lal, (2001) 5 SCC 705 , particularly, he referred to paragraph-17 of the said Report, which is reproduced hereunder: 17. 12. In the instant case, the Courts below did not consider the said aspect and in support of his aforesaid contention, he has placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Deena Nath Vs. Pooran Lal, (2001) 5 SCC 705 , particularly, he referred to paragraph-17 of the said Report, which is reproduced hereunder: 17. Coming to the case on hand, the judgment of the High Court clearly bears out the position that the lower Courts had failed to consider the requirement of the section regarding availability of reasonable accommodation in occupation of the appellant landlord. As noted earlier at the time of filing the suit, one vacant shop room was in occupation of the landlord and in course of the proceedings one more shop room, on being vacated by the tenant, came in his occupation. The High Court has found that the landlord could easily make arrangements for starting the shop which his son Pradeep Kumar Gupta intends to open in the vacant shop rooms. If any adjustment was necessary, then the respondent tenant could also have been offered an alternative shop room for his occupation. No such step was taken by the landlord during all these years. During the hearing of this appeal, we made a suggestion to the learned counsel appearing for the appellant landlord, whether he is willing to permit the respondent tenant to occupy the shop room presently in his (landlord) occupation so that he may have a block of four shop rooms for the business of himself and his son. The learned counsel stated that the landlord, who was present in the Court; declined to accept the suggestion. 13. He also placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Janaklalis Gupta Vs. Namdeo Mahadeo, (2000) 2 SCC 176 to convince this Court that a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution is maintainable against the order of the learned Rent Control Revisional Authority. He further contended that the beneficial law enacted by the Legislature for protection of the tenant should not be given liberal construction to its language for providing benefit to the landlord, what in the instant case, the learned Rent Control Court did and consequent thereto, the appellate authority and the learned Rent Control Revisional Authority affirmed the same. 14. Mr. He further contended that the beneficial law enacted by the Legislature for protection of the tenant should not be given liberal construction to its language for providing benefit to the landlord, what in the instant case, the learned Rent Control Court did and consequent thereto, the appellate authority and the learned Rent Control Revisional Authority affirmed the same. 14. Mr. Choudhury finally contended that the learned Rent Control Court also failed to consider the former agreement with former landlord of the petitioner tenant for a period of twenty- five years. 15. Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior Counsel while resisting the contention of Mr. Choudhury submits that concurrent findings of the Courts below regarding the bona fide need and comparative hardship of the landlord cannot be altered by a High Court in exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, particularly, when the Courts below acted within their own jurisdiction and did not commit any patent error, more so, when the decision of the Courts below are also not perverse. 16. He further submits that admittedly, when the petitioner tenant OP admitted the respondent as landlord, he cannot raise the question of bona fide requirement of such landlord without challenging such bona fide requirement by way of adducing the evidence. 17. Mr. Chakraborty has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Rent Control Court wherein the learned Rent Control Court noted, inter alia, that rather from examination-in-chief of P.W. 2, it can be seen that he has a vacant shop premise on the eastern side of the suit premise. In his cross-examination, P.W. 2 denied the suggestion of Ld. Counsel for the O.P. that P.W. 2 has no vacant shop premise. He also pointed out that the evidence of the O.P.W. 1, the petitioner tenant who in his cross-examination specifically admitted that he has not asked P.W. 2 Swapan Debnath for shop premise which was lying vacant on the eastern side of the suit premises, meaning thereby that there was other suitable building available in the locality for the petitioner tenant to carry on his business, but he did not attempt for availing of such a scope for continuing his business. By that itself, the learned Rent Control Court and the Appellate Court as well as the learned Rent Control Revisional Authority were perfectly correct and did not commit any error. By that itself, the learned Rent Control Court and the Appellate Court as well as the learned Rent Control Revisional Authority were perfectly correct and did not commit any error. In support of his aforesaid contention, he placed reliance on the second proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 12 wherein it is mentioned that the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable-building available in the locality for such person to canyon such trade or business. According to him, when there is a suitable building available in the locality for tenant, then the Court can pass the order in favour of the landlord when the landlord requires the premises for his bona fide need. 18. Mr. Chakraborty while resisting the contention relating to the period of lease as contended by the petitioner tenant submits that there was no agreement between the petitioner tenant and the former landlord of him, i.e., the mother of the present land lord and on that count; the petitioner tenant did not adduce any evidence except his own statement. More so, after purchase of the premises in question by the respondent landlord from the former landlord, i.e., the mother of him, the earlier alleged oral agreement is no longer in force, particularly, after issuance of the notice for one year by the landlord. 19. He further submits that the present case is fully covered by a decision of this Court in Civil Rule 31 of 1998: Sri Jitendra Lal Dey Vs. Sudhriti Pen Stores & Ors., where a similar question came up for decision and this Court considering the entire facts and circumstances of that case, noted that as the petitioner is the owner of the said premises and the source of livelihood of his son and daughter is in question, certainly, the same should prevail over the bona fide need of the tenant. 20. 20. He finally contended that the provisions of the Act, 1975 enacted by the Legislature for protecting the need of the tenant as well as the landlord when admittedly the landlord is in bonafide need of the rented premises and question of whose bonafide need should prevail would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case. In the instant case, the Rent Control Court taking note of the evidence on record found that the bonafide need of the landlord prevailed over the need of the petitioner tenant being there are some suitable buildings available in the locality for the tenant to canyon his business, particularly, the availability of the vacant shop of P.W. 2 for which admittedly the petitioner tenant did not approach at any point of time. 21. To support of his aforesaid contention, he has placed reliance on paragraph-15 of the said judgment which is as follows: 15. The legal position emerging from the above decisions is that though a tenant is entitled to the benefit of statutory protection of rent control legislation noticed above, at the same time, the Court also has a duty to interpret the law so that equal justice is not denied to a landlord in appropriate circumstances. Admittedly, in the case in hand, both the landlord and the tenant have bona fide need for the suit premises. While the respondent-tenant needs the premises to continue his business which is the only source of his livelihood, at the same time, the landlord is also admittedly in bona fide need of the same for his unemployed son and widow daughter in order to provide them with a source of livelihood. Thus, livelihood of both the landlord and the tenant from the leased premises being an admitted position, the question is whose bona fide need should prevail. As the petitioner is the owner of the said premises and the source of livelihood of his son and daughter is in question, certainly, the same should prevail over the bona fide need of the tenant. Accordingly, the Rent Control Court as well as the appellate Court have decided the question in favour of the petitioner-landlord. As the petitioner is the owner of the said premises and the source of livelihood of his son and daughter is in question, certainly, the same should prevail over the bona fide need of the tenant. Accordingly, the Rent Control Court as well as the appellate Court have decided the question in favour of the petitioner-landlord. The legal position discussed above makes very clear that unless gross illegality or perversity occasion a failure of justice, the concurrent findings of the Courts of facts should not be interfered with by revisional authority for substituting its own findings after re-appreciation of the entire evidence. Considered from this angle and from a closer scrutiny of the judgment impugned in the light of the legal and factual position noticed above, it can be safely held that the findings of the revisional authority are not legally sustainable. 22. As the whole debate in the instant revision petition is relating to the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Act, 1975, thus it would be proper to reproduce the same which is as hereunder: Provided also that no landlord whose right to recover possession arises under an instrument of transfer inter vivos shall be entitled to apply to be put in possession until the expiry of one year from the date of instrument. 23. It appears from Sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Act, 1975 that the Legislature while considering the interest of the tenant also provided an opportunity to the landlord for applying to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if he bonafide needs the building for his own occupation, meaning thereby, the bonafide need is the sine qua non. 24. The word 'bonafide need' is not defined in the Act, 1975 nor any Rule made thereunder by which the bona fide need is prescribed. It is settled position of law that when a word is not defined in the Statute, then dictionary meaning of the said word has to be accepted. In the Law Lexicon, 2nd edition, the 'bonafide need' means the land lord has a genuine need to occupy the accommodation, that is, he must have necessity to occupy it and the necessity must be bonafide or genuine one. 25. In Girja Devi & Anr. Vs. In the Law Lexicon, 2nd edition, the 'bonafide need' means the land lord has a genuine need to occupy the accommodation, that is, he must have necessity to occupy it and the necessity must be bonafide or genuine one. 25. In Girja Devi & Anr. Vs. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer & Ors, AIR 1965 All 366 , a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court while considering the provisions of U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Rules, discussed about the meaning of bona fide need of personal occupation which is as follows: (5) What is meant by the words, 'Is bona fide needed for his own personal occupation' is that the landlord has a genuine need for occupying the accommodation himself. It is not enough that he really means to occupy it himself; it must be necessary for him to occupy it and the necessity must be a bona fide or genuine one. When a landlord wants, what is popularly known as a release order, in his favour, he may want it neither for keeping the accommodation vacant, or for giving it to a relation or friend as a licencee, or for occupying it himself. If he wants to keep it vacant or to give it to a friend or relation as a licence it is not a case of his needing it for own personal occupation and Rule 6 will not apply. But, it does not follow that it will necessarily apply when he wants to occupy it himself. In addition to the intention to occupy it himself there must be genuine need for his occupying it. If there is no need for his occupying it, as for instance, when another accommodation that he is occupying, is suitable and ample for his needs, it is not a case of his bona fide needing it for own occupation, even if he really means to occupy it himself. .... 26. Upon going through the aforesaid observation of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, it can be said that bonafide need of the landlord depends upon the facts of each case, but one thing is common that the landlord has to establish that the tenanted premise is needed for his own occupation or for the occupation of his family members and mere intention to occupy the said premise is not enough. He must also to show that the said tenanted premise becomes necessary for his family to maintain livelihood. 27. In Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, (1999) 6 SCC 222 , the Apex Court discussed about the bona fide need in Paragraph-13 of the said Report as: Chambers 20th Century Dictionary defines bona fide to mean 'in good faith: genuine'. The word 'genuine' means 'natural: not spurious: real: pure: sincere'. In Law Dictionary, Mozley and Whitley define bona fide to mean 'good faith, without fraud or deceit'. Thus the term bona fide or genuinely refers to a state of mind. Requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of intensity contemplated by 'require' is much higher than in mere desire. The phrase 'required bona fide' is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire which is the outcome of whim or fancy is not taken note of by the rent control legislation. A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contradistinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle him to seek ejectment of the tenant. Looked at from this angle, any setting of the facts and circumstances protruding the need of the landlord and its bonafides would be capable of successfully withstanding the test of objective determination by the Court. The judge of facts should place himself in the armchair of the landlord and then ask the question to himself-whether in the given facts substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the positive the need is bona fide.... 28. In the instant case, though the respondent landlord had his transport business in another place that was not running well and for that, the landlord requires the tenanted premises for his own purpose and he has established the same by way of adducing the evidence that his need for tenanted premises is genuine and honest one and unless he gets the same, his purpose of purchasing the tenanted premises would be frustrated. 29. 29. In Deena Nath (supra), the Apex Court while considering the requirement of the landlord within the meaning of Section 12(1)(f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, took note of the fact that at the time of filing the suit, one vacant shop room was in occupation of the landlord and in course of the proceedings one more shop room, on being vacated by the tenant, came in his occupation. The High Court has found that the landlord could easily make arrangements for starting the shop which his son Pradeep Kumar Gupta intends to open in the vacant shop rooms. If any adjustment was necessary, then the respondent tenant could also have been offered an alternative shop room for his occupation. No such step was taken by the landlord during all these years. 30. In view of the above facts, the Apex Court considered that the landlord had no bona fide requirement for the premises in question. 31. In the instant case, the petitioner tenant did not raise any such plea that the respondent landlord has any other vacant shop or premises in question where he could make arrangement for starting a business by his family members who intends to start his business. Thus, the case of Deena Nath (supra) in no way helps the present petitioner. 32. There is also no quarrel with the proposition of Janaklalis (supra) from which it appears that a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution can be preferred for setting aside the judgment of the appellate Court, but the facts of that case is totally different from the case in hand. Thus, the said case also in no way helps the case of the petitioner. 33. In Liaq Ahmed & Ors. Vs. Thus, the said case also in no way helps the case of the petitioner. 33. In Liaq Ahmed & Ors. Vs. Habeed-Ur-Rehman, (2000) 5 SCC 708 while the Apex Court dealing with the provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 noted inter alia, that Rent control legislations have been acknowledged to be pieces of social legislation which seek to strike a just balance between the rights of the landlord and the requirements of the tenants and such legislations prevent the landlords from taking the extreme steps of evicting the tenants merely upon technicalities or curved ground and ultimately allowed the appeal preferred by the Liaq Ahmed and other setting aside the order of the learned Rent Control Court dated 22.10.1997 and that of the High Court dated 16.4.1999, as both the Courts failed to see the distinction between the Evacuee Property Act and Enemy Property Act, particularly, subject matter of the litigation had vested in the Custodian of Enemy Properties for India. Not only that, the facts of that case, inter alia, are that the respondent in that case claiming to be the owner on the basis of a sale deed executed in his favour on 27.11.1991 filed a petition seeking eviction of the appellant tenants on the ground of his bonafide requirement as contemplated under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The claim of the landlord was resisted by the appellants on the ground that the property, the subject-matter of litigation, was vested in the Custodian of Enemy Properties for India, which could not be alienated or sold to the respondent landlord and reliance was placed on Section 18 of the Enemy Property Act, 1968. Thus, the facts as well as debate involved in that case are totally different than the case in hand. As such, the case of Liaq Ahmed (supra) has also no application in the instant case. 34. This Court has gone through the judgment of the learned Rent Control Court where, the learned Rent Control Court considering the following points namely, (i) Whether the instant case is maintainable in law or not? (ii) Whether the petitioner is in bonafide requirement of the premises? (iii) Whether the petitioner is entitled to a decree to be put in vacant possession of suit premises by evicting tenant O.P.? 35. (ii) Whether the petitioner is in bonafide requirement of the premises? (iii) Whether the petitioner is entitled to a decree to be put in vacant possession of suit premises by evicting tenant O.P.? 35. While deciding the aforesaid points, the Rent Control Court considered the evidence on record adduced by the parties and also took note of the third proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Act, 1975 where it is stated that no landlord whose right to recover possession arises under an instrument of transfer inter vivos shall be entitled to apply to be put in possession until the expiry of one year from the date of instrument. 36. On plain reading of the said proviso, it is clear that in the said proviso, no where it is stated that notice has to be sent after one year. Requirement of the said proviso is that landlord shall be entitled to apply to put him in possession by way of filing an application after completion of one year. In the instant case, it is the admitted position that the present respondent landlord after purchase of the land from his mother and brother in law issued notice to the petitioner tenant for one year and after completion of one year filed an application under Sub- Section (3) of Section 12 of the Act, 1975. Thus, it can be said that the respondent landlord applied before the Rent Control Court one year after inter vivos of transfer of the land in question. 37. The learned Rent Control Court while deciding the bona fide need of the landlord also considered the decision of the Apex Court in Harin Chandra Das & Ors. Vs. Pradip Chowdhury & Ors., (1996) 3 GLR 334, wherein it is noted inter alia that in a series of decisions the settled position of law is that one family may have more than one business and one landlord may select any business for expansion of his business or to add income to his family. It is certainly the prerogative of the landlord to expand business and for that requirement he can claim back the suit premises. Therefore, bonafide requirement of the suit premises for the business expansion of his son separately from the existing one is cogent. 38. The Rent Control Court also considered the case of Bhimanagouda Basanagouda Patil Vs. It is certainly the prerogative of the landlord to expand business and for that requirement he can claim back the suit premises. Therefore, bonafide requirement of the suit premises for the business expansion of his son separately from the existing one is cogent. 38. The Rent Control Court also considered the case of Bhimanagouda Basanagouda Patil Vs. Mohammed Gudusaheb AIR 2003 SC 1634 , wherein the Apex Court-while considering the Section 21(1)(h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act discussed regarding the bona fide need as well as comparative hardship of the parties and noted in para-8 of the said Report: 8. We have perused the material on record based on which the Courts below have given the finding as to comparative hardship in favour of the respondent. The learned District Judge while coming to the conclusion on this question held because the landlord has purchased the premises in question, he should be deemed to be an affluent person. While tenant who has a large family whose earning capacity is about Rs.20/- per day ought to be held to suffer greater hardship, if an eviction is ordered. Therefore, the learned District Judge held comparative hardship in favour of the tenant solely on the basis of affluence of the parties. If this is a correct approach them an affluent landlord can never get possession of his premises, even if he proves all his bona fide needs. The fact that a person has a capacity to purchase the property cannot be the sole ground to hold against the landlord while deciding the question of comparative hardship. If the purchase is pursuant to a genuine need of the landlord the said purchase has to be given due weightage unless, of course, the purchase is actuated by collateral consideration. In the instant case both the High Court and the District Court having upheld that claim of the landlord as to his bona fide need under Section 21(1)(h) they could not have denied the relief solely on the ground that he is an affluent person. (Emphasis supplied). 39. The learned Rent Control Court also considered the decision of the Apex Court in M/s. Sait Nagjee Pursushotham & Co. Ltd. Vs. Vimalabai Prabhulal & Ors. (Emphasis supplied). 39. The learned Rent Control Court also considered the decision of the Apex Court in M/s. Sait Nagjee Pursushotham & Co. Ltd. Vs. Vimalabai Prabhulal & Ors. 2006 AIR SCW 45 wherein the Apex Court while considering the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant in that case, inter alia, that plea of either starting business or expanding it at Calicut is nothing but sham and it was also pointed out that some of the sons have multifarious activities and are already established in some other business and one of the sons i.e. respondent No. 9 had already gone to United States of America and he has settled there. Therefore, the need is not bona fide, the Apex Court noted that; we fail to appreciate that when two sons are there and if they want to expand their business at Calicut then it cannot be said that the need is a sham one. It is not possible for the landlords and their sons to wait till the disposal of the case. They have to do something in life and they cannot wait till the appellant is evicted from the premises in question. It is common experience that landlord tenant disputes in our country take long time and one cannot wait indefinitely for resolution of such litigation. If they want to expand their business, then it cannot be said that the need is not bona fide. 40. In the said judgment, the Apex Court also noted that it is not the tenant who candidate the terms to the landlords and advise him what he should do and what he should not. It is always the privilege of the landlord to choose the nature of the business and the place of business. 41. In the instant case, it is the admitted position that the respondent-landlord purchase the tenanted premises from his mother and brother-in-law, i.e., the former landlord only to establish a new business for adding income to his family for survival as his transport business is running loss. Thus, it cannot be said that the Rent Control Court as well as Appellate Court committed any error. 42. The Appellate authority while dismissing the appeal preferred by the petitioner tenant has given proper reason for dismissal of the appeal. Thus, it cannot be said that the Rent Control Court as well as Appellate Court committed any error. 42. The Appellate authority while dismissing the appeal preferred by the petitioner tenant has given proper reason for dismissal of the appeal. More so, the learned Rent Control Revisional Authority also passed a reasoned order with detailed discussion which would be evident from paragraph-7 of the judgment which is reproduced as under: 7. I have considered the submissions of both sides. I have carefully gone through the impugned judgment and order dated 7.7.2010 passed by the learned Appellate Authority (Civil Judge, Senior Division, Court No. 2, West Tripura, Agartala) in Case No. RCC (Appeal) 06 of 2008. I have found that the learned Appellate Court did not commit any wrong in appreciating the judgment dated 3.9.2008 passed by the learned Rent Control Court in RCC Case No. 14 of 2006 in allowing the petition filed by the Respondent Landlord under Section 12(3) of the Tripura Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1975. I have found that the Revision Petitioner was initially a tenant under the brother-in-law and mother of the Respondent. The present Respondent had purchased the suit premises by two sale deeds separately from his brother-in-law on 4.2.2005 and from his mother on 4.5.2005 under exhibits 1 and 2. I have also found that on 3.8.2005 the Respondent issued a notice to the Revision Petitioner intimating him about change of ownership of the suit premises and also vacating the suit premises after expiry of one year from the last date of purchase of the suit premises i.e. 4.5.2005 and subsequently, on 9.5.2006 on behalf of the Respondent addendum to the notice dated 3.8.2005 was issued to the Revision Petitioner asking him to hand over the vacant possession of the suit premises to the Respondent. It further reveals from the case record that the Respondent ultimately on 8.6.2006 filed the eviction petition before the Learned Rent Control Court against the revision petitioner which is after 1 (one) year from the date of purchase of the suit premises. So, the restriction imposed under 3rd proviso to sub section 3 of Section 12 of the Tripura Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1975 does not apply to the case of the Revision petitioner. So, the restriction imposed under 3rd proviso to sub section 3 of Section 12 of the Tripura Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1975 does not apply to the case of the Revision petitioner. I am of the opinion that the learned Appellate Court did not commit any wrong in affirming the judgment of the Learned Rent Control Court. 43. As it has already been stated that the provisions of the Act, 1975 are not to provide the benefit only to the tenant, but also to see the interest of both the landlord and the tenant and the landlord has also the right to approach the Rent Control Court for evicting the tenant when the tenanted premises is required by the landlord for his bona fide use. More so, Mr. Chakraborty very rightly stated that the Court should not interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts below regarding the bona fide requirement and comparative hardship in favour of the landlord. The need as pleaded by the landlord is undoubtedly a bona fide need unless the tenant creates a doubt regarding such bona fide need by way of placing the materials. 44. In a dispute between the landlord and the tenant relating to tenanted premises, the Court should always adopt a balanced approach and both the landlord and the tenant should be treated equally to provide opportunity to prove their respective hardship and bonafide need. 45. On examination of record, no material is found to doubt the genuineness of such bona fide need of the landlord. More so, it is not a case of the petitioner tenant that the respondent landlord is seeking possession of the tenanted premises by any ulterior motive or is guided by some other things in his mind. 46. It appears from the impugned judgment and order that the learned Rent Control Revisional Authority and the Appellate authority as well as the Rent Control Court have not committed any error while exercising their jurisdiction nor are the judgment and orders passed by them perverse. Unless an order of the Courts below is either wholly wrong or perverse, the High Court should not exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution. The Courts below exercised the jurisdiction within their power. Unless an order of the Courts below is either wholly wrong or perverse, the High Court should not exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution. The Courts below exercised the jurisdiction within their power. More so, when a concurrent finding of the Rent Control Court as well as Appellate authority relating to bona fide requirement and comparative hardship of the landlord is affirmed by the learned Rent Control Revisional Authority, according to this Court, it would not be proper to interfere with the order of the revisional authority. Considering the matter in its entirety, this Court does not find any illegality or irregularity in the impugned revisional order passed by the learned Rent Control Revisional Authority warranting interference by this Court in exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Accordingly, the revision petition is dismissed at this admission stage. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.