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2012 DIGILAW 104 (HP)

State Of H. P. v. Parmjit Singh

2012-03-19

SURINDER SINGH

body2012
JUDGMENT : Surinder Singh, J. The State has felt aggrieved by the judgment of acquittal of reversal passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in Criminal Appeal No.16/D/X/04 decided on 11.3.2005 whereby the conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Court for the offences punishable under Sections 279, and 304-A is set-aside. 2. Precisely, the prosecution case is that the respondent, hereinafter referred as "the accused" was a driver of vehicle No.DL-IC-B-1578 (Matador). On 28th March, 1999, around 8.30 a.m., said Matador was being driven at a high speed rashly and negligently by the accused. When it reached village 'Tang', it knocked down one Shri Ghami Ram, who was standing on the side of the road. Thereafter, the accused put the injured into his vehicle with the assistance of the co-accused, who was passenger with him and drove it off towards Dharamshala. 3. Later PW5 Fandi Ram, the real brother of Ghami Ram came to know about the accident from PW3 Kamlesh Kumari and reached Zonal Hospital, Dharamshala, but on inquiry, he did not find his brother in the causality or elsewhere. Thereafter, he informed Dharamshala police. 4. Police flashed wireless message to various Police Stations including Nurpur Police Station and also informed Kandwal Police-barrier, where the vehicle in question was apprehended with the dead-body of Ghami Ram. The vehicle as well as dead-body both were brought to Police Station, Nurpur and a memo to this effect was prepared. 5. Police also recorded statement of PW3 Kamlesh Kumari, which culminated into FIR Ext.PW19/D. Police also visited place of accident, seized broken pieces of glasses and plastic and took the same into possession. Accused was not having the driving licence and the insurance policy of the vehicle. Further the police prepared inquest papers and took photographs of the dead body lying in the vehicle and sent for autopsy, which was conducted by PW2 Dr. Ajay Kumar, posted in Zonal Hospital, Dharamshala. He noticed various ante-mortem injuries on the dead body and in his opinion, the death was due to neurogenic shock and multiple ante-mortem injuries. He issued the Postmortem report Ext.PW2/A. He also opined the injuries caused were on account of motor vehicular accident. 6. After completing the investigation, challan was presented in the Court for the trial of the accused and his accomplice. He issued the Postmortem report Ext.PW2/A. He also opined the injuries caused were on account of motor vehicular accident. 6. After completing the investigation, challan was presented in the Court for the trial of the accused and his accomplice. Since the accused was not having the driving licence and the documents of the vehicle, he was also charge-sheeted for the offences punishable under Sections 184 and 187 of the Motor Vehicle Act. He had admitted the aforesaid charges when his statement was recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but denied the act of rash or negligence driving. Further he explained that he was a stranger and did not know about the topography of the area and location of hospital(s), ultimately when he reached Police Station Nurpur, he reported to police but the story as propounded against him is incorrect. At the end of trial, while disbelieving the defence raised, learned trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused for the offences aforesaid vide his detailed judgment, which was challenged in appeal before the Court of Sessions. 7. On the reappraisal of the evidence, learned Appellate Court came to the conclusion that the offences under Sections 181, 184, 187, 192 and 196 of the Motor Vehicles Act stood proved and the conviction and sentence for it, passed by the learned trial Court were affirmed, but the accused was not found rash or negligent nor could be said to have destroyed the evidence, as such set-aside judgment of conviction qua the offences under Penal Code, consequently acquitted the accused. Now, the judgment of First Appellate Court has been challenged in the present appeal. 8. Shri R.P. Singh, learned Assistant Advocate General forcefully argued that the accused has admitted that he was driver of the alleged offending vehicle. He also did not dispute that the dead body was not recovered at Nurpur from his vehicle. He also referred to the statement of PW3 Kamlesh Kumari and PW4 Ravi Kumar and ventilated that these two witnesses coupled with the statement of PW5 Fandi Ram, real brother of the deceased proved the charges against the accused, thus the acquittal passed against the accused by the learned First Appellate Court is bad in law. 9. Contra, Shri Sanjay Jaswal, learned counsel for the accused has supported the impugned judgment of acquittal. 10. 9. Contra, Shri Sanjay Jaswal, learned counsel for the accused has supported the impugned judgment of acquittal. 10. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions of the parties and have cautiously and carefully gone through the evidence on record in the light of the law applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. 11. In the instant case, accident stands admitted and it is also admitted that the accused was driver of the vehicle aforesaid. To prove the offences under Sections 279 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code as alleged against the accused, the prosecution is obliged to prove the rash or negligent act of driving by him, which was responsible for causing the death of Shri Ghami Ram (deceased). In other words, death must be direct result of the rash or negligent act of accused and the act must be efficient cause without intervention of another's negligence. It must be the causa causans; it is not enough that it may have been the causa sine qua non. There must, therefore, be a direct nexus between death of a person and a rash and negligent act of the accused. The death should be the direct result of rash and negligent act of the accused and that act must be the proximate and efficient cause without the intervention of another's negligence. Thus, there can be no conviction when rashness or negligence of third party intervenes. 12. PW3 Kamlesh Kumari is a star witness of the prosecution. On the day of said accident, she was present in her tea-stall. She only stated that the Matador being driven by the accused came in a high speed. On hearing some commotion, she came to know that Ghami Ram was lying on the road with the bleeding injuries. He was put in the same vehicle and taken to the hospital. 13. PW4 Ravi Kumar though declared hostile, but stated that the Matador was in a high speed. Ghami Ram was standing on the side of the road and he came in contact with the alleged offending vehicle. He noticed bleeding injuries on his head. 14. It is a settled law that the speed is not a criterion to prove the rash or negligent act of driving. The prosecution, as already stated above is obliged to prove the necessary ingredients of the offence by direct or circumstantial evidence. He noticed bleeding injuries on his head. 14. It is a settled law that the speed is not a criterion to prove the rash or negligent act of driving. The prosecution, as already stated above is obliged to prove the necessary ingredients of the offence by direct or circumstantial evidence. To fasten the criminal liability for the offences charged, there should be consistent, convincing and reliable evidence. Even in the exceptional cases, where the rule of res ipsa loquitor applies, it cannot be taken for guaranteed that the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident is guilty of offence. In the same situation, there could be civil liability as well, in addition to the criminal liability, but so far as the criminal liability, it has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and civil liability can be proved by preponderance of probabilities. 15. On the strength of the aforesaid evidence, it is very difficult to conclude that the accused was driving the vehicle rashly or negligently, more specifically when it has also come in the evidence that the deceased came in contact with the offending vehicle while crossing the road. Therefore, in my considered opinion, the offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the accused are not made out. 16. Insofar as the charge under Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, Shri R.P. Singh, learned Assistant Advocate General vehemently argued that on the way there were two hospitals but the accused did not take the deceased to Dharamshala hospital or even to the hospital at Nurpur. He had rather tried to enter into the boundary of Punjab, so that he could escape criminal liability. But if scan from the evidence, the defence taken is that since he was a stranger in the area and did not know about the topography and the location of the hospital, thus he took the vehicle to the Police Station, Nurpur, where he was wrongly implicated in this case. 17. In this case, the police did not produce any material on record which can substantiate their story in the manner they have put in charge-sheet against them. Otherwise also from the evidence on record defence version stands probablised. 18. 17. In this case, the police did not produce any material on record which can substantiate their story in the manner they have put in charge-sheet against them. Otherwise also from the evidence on record defence version stands probablised. 18. To prove the offence under Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code, for causing disappearance of the evidence, it is sine quo non, to prove the essential ingredient that the offence has been committed or that he has reason to believe about the commission of crime. But in the instant case, when the offences under Sections 279 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code are not proved in that event Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code is also not attracted. 19. For the reasons aforesaid, I do not find anything worth interference against the acquittal of the accused, as such, appeal filed by the State is without any merit, hence dismissed. 20. The accused is discharged of his bail bonds entered upon him during the proceedings of this case. 21. Send down the records.