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2012 DIGILAW 1041 (MAD)

Muthulakshmi @ Baby v. Ramaiyan (Died)

2012-02-27

M.VENUGOPAL

body2012
Judgment :- 1. The Appellants/Plaintiffs have focussed this Second Appeal adverting upon the Judgment and Decree of the Learned Principal District Judge, Nagapattinam in A.S.No.189 of 2000 dated 22.06.2001 in confirming the Judgment and Decree dated 07.11.2000 in O.S.No.163 of 1998 passed by the Learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Nagapattinam. 2. The First Appellate Court, while delivering the Judgment in A.S.No.189 of 2000 (filed by the Appellants/Plaintiffs) and in A.S.No.53 of 2001 [filed by the Defendants 2 and 3) on 22.06.2001, has, inter alia, observed that an oral partition has taken place during the year 1968 between Marimuthu and D.W.1 which has been accepted and acted upon and as such, the Appellants are barred from demanding partition after Ex.B.2-Mortgage Deed dated 28.02.1985 and also that the 1st Respondent [1st Defendant] has prescribed title by adverse possession to the western portion of the suit property and as such, the Appellants are not entitled to any relief much less the relief of partition and resultantly, dismissed the Appeal A.S.No.186 of 2000 without costs and further opined that in view of the fact that since D.W.1 has prescribed title by adverse possession by co-owner, the lower Court decree and judgment is correct and consequently, dismissed the Appeal A.S.No.53 of 2001 without costs. 3. Earlier, before the trial Court in the main suit, 1 to 3 issues have been framed for determination. On behalf of the Appellants/ Plaintiffs, witnesses P.W.1 to P.W.4 have been examined and Exs.A.1 to A.11 have been marked. On behalf of the Defendants, witnesses D.W.1 to D.W.3 have been examined and Exs.B.1 to B.25 have been marked. 4. The trial Court, on an appreciation of entire oral and documentary evidence on record, has come to a categorical conclusion that the sons of Sabapathi Chettiar have orally partitioned the properties which fact has been known to all and each one of the parties have been in enjoyment of the properties well over the statutory period and also that the 1st Defendant has developed the property and has enjoyed the same and in the property being enjoyed by the 1st Defendant for well over statutory period the Appellants/ Plaintiffs and Defendants 2 and 3 [Appellants in A.S.No.53 of 2001 before the First Appellate Court] are not entitled to claim the relief of partition and dismissed the suit without costs. 5. 5. The Appellants/Plaintiffs, being aggrieved against the Judgment and Decree of the First Appellate Court in A.S.No.189 of 2000 dated 22.06.2001, have filed the present Second Appeal before this Court. 6. The Defendants 2 and 3, who figured as Appellants in A.S.No.53 of 2001 have chosen to file Cross Objection No.9 of 2012 before this Court as against the Judgment and Decree dated 22.06.2001 in A.S.No.189 of 2000 passed by the First Appellate Court. 7. At the time of admission of the Second Appeal, this Court has formulated the following Substantial Questions of Law: 1. Was the finding of Lower Appellate Court that the 1st Defendant had purchased title to suit property by ouster and adverse possession sustainable in the peculiar circumstances of the case when the three daughters are not parties to the suit and one of the daughter of deceased was not heard of? 2. Was it correct for the Lower Appellate Court to hold that there was partition of suit properties made in 1968 when the partition was not proved? The Contentions, Discussions, Findings on Point Nos.1 and 2: 8. According to the Learned Counsel for the Appellants/Plaintiffs, the deceased Sabapathi had 6 children viz., two sons and four daughters in all and each one of them is entitled to get a share of 1/6 in respect of suit properties and that Meenambal one of the daughters of deceased Sabapathi was not either included or shown as one of the parties to the partition reported to have taken place in the year 1990 and that in the Plaint, the Appellants/Plaintiffs have prayed for allotment of 4/5th shares in the suit properties and for passing of a preliminary decree. 9. It is the further contention of the Learned Counsel for the Appellants/Plaintiffs is that when the quantum of share to which the Appellants/Plaintiffs are entitled to get in the suit properties has been wrongly mentioned as 4/5th share and in fact, each one of the heirs of Sabapathi Chettiar are only entitled to get 1/6th share in respect of the suit properties and this aspect of the matter was not either properly appreciated or adverted to by the trial Court and the First Appellate Court, which has resulted in serious miscarriage of justice. 10. 10. Added further, the Learned Counsel for the Appellants/ Plaintiffs submits that mere non-enjoyment of the property or realisation of income of property would not render extinguishment of title to the daughters of deceased Sabapathi Chettiar and this was not looked into by the Courts below in proper and real perspective. 11. The Learned Counsel for the Appellants/Plaintiffs cites the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana V. Mukesh Kumar and others, 2011-5-L.W.725 wherein it is held as follows: "25. Unfortunately, the State of Haryana, is still not satisfied with the three strong judgments by three different forums given against the State and is still quite anxious and keen to grab the property of the defendants in a clandestine manner on the plea of adverse possession. 30. The concept of adverse possession was born in England around 1275 and was initially created to allow a person to claim right of “seisin” from his ancestry. 31. The concept of adverse possession was subsequently adopted in the United States. The doctrine was especially important in early American periods to cure the growing number of title disputes. 35. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner. It is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish adverse possession. Though we got this law of adverse possession from the British, it is important to note that these days English Courts are taking a very negative view towards the law of adverse possession. The English law was amended and changed substantially to reflect these changes, particularly in light of the view that property is a human right adopted by the European Commission. 36. The right to property is now considered to be not only constitutional or statutory right but also a human right. Human rights have already been considered in realm of individual rights such as right to health, right to livelihood, right to shelter and employment etc. But now human rights are gaining a multi faceted dimension. Right to property is also considered very much a part of the new dimension. Therefore, even claim of adverse possession has to be read in that context. 43. The Parliament must seriously consider at least to abolish "bad faith" adverse possession, i.e., adverse possession achieved through intentional trespassing. But now human rights are gaining a multi faceted dimension. Right to property is also considered very much a part of the new dimension. Therefore, even claim of adverse possession has to be read in that context. 43. The Parliament must seriously consider at least to abolish "bad faith" adverse possession, i.e., adverse possession achieved through intentional trespassing. Actually believing it to be their own could receive title through adverse possession sends a wrong signal to the society at large. Such a change would ensure that only those who had established attachments to the land through honest means would be entitled to legal relief. 46. It is our bounden duty and obligation to ascertain the intention of the Parliament while interpreting the law. Law and Justice, more often than not, happily coincide only rarely we find serious conflict. The archaic law of adverse possession is one such. A serious re-look is absolutely imperative in the larger interest of the people. 47. Adverse possession allows a trespasser -a person guilty of a tort, or even a crime, in the eyes of law - to gain legal title to land which he has illegally possessed for 12 years. How 12 years of illegality can suddenly be converted to legal title is, logically and morally speaking, baffling. This outmoded law essentially asks the judiciary to place its stamp of approval upon conduct that the ordinary Indian citizen would find reprehensible. 48. The doctrine of adverse possession has troubled a great many legal minds. We are clearly of the opinion that time has come for change. 49. If the protectors of law become the grabbers of the property (land and building), then, people will be left with no protection and there would be a total anarchy in the entire country. 50. It is indeed a very disturbing and dangerous trend. In our considered view, it must be arrested without further loss of time in the larger public interest. No Government Department, Public Undertaking, and much less the Police Department should be permitted to perfect the title of the land or building by invoking the provisions of adverse possession and grab the property of its own citizens in the manner that has been done in this case." 12. No Government Department, Public Undertaking, and much less the Police Department should be permitted to perfect the title of the land or building by invoking the provisions of adverse possession and grab the property of its own citizens in the manner that has been done in this case." 12. Conversely, it is the contention of the Learned Counsel for the Appellants/Cross Objectors [Defendants 2 and 3 in Cross Objection] that Sabapathi Chettiar's deceased daughter Meenambal, during her life time, conspicuously has not been included in the purported oral partition that had taken place between the parties either in the year 1968 or in the year 1990 as alleged by the contesting parties and the deceased Meenambal she being the daughter of deceased Sabapathi Chettiar was certainly entitled to get 1/6th share in respect of the suit properties left behind by deceased Sabapathi Chettiar and that the Appellants/Plaintiffs have arrayed the daughters of deceased Meenambal viz., Vedavalli and Vasantha-Defendants 2 and 3 and they have contested the proceedings before the trial Court. 13. The trial Court, in Para 7 of its Judgment in the main suit, has observed that the 1st Defendant as DW2 in his evidence has stated that during the period from 1936 to 1949, all sisters have got married and have gone away and that he only conducted the marriage of 1st Plaintiff's husband Marimuthu and Ex.B.1 is the printed Invitation and orally, he has partitioned an Eastern portion of the suit property in which there has been a house where he permitted his brother Marimuthu to reside there, in the year 1968 and he has remained in the Western side of the suit property etc. 14. The trial Court observed in Para 8 of its Judgment in the main suit that 2 and 3 Defendants based on Patta transfer proceedings, wherein they have been added as party by Tahsildar, while passing orders the claim right in the suit properties which cannot be accepted and that before 1968, Ramaiyan and Marimuthu have partitioned and they have been in enjoyment of the properties separately and as such, since they claim right of partition, they ought to have filed a suit for partition within 12 years, but they have not done so. 15. 15. Moreover, the trial Court in Ex.B.2 Mortgage Deed, dated 28.02.1985, in property detail, it is mentioned as on the Eastern side of his brother Ramaiyan's own plot and from this document, it is evident that between the 1st Defendant's brother Marimuthu and the 1st Defendant, 15 years before 28.02.1985, an oral Partition has taken place etc. 16. Just because in Ex.B.2 Mortgage Deed, dated 28.02.1985, there are recitals to the effect that Partition has taken place before 15 years and the same has been accepted and acted upon and that will prove the Partition has taken place, as observed by the trial Court in its Judgment, are not a correct one, because of the fact that the plea of oral Partition that has purportedly taken place between the parties must be pleaded in the pleadings and it must be proved in the manner known to law and in accordance with law, as opined by this Court. 17. The burden lies on the party, who asserts oral partition to prove oral partition. Even when an oral partition is alleged to have been taken place moreover 100 years or so, the intention of the partition are to be gathered from their subsequent conduct. 18. There can be no Adverse Possession by one co-owner as against others until there is ouster or exclusion and the possession of the one co-owner becomes adverse to another co-owner from the moment when there is an ouster. As regards co-owners, the law is well settled that there can be no Adverse Possession by one co-owner, unless there has been a denial of title and an ouster to the knowledge of the other as per decisionGovindrao v. Rajabai 58 IA 106; AIR 1931 PC 48. 19. PW1 in her evidence has deposed that Sabapathi Chettiar has five daughters and during his lifetime, he performed the marriage of his five daughters and they are residing with their husband at outstations and till the death of Sabapathi Chettiar, during the year 1990, no one has created a problem in regard to the division of properties. 20. PW2 in her evidence has deposed that his father has five daughters and four sons and two sons have died without getting married tooand one daughter Pappathi has left without informing anyone and whereabouts are not known. 21. 20. PW2 in her evidence has deposed that his father has five daughters and four sons and two sons have died without getting married tooand one daughter Pappathi has left without informing anyone and whereabouts are not known. 21. PW3 in her evidence has stated that his father has five daughters and 4 sons and apart from Marimuthu and Ramaiyan, the other two sons have died before the death of the father and at the time of the death of the father, Pappathi Ammal has not been living along with them and before that she has left without informing anyone and she does not know whether she is alive and also that, whereabouts are not known. 22. DW1 in her evidence has deposed that the suit property originally belongs to her maternal grandfather Sabapathi Chettiar, who has six heirs and her mother, Chinnpillai, Jagathambal, Saraswathi, 1st Defendant Ramaiyan and Marimuthu are the heirs of grandfather and her mother Meenambal has one share in the suit property. As such, for herself and her sister 3rd Defendant, they have 1/6 share in the suit property. 23. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants, who filed Cross Objection No.9 of 2012 before this Court, in the Written Statement have taken a plea to the effect that in the proceedings before the Nagapattinam Tahsildar relating to patta transfer, the 1st Plaintiff's husband, 2 to 5 Defendants' father-Marimuthu and 1st Defendant are all concerned with and Defendants 2 and 3 being the daughters of Meenambal, in the Patta Transfer Proceedings, their names have also been included along with others as per Ex.A.3-Patta Transfer Proceedings dated 16.11.1992 and therefore, the oral partition alleged by the Appellants/Plaintiffs is not to be a true one. But the First Appellate Court has come to a conclusion in the Appeal Judgment that Ex.A.3-Patta Transfer Proceedings was not helpful to the Appellants/Plaintiffs. It has also in its Judgment observed in para 13 that 'from 1968 onwards the 1st Respondent [in A.S.No.53 of 2001] enjoyed the property as own by way of mutation of records making further construction obtaining service connection, water connection, which is proved by Ex.B.3 to B.24. 24. In the Written Statement, the 1st Defendant (during his life time) has taken a plea that the oral partition has taken place in the year 1968 and therefore, the Appellants/Plaintiffs are not entitled to seek the relief of partition. 24. In the Written Statement, the 1st Defendant (during his life time) has taken a plea that the oral partition has taken place in the year 1968 and therefore, the Appellants/Plaintiffs are not entitled to seek the relief of partition. Further, he has also made a reference to the Mortgage Deed dated 28.02.1985 and the mortgage property was mortgaged by the 1st Plaintiff's husband and his legal heirs and had obtained a loan amount from third person. 25. Further, the 1st Defendant, during his life time, when he filed a Written Statement has also taken a stand that the Appellants/ Plaintiffs had to prove that Anjalai @ Chinnapillai had executed a Will dated 28.06.1994 and further, they had to prove that Jagathambal and Saraswathi had executed Release Deed dated 14.07.1997. Continuing further, it was the stand of the 1st Defendant, during his life time, that the 1st Plaintiff's husband, after partition, was in enjoyment of the property for well over 12 years and as such, the right of the Appellants /Plaintiffs in respect of the suit property if any had got extinguished by the plea of limitation. 26. At this juncture, it is not out of place for this Court to make a pertinent mention that even in Ex.A.6-Will dated 28.06.1994 executed by Anjalai Ammal daughter of late Sabapathi and wife of Vaithialingam Chettiar and further, Ex.A.7-Release Deed dated 14.07.1997 in and by which in favour of Marimuthu wife of M.Babi, M.Palanivel, M.Gnanavel, M.Sakthivel, daughter Punithavalli in favour of Sabapathi's daughter Jagathambal and Manickam's wife Saraswathi have executed a Release Deed in respect of 2/5 undivided share in respect of the suit properties. Conspicuously, in both Exs.A.6 and A.7 documents there is no whisper about the daughter of Sabapathi Chettiar Meenambal. When in reality Meenambal, being the daughter of deceased Sabapathi Chettiar, is entitled to get a share in the suit properties. The plaint has not proceeded on the footing that Meenambal is entitled to 1/6th share in respect of the suit properties. 27. In this connection, D.W.1 (2nd Defendant), in her evidence, has deposed that his mother deceased Meenambal has one share in the suit property and also she along with her sister 3rd Defendant has a share of 1/6 in the suit properties for which they have paid the requisite Court Fee. 27. In this connection, D.W.1 (2nd Defendant), in her evidence, has deposed that his mother deceased Meenambal has one share in the suit property and also she along with her sister 3rd Defendant has a share of 1/6 in the suit properties for which they have paid the requisite Court Fee. The fact that Meenambal is the daughter of the deceased Sabapathi Chettiar is admitted by the parties to the litigation and the said factum is not in dispute before this Court in Second Appeal. The very fact that Meenambal being the daughter of deceased Sabapathi Chettiar has been left out while calculating the quantum of share claimed by the Appellants/Plaintiffs in the suit, perforce this Court to come to an irresistible and inescapable conclusion that the Plaint has not proceeded on the right lines specifying the quantum of share each of the children of the deceased Sabapathi Chettiar is entitled to. 28. The evidence of PW2 and PW3 that one of the daughters of Sabapathi Chettiar viz., Pappathi Ammal has left the house without informing anyone and her whereabouts are not known and whether she is alive or not, also not known, it is to be pointed out that law raises no presumption as to the date or time of a person's death. There is a legal presumption of continuance of life, if nothing is shown contrary. 29. It is to be pointed out that Section 107 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, deals with the presumption of continuance of life. Whereas Section 108 of the Indian Evidence Act, deals with the presumption of death. The presumption of civil death or fictional death as per Section 108 of the Indian Evidence Act amounts to physical death in the eye of law. A person, who has not been heard of for seven years by those, who if he/she had been alive, would be likely to have heard of him, is presume to be dead. But, there is no presumption as to the time during the several years at which he died. The burden of proving death on any specified date lies on the individual to whose title that fact is essential, in the considered opinion of this Court. No suit has been filed praying for the relief of declaration as to the civil death of Pappathi Ammal. 30. The burden of proving death on any specified date lies on the individual to whose title that fact is essential, in the considered opinion of this Court. No suit has been filed praying for the relief of declaration as to the civil death of Pappathi Ammal. 30. This Court aptly points out the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court GANDURI KOTESHWARAMMA AND ANOTHER v. CHAKIRI YANADI AND ANOTHER, (2011) 9 SUPREME COURT CASES 788, at Page 789 wherein it is held as follows: “The new Section 6 provides for parity of rights in the coparcenary property among male and female members of a joint Hindu family on and from 9.9.2005. The legislature has now conferred substantive right in favour of the daughters. The declaration in Section 6 that the daughter of a coparcener shall have same rights and liabilities in the coparcenary property as she would have been a son is unambiguous and unequivocal. Thus, on and from 9.9.2005, the daughter is entitled to a share in the ancestral property and is a coparcener as if she had been a son. The right accrued to a daughter in the property of a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara Law, by virtue of the 2005 Amendment Act, is absolute, except in the circumstances provided in Section 6(1) proviso. For the purposes of new Section 6, it is explained that `partition' means any partition made by execution of a deed of partition duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908 or partition effected by a decree of a court. In light of a clear provision contained in the Explanation appended to section 6(5), for determining the non-applicability of the Section 6, what is relevant is to find out whether the partition has been effected before 20.12.2004 by deed of partition duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908 or by a decree of a court. The preliminary decree passed by the trial court on 19.3.1999 and amended on 27.9.2003 does not deprive the appellant daughters of the benefits of 2005 Amendment Act since the final decree for partition has not yet been passed. The preliminary decree passed by the trial court on 19.3.1999 and amended on 27.9.2003 does not deprive the appellant daughters of the benefits of 2005 Amendment Act since the final decree for partition has not yet been passed. It is true that final decree is always required to be in conformity with the preliminary decree but that does not mean that a preliminary decree, before the final decree is passed, cannot be altered or amended or modified by the trial court in the event of changed or supervening circumstances even if no appeal has been preferred from such preliminary decree.” 31. Generally speaking, an order of remand is not to be passed as a matter of routine or to prove a new opportunity to the parties to litigate. Under an inherent power and to prevent ends of Justice being defeated a remand can be made by a Court of Law. Moreover, an order of remand can be passed where there has been no real trial of the dispute and no complete or effectual adjudication of the proceedings and the party complaining has suffered material prejudice on that aspect. 32. In the present case, inasmuch as this Court is concerned more with substantial question of succession, the Ex.A.6 Will dated 28.06.1994 and the Release Deed dated 14.07.1997 take a back seat. Viewed in that perspective, this Court opines that if any Judgment is rendered by this Court in Second Appeal based on oral and documentary materials available on record, then, it would cause serious prejudice and affect the rights of parties to the litigation one way or other. Viewed in that perspective, this Court opines that if any Judgment is rendered by this Court in Second Appeal based on oral and documentary materials available on record, then, it would cause serious prejudice and affect the rights of parties to the litigation one way or other. As such, this Court, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case and also with a view to provide an opportunity to the Appellants/Plaintiffs, to amend the Plaint in regard to the exact quantum of share they are entitled to in respect of the suit properties, to meet the ends of justice, without answering the Substantial Questions of Law 1 and 2 and leaves open, allows the Second Appeal, by remanding the entire subject matter in issue to the trial Court, since this Court firmly is of the opinion that both the trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court have not adverted to the real aspect of quantum of share to which the Meenambal [daughter of deceased Sabapathi] is entitled to and also not dealt with the aspect of Pappathi Ammal leaving the house without informing anyone and her whereabouts not been known (including whether she is alive or dead). Accordingly, the Substantial Questions of Law are so answered. Consequently, the Second Appeal is allowed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. 33. Since this Court has allowed the Second Appeal, the Cross Objection filed by the Defendants 2 and 3 is also allowed by this Court to prevent an aberration of justice. 34. In the result, the Second Appeal and the Cross Objection are allowed. The Judgments and Decrees of the trial Court in O.S.No.163 of 1998 dated 07.11.2000 as well as the First Appellate Court in A.S.No.189 of 2000 dated 22.06.2001 are set aside for the reasons assigned in this Appeal. Liberty is granted to the Appellants/Plaintiffs to amend the Plaint before the trial Court by filing necessary Petition/ Application as per Order 16 Rule 17 of Civil Procedure Code and in this regard, the trial Court is directed to permit the Appellants/Plaintiffs to file the application. Equally, the trial Court is directed to provide opportunities to the other parties to the litigation to file counter, if any, to the said amendment of plaint application. Equally, the trial Court is directed to provide opportunities to the other parties to the litigation to file counter, if any, to the said amendment of plaint application. Thereafter, the trial Court is directed to pass appropriate orders on merits, dispassionately and also uninfluenced with any of the observations made by this Court in the Second Appeal. It is open to the parties to raise all factual and legal pleas before the trial Court (including the plea of whether Pappathi Ammal's whereabouts – whether she is alive or not). The parties are also given the option to lead further additional oral evidence and to mark additional documents, if they so desire/advised and the trial Court shall permit them in this regard. Consequently, the Amendment Application under Order 6 Rule 17 being allowed by the trial Court if any additional written statement is to be filed by the parties, then, the parties are directed to file the additional written statement and based on the additional written statement or pleadings or subsequent pleadings if any issues are to be framed, the trial Court shall permit the necessary issues as per Order 14 of Civil Procedure Code. Since the suit is of the year 1998, the trial Court in any event is directed to dispose of the main suit within a period of six months from the date of receipt of copy of this Judgment.