CHAKRADHARI SHARAN SINGH, J.:–Both the writ applications arise out of respective punishments imposed for alleged misconduct with regard to same occurrence dated 08.07.1987; for the reason that the order impugned in C.W.J.C. No. 13417 of 2002 referred to punishment imposed on the writ petitioner of C.W.J.C. No. 5245 of 2001, this Court vide order dated 09.08.2005, while admitting C.W.J.C. No. 13417 of 2002 ordered for analogous hearing of both the cases. Accordingly, both the cases have been listed together for hearing. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner at the very beginning points out that out of inadvertence ‘5’ has been typed in paragraph-1 of the writ application in place of ‘7’ and seeks permission to make correction in the said paragraph. The prayer is allowed. Let it be done course of the day. This is for the reason that Annexure-7 is the order of D.G.-cum-I.G.(P) Bihar which is under challenge. 3. In spite of repeated calls no one appeared on behalf of the petitioner of C.W.J.C. No. 5245 of 2001. Learned counsel for the State is however present. 4. The original petitioner of C.W.J.C. No. 13417 of 2002 filed the writ application challenging order of Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police, dated 04.10.2002 whereby, exercising power of review suo motu under Rule 853-A of the Police Manual he has dismissed the original petitioner (Jay Kumar Singh, since deceased) from service. During the pendency of writ application the original petitioner died. As the impugned order had civil consequences, an application for substitution was filed which was allowed by the order dated 23.07.2008. Accordingly, the widow of original petitioner Saket Surat Devi has been substituted in place of the original petitioner. 5. In view of the changed situation, learned counsel for the petitioner at the out set submitted that he would not go into the merits of his contention as regards proof of misconduct against the husband of the petitioner. Accordingly, the widow of original petitioner Saket Surat Devi has been substituted in place of the original petitioner. 5. In view of the changed situation, learned counsel for the petitioner at the out set submitted that he would not go into the merits of his contention as regards proof of misconduct against the husband of the petitioner. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and the chain of events from the date of initiation of departmental proceeding and keeping in view the nature of allegation as also keeping in view the fact that at no point of time, prior to the initiation of departmental proceeding in question, any punishment was imposed on the petitioner’s husband, learned counsel for the petitioner would confine his submission that the punishment of dismissal imposed in this case is disproportionate to the alleged misconduct, inasmuch as by virtue of the order of dismissal, the petitioner’s husband not only lost his employment, his entitlement of pension and family pension to his widow, i.e. the present petitioner also stood forfeited. He submits that in view of the nature of allegation, the punishment is shocking to conscience of a reasonable person and therefore, seeks a direction to the authorities to re-consider the case only on the point of quantum of punishment. 6. Before I deal with the limited prayer which has been made on behalf of the petitioner, certain facts of the case need to be gone into and considered. 7. Annexure-2 dated 05.08.1987 is the charge-sheet of departmental proceeding. The allegation against the petitioner is of 08.07.1987 to the effect that as member police escort party in the train (49 up), he demanded a sum of Rs. 10/- from a passenger, who was unauthorisedly found in reserved coach and when he did not oblige, other member of the escort party namely, Brameshwar Singh assaulted him (the passenger). It is further mentioned in the charge-sheet that the co-passenger identified the petitioner’s husband late Jay Kumar Singh, who had demanded the money even in course of enquiry. 8. It appears that the Enquiry Officer after completing the enquiry submitted his report, holding the petitioner guilty of the charge framed against him. The report of the Enquiry Officer, is Annexure-‘J’ to counter affidavit. 8. It appears that the Enquiry Officer after completing the enquiry submitted his report, holding the petitioner guilty of the charge framed against him. The report of the Enquiry Officer, is Annexure-‘J’ to counter affidavit. After submission of the enquiry report, petitioner’s husband was given second show-cause notice vide letter dated 29.08.1988 (Annexure-K to the counter affidavit) and finally agreeing with the report of the Enquiry Officer the disciplinary authority vide order dated 12.09.1988 (Annexure-3) dismissed the petitioner from service. 9. The petitioner’s husband thereafter filed statutory appeal against the order of dismissal. The appellate authority vide order dated 25.01.1990 (Annexure-4) modified the order of dismissal and converted it to punishment of stoppage of increment of salary for two years; equivalent to three black marks. Thereafter, the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police, exercised his suo motu power conferred under Rule-853A(a) of the Bihar Police Manual and issued notice to the petitioner’s husband on 05.07.1993 (Annexure-5) asking him to show-cause as to why he not be dismissed from service. 10. In the meanwhile, it appears that the co-delinquent Barmeshwar Singh, was dismissed from service in connection with same occurrence and his appeal against the order of dismissal was rejected. The co-delinquent Barmeshwar Singh filed the writ petition before this Court vide C.W.J.C. No. 5245 of 2001 taking the plea, inter alia, that in similar circumstances, while Jay Kumar Singh (since deceased) had been given the punishment of stoppage of increments for two years, his appeal had been rejected. 11. The final order in the case of the petitioner’s husband came to be passed on 04.10.2002 by the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police, dismissing the petitioner’s husband from service in exercise of the power under Rule 853(A) (a) of the Bihar Police Manual. From the reading of the said order dated 04.10.2002 (Annexure-7), which is under challenge, it appears that the plea of the co-delinquent Barmeshwar Singh in his writ petition filed in this Court of discriminatory treatment has weighed in the mind of the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police, while passing the order. 12. A plea has been taken on behalf of the petitioner with particular reference to a Judgment of this Court reported in 2001(1) PLJR 133 V.S. Reedy Vs. Union of India and Ors. 12. A plea has been taken on behalf of the petitioner with particular reference to a Judgment of this Court reported in 2001(1) PLJR 133 V.S. Reedy Vs. Union of India and Ors. that since the petitioner had already undergone and suffered the punishment of withholding of increments pursuant to the order of the appellate authority, it was not proper for the D.G.-cum-I.G.P. to have passed the order of dismissal after so much of delay i.e. nearly twelve years after the date of the appellate order. In the case of V.S. Reddy Vs. Union of India (supra) this Court held that pursuant to the earlier order the petitioner had been allowed to serve the punishment, the second order of punishment amounted to imposition twice for the same charge which is not permissible in law. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, at the same time submits that keeping in view the changed situation and the contention of the present petitioner, he would not go into all those details and reiterates that the authorities may be directed to re-consider the case only on the point of substituting the punishment of dismissal by any other punishment so that the petitioner may get the benefits of at least of the pensionary benefits as her husband had served the department for several years and the punishment of dismissal from service was imposed when he was at the fag ends of his career and more particularly because there was no punishment imposed on him earlier with respect to any misconduct. I find some force in submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that previous conduct of an employee can be a valid consideration while choosing the nature of punishment to be imposed on him for completion of the disciplinary proceeding. 13. It is true that the nature of punishment to be imposed on a Government servant is within the discretion of the Disciplinary Authority or other competent authority. This court in exercise of power of Judicial Review under Article 226 of the Constitution, normally does not substitute its opinion in place of punishment inflicted by the disciplinary authority or other competent authority empowered in that behalf. This court in exercise of power of Judicial Review under Article 226 of the Constitution, normally does not substitute its opinion in place of punishment inflicted by the disciplinary authority or other competent authority empowered in that behalf. However, this Court may in exercise of such power, when it finds the punishment to be shockingly disproportionate to alleged misconduct, ask the competent authority to reconsider the quantum of punishment or some times for the ends of justice may even substitute. 14. In the present case the allegation against the delinquent is based on a complaint made by a passenger who was admittedly found in the reserved compartment unauthorisedly. Secondly, the Appellate Authority had modified the order of dismissal passed by the Disciplinary Authority to that of stoppage of increment for two years 25.01.1990 (Annexure-4) itself. The Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police exercised his power under Rule 853-A(a) of the Bihar Police Manual after more than twelve years, whereas, according to the said rule, the power must be exercised within a reasonable period. Twelve years can’t be said to be a reasonable period for exercise of power under the said rule. Thirdly, there is no denial to the plea on behalf of the petitioner that this was his first misconduct alleged. Fourthly, the effect of dismissal from service is, inter alia, forfeiture of all pensionary benefits which the petitioner’s husband earned during long service tenure. Keeping these aspects in mind, I am of the view that the punishment of dismissal imposed on the petitioner’s husband is unduly harsh and disproportionate to misconduct alleged. 15. I accordingly set aside the order dated 04.10.2002 (Annexurer-7) passed by the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police, Bihar (Respondent no. 2) with a direction to him to re-consider the petitioner’s case by substituting the punishment of dismissal by any other punishment which is found to be just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case so that the petitioner may not be denied, the pensionary benefits arising out of the long service rendered by the petitioner’s husband in the police force. 16. Re-consideration must be done within a period of three months from the date of receipt / production of a copy of this order. It is expected that the respondents shall expedite grant of other reliefs arising out of alteration of the punishment by respondent no. 2, the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police, Bihar. 16. Re-consideration must be done within a period of three months from the date of receipt / production of a copy of this order. It is expected that the respondents shall expedite grant of other reliefs arising out of alteration of the punishment by respondent no. 2, the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police, Bihar. 17. For the reason that no one appeared in C.W.J.C. No. 5245 of 2001 on behalf of the petitioner, the same is dismissed for non-prosecution. However, dismissal of this case will not come in way of respondent no. 2 considering the case of Barmeshwar Singh also on the quantum of punishment on principle of equality and fair play, and if he is of the view that case of petitioner of C.W.J.C. No. 5245 of 2001 is similar to that of the deceased Jay Kumar Singh in all respect, he will pass necessary orders in this regard.