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2012 DIGILAW 1047 (KER)

K. AMIRKUTTY v. STATE OF KERALA

2012-11-30

P.R.RAMACHANDRA MENON

body2012
JUDGMENT : P.R. Ramachandra Menon, J. Whether the petitioner, who was appointed as a Government Law Officer to do Government Work at the Munsiff's Court Centre, Karunagappally, in Kollam district, by virtue of Ext. P1, is entitled to continue even after attaining the age of 60' years, in view of the 'Common Provisions' under the 'Head G' in Chapter II of the Kerala Government Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) and Conduct of Cases Rules, is the subject matter of consideration. The case of the petitioner is that, he was a practising lawyer at Karunagappally and on substantiating the credentials, he came to be appointed as aforesaid, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Rule as mentioned above. By virtue of the terms of Ext. P1 appointment, he assumed charge and it was for a period three years from the date of his assumption of charge or on attaining the age of sixty years, whichever was earlier. Admittedly, the petitioner crossed the age of 60 years and immediately thereupon, Ext. P2 order came to be passed by the Government on 23.11.2012, holding that, the appointment of the petitioner has automatically come to an end w.e.f. 15.11.2012. Simultaneously, the second respondent was appointed for a period of three years from the date of his assumption of charge of till the attainment of the age of sixty years, whichever was earlier, exactly in similar lines of Ext. P1. The petitioner challenges Ext. P2 in this writ petition. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that merely by virtue of crossing the age of 60 years, it cannot lead to any automatic termination, in view of 'Rule 14' coming under 'Head G' 'Common Provisions'; which stipulates that the age barrier applicable only in the case of persons other than a Government Law Officer (other than Public Prosecutor of High Court), a Special Government Pleader, Special Public Prosecutor or a Pleader to do Government work. The petitioner being a person, who comes under the exempted category, it is contended that, the prohibition is not at all attracted and the petitioner ought to have been permitted to continue even after crossing the age of 60 years, till he completing the period of three years. 3. Heard the learned Government Pleader as well. 4. With regard to the term of appointment, there is absolutely no dispute, as Ext. 3. Heard the learned Government Pleader as well. 4. With regard to the term of appointment, there is absolutely no dispute, as Ext. P1 order is not under challenge. Coming to the challenge raised against Ext. P2, whereby the petitioner has been treated as terminated from the service on crossing the age of 60 years, simultaneously appointing the second respondent in that place, it is worthwhile to go through the relevant provision, to ascertain the mandate of Rule 14 coming under the head 'Common Provisions'. The relevant Rules governing the appointment were in fact formulated and notified by the Government as early as in 1978, which were brought into effect from 25.01.1978. As a matter of fact, Chapter II of the said Rules deals with appointment of Government Law Officers comprising in different segments; virtually; A. Government Law Officer in the High Court. B. Government Law Officers in District Court, Additional District Court and Sub Court Centres. C. Pleaders appointed to do Government work. D. Special Government Pleaders and Special Public Prosecutors. E. Government Pleader for Arbitration Proceedings. F. Standing counsel in the Supreme Court. G. Common provisions. It is under the Head 'G' 'Common Provisions', that Rule 14 appears; which reads as follows: G. Common provisions: 14. Common qualifications regarding age: No person, who has completed the age of sixty years shall be appointed as a Government Law Officer [other than Public Prosecutor of the High Court] a Special Government Pleader, Special Public Prosecutor or a Pleader to do Government work. It is clear from the above Rule that crossing the age of 60 years is not applicable to the appointment of Public Prosecutor of High Court; Special Public Prosecutor or Pleader to do Government work. In other words, it means that the bar is applicable only in respect of other law officers and when it comes to the exempted category, it is open for the Government to have appointed a person who has crossed 60 years. But coming to nature of appointment in the present case, it specifically falls under the Head 'C' 'Pleaders appointed to do Government work', which is dealt with under Rule 10, which, as it stood earlier, reads as follows: C. Pleaders appointed to do Government work: 10. But coming to nature of appointment in the present case, it specifically falls under the Head 'C' 'Pleaders appointed to do Government work', which is dealt with under Rule 10, which, as it stood earlier, reads as follows: C. Pleaders appointed to do Government work: 10. Appointment of Pleaders to do Government work.- (1) The District Collector may appoint any advocate for doing Government work, if any, in any Munsiff's Court at a Centre where there are not Government Law Officers. (2) The appointment of a Pleader to do Government work in Munsiff's Court shall be made from a panel of at least three names furnished by the Revenue Divisional Officer in consultation with the Presiding Officer of the Court. (3) The term of appointment of a Pleader appointed under sub-rule (1) shall ordinarily be for a period of three years. The District Collector may reappoint any such person for further periods not exceeding three years at a time. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this rule the Government shall be at liberty to engage any other advocate for conducting any particular Government case. Reading the said Rule along with Rule 14 sought to be relied on by the petitioner, it was quite possible to have engaged persons like the petitioner even beyond the age of 60 years. Things took a different turn, when the relevant Rule i.e. Rule 10 was amended by virtue of SRO No. 1498 of 1995. The amended Rule reads as follows: 10. Method of appointment of Pleaders to do Government work - (1) The Government shall appoint an Advocate for doing Government work in a Munsiff's Court at a centre where there are no Government Law Officers. (2) The appointment of a Pleader to do Government work in a Munsiff's Court shall be made from a panel of at least three names of Advocates furnished by the District Collector concerned. (3) The term of appointment of a Pleader appointed under sub-rule (1) shall ordinarily be for a period of three years. The Government may re-appoint any such person for further period not exceeding three years. Provided that the services of any such person shall automatically terminate on his attaining the age of sixty years. (3) The term of appointment of a Pleader appointed under sub-rule (1) shall ordinarily be for a period of three years. The Government may re-appoint any such person for further period not exceeding three years. Provided that the services of any such person shall automatically terminate on his attaining the age of sixty years. (4) The District Collector shall while preparing the panel bear in mind the following: (i) a person included in the panel shall have at least fiver years practice as an Advocate: (ii) the panel shall be prepared in consultation with the Presiding Officer of the Court and only those persons, who having to their qualifications, experience, integrity, reliability, reputation and character and antecedents are in the opinion of the District Collector, fit to be appointed, shall be included, therein. Note: It shall be necessary to advertise the vacancies or invite applications for appointment. After the amendment of the Rules in 1995, the power and authority vested with the District Collector to appoint Law Officers to do the work of Munsiff's Court at a centre came to be vested with the Government and that apart, a 'proviso' was added to Sub Rule 3 of Rule 10, whereby it was stipulated that the service of any such person shall automatically terminated on attaining the age of 60 years. While reading Rule 10 under the Head 'C' along with Rule 14 under the 'Head 'G' (Common Provisions), it has to be noted that Rule 14 under the 'Common Provisions' has been in existence right from the date of inception. But after the modification of the specific Rule i.e. Rule 10, as amended with effect from 1995, there cannot be any obscurity at all, that on attaining the age of 60 years, engagement of the person concerned will stand automatically terminated. It is with reference to this Rule, that the Government has held in Ext. P2 that the service of the petitioner appointed as per Ext. P1 had come to be automatically terminated from 15.11.2012, the date when he crossed the age of 60' years. In so far as there is no challenge to the Rule as above, the claim mooted by the petitioner seeking to permit him to continue beyond the age of 60' years is rather unfounded and the challenge raised against Ext. P2 has necessarily to fail. The matter can be examined from another angle as well. In so far as there is no challenge to the Rule as above, the claim mooted by the petitioner seeking to permit him to continue beyond the age of 60' years is rather unfounded and the challenge raised against Ext. P2 has necessarily to fail. The matter can be examined from another angle as well. As borne by Ext. P1, the appointment given to the petitioner was for a period of 'three' years from the date of assumption of charge, or till attaining the age of 60 years which ever was earlier, as clearly incorporated in the 'third' (unnumbered) paragraph of Ext. P1. The said appointment was accepted by the petitioner with open eyes and without any protest. In so far as the petitioner has admittedly crossed the age of 60 years, by virtue of Ext. P1, it is quite possible to terminate the service without anything else to be looked into. The stipulation in Ext. P1 has never been subjected to challenge at any point of time and Ext. P1 is not sought to be set aside in this writ petition as well. In the above circumstance, this Court finds that the writ petition is devoid of any merit. The same is dismissed accordingly.