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2012 DIGILAW 105 (ORI)

Subodha Mohanta @ Subrata Kumar Mohanty v. Government of India

2012-02-24

B.K.PATEL, L.MOHAPATRA

body2012
JUDGMENT L. MOHAPATRA, J. - The petitioner in this writ application has challenged the legality of the order dated 26.12.2011 rejecting his representation dated 29.11.2011 for revocation of the order of detention and prayer is made to hold the detention illegal. 2. The petitioner by order of the District Magistrate and Collector, Balasore dated 26.12.2011 passed under Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 was detained in custody. The said order of detention was confirmed by the Board as well as the State Government. Challenging the said order of detention, the petitioner had approached this Court in W.P.(Crl.) No.410 of 2011. The said writ application challenging the order of detention was dismissed on 29.7.2011. Thereafter the petitioner submitted a representation under Section 14 of the National Security Act, 1980 to revoke the order of detention on personal grounds. The said representation having been rejected by the State in Annexure-3, this writ application has been filed. 3. Shri Mohanty, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner challenged the order in Annexure-3 solely on the ground that his representation addressed to the District Magistrate, Balasore under Section 14 of the National Security Act, 1980 was not considered by the Government of India in the Ministry of Home Affairs (Internal Security) and no order having been passed by the Government of India on the said representation, the order in Annexure-3 passed by the State Government rejecting the representation is liable to be set aside and further detention of the petitioner is illegal. 4. No counter has been filed either on behalf of the State authorities or on behalf of the Union of India. 5. Admittedly the earlier writ application filed by the petitioner challenging the order of detention passed by the District Magistrate, Balasore in exercise of power under Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the National Security Act had been dismissed. Thereafter the petitioner submitted the representation before the District Magistrate, Balasore under Section 14 of the National Security Act for revocation of the order of detention on personal grounds. A copy of the representation annexed to the writ application as Annexure-2 shows that a copy of the same had been forwarded to Government of India, represented through its Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi. A copy of the representation annexed to the writ application as Annexure-2 shows that a copy of the same had been forwarded to Government of India, represented through its Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi. The representation of the petitioner addressed to the District Magistrate had been forwarded to the State Government and in the impugned order the State Government rejected the representation. Section 14 of the National Security Act, 1980 provides that without prejudice to the provisions of Sections 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, a detention order may, at any time, be revoked or modified. Invoking this provision, the petitioner had submitted his representation in Annexure-2. Section 14 does not provide for any time limit for disposal of representation by the Union of India. Faced with the situation, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the representation submitted by the petitioner should have been forwarded to the Central Government for consideration by the State Government but instead of doing so, the same has been rejected by the State Government. In support of such contention, the learned counsel relied on two decisions annexed to the writ application. The first decision in Annexure-4 is a judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Vinayak Ramachandra Sakhalkar and etc. etc. v. D. Ramchandran, Commissioner of Police, Thane and others etc., reported in 1985 STPL (LE-Crim) 14335 BOM. In the said reported decision, the challenge was in respect of the order of detention passed under Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the National Security Act and Section 14 of the Act was never under consideration. The second decision in Annexure-5 relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is in the case of Haji Mohd. Akhlaq v. District Magistrate, reported in 1987 STPL (LE) 13461 SC, which relates to Section 14 (1) of the National Security Act, 1980 read with Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India. In the said reported case the detenu made a representation to the Central Government through the State Government for revocation of the order of detention. There was delay on the part of the State Government in forwarding the same to the Central Government. In the said reported case the detenu made a representation to the Central Government through the State Government for revocation of the order of detention. There was delay on the part of the State Government in forwarding the same to the Central Government. The Court held that the Central Government has the power under Section 14 (1) to revoke an order of detention passed by the State Government or its officers and that power in order to be real and effective, must imply a right in a detenu to make a representation to the Central Government. Failure on the part of the State Government deprives the detenu of his right to have his detention revoked, With the above findings, the Court further held that the detention was constitutionally impermissible. In this connection, reference may be made to a decision of the apex Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Zavad Zama Khan, reported in AIR 1984 Supreme Court 1095. This judgment has been rendered by a Bench consisting of three Hon'ble Judges whereas the decision relied upon by the learned counsel in Annexure-5 is a decision rendered by two Hon'ble Judges. In paragraph 13 of the above judgment, the Court observed as follows: "The principle that emerges from all these decisions is that the power of revocation conferred on the Central Government under S.14 of the Act is a statutory power which may be exercised on information received by the Central Government from its own sources including that supplied by the State Government under Sub-sec. (5) of S. 3 or from the detenu in the form of a petition for representation. It is for the Central Government to decide whether or not it should revoke the order of detention in a particular case. In the present case, the detenu was not deprived of the right of making a representation to the detaining authority under Art.22 (5) of the Constitution read with S.8 (1) of the Act. Although the detenu had no right to simultaneously make a representation against the order of detention to the Central Government under Art. 22 (5) and there was no duty cast on the State Government to forward the same to the Central Government, nevertheless the State Government forwarded the same forthwith. Although the detenu had no right to simultaneously make a representation against the order of detention to the Central Government under Art. 22 (5) and there was no duty cast on the State Government to forward the same to the Central Government, nevertheless the State Government forwarded the same forthwith. The Central Government duly considered that representation which in effect was nothing but a representation for revocation of the order of detention under Section 14 of the Act. That being so it was not obligatory on the part of the Central Government to consider a second representation for revocation under S. 14. We may profitably refer to Phillippa Anne Duke's case. ( AIR 1982 SC 1178 ) (supra), where in somewhat similar circumstances it was held that failure of the Central Government to consider a representation for revocation of an order of detention under S.11 (1) (b) of the COFEPOSA Act handed over to the Prime Minister during her visit to England did not render the continued detention invalid. It was observed: "Representations from whatever source addressed to whomsoever officer of one or other department of the Government cannot be treated as a representation to the Government under S. 11 (1) (b) of the COFEPOSA Act." It is observed in the said paragraph that there was no duty cast on the State Government to forward the representation to the Central Government. This decision has not been taken note of in the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel in Annexure–5. We are, therefore, bound by the view expressed by the Larger Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Zaval Zama Khan (supra) and hold that no duty is cast upon the State Government to forward the representation of the petitioner to the Central Government under Section 14 of the National Security Act, 1980. 6. Even though we have found that there was no duty cast on the State Government to forward the representation of the petitioner to the Central Government, the detaining authority was required to forward the representation of the petitioner to the Central Government for consideration. No counter having been filed either by the State Government or by the Central Government, it is not possible to know as to whether the said representation was forwarded to the Central Government by the detaining authority and the same was considered or not. No counter having been filed either by the State Government or by the Central Government, it is not possible to know as to whether the said representation was forwarded to the Central Government by the detaining authority and the same was considered or not. In the case of Haji Mohd Akhlaq v. District Magistrate (supra), on the ground of inordinate delay in disposal of the representation invoking the power of the Central Government under Section 14 of the act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held the detention to be constitutionally impermissible. There being nothing on record to show that the representation of the petitioner had been disposed of by the Central Government within a reasonable time, we have to accept the case of the petitioner that the representation invoking Section 14 (1) of the Act has not been considered by the Central Government and accordingly hold that further detention of the petitioner is constitutionally impermissible. 7. We, therefore, allow this writ application and direct release of the petitioner with immediate effect. B.K. PATEL, J. I Agree. Application allowed.