JUDGMENT 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court in C.M.A.No.24 of 2003 dated 28.1.2005 in enhancing the compensation fixed by the Land Acquisition Officer in Award No.4/02-03 dated 26.3.2003 . 2. The appellants are the respondents and the respondents herein are the appellants before the First Appellate Court. The second appellant is the Land Acquisition Officer who has passed the award, which was challenged before the First Appellate Court. 3. The case of the both parties in brief were as follows: The Adi-dravidar families at D.Elamangalam Village, Tittagudi Taluk were living in a congested and unhygienic conditions and therefore, in order to provide free housing plots to such homeless Adi-dravidar community people an extent of 5.55.5 hectares of land in S.No.73/1, 73/2, 102/1A, 103/1A1 and 103/1A2 in the said Village were acquired for providing 274 poor Adi-dravidar families. The aforesaid lands was owned by private parties and therefore, 4(1) notification under Tamilnadu Adi-Driavidar Welfare Scheme Act 1978 was issued and it was published in Cuddalore District gazatee dated 3.3.2003 and thereafter, a notice under section 5(1) were sent to land owners for conducting the enquiry. Accordingly, the award enquiry was conducted in a public place on 26.3.2003 in D.Elamangalam village. Thereafter, necessary formalities have been followed and the Land Acquisition Officer had proceeded further to fix the compensation for the acquired lands by way of fixing the market value of the said acquired lands. For that he had gathered the data sales in between 1.3.2002 till 4.3.2003 i.e., one year period prior to the date of 4(1) notification and accordingly 20 sales executed during the said period was collected and out of them the sale in Serial No.7, for R.S.88/5 of an extent of 34 cents for a sum of Rs.17,500/- as per document No.496/2002 dated 16.5.2002 was found to be the suitable value since other 19 sales were rejected on various grounds. The value of 34 cents for a sale consideration of Rs.17,500/- was calculated at Rs.51,470/- per one acre which is equivalent to Rs.1,27,131/-per one hectare. The soil nature, tharam and classification of the aforesaid data sale was similar to that of the acquired lands and therefore, the said value at Rs.51,470/-per one acre was fixed towards compensation for the acquired lands. Accordingly, the land owners were given information. The soil nature, tharam and classification of the aforesaid data sale was similar to that of the acquired lands and therefore, the said value at Rs.51,470/-per one acre was fixed towards compensation for the acquired lands. Accordingly, the land owners were given information. The respondents/claimants who were the owners of the land in S.No.73/1 to an extent of 2.43.0 hectares and in S.No.102/1A to an extent of 0.67.5 hectares and in S.No.103/1A1 to an extent of 2.20.0 hectares , totaling 3.30.5 hectares, a compensation was offered to the claimants and the claimants have received the compensation, without prejudice to their case to enhance compensation for a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- per acre. 4. Aggrieved by such award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer, the claimants preferred an appeal before the First Appellate Court in C.M.A.No.24/2002 challenging the award and sought for fixing higher compensation of Rs.3,00,000/- per one acre. The first Appellate Court heard both sides and fixed the market value at Rs.3,00,000/-per one acre and calculated the compensation for the acquired lands. 5. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court, the appellants herein have preferred the present appeal. 6. On admission, the following substantial questions of law were formulated for consideration in this appeal. "i) Whether the Court below had erred in applying the provisions of Act 1/1894 in allowing interest, additional amount and solatium when the acquisition proceedings had been initiated under Act 31/1978? ii) Whether the Court below had erred in placing reliance on Ex.A9 when the land conveyed under the said document is classified as house site whereas the land acquired is classified as dry agricultural land? iii) Whether the Court below erred in coming to the finding that the market value fixed by the competent Authority is not true and correct especially when the competent Authority had relied upon a data sale deed under which the land similar in soil, nature and tharam to the land acquired had been conveyed? iv) Whether Court below had erred in not appreciating the provisions of Section 8 of Act 31/78 which clearly prohibits taking into account of any increase to the value of the land acquired which is likely to accrue from the use to which it will be put after acquisition?" 7. Heard, Mr.M.Venugopal, learned Additional Government Pleader (C.S.) for the appellants and Mr.N.Suresh, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 8. Heard, Mr.M.Venugopal, learned Additional Government Pleader (C.S.) for the appellants and Mr.N.Suresh, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 8. Learned Additional Government Pleader would submit in his argument that the First Appellate Court erred in enhancing the compensation from Rs.51,470/- per one acre to Rs.3,00,000/- per one acre. He would further submit that the Land Acquisition Officer had correctly found out the land identical to the acquired land and fixed the value of the said land for the acquired land and the nature of soil, tharam and classification are similar and therefore, the market value fixed at Rs.51,470/-should not have been enhanced. He would also submit that the land acquired is comprised in R.S.No.73/1 and the data sale selected was comprised in S.No.88/5 which has got close proximity to each other and therefore, the value fixed for the land acquired would be a correct market value. He would further submit that the First Appellate Court had placed reliance on Ex.A8 and fixed the market value which has been classified as a house site whereas the land acquired is classified as dry agriculture land. He would also submit that there are other equal identical land is available for fixing the market value and why small extent of land alone to be selected for fixing the market value. The house site cannot be compared with the acquired lands for their fixation of value. He would further submit in his arguments that the extent of the property in Ex.A8 is smaller extent whereas the acquired land were in larger extent. He would also submit that the land comprised in Ex.A8 is far away in S.No.38/1 and there is no proximity to the acquired land comprised in S.Nos.73/1 and 103/1. He would also submit that the grant of solatium at 30% and additional value at 12% and the interest calculated at 9% and 15%, applying the provisions of Land Acquisition Act are not applicable to the present acquisition and as per the provisions of Act 31/78, solatium has to be fixed at 15% and interest could be fixed at 6% p.a. under Section 7 of the Act. He would therefore, request the Court that the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court may be revised and the fixation of the market value by the Land Acquisition Officer, may be restored. He would request the Court to allow the Second Appeal accordingly. 9. He would therefore, request the Court that the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court may be revised and the fixation of the market value by the Land Acquisition Officer, may be restored. He would request the Court to allow the Second Appeal accordingly. 9. Learned counsel for the respondents would submit in his argument that the First Appellate Court has correctly selected the document, Ex.A8 for fixing the market value even though the extent mentioned in Ex.A8 was smaller. He would further submit that the said land was in S.No.38/1 which is very near to the acquired land in S.No.73/2 and S.No.103/1A2. He would further submit that the Village map produced in Ex.A9 would prove the same. He would further submit that the said acquired land was located on the north western side of land comprised in Ex.A8 whereas it is located away from the data land selected by the Land Acquisition Officer on its north eastern side and there are 3 survey numbers' land in between those two lands. He would further submit that even though the land was smaller in size in Ex.A8, suitable deductions can be made for arriving to a correct value of the land acquired. He would further submit that the data land selected by the Land Acquisition Officer which is also produced in Ex.B3 would not in any way suitable for fixation of the value. He would further submit in his argument that even when the deduction theory is applied, the value of the land as per Ex.A8 would fetch more than Rs.4,00,000/- per one acre and therefore, the fixation of market value by the First Appellate Court need not be interfered. 10. He would further submit in his argument that various judgments of the Honourable Apex Court would go to show that the deductions can be fixed in between 20% to 75% and if the highest deduction of 75% is applied, the correct market value would be fixed at Rs.4,57,000/-. 10. He would further submit in his argument that various judgments of the Honourable Apex Court would go to show that the deductions can be fixed in between 20% to 75% and if the highest deduction of 75% is applied, the correct market value would be fixed at Rs.4,57,000/-. The appeal has been preferred by the appellants and even though no appeal has been preferred nor any cross appeal has been filed by the respondents /claimants, the claimants can set forth their claim for further enhancement of compensation as per the provisions of Order 41 Rule 33 C.P.C. He would also submit in his arguments that in order to render substantial justice, the respondents/claimants who were the land owners, parted their lands for noble purpose, should have been given an enhanced compensation, even though they have asked for a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- per one acre before the First Appellate Court as well as with the Land Acquisition Officer. The enhanced compensation may be awarded at Rs.4,57,000/-to the claimants even a sum of Rs.3,00,000/-was only claimed in the appeal preferred by the appellants. He would also rely upon the judgment of this Court reported in (The Revenue Divisional Officer, Tiruvannamalai v. A.Geetha Ammal and another) for the principle regarding the application of Order 41 Rule 33 C.P.C. for correcting the judgment in order to render substantial justice. Yet another judgment of this Court reported in (The Special Tahsildar (LA) & another v. G.Raju & others) has also been relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents for the same principle. He would also cite a judgment of Honourable Apex Court reported in 2010 (10) SCC 458 (Pralhad and others v. State of Maharashtra and another) for the principle that the appellate Court is empowered to pass any decree or any order which ought to have been passed or made under Order 41 Rule 33 C.P.C. He would further submit that the data sale produced in Ex.B3 cannot at any stretch of imagination be compared for fixing the market value of the land acquired since it is away from the site and the land in S.No.38 comprised in Ex.A8 alone is located adjacently on its south western side and therefore, the value found in Ex.A8 alone could be taken as correctly done by the First Appellate Court. He would further submit that even the highest rate of deduction at 75% is applied to the said value, the actual value of 1 acre of the acquired land would be Rs.4,57,000/-and therefore, such amount may be fixed even though the claimants have restricted their claim before the First Appellate Court as well as Land Acquisition Officer atRs.3,00,000/-per one acre, under Order 41 Rule 33 C.P.C. in order to render substantial justice. Therefore, he would request the Court to modify the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court by modifying the decree after dismissing the second appeal preferred by the appellants. 11. The Additional Government Pleader (CS) would reply in his argument that the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents/claimants regarding the further enhancement of the compensation could not be granted by this Court because it is not their appeal but it is an appeal filed by the appellants, aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court. He would also submit that the respondents/claimants did not file any cross appeal nor any separate appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court and therefore, he cannot seek for enhancement at Rs.4,57,000/-per one acre since their claim was restricted to Rs.3,00,000/- per one acre before the First Appellate Court and the Land Acquisition Officer. He would also cite a judgment of the Honourable Apex Court for the proposition that in an appeal filed by the appellants questioning the enhanced compensation, the respondent cannot seek for further enhancement compensation without filing any cross appeal or separate appeal. He would draw the attention of this Court to a judgment of the Honourable Apex Court reported in (Ranjana Prakash & others v. Divisional Manager & another). Relyingupon the aforesaid judgment, he would submit in his argument that the respondents/claimants have restricted their claim at Rs.3,00,000/-per one acre before the Land Acquisition Officer as well as before the First Appellate Court and the First Appellate Court had also allowed the appeal and granted the relief accordingly, and the present claim of more than Rs.3,00,000/-, i.e., Rs.4,57,000/-, in the appeal preferred by the appellants filed against the enhancement of compensation of Rs.3,00,000/-, is not sustainable in view of the dictum laid down by the Honourable Apex Court. Therefore, he would request the Court to allow the appeal and to restore the order of the Land Acquisition Officer. 12. I have given anxious thoughts to the arguments advanced on either side. 13. The admitted facts are that the land belonging to the respondent in S.No.73/1 to an extent of 2.43.0 hectares and in S.No.102/1A to an extent of 0.67.5 hectares and S.No.103/1A1 to an extent of 2.20.0 hectares, totaling 3.30.5 hectares were acquired and the Land Acquisition Officer had fixed the compensation at Rs.51,470/-per one acre and it was not accepted by the claimants and they have asked for Rs.3,00,000/-per one acre before the First Appellate Court . It is also true that the First Appellate Court also considered the evidence adduced before it and it came to the conclusion of determining the market value at Rs.18,312/-per one cent which is otherwise Rs.18,31,200/- per one acre. The documents relied upon by the first Appellate Court was Ex.A8 in which document, the land located in S.No.38/1 was sold. However, the fixation of the market value was done by the Land Acquisition Officer relying on Ex.B3 in S.No.88/5 and accordingly, Rs.51,470/-per one acre was fixed as market value. No doubt, the said sale deed in Ex.B3 was dated 16.5.2002 within one year period prior to the date of 4(1) notification . However, Ex.A8 is dated 18.2.2003 which is also immediately prior to 4(1) notification. When the village map is perused, the land comprised in Ex.B3, date sale, relied upon by the Land Acquisition Officer was located on the south western side of the acquired land and there were three survey numbers in between those two lands. Per contra, the land comprised in Ex.A8 taken by the first appellate Court for valuation is in S.No.38 which is adjacently located to the land acquired on its south eastern side. Therefore, the quality and tharam of the land in Ex.A8 would be more similar to the land acquired than the data sale selected by the Land Acquisition Officer in Ex.B3. Therefore, the conclusion reached by the First Appellate Court to fix the value of the land in Ex.A8 is found to be correct. 14. Therefore, the quality and tharam of the land in Ex.A8 would be more similar to the land acquired than the data sale selected by the Land Acquisition Officer in Ex.B3. Therefore, the conclusion reached by the First Appellate Court to fix the value of the land in Ex.A8 is found to be correct. 14. It has been contended that the land in Ex.A8 was only 2 ½ cents for which the value has been fixed at Rs.45,700/- and such value of a very small extent which is classified as house site, cannot be compared with a larger extent acquired for the house scheme of Adi-dravidar community people. 15. No doubt, it is true that the said land in Ex.A8 is the next land adjacent to the plot acquired. However it is smaller in extent and it was classified as the house site. In such circumstances, what is to be done, has been laid by the Honourable Apex Court in various judgments. In the judgment of the Honourable Apex Court reported in 2011 (13) SCALE 48 (Chandrashekar v. Land Acquisition Officer) it has been categorically laid down that 75% could have been the maximum limit for deductions and it should not exceed such upper benchmark to 75%. The relevant passage would run as follows: "19. In Lal Chand's case (supra) and in Andhra Pradesh Housing Board's case (supra), this Court expressed the upper limit of permissible deductions as 75 percent. Deductions upto 67 percent can be made under the head of "development". Under what head then, would the remaining component of deductions fall? Further deductions would obviously pertain to considerations other than the head of "development". Illustratively a deduction could be made keeping in mind the waiting period required to raise infrastructure, as also, the waiting period for sale of developed plots and or built-up areas. This nature of deduction may be placed under the head "waiting period". Illustratively again, deductions could also be made in cases where the exemplar sale transaction, is of a date subsequent to the publication of the preliminary notification. This nature of deduction may be placed under the head " de-escalation". Likewise, deductions may be made for a variety of other causes which may arise in different cases. It is however necessary for us to conclude, in the backdrop of he precedents on the issue. This nature of deduction may be placed under the head " de-escalation". Likewise, deductions may be made for a variety of other causes which may arise in different cases. It is however necessary for us to conclude, in the backdrop of he precedents on the issue. That all deductions should not cumulatively exceed the upper benchmark of 75 percent. A deduction beyond 75 percent would give the impression of being lopsided, or contextually unreal, since the land loser would seemingly get paid for only 25 percent of his land. This impression is unjustified, because deductions are made out of the market value of developed land, whereas, the acquired land is undeveloped (or not fully developed). Differences between the nature of the exemplar land and the acquired land, it should be remembered, is the reason/cause for applying deductions. Another aspect of this matter must also be kept in mind. Market value based on an ememplar sale, from which deduction in excess of 75 percent has to be made, would not be a relevant sale transaction to be taken into consideration, for determining the compensation of the acquired land. In such a situation the exemplar land and the acquired land would be uncomparable, and therefore, there would be no question of applying the market value of one (exemplar sale) to determine the compensation payable for the other (acquired land). It however needs to be clarified, that even though on account of developmental activities (under the head "development"), we have specified the upper benchmark of 67percent, it would seem, that for the remaining deduction(s), the permissible range would be upto 8 percent. That however is to the correct position. The range of deductions, other than under the head "development", would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Such deductions, may even exceed 8 percent, but that would be so only, where deductions for developmental activities (under the head "development") is less than 67 percent, i.e., so long as the cumulative deductions do not cross the upper benchmark of 75 percent. We therefore hold, that the range for deductions, for issues other than developmental costs, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, they may be 8 percent, or even the double thereof, or even further more, as long as, cumulatively all deductions put together do not exceed the upper benchmark of 75 percent. " 16. We therefore hold, that the range for deductions, for issues other than developmental costs, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, they may be 8 percent, or even the double thereof, or even further more, as long as, cumulatively all deductions put together do not exceed the upper benchmark of 75 percent. " 16. When we apply the said principle in this case, the extent of the property acquired is more than 13 acres to which the value of 2 ½ cents house site has to be applied for, since the said smaller extent is located adjacent to the acquired land. However, the First Appellate Court had not applied the deduction theory but had simply followed the valuation as per Ex.A8 and found that the market value for one acre was fixed at Rs.18.31,200/- (Rs.18,312/- per one cent). In view of the value of the smaller extent is taken up for the larger extent as well as the said property in Ex.A8 is described as a house site and the land acquired is a vast punja land, the maximum deduction of 75% has to be applied for assessing the correct market value. When we apply 75% deduction, the value of 1 acre would come to Rs.4,57,800/-. The said value ought to have been arrived at by the First Appellate Court. But it had arrived to the value of Rs.18,21,200/- per one acre for the land acquired. However, it had come to the conclusion that the said value was more than Rs.3,00,000/- as asked for by the appellants/ claimants and therefore, it had fixed at Rs.3,00,000/- per one acre. The calculation made in this second appeal and the value of one acre fixed for the land acquired is at Rs.4,57,800/- which also more than Rs.3,00,000/- per one acre, as asked for by the appellants. 17. The claim of the respondents raised in this appeal would be that the said value of Rs.4,57,800/- could have been granted to the claimants even though they have not applied through cross objection or by filing a separate appeal. 17. The claim of the respondents raised in this appeal would be that the said value of Rs.4,57,800/- could have been granted to the claimants even though they have not applied through cross objection or by filing a separate appeal. He would further insist in his argument that such enhancement can be ordered in favour of the respondent in an appeal filed by the rival party as per the provisions of Order 41 Rule 33 C.P.C. The judgment cited by the learned counsel for the respondents reported in CTJ 2008 MHC 2362 (The Special Tahsildar (LA) & another v. G.Raju & others) and CTJ 2009 MHC 3194 (The Revenue Divisional Officer, Tiruvannamalai v. A.Geetha Ammal and another) were cited for that purpose. On a careful perusal of those judgments, it was ordered in respect of correcting the error committed by the First Appellate Court while calculating the market value. The arithmetic mistake committed by the first Appellate Court has been corrected in the said judgments. 18. In the judgment of the Honourable Apex Court reported in 2010 (1) SCC 458 (Pralhad & others vs. State of Maharashtra & another) the power of the Court under Order 41 Rule 33 C.P.C. has been laid as follows: "18. The provision of Order 41 Rule 33 CPC is clearly an enabling provision, whereby the appellate Court is empowered to pass any decree or make any order which ought to have been passed or made, and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require. Therefore, the power is very wide and in this enabling provision, the crucial words are that the appellate court is empowered to pass any order which ought to have been made as the case may require. The expression "order ought to have been made" would obviously mean an order which justice of the case requires to be made. This is made clear from the expression used in the said Rule by saying "the court may pass such further or other order as the case may require". This expression "case" would mean the justice of the case. Of course, this power cannot be exercised ignoring a legal interdict or a prohibition clamped by law. .... .... 21. This is made clear from the expression used in the said Rule by saying "the court may pass such further or other order as the case may require". This expression "case" would mean the justice of the case. Of course, this power cannot be exercised ignoring a legal interdict or a prohibition clamped by law. .... .... 21. In the instant case, the right of the land owner to receive the benefit under Section 23(1-A) of the Principal act is legally permissible in view of the majority decision in Paripoornanm. Therefore, the law declared by this Court in Paripoornan is binding on the High Court under Article 141 of the Constitution and the High Court is bound to follow the same, especially when an application has been made by the landowner under Order 41 Rule 33 CPC." 19. As per the dictum laid down by the Honourable Apex Court if the respondents are legally entitled to such enhanced compensation, it could be awarded even without cross appeal or any separate appeal. For that, we have to refer to other two judgments of the Honourable Apex Court reported in A.I.R. 1985 SC 1576 (Bhag Singh and others v. Union Territory of Chandigarh) and A.I.R. 1988 SC 1652 (Chimanlal v. special Land Acquisition Officer, Poona) also. 20. The Judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Bhimashav. Special Land Acquisition officer and another reported in (2008) 10 Supreme Court Cases 797 would also guide us to the effect that under Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the party, who is claiming an enhanced compensation, was not bound by the quantum claimed by him and if the market value of the said land was found to be more than the rate claimed by the claimant, it should have been awarded as higher compensation subject to the payment of balance Court fee. For better understanding of the said Judgment, the following passage is extracted here under: “5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. In the impugned order the High Court, after taking note of the yield notification issued by the Government and price list notified by the competent authority for crops (both are public documents) concluded that market value of the land is Rs.66,550 per acre. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. In the impugned order the High Court, after taking note of the yield notification issued by the Government and price list notified by the competent authority for crops (both are public documents) concluded that market value of the land is Rs.66,550 per acre. Therefore, the appellant's omission to make appropriate claim before the High Court after paying the requisite court fee cannot be castigated as one lacking bona fide. 6. In our view, the High Court should have, after taking note of the peculiar facts of the case and the market value determined by it, awarded higher compensation to the appellants subject to the condition of paying the balance court fee. This, having not been done, we feel that ends of justice could be met if the impugned order is suitably modified”. 21. On a careful understanding of the said dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, we could see that the claimant even though had claimed lesser amount and the Court had found a higher market value for the acquired lands, the higher value arrived at by the Court should have been awarded. The only thing to be ordered is the collection of the balance Court fee for the difference between the higher market value arrived and the amount claimed by the claimant. 22. As far as this case is concerned, the claimants have restricted their claim at Rs.3,00,000/- before the Land Acquisition Officer and in view of the aforesaid judgment if they are found entitled to more than the said amount, they can claim the said enhanced amount. However, whether it is possible to order such compensation amount in the appeal preferred by the appellant has been answered by the Honourable Apex court in its judgment made in a Motor Accident Claims appeal. In the judgment of the Honourable Apex Court reported in (Ranjana Prakash and others Vs. Divisional Manager and others.), it has been laid down as follows: "7. This principle also flows from Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure which enables an appellate court to pass any order which ought to have been passed by the trial court and to make such further or other order as the case may require, even if the respondent had not filed any appeal or cross-objections. This principle also flows from Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure which enables an appellate court to pass any order which ought to have been passed by the trial court and to make such further or other order as the case may require, even if the respondent had not filed any appeal or cross-objections. This power is entrusted to the appellate court to enable it to do complete justice between the parties. Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code can however be pressed into service to make the award more effective or maintain the award on other grounds or to make the other parties to litigation to share the benefits or the liability, but cannot be invoked to get a larger or higher relief. For example, where the claimants seeks compensation against the owner and the insurer of the vehicle and the tribunal makes the award only against the owner, on an appeal by the owner challenging the quantum, the appellate court can make the insurer jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation, along with the owner, even though the claimants had not challenged the non-grant of relief against the insurer. Be that as it may. 8. Where an appeal is filed challenging the quantum of compensation irrespective of who files the appeal, the appropriate course for the High court is to examine the facts and by applying the relevant principles, determine the just compensation. If the compensation determined by it is higher than the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the High Court will allow the appeal, if it is by the claimants and dismiss the appeal, if it is by the owner/insurer. Similarly, if the compensation determined by the High Court is lesser than the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the High Court will dismiss any appeal by the claimants for enhancement but allow any appeal by owner/insurer for reduction. The High Court cannot obviously increase the compensation in an appeal by owner/insurer for reducing the compensation, nor can it reduce the compensation in an appeal by the claimants seeking enhancement of compensation." 23. The High Court cannot obviously increase the compensation in an appeal by owner/insurer for reducing the compensation, nor can it reduce the compensation in an appeal by the claimants seeking enhancement of compensation." 23. In the aforesaid judgment, it is categorically mentioned that in an appeal preferred by the person who is to pay compensation, the enhancement of compensation cannot be ordered at the request of the respondents under Order 41 Rule 33 C.P.C. Therefore, it has categorically found that the claimants are not legally entitled to ask for the enhanced compensation in the appeal preferred by the appellants herein. Therefore, the request of the appellant that the enhanced compensation at Rs.4,57,000/- has to be awarded is not sustainable. Under such circumstances, I am of the considered view that the substantial questions of law are decided accordingly. 24. For the foregoing discussion, I am of the considered view that the market value fixed by the first Appellate Court is otherwise in order since the claimants have asked for Rs.3,00,000/- per one acre only and therefore, I find no reason to interfere with the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court is not liable to be interfered. The request of the claimants to enhance the compensation further under Order 41 Rule 33 C.P.C. Cannot be ordered. Therefore, this court has no other option except to dismiss the appeal by upholding the fixation of the market value at Rs.3,00,000/-per one acre as found by the First Appellate Court. The question of grant of solatium would be only as per the provisions of Sections 7, 8 and 12. The provisions of Land acquisition Act 1894 is not applicable in view of Section 20 of the Act. 25. However, the First Appellate Court had granted solatium interest in addition to the market value as per the provision of Land Acquisition Act 1894, which is not sustainable. The market value fixed by the First Appellate Court at Rs.3,00,000/-per one acre was valued with the solatium interest only as per Sections 7, 8 and 12 of the Act 31 of 1978. To that extent, the appeal is allowed in part and in other aspects, the appeal is dismissed by confirming the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court. 26. To that extent, the appeal is allowed in part and in other aspects, the appeal is dismissed by confirming the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court. 26. In fine, the market value fixed by the First Appellate Court at Rs.3,00,000/-is confirmed but the solatium interest and other additional market value fixed as per the provision of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is set aside and the solatium interest as given under Sections 7, 8 and 12 of the Act 31 of 1978, is awarded and the second appeal is allowed to that extent. The parties are directed to bear their respective costs.