JUDGMENT 1. These writ petitions have been filed, praying for issuance of writs of mandamus forbearing the first and third respondents from levying, imposing or collecting any fee or sum on the goods carried into the Market in Motor Vehicles or by animal drawn carriages other than or in addition to the levy on entry of such motor vehicles or animal drawn carriages. 2. Since both these writ petitions involve one and the same issue, they are being disposed of by this common order. 3. Facts of the case as put forth in the affidavit would run thus: 3.1. Petitioners are Associations of wholesale merchants who hold licensed shops in Dr. M.G.R. Wholesale Market, which has been established as public market under the control of the first respondent. All the members of the petitioner Association are in wholesale vegetable trade. The M.G.R. Wholesale Market was established in the year 1994 in the West Zone and the members of the petitioner Association all hold licensed shops in the precincts of the said market and have been doing business in vegetables on a wholesale basis for several years. Earlier, there was T.K. Market established in 1950, but in 1994 the wholesale market was shifted from there and the MGR wholesale Market was established. The members of the petitioner Association have all been regularly paying the prescribed license fee and other levies in respect of the shops under their occupation. 3.2. Public markets are governed by the Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act‘). Under Section 378 of the Act, all markets which are acquired, constructed, repaired and maintained out of the municipal funds shall be deemed to be public markets. Section 379(2) empowers the Commissioner to levy fees at such rates as the Standing Committee may determine, including inter alia “... fees on vehicles or pet animals carrying or on persons bringing goods for sale in such markets. ...” 3.3. Pursuant to the said provision, by Resolution No. 168 dated 29.12.2009, fees has been levied for the years 2010-13 in exercise of the said powers under Section 379(2) (c) of the Act, which was amended by Resolution No. 242 dated 2.3.2010 at the following rates: On a Lorry Rs. 35/-Tempo/Van Rs. 20/-Auto Rickshaw Rs. 10/- Items 5 and 7 cited in the first Resolution are Rs. 2/- per basket of tomatoes and Rs. 35/-Tempo/Van Rs. 20/-Auto Rickshaw Rs. 10/- Items 5 and 7 cited in the first Resolution are Rs. 2/- per basket of tomatoes and Rs. 2/- per bag of other vegetables. 3.4. The third respondent has been nominated as the Contractor for the purpose of collecting the said fees. Although Resolution No. 226 dated 29.1.2010 has also been cited, the same does not pertain to M.G.R. Wholesale Market and is not relevant. 3.5. Strangely, while collecting the fee levied and determined for entry of lorries, tempos, autos and head loaders, the third respondent has been illegally collecting additional charges on the goods carried in the said vehicles at the following rates: Tomatoes, Potatoes and other Vegetables – Rs. 2/- per bag Plantain leaves - Rs. 2/- per bundle 3.6. This is a levy contemplated when persons carry head loads and not meant to be a double-levy when goods are carried into the market by vehicles. On an average, a lorry carries 350 bags of Vegetables; as such, Rs. 700/- per lorry is being collected illegally in addition to the levy on the lorry itself. This is clearly illegal and contrary to the provisions of the Act. The first respondent only has the power to levy a fee on vehicles, animals, persons carrying goods into the market and not on ‘goods‘ themselves. Moreover, the levy is in the nature of a fee, and not a tax. The resolution of the first respondent too only authorises collection of fee on vehicles and persons carrying goods into the market, and not any fee on goods. 3.7. The Resolution authorises collection of fees on vegetables and like plantain leaves carried by head loaders and for that purpose prescribes different rates for different vegetables. The third respondent has been abusing the authority granted to him by collecting double levies both on the vehicles and animal drawn carriages in addition on the goods carried in these vehicles. The petitioner Association and its members have made several representations to the first and 2nd respondents, including representations dated 16.1.2010 and 25.4.2011 seeking their intervention, but till date there has been no response. The members of the petitioner Association are all small traders and are finding it financially unviable to pay such double levies. It is pertinent to state that the rates charged in public markets in other Corporations, like Madurai, Erode, Salem etc. The members of the petitioner Association are all small traders and are finding it financially unviable to pay such double levies. It is pertinent to state that the rates charged in public markets in other Corporations, like Madurai, Erode, Salem etc. are much lower; fees are collected only on vehicles and head loads, and not on goods carried therein. In Trichy, no charge or toll is collected in the public markets. As such, levy of double fees in the above mentioned manner is unreasonable, discriminatory and illegal. 4. The first respondent has filed a counter affidavit, contents of which would run thus: (i) There are about 9 public markets maintained by the first respondent Corporation for the benefit of general public. Under Section 379(2) of the Act, the first respondent is having authority to levy one or more fees at such rate as determined by the Standing Committee of the Corporation. (ii) Ever since the inception of the first respondent Corporation, in pursuance to the above provisions, appropriate fee is being levied on the goods viz. the vegetables and fruits as well as on vehicles and even on the persons who are bringing those goods. The rates so fixed were not regularly revised. Under those circumstances, the Contractors of various public markets had represented that the rate of fees was fixed by the Corporation nearly 20 years ago and which is very meager, therefore, they have requested to revise the said rate. The request of the Contractors was considered by the Taxation and Finance Committee of the first instance. The said Committee, by their Resolution No.2 dated 11.1.2010 had resolved to recommend for the revision of rates. Along with the said Resolution of the Committee, the subject was placed before the Council of the first respondent Corporation. The Council, by way of various Resolutions had resolved to revise the various rates to the various public markets. By Resolution No. 226, dated 29.1.2010, the Council had resolved to revise the rate for the public markets situated within the West Zone of the Corporation. (iii) After the said revision of rates, various Traders Association like the petitioner herein submitted certain representations stating that the said revision of rates may be reconsidered since it is causing prejudice to them. By Resolution No. 226, dated 29.1.2010, the Council had resolved to revise the rate for the public markets situated within the West Zone of the Corporation. (iii) After the said revision of rates, various Traders Association like the petitioner herein submitted certain representations stating that the said revision of rates may be reconsidered since it is causing prejudice to them. This request was also considered by the Council of this Corporation and the Council by their subsequent Resolution No. 242 dated 2.3.2010 had resolved to reduce the rate for certain items and for other items, the rate as it was fixed in the earlier Resolution No. 226 dated 29.1.2010 was confirmed. In this Resolution No. 242, dated 2.3.2010, it has specifically resolved that the rates as fixed for the Anna Daily Market, Mettupalayam Road are equally applicable to the Dr. M.G.R. Wholesale Market also. (iv) On the basis of the above rates, tenders for the various public markets were called for. In so far as Dr. M.G.R. Whole Sale Market, which is the subject matter of this petition, the third respondent herein had offered the highest rate of Rs. 1,08,01,000/-. The Council, by their Resolution No. 290 dated 31.3.2010 had resolved to accept the offer of the third respondent, which is the highest, and the right to collect the fee at the rate as it was already fixed by the Corporation for the period between 1.4.2010 and 31.3.2010 was assigned to him. Appropriate administrative order was also passed by the Assistant Commissioner, West Zone, by his proceedings dated 31.3.2010. Accordingly, the third respondent who is the successful bidder is collecting the fee and maintaining the market for the last 1½ years. (v) Under those circumstances, the third respondent submitted a representation dated 4.4.2011 stating that the vendors are refusing to pay the fees as it was fixed by the Corporation. Therefore, he had requested the first respondent to intervene in the said matter. In pursuance to his request, a Joint Meeting was called on 5.4.2011 by the Assistant Commissioner, West Zone. During the said Joint Meeting, the petitioners and the third respondent had agreed that they will resolve the difference between themselves amicably. Therefore, he had requested the first respondent to intervene in the said matter. In pursuance to his request, a Joint Meeting was called on 5.4.2011 by the Assistant Commissioner, West Zone. During the said Joint Meeting, the petitioners and the third respondent had agreed that they will resolve the difference between themselves amicably. It was only thereafter the petitioner, by their representation dated 25.4.2011 had represented that in view of the rates as it was fixed by the respondent Corporation they are incurring loss, hence they had requested for revision of rates. (vi) In view of the above stated details, the various averments made by the petitioner are unsustainable and liable to be rejected. The averment of the petitioners that they are paying the prescribed licence fees and other levies regularly is denied. They are irregular in their payment. The relevant Resolution which is pertinent to Dr. M.G.R. Wholesale Vegetable Market is Resolution No. 226, dated 29.1.2010 and not the Resolution No. 168, dated 29.12.2009. In the subsequent Resolution No. 242, dated 2.3.2010, it has been clearly stated that the rates as it was fixed to the Anna Daily Market, Mettupalayam Road vide the Resolution No. 226, dated 29.1.2010 will be equally applicable to Dr. M.G.R. Wholesale Vegetable Market also. Therefore, the rates as it was fixed to the Anna Daily Market vide the Resolution No. 226 dated 29.1.2010 alone will be applicable to Dr. M.G.R. Wholesale Market. (vii) The averment that the third respondent is collecting additional charges on the goods carried in the vehicle is misleading and unsustainable. Their further averment that the levy contemplates only when a person carries head loads and not meant to be a double levy when the goods are carried into the market by the vehicle is incorrect. Section 379(2)(a) empowers the first respondent to charge on the goods also. The Council on the recommendation of the Taxation and Financial Committee had duly fixed the rate and the third respondent is collecting rate only as it is fixed by the Corporation. Their further averment that on an average, a lorry carries 350 bags of vegetables and as such Rs. 700/- being collected illegally in addition to the levy in the lorry itself is also misleading. As per the above referred resolution, the rate fixed for bag of vegetable at the rate of Rs. 1.50 is chargeable on each bag of vegetable. Their further averment that on an average, a lorry carries 350 bags of vegetables and as such Rs. 700/- being collected illegally in addition to the levy in the lorry itself is also misleading. As per the above referred resolution, the rate fixed for bag of vegetable at the rate of Rs. 1.50 is chargeable on each bag of vegetable. Their further averment that the first respondent has power to levy fees only on vehicles, animals, persons carrying goods into the market and not on “Goods” themselves is incorrect. The first respondent is empowered to levy fees even on the goods as per Section 379(2)(a) of the Act. (viii) According to the first respondent, the present writ petition is not maintainable on the ground that the members of the petitioner Association cannot term themselves as “aggrieved persons” to file the present writ petition. Admittedly, the members of the petitioner Association are traders doing business in the shops allotted to them within the said public market. Whereas, the fees which is now sought to be questioned is the one payable by the person who is bringing the goods to the market for the purpose of sale. Normally, it may be an Agricultural Producer or a Commission Agent, who brings the goods for the purpose of sale to the market and the present fee is payable only by those persons namely, the Agricultural Producer or the Commission Agent. Therefore, the members of the petitioner Association cannot be said to be aggrieved by the levy of the fee on goods. Hence, the present writ petitions are not maintainable. 5. Third respondent has also filed a counter affidavit on similar lines with that of first respondent. 6. The only contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the action of the first respondent in permitting the third respondent to collect fee on goods carried into the market in addition to the fee levied on vehicles, animals and persons carrying head loads is arbitrary, illegal and without jurisdiction. He would cite the following authorities : (i) CIT v. Naga Hills Tea Co. Ltd., AIR 1973 SC 2524 : (1973) 4 SCC 200 “6. At the outset we may mention that the provision of law is extremely confusing. It required more than one reading on our part to understand what it means. He would cite the following authorities : (i) CIT v. Naga Hills Tea Co. Ltd., AIR 1973 SC 2524 : (1973) 4 SCC 200 “6. At the outset we may mention that the provision of law is extremely confusing. It required more than one reading on our part to understand what it means. One thing is clear from the provision, namely it does not provide for carryover of any unabsorbed rebate from year to year. Mr. Ramachandran contended that when the Finance Act says “on that part of the aggregate of the sums arrived at in accordance with Clause (i) of the second proviso to para D of Part II of the First Schedule to the Finance Act , 1958 (Act XI of 1958) as had not been deemed to have been taken into account, in accordance with Clause (ii) of the said proviso, for the purpose of reducing the rebate mentioned in Clause (i) of the said proviso to nil”, it means that the unabsorbed deduction of rebate can be carried forward until it is reduced to nil. We are unable to accept this contention as correct. In our opinion, all that provision provides for is that if there is any unabsorbed reduction of rebate in Assessment Year 1958-59, then that can be taken into consideration while allowing rebate in Assessment Year 1959-60. We are unable to read into the provision in question a power to the Revenue to take into consideration any unabsorbed reduction in rebate for any year prior to 1958-59. That is the view taken by the Calcutta High Court in the case mentioned earlier. The Calcutta High Court opined in that case that the second proviso to para D of Part II of the First Schedule to the Finance Act , 1959 provides that the amount of rebate to be allowed under Clauses (i) and (ii) of the first proviso thereto has to be reduced to the sum, if any, equal to the amount or the aggregate of the amount, as the case may be, computed in the manner set out in the second proviso. It further observed: “Now, Clause (i)(a) of the second proviso, refers to the aggregate of the sums arrived at in accordance with Clause (i) of the second proviso to para D of Part II of the First Schedule to the Finance Act of 1958. It further observed: “Now, Clause (i)(a) of the second proviso, refers to the aggregate of the sums arrived at in accordance with Clause (i) of the second proviso to para D of Part II of the First Schedule to the Finance Act of 1958. The aforesaid proviso in 1958 Act, therefore, can apply only when there was a total income in terms of 1958 Act and certain reduction from that total income remained unabsorbed in 1958. If a particular assesses had suffered loss in 1958, there was no income to which a rate of super-tax prescribed in the 1958 Act could be applied and if no rate of super-tax was applicable, there was no question of rebate or reduction in rebate to be allowed under the 1958 Act.” (ii) Chief Commissioner v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd., AIR 1978 SC 1181 : (1978) 2 SCC 367 : “3. The main point which arises for consideration in this case is as to whether or not the fee charged under the notification issued by the Chief Commissioner was a legal impost justified by the provisions of the Constitution. It is well-settled that a fee in order to be a legal fee, must satisfy two conditions— (i) there must be an element of quid pro quo that is to say, the authority levying the fee must render some service for the fee levied however remote the service may be; (ii) that the fee realised must be spent for the purposes of the imposition and should not form part of the general revenues of the State. 4. In the instant case, it was not disputed before the High Court that the fee realised by the Registration Department under the notification abovementioned was to form part of the general revenues of the State. It is, therefore, manifest that the second element of a fee was wholly wanting in this case and the High Court was, therefore, right in striking down the notification. Mr Bhatt, appearing in support of the appeal, submitted that by virtue of the fact that the document was registered, the respondents obtained initial advantage in using the document as an authentic piece of evidence and as proof of title and this was, therefore, a sufficient service rendered for the imposition of the fee. Even assuming that this was so, the second essential ingredient of a valid fee viz. Even assuming that this was so, the second essential ingredient of a valid fee viz. that the fee realised must be co-related with expenditure incurred on registration so as to be spent on maintenance of registration organisation, was not satisfied in this case and on this ground alone the fee could not be imposed. In Mahant Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das v. State of Orissa this Court observed as follows: “Two elements are thus essential in order that a payment may be regarded as a fee. In the first place, it must be levied in consideration of certain services which the individuals accepted either willingly or unwillingly. But this by itself, is not enough to make the imposition a fee, if the payments demanded for rendering of such services are not set apart or specifically appropriated for that purpose but are merged in the general revenue of the State to be spent for general public purposes.” The same view was reiterated in Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay 5. In a recent decision of this Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Salvation Army, Western India Territory this Court observed as follows: “Thus, two elements are essential in order that a payment may be regarded as a fee. In the first place, it must be levied in consideration of certain services which the individuals accept either willingly or unwillingly and in the second place, the amount collected must be earmarked to meet the expenses of rendering these services and must not go to the general revenue of the State to be spent for general public purposes.” (iii) Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal, (2002) 1 SCC 33 : “38. There is no dispute regarding the legal proposition that the rights under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be enforced only by an aggrieved person except in the case where the writ prayed for is for habeas corpus or quo warranto. Another exception in the general rule is the filing of a writ petition in public interest. The existence of the legal right of the petitioner which is alleged to have been violated is the foundation for invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under the aforesaid article. Another exception in the general rule is the filing of a writ petition in public interest. The existence of the legal right of the petitioner which is alleged to have been violated is the foundation for invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under the aforesaid article. The orthodox rule of interpretation regarding the locus standi of a person to reach the Court has undergone a sea change with the development of Constitutional law in our country and the Constitutional Courts have been adopting a liberal approach in dealing with the cases or dislodging the claim of a litigant merely on hypertechnical grounds. If a person approaching the Court can satisfy that the impugned action is likely to adversely affect his right which is shown to be having source in some statutory provision, the petition filed by such a person cannot be rejected on the ground of his not having the locus standi. In other words, if the person is found to be not merely a stranger having no right whatsoever to any post or property, he cannot be non-suited on the ground of his not having the locus standi.” (iv) Municipal Corpn., Amritsar v. Senior Supdt. of Post Offices, AIR 2004 SC 2912 : (2004) 3 SCC 92 : (2004) 3 MLJ 66 : “8. The question, whether the demand so made was by way of “service charge” or “tax”, need not detain us any longer. The demand so made was with regard to the services rendered to the respondents‘ Department, like water supply, street-lighting, drainage and approach roads to the land and buildings. In the counter, the respondents averred that they are paying for the services rendered by the appellant Corporation by way of water and sewerage charges and power charges separately. It is also categorically averred that no other specific services are being provided to the respondents for which the tax in the shape of service charges can be levied and realized from the respondents. There is no provision in the Municipal Corporation Act for levying service charges. The only provision is by way of tax. Undisputedly, the appellant Corporation is collecting the tax from general public for water supply, street-lighting and approach roads etc. Thus, the “tax” was sought to be imposed in the garb of “service charges”. There is no provision in the Municipal Corporation Act for levying service charges. The only provision is by way of tax. Undisputedly, the appellant Corporation is collecting the tax from general public for water supply, street-lighting and approach roads etc. Thus, the “tax” was sought to be imposed in the garb of “service charges”. The interplay of the Constitutional and legal provisions being well cut and well defined, it was clearly not within the competence of the Corporation to impose tax on the property of the Union of India, the same being violative of Article 285(1) of the Constitution.” 7. On the other hand, the contention of the learned counsel for respondents is that the action of the first respondent in permitting the third respondent to collect fee on goods carried into the market in addition to the fee levied on vehicles, animals and persons carrying head loads is as per law and perfectly justified. The additional contention of the learned counsel is that these Writ Petitions are not maintainable as the petitioners are not the aggrieved persons. They would rely on the following authorities: (i) Arumuga Kone v. Palayamcottai Municipal Council, (1974) 1 MLJ 258 (DB) : “37. We are also of the view that the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the simple ground that by the enhancement of the fee in question, no right of the petitioners has been effected. We have already held that the position of the petitioners was that of a licensee and that the period of licence ended on 31.3.1972. As we have pointed out already, this position has been admitted by the petitioners themselves. Even though the petitioners in the affidavits filed in support of W.P. No. 1122 of 1972 contended that the stall-holders have rights of a fairly permanent character and that they are entitled to the renewal of the term year after year, Mr. T.R. Mani, was not able to bring to our notice any fact which would support or substantiate this claim. Therefore, we proceed on the basis that the petitioners and the appellant were in occupation of the respective stalls as lincensees as defined in Section 52 , Easements Act,1882, for the year ending with 31.3.1972. Section 62 (c) of the Easements Act, itself provides that a license is deemed to be revoked where it has been granted for a limited period and the period expires. Section 62 (c) of the Easements Act, itself provides that a license is deemed to be revoked where it has been granted for a limited period and the period expires. Therefore, the licences stood revoked as on 1.4.1972 and if the petitioners and the appellants wanted to continue to use the stalls thereafter, they could do so only on the basis of fresh licences and for such fresh licences the petitioners and the appellant would have to pay the fee demanded by the Municipal Councils and they had no right to question the enhancement thereof, with reference to the fee prevailing for the year 1971-72. As we have pointed out already, the Municipal Councils did not compel the petitioners and the appellant to occupy the stalls and pay the enhanced fees and the latter should pay the licence fee fixed for the year 1972-73 only if they wanted to continue the use or occupation of the stalls. In this view, the petitioners and the appellant have no right to question the enhancement of the fee, since the said enhancement cannot be said to have affected any of their existing rights. It has been repeatedly held that the existence of an enforceable right is a sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and there being no such enforceable right in the petitioners, they are not entitled to the issue of any writs by this Court.” (ii) Oriental Bank of Commerce v. Sunder Lal Jain, (2008) 2 SCC 280 : (2008) 1 MLJ 1181 “11. The principles on which a writ of mandamus can be issued have been stated as under in The Law Of Extraordinary Legal Remedies by F.G. Ferris and F.G. Ferris, Jr.: “Note 187.—Mandamus, at common law, is a highly prerogative writ, usually issuing out of the highest Court of general jurisdiction, in the name of the sovereignty, directed to any natural person, corporation or inferior Court within the jurisdiction, requiring them to do some particular thing therein specified, and which appertains to their office or duty. Generally speaking, it may be said that mandamus is a summary writ, issuing from the proper Court, commanding the official or board to which it is addressed to perform some specific legal duty to which the party applying for the writ is entitled of legal right to have performed. Generally speaking, it may be said that mandamus is a summary writ, issuing from the proper Court, commanding the official or board to which it is addressed to perform some specific legal duty to which the party applying for the writ is entitled of legal right to have performed. Note 192.—Mandamusis, subject to the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, the appropriate remedy to enforce a plain, positive, specific and ministerial duty presently existing and imposed by law upon officers and others who refuse or neglect to perform such duty, when there is no other adequate and specific legal remedy and without which there would be a failure of justice. The chief function of the writ is to compel the performance of public duties prescribed by statute, and to keep subordinate and inferior bodies and Tribunals exercising public functions within their jurisdictions. It is not necessary, however, that the duty be imposed by statute; mandamus lies as well for the enforcement of a common law duty. Note 196.—Mandamusis not a writ of right. Its issuance unquestionably lies in the sound judicial discretion of the Court, subject always to the well-settled principles which have been established by the Courts. An action in mandamus is not governed by the principles of ordinary litigation where the matters alleged on one side and not denied on the other are taken as true, and judgment pronounced thereon as of course. While mandamus is classed as a legal remedy, its issuance is largely controlled by equitable principles. Before granting the writ the Court may, and should, look to the larger public interest which may be concerned—an interest which private litigants are apt to overlook when striving for private ends. The Court should act in view of all the existing facts, and with due regard to the consequences which will result. It is in every case a discretion dependent upon all the surrounding facts and circumstances. Note 206.—… The correct rule is that mandamus will not lie where the duty is clearly discretionary and the party upon whom the duty rests has exercised his discretion reasonably and within his jurisdiction, that is, upon facts sufficient to support his action.” 12. These very principles have been adopted in our country. In Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Coop. Note 206.—… The correct rule is that mandamus will not lie where the duty is clearly discretionary and the party upon whom the duty rests has exercised his discretion reasonably and within his jurisdiction, that is, upon facts sufficient to support his action.” 12. These very principles have been adopted in our country. In Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Coop. Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh after referring to the earlier decisions in Lekhraj Sathramdas Lalvani v. N.M. Shah, Rai Shivendra Bahadur (Dr.) v. Nalanda College and Umakant Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar this Court observed as follows in para 15 of the Reports (SCC): (Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Coop. Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh (supra),) “15. … There is abundant authority in favour of the proposition that a writ of mandamus can be granted only in a case where there is a statutory duty imposed upon the officer concerned and there is a failure on the part of that officer to discharge the statutory obligation. The chief function of a writ is to compel performance of public duties prescribed by statute and to keep subordinate Tribunals and officers exercising public functions within the limit of their jurisdiction. It follows, therefore, that in order that mandamus may issue to compel the authorities to do something, it must be shown that there is a statute which imposes a legal duty and the aggrieved party has a legal right under the statute to enforce its performance. … In the instant case, it has not been shown by respondent 1 that there is any statute or rule having the force of law which casts a duty on respondents 2 to 4 which they failed to perform. All that is sought to be enforced is an obligation flowing from a contract which, as already indicated, is also not binding and enforceable. Accordingly, we are clearly of the opinion that Respondent 1 was not entitled to apply for grant of a writ of mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution and the High Court was not competent to issue the same.” Therefore, in order that a writ of mandamus may be issued, there must be a legal right with the party asking for the writ to compel the performance of some statutory duty cast upon the authorities.......” 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also gone through the records. 9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also gone through the records. 9. Before deciding the Writ Petitions on merit, let me first deal with their maintainability, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents. 10. The petitioners are traders, doing business in the precincts of the M.G.R. Wholesale Market, Coimbatore, and regularly paying the license fee. Their grievance is that the third respondent has been collecting double levies viz., one on entry of vehicles and the other on goods, from them and they, being small traders, are finding it difficult to pay such levies. With regard to this point, the contention of the respondents is that it is only the agricultural producers or their agents who bring the goods for the purpose of sale to the market that pay the fee in question and, therefore, the petitioners are not the aggrieved persons. 11. As could be seen from the records, the fee which is paid by the members of the petitioner association has been actually recovered from the sale proceeds of the goods brought by the agricultural producers It is also established that the members of the petitioner association, who are commission agents, are charging their share of commission from the sale proceeds of the goods. What may, it is only the petitioners who are paying the fee in question initially, though it is subsequently recovered by them from the sale proceeds of the goods. 12. Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be enforced only by an aggrieved person except in the case where the writ prayed for is for habeas corpus or quo warranto. Another exception in the general rule is the filing of a writ petition in public interest. The existence of the legal right of the petitioner which is alleged to have been violated is the foundation for invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under the aforesaid Article. The orthodox rule of interpretation regarding the locus standi of a person to reach the Court has undergone a sea change with the development of Constitutional law in our country. The orthodox rule of interpretation regarding the locus standi of a person to reach the Court has undergone a sea change with the development of Constitutional law in our country. If a person approaching the Court can satisfy that the impugned action is likely to adversely affect his right, which is shown to be having a source in some statutory provision, the petition filed by such a person cannot be rejected on the ground of his not having the locus standi. This is the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 13. If we apply the above principle to the case on hand, as it is the members of the petitioner association who pay the levy in question at the first instance and the same having been admitted by the respondents in their counter in para 9 to the effect that all the fee paid by the members of the petitioner association is being collected from the owners of the goods and hence there cannot be any loss to them, in my standpoint, the burden is passed on to the petitioner association to some extent and, therefore, the impugned action of the respondents in collecting the fee in question would affect the petitioners in one way or other and there accrues a legal right to the petitioners Hence, these writ petitions are maintainable. 14. With regard to merit, it is to be stated that under Section 379(2) of the Act, the first respondent is having authority to levy one or more fees at such rate as determined by the Standing Committee of the Corporation. Section 379(2) reads as follows: “Section 379 : Powers of the Municipal authorities in respect of public market. 1. The Council may provide places for use as public market. 2. The Commissioner may in any public market charge and levy one or more of the following fees at the rate as the Standing Committee may determine as may appear to him proper or may farm out such fees on such terms and subject to such conditions as he may deem fit. a. Fee for the use of, or for the right to, expose goods for sale, in such market; Explanation:The fees under these classes shall not be levied unless the goods are actually brought into such markets. a. Fee for the use of, or for the right to, expose goods for sale, in such market; Explanation:The fees under these classes shall not be levied unless the goods are actually brought into such markets. b. Fee for the use for the shops, stalls, pens or stands in such market; c. Fees on vehicles or pack animals carrying, or on persons bringing, goods for sale in such market; d. Fees on animals brought for sale into, or sold in, such markets and e. Licence fees on brokers, commission agents, porters, weigh men and measurers practicing their calling in such markets. 3. Such fees shall be recoverable in the same manner as the property tax.” 15. It is clear from the above provision that in addition to the fees for the use of the shops, stalls, pens or stands in such market; fees on vehicles or pack animals carrying, or on persons bringing, goods for sale in such market; fees on animals brought for sale into, or sold in, such markets and Licence fees on brokers, commission agents, porters, weigh men and measurers practicing their calling in such markets, the Commissioner may, in any public market, charge and levy fee for the use of, or for the right to, expose goods for sale, in such market, if the goods are brought into such markets, at the rate as the Standing Committee may determine. (emphasis supplied) 16. In the case on hand, ever since the inception of the first respondent Corporation, appropriate fee is being levied on the goods viz., the vegetables and fruits as well as on vehicles and even on the persons who are bringing those goods. The rates so fixed were not regularly revised. In the given situation, the Contractors of various public markets had represented that the rate of fees was fixed by the Corporation nearly 20 years ago, which is very meager, and, therefore, they requested to revise the said rate. The request of the Contractors was considered by the Taxation and Finance Committee at the first instance. The said Committee, by its Resolution No. 2 dated 11.1.2010, had resolved to recommend for the revision of rates. The said Resolution of the Committee was placed before the Council of the first respondent Corporation and the Council, by way of various Resolutions, resolved to revise the various rates to various public markets. The said Committee, by its Resolution No. 2 dated 11.1.2010, had resolved to recommend for the revision of rates. The said Resolution of the Committee was placed before the Council of the first respondent Corporation and the Council, by way of various Resolutions, resolved to revise the various rates to various public markets. By Resolution No. 226, dated 29.1.2010, the Council resolved to revise the rate for the public markets situated within the West Zone of the Corporation. 17. After the said revision of rates, various Traders Associations like the petitioner herein submitted certain representations stating that the said revision of rates may be reconsidered since it is causing prejudice to them. This request was also considered by the Council of Corporation and the Council by its subsequent Resolution No. 242 dated 2.3.2010 resolved to reduce the rate for certain items and, for other items, the rate, as it was fixed in the earlier Resolution No. 226 dated 29.1.2010, was confirmed. In the Resolution No. 242, dated 2.3.2010, it was specifically resolved that the rates as fixed for the Anna Daily Market, Mettupalayam Road, are equally applicable to the Dr. M.G.R. Wholesale Market also. 18. On the basis of the above rates, tenders for various public markets were called for. Inasmuch as Dr. M.G.R. Whole Sale Market, which is the subject matter of these Writ Petitions, the third respondent offered the highest rate of Rs. 1,08,01,000/-. The Council, by its Resolution No. 290 dated 31.3.2010, resolved to accept the offer of third respondent, which was the highest, and the right to collect the fee at the rate as it was already fixed by the Corporation for the period between 1.4.2010 and 31.3.2013 was assigned to him. Appropriate administrative order was also passed by the Assistant Commissioner, West Zone, by his proceedings dated 31.3.2010. Accordingly, the third respondent, who is the successful bidder, is collecting the fee and maintaining the market for the last one-and-a-half years. 19. Be that as it may, the third respondent submitted a representation, dated 4.4.2011, to the first respondent, stating that the vendors are refusing to pay the fees, fixed by the Corporation. Therefore, he requested the first respondent to intervene in the matter. Pursuant to his request, a Joint Meeting was called on 5.4.2011 by the Assistant Commissioner, West Zone. 19. Be that as it may, the third respondent submitted a representation, dated 4.4.2011, to the first respondent, stating that the vendors are refusing to pay the fees, fixed by the Corporation. Therefore, he requested the first respondent to intervene in the matter. Pursuant to his request, a Joint Meeting was called on 5.4.2011 by the Assistant Commissioner, West Zone. During the said meeting, the petitioners and the third respondent had agreed that they would resolve the differences between themselves amicably. It was only thereafter, the petitioners, by their representation dated 25.4.2011, represented that in view of the rates as fixed by the respondent Corporation, they are incurring loss and, hence, they requested for revision of rates. The relevant Resolution which is pertinent to Dr. M.G.R. Wholesale Vegetable Market is Resolution No. 226, dated 29.1.2010 and not the Resolution No. 168, dated 29.12.2009. It is also relevant to mention here that the rates fixed vide Resolution No. 226, dated 29.1.2010, were revised and reduced vide Resolution No. 242, dated 2.3.2010, as under: Rate as it was fixed Rate as it was Item Pre-existing by the Resolution revised by the Rate No.226, dated Resolution No. 242, 29.1.2010 Dated 2.3.2010 On Lorry Rs.30 Rs.40 Rs.35 Tempo/Van Rs.15 Rs.20 Rs.20 Auto Rickshaw Rs.10 Rs.10 Tomato Tipper Rs.3.00 Rs.2.00 Tomato Basket Rs.1.50 Rs.1.50 Rs.1.50 Bag of Vegetables Rs.1.50 Rs.2.00 Rs.1.50 20. In view of the above, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the levy contemplates only on entry of motor vehicles or animal drawn carriages and not a double levy on the goods carried into the market by the vehicles or animal drawn carriages and that the action of the third respondent in collecting additional charges on the goods carried in the vehicles is without jurisdiction and against the law cannot be accepted, as the same is being collected as authorised by the first respondent, in exercise of the powers under Section 379(2)(a), which empowers the first respondent to charge on the goods as well. It is also not the case of the petitioners that the provision under Section 379(2)(a) is ultra vires. It is also not the case of the petitioners that the provision under Section 379(2)(a) is ultra vires. Therefore, in the absence of any challenge either to the above resolutions of the first respondent Corporation or to the provision of the Act, all I say is that the action of the respondents in levying or imposing fee or sum on the goods carried into the Market in motor vehicles or by animal drawn carriages other than or in addition to the levy on entry of such motor vehicles or animal drawn carriages is with authority of law and perfectly justified. As such, the mandamus, as sought for by the petitioners, cannot be issued. 21. To sum up, while these Writ Petitions are maintainable, they are dismissed for want of merit. No costs. Consequently, the connected M.P. Nos. 1 and 2 of 2011 are also dismissed.