JUDGMENT : Tarun Kumar Gupta, J. This second appeal is directed against ex parte judgment dated 31st of January, 1983 and decree thereof passed by learned Additional District Judge, 10th Court, Alipore in Title Appeal No. 731 of 1979 reversing the judgment and decree dated 31st of May, 1979 passed by learned Sub-ordinate Judge, First Court, Alipore in Title Suit No. 17 of 1971. The appellant filed said suit alleging that he was an employee of the defendant statutory corporation being posted at Sonarpur office. The plaintiff became the Vice-President of the Union of the employees of defendant No. 1 Company and incurred displeasure to his employer. He was forced to go on medical leave on 26.11.1969 and while on leave he received an order dated 25/27 of November, 1969 transferring him from Sonarpur office to Shibsagar, Assam. On 03.12.1969 he received another order of transfer dated 25th November, 1969 transferring him from Sonarpur to Gauhati, Assam. He was further ordered to report to the General Manager, O.N.G.C. Nazira on the expiry of his leave. He received another order of transfer dated 16.03.1970 from Sonarpur to Camp Santipur, Gauhati and was directed to join there on expiry of his leave. Successive transfer orders created confusion and some of the transfer orders were illegal. The plaintiff was granted extraordinary leave with effect from 23rd January, 1970 to 31st January, 1970 by order dated 30th January, 1970. The maximum limit of leave is six months and the maximum limit expired on 23rd July, 1970. The matter was referred to Regional Labour Commissioner and as per his direction plaintiff appeared before the CMOH for medical examination and the plaintiff was declared fit to resume his light official duties. The plaintiff along with his medical certificate tried to resume his duties at Port Canning office, Sonarpur on 9th of July, 1970 but he was not allowed to resume his duties. The plaintiff tried to join time and again but without any success. He sent several written representations but without any result. The plaintiff along with his medical certificate tried to resume his duties at Port Canning office, Sonarpur on 9th of July, 1970 but he was not allowed to resume his duties. The plaintiff tried to join time and again but without any success. He sent several written representations but without any result. On 16th of January, 1971 the plaintiff received a copy of letter from the President of Association stating that by an Order dated 2/4 January, 1971 passed by the General Manager, Eastern Region he was deemed to have been resigned his appointment in terms of Regulation No. 14(5) of O.N.G.C. Leave Regulation, 1969 on the ground that he remained absent for a total period exceeding 180 days. Such order of deemed resignation was unauthorized, invalid and illegal and accordingly the plaintiff filed said suit for declaring that he was still in service and was entitled to get his salaries as per rule. 2. The defendant No. 1 Company contested the suit by filing written statement. The material allegations of the plaintiff were denied. It was alleged inter alia that the job of the plaintiff was transferable and accordingly, he along with other staff of the Port Canning Office was transferred to other offices of O.N.G.C. The plaintiff was granted leave on medical ground till 31st January, 1970 and his last date of attendance in the office was 25th of November, 1969. The plaintiff was directed to report to the General Manager, Nazira for joining his new appointment on the expiry of his leave but he failed to report for duty in that place. As plaintiff remained absent for more than six months at a stretch he was deemed to have resigned his appointment in terms of Regulation 14(5) of O.N.G.C. The plaintiff was accordingly informed of said order dated 2/4 January, 1971. The plaintiff never went to join in Sonarpur office and there is no question of his joining at Sonarpur Office in view of issuance of transfer order. The suit was not maintainable in the Civil Court and was liable to be dismissed. 3. After contested hearing learned Trial Court decreed the suit. Defendant Corporation preferred an appeal being Title Appeal No. 731 of 1979. The appeal was allowed ex parte. 4. Being aggrieved with said judgment and decree the instant second appeal has been filed. 5. The suit was not maintainable in the Civil Court and was liable to be dismissed. 3. After contested hearing learned Trial Court decreed the suit. Defendant Corporation preferred an appeal being Title Appeal No. 731 of 1979. The appeal was allowed ex parte. 4. Being aggrieved with said judgment and decree the instant second appeal has been filed. 5. At the time of admission of this second appeal the following substantial questions of law were formulated. I. Whether when the appeal before the lower appellate court stood dismissed for default against which an appeal was preferred together with an application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act which was allowed on some conditions which were not fulfilled and that the order of dismissal under Order No. 77 dated 23rd of August, 1982 having not been challenged and the said order being still in force, could any decree be passed in the appeal until the order No. 77 dated 23rd of August, 1982 is set aside particularly when the Memorandum of Appeal was rejected on contest under Order No. 45 dated 17th of September, 1980. II. Whether the purported cessation of employment effected under Regulation 14(5) of the Regulation of the respondent could be affected in a case where there are materials to show that the appellant/plaintiff had been attempting to join his service after having successively transferred to three places, without any opportunity of holding any disciplinary proceedings. III. Whether Regulation 14(5) could be applied to a case without any materials to show that the appellant had not reported for duty when contrary was apparent on record. IV. Whether the suit seeking declaration that the appellant/petitioner is still in service despite the purported cessation of employment could be entertained by a Civil Court. Point No. 1 6. Unfortunately the lower court records could not be placed before this Court at the time of hearing of the matter. However, the appellants filed a bunch of xerox copies of papers incorporating copies of plaint, written statement and some other materials including order No. 96 to 101 of the Learned Lower Appellate Court. However, the order No. 77 dated 23rd of August, 1982 did not find place in said bunch of paper. However, the appellants filed a bunch of xerox copies of papers incorporating copies of plaint, written statement and some other materials including order No. 96 to 101 of the Learned Lower Appellate Court. However, the order No. 77 dated 23rd of August, 1982 did not find place in said bunch of paper. However, it appears from the submissions of learned counsels of the parties that the Title Appeal No. 731 of 1979 was dismissed for default vide order No. 77 dated 23rd of August, 1982 and that said alleged order of dismissal being No. 77 dated 23rd of August, 1982 and another order being No. 45 dated 17th September, 1980 came up before this Court for decision and that this Court directed learned Lower Appellate Court to dispose of the appeal as expeditiously as possible preferably within a month. On the strength of said order of the Hon'ble Court the appeal was taken up for hearing by learned Lower Appellate Court. It is thus apparent from the aforesaid submissions of learned counsels of the parties as well as from the available materials lying in the record that the order of dismissal being Order No. 77 dated 23rd of August, 1982 came up for decision before this Court and this Court taking note of said order of dismissal passed an order directing learned Lower Appellate Court to dispose of said appeal treating the same as pending in a time bound manner. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that learned Lower Appellate Court did not grant any adjournment to the plaintiff respondent Tridib Nath Sanyal, though he filed one application u/s 24 of the CPC before learned District Judge, Alipore for transfer of said appeal from the Court of learned Additional District Judge, 10th Court and two separate special leave petitions were filed before Hon'ble Supreme Court against the order of High Court. According to him, learned Lower Appellate Court without granting any adjournment for bringing said order from Hon'ble Apex Court took up hearing of the appeal even though original plaintiff filed a petition intimating his retirement from the hearing of said appeal. I am of opinion that these submissions have no bearing to the present issue. According to him, learned Lower Appellate Court without granting any adjournment for bringing said order from Hon'ble Apex Court took up hearing of the appeal even though original plaintiff filed a petition intimating his retirement from the hearing of said appeal. I am of opinion that these submissions have no bearing to the present issue. As hearing of the appeal was taken up in terms of the direction of the Hon'ble High Court passed in order dated 30th September, 1982 it is implied that the order of dismissal stood vacated by this Court in view of said order dated 30.09.1982. There is no scope for reopening that issue again at this stage. Point No. 4 7. This issue relates to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that both learned Trial Court as well as learned Lower Appellate Court held that the suit was maintainable in the Civil Court. According to him, as no cross appeal was preferred by the defendant respondent he cannot be permitted to argue on this score. 8. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that if the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit then it goes to the root of the matter. According to him, in that case starting from the judgment of learned Trial Court all subsequent proceedings and orders were invalid and that this issue of "want of jurisdiction" can be agitated at any point even in the second appeal as it relates to inherent lack of jurisdiction of Civil Court and not simply lack of territory jurisdiction or pecuniary jurisdiction. 9. I find much force in the aforesaid submissions of learned counsel for the respondent company. If a Court lacks inherent jurisdiction then all the proceedings in said Court as well as all subsequent proceedings arising from order of said Court would have been invalid. Admittedly, this issue can be agitated even for the first time in the second appeal. Admittedly parties by consent can neither give to nor take away from a Civil Court its jurisdiction. 10. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that Section 9 of the CPC is for enforcement of fundamental principles of law and that a litigant having a grievance of civil nature has a right to file a civil suit in a competent Civil Court. 10. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that Section 9 of the CPC is for enforcement of fundamental principles of law and that a litigant having a grievance of civil nature has a right to file a civil suit in a competent Civil Court. According to him, said right of Civil Court cannot be barred unless it is barred either expressly or impliedly by any statute. He further submits that in this case the original plaintiff was terminated from his service from the defendant company by illegally invoking the clause of deemed resignation resulting cessation of employment in terms of Rule 14(5) of O.N.G.C. Leave Rules. According to him, the original plaintiff was not permitted to join his service and later on an order dated 2/4.01.1971 (Ext. 2) was passed alleging that the original plaintiff did not resume his duties till date and that the original plaintiff remained absent on extraordinary leave and he was without leave for a total period of exceeding 180 days and that in terms of Regulations 14(5) of the O.N.G.C. Leave Regulations, 1969 the original plaintiff deemed to have resigned his appointment and accordingly ceased to be in the employment of the Commission. According to him, as said Clause 14(5) of said Regulation was illegally invoked, it amounted to illegal termination of service of the original plaintiff employee. In this connection he refers a case law reported in Sukhdev Singh, Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Life Insurance Corporation, Industrial Finance Corporation Employees Associations Vs. Bhagat Ram, Association of Clause II. Officers, Shyam Lal, Industrial Finance Corporation, (1975) 1 SCC 421 wherein it was held that rules and regulations framed by the Oil and Natural Gas Commission have the force of law and that the employees of said statutory body have a statutory status being entitled to declaration of being in employment when their dismissal or removal is in contravention of statutory provisions. 11. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that the instant dispute is arising out of alleged infringement of condition of service by and between employer (O.N.G.C.) and employee (original plaintiff). He further submits that admittedly plaintiff working as a clerk was within the definition "worker" as defined in the Industrial Dispute Act and that O.N.G.C. is an industry. He further submits that admittedly plaintiff working as a clerk was within the definition "worker" as defined in the Industrial Dispute Act and that O.N.G.C. is an industry. According to him, as a dispute between the original plaintiff (employer) and the defendant (employee) was regarding alleged termination of service of the employee by invoking the clause of deemed resignation consequential cessation of service the only forum was the forum prescribed under Industrial Dispute Act and not under Civil Court. In this connection he refers case laws reported in The Premier Automobiles Ltd. Vs. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke of Bombay and Others, (2012) 3 SCC 619 State of Bihar Vs. Dhirendra Kumar and others, (1976) 1 SCC 496 According to him, in all those case laws it was held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that if jurisdiction of the Civil Court is excluded either explicitly or being impliedly by any statute then Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit falling under that particular statute. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant, on the other hand, submits in reply that those case laws have no application in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In this connection, he refers a case reported in Sushil Suri Vs. C.B.I. and Another, (2011) 5 SCC 708 to impress upon this Court that even one additional or different fact may make the world of difference between the conclusions in two cases and blindly placing reliance on a decision is never proper. 13. There is no denial that if one tries to press into service that ratio of a case law to another case having different sets of facts then it causes more injustice than justice. In this connection the case law as reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Another Vs. Krishna Kant and Others, (1995) 5 SCC 75 may be referred. 14. The three Judge Bench in Krishna Kant's case (ibid) summarized the principles regarding the forum of the dispute between employer and workman by observing as follows: 35.(1) Where the dispute arises from general law of contract i.e., where relief’s are claimed on the basis of the general law of contract, a suit filed in civil court cannot be said to be not maintainable, even though such a dispute may also constitute an 'industrial dispute' within the meaning of Section 2(k) or Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. (2) Where, however, the dispute involves recognition, observance or enforcement of any of the rights or obligations created by the Industrial Disputes Act, the only remedy is to approach the forums created by the said Act. (3) Similarly, where the dispute involves the recognition, observance or enforcement of rights and obligations created by enactments like the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders), Act, 1946-which can be called 'sister enactments' to the Industrial Disputes Act-and which do not provide a forum for resolution of such disputes, the only remedy shall be to approach the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act provided they constitute industrial disputes within the meaning of Section 2(k) and Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act or where such enactment says that such dispute shall be either treated as an industrial dispute or says that it shall be adjudicated by any of the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act. Otherwise, recourse to civil court is open. (4) It is not correct to say that the remedies provided by the Industrial Disputes Act are not equally effective for the reason that access to the forum depends upon a reference being made by the appropriate government. The power to make a reference conferred upon the Government is to be exercised to effectuate the object of the enactment and hence not unguided. The rule is to make a reference unless, of course, the dispute raised is a totally frivolous one ex facie. The power conferred is the power to refer and not the power to decide, though it may be that the Government is entitled to examine whether the dispute is ex facie frivolous, not meriting an adjudication. (5) Consistent with the policy of law aforesaid, we recommend to Parliament and the State Legislatures to make a provision enabling a workman to approach the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal directly- i.e., without the requirement of a reference by the Government-in case of industrial disputes covered by Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act. This would go a long way in removing the misgivings with respect to the effectiveness of the remedies provided by the Industrial Disputes Act. This would go a long way in removing the misgivings with respect to the effectiveness of the remedies provided by the Industrial Disputes Act. (6) The certified Standing Orders framed under and in accordance with the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 are statutorily imposed conditions of service and are binding both upon the employers and employees, though they do not amount to 'statutory provisions.' Any violation of these Standing Orders entitles an employee to appropriate relief either before the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act or the civil court where recourse to civil court is open according to the principles indicated herein. (7) The policy of law emerging from the Industrial Disputes Act and its sister enactments is to provide an alternative dispute resolution mechanism to the workmen, a mechanism which is speedy, inexpensive, informal and unencumbered by the plethora of procedural laws and appeals upon appeals and revisions applicable to civil courts. Indeed, the powers fo the courts and tribunals under the Industrial Disputes Act are far more extensive in the sense that they can grant such relief as they think appropriate in the circumstances for putting an end to an industrial dispute. 15. Aforesaid proposition of law as laid down in Krishna Kant's case was accepted and approved by Hon'ble Apex Court subsequently in another three Bench decision in the case of Chandrakant Tukaram Nikam and Others Vs. Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad and Another, (2002) 2 SCC 542 . 16. Admittedly, the respondent Corporation invoked Rule 14(5) O.N.G.C. Leave Regulations 1969 to allege that on account of not joining service by the original plaintiff (predecessor-in-interest of the present appellants) even after expiry of his all leaves including extraordinary leave the original plaintiff deemed to have resigned his appointment and accordingly ceased to be in the employment of the Commission. 17. On the other hand, it was specific case of the original plaintiff employee/workman that there was no occasion for invoking said Clause 14(5) of said Regulation and that it amounted to illegal termination of service. As the dispute between the parties being employee and employer was whether the service of the employee was illegally terminated by the employer by illegally invoking the Clause of deeming resignation and cessation of service the dispute was essentially an industrial dispute between a workman and his employer. As the dispute between the parties being employee and employer was whether the service of the employee was illegally terminated by the employer by illegally invoking the Clause of deeming resignation and cessation of service the dispute was essentially an industrial dispute between a workman and his employer. If that be the position then in terms of the ratio of the case of Krishna Kant (ibid) and Chandrakant (ibid) it can be said that the dispute between the parties was essentially an industrial dispute and that the Civil Court has impliedly barred to entertain said dispute. As such, it appears from the aforesaid discussion that the suit essentially being an industrial dispute between employer and employee was not maintainable in the Civil Court. As such all proceedings in connection with civil suit were illegal. 18. In view of discussions as made above in connection with point No. 4 no further discussion is called for to decide point Nos. 2 and 3. As the suit is found to be not maintainable in the Civil Court all proceedings starting from the proceeding in the Trial Court were illegal and void. If that be the position then there is no need for deciding other points framed at the time of admission of the second appeal. 19. As the suit is found to be not maintainable in the Civil Court, the ultimate finding of learned Lower Appellate Court that the suit was liable to be dismissed, is upheld though on other ground. 20. As a result, the appeal is hereby rejected on contest but without costs. 21. Let a copy of this judgment be forwarded to the learned Court concerned with Lower Court record, if any. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment be supplied to the learned counsels of the parties, if applied for.