Judgment Brij Kishore Dube. J;- 1. This Misc. Appeal has been filed under Order 43 Rule 1(u) of Code of Civil Procedure against the judgment and decree of remand dated 07.02.11 passed by the Additional Judge to the Court of Additional District Judge, Sironj, District Vidisha in Civil Appeal No. 47-A/10, whereby, reversed the judgment and decree dated 06.12.85 passed by Civil Judge Class II, Lateri, District Vidisha in Civil Suit No. 8-A/85 and the matter has been remanded back to the Trial Court for fresh adjudication. Short facts of the case are that the father of the appellants, namely; Sardar Singh (since deceased) had filed a suit for declaration of title against the respondents No. 1 to 3/defendants No. 2, 3 & 4 and father of the respondents No. 4 & 5, namely; Bheem Singh (since deceased) which was numbered as Civil Suit No. 8-A/1985 in which defendants filed written statement admitting the plaint allegations and prayed that the decree sought by the plaintiff may be passed in his favour. The Trial Court vide its judgment and decree dated 06.12.1985 passed the decree in favour of the plaintiff. An appeal was filed by the respondents No. 1 to 3 herein against the legal representatives of the deceased, plaintiff (Sardar Singh) and also legal representatives of the defendant, Bheem Singh on 06.08.2009 alleging that no notice was served on the defendants and they neither appeared nor filed written statement before the Trial Court. The plaintiff got judgment and decree by submitting fake and fabricated written statement. The written statement was not verified. It is further alleged that at the relevant time defendant No. 3, Bhupendra Singh was minor and no proceedings were made under Order 32 of the CPC. Since, the appeal was not filed in time and was barred by limitation, therefore, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was filed by the respondents No. 1 to 3 herein along with the appeal memo praying that the delay in filing the appeal be condoned. The application was opposed by the appellants herein. 2. Since, the appeal was not filed in time and was barred by limitation, therefore, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was filed by the respondents No. 1 to 3 herein along with the appeal memo praying that the delay in filing the appeal be condoned. The application was opposed by the appellants herein. 2. The First Appellate Court after hearing the parties on the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal as well as on merits of the appeal, vide the impugned judgment and decree dated 07.02.2011 condoned the delay in filing the appeal and set-aside the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court and remanded the suit for fresh adjudication. While remanding the suit to the Trial Court, the First Appellate Court directed the Trial Court to permit the defendants to file written statement and, thereafter, decide the suit in accordance with law. Aggrieved by the aforesaid remand order, the appellants have filed this appeal. 3. Learned counsel for the appellants, Shri D.D. Bansal argued at length and submitted that the remand order passed by the Court below is illegal, incorrect and deserves to be set-aside. It is submitted that the First Appellate Court did not care to decide the application for condonation of delay of more than 24 years before passing the final order and passed order on the application along with the final judgment in the appeal. It is well settled that unless the delay is condoned, no judgment on merit can be passed in appeal. In this context, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in the case of Manoramabai Vs. State of M.P., 2012 (3) MPLJ 158. It is further submitted that the First Appellate Court has also erred in condoning the delay of more than 24 years on the wrong interpretation of law of limitation. Since, there is no reasonable explanation put-forth by the respondents No. 1, 2 & 3 herein, therefore delay cannot be condoned liberally. In this regard, learned counsel has cited the decision in the case of Zabiar v. State of M.P., 1980 II WN 53 and State of M.P. Vs. Fakirchand, 1980 II WN 199. Since, there is no reasonable explanation put-forth by the respondents No. 1, 2 & 3 herein, therefore delay cannot be condoned liberally. In this regard, learned counsel has cited the decision in the case of Zabiar v. State of M.P., 1980 II WN 53 and State of M.P. Vs. Fakirchand, 1980 II WN 199. It is further submitted that the ground on the basis of which the regular civil appeal was filed before the First Appellate Court needs enquiry and without holding any enquiry into the allegations levelled against the appellants and Trial Court, the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court cannot be set-aside. 4. In response, Shri S.K. Shrivastava, learned counsel for the respondents argued in support of the impugned judgment and decree and submitted that cogent reasons have been assigned by the Appellate Court for condoning the delay as well as remanding the case to the Trial Court. He further submits that there is no specific bar which restrain the Appellate Court to hear and decide the appeal along with the application for condonation of delay. The defendants neither appeared before the Trial Court nor filed any written statement. After 24 years of the alleged judgment and decree of the Trial Court, the appellants filed an application before the Tahsildar, Lateri for mutation. On receiving the notice from the Tahsil Court, they (respondents No. 1, 2 & 3 herein) came to know on 10.07.2009 about the judgment and decree, thereafter, they received the certified copy and filed the appeal on 06.08.2009, therefore, there was sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. It is further submitted that the grounds on which the judgment and decree of the Trial Court was set-aside does not requires any enquiry. The learned counsel has further submitted that the appeal filed against the remand order can be heard only on the ground enumerated in Section 100 of the CPC. In this context, he has cited the recent judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Jegannathan Vs. Raju Sigamani and another, 2012 (3) MPLJ 502 (SC). 5. I have considered the submissions made on both sides and perused the record of the First Appellate Court as well as of the Trial Court. 6. Admittedly, respondents No. 1 to 3 herein/defendants filed appeal on 06.08.2009 before the First Appellate Court. Raju Sigamani and another, 2012 (3) MPLJ 502 (SC). 5. I have considered the submissions made on both sides and perused the record of the First Appellate Court as well as of the Trial Court. 6. Admittedly, respondents No. 1 to 3 herein/defendants filed appeal on 06.08.2009 before the First Appellate Court. Along with the appeal, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was filed for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 7. In Manoramabai (supra), along with the appeal, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act alleging that the delay be condoned was filed. A specific application was made by the respondent to the effect that before proceeding further in the appeal, the application for condonation of delay has to be decided. After hearing the parties, learned Appellate Court dismissed the aforesaid application. In such factual matrix of the case, this Court held that unless the application for condonation of delay is decided in favour of the appellants, the appeal cannot be heard and decided finally. 8. In the present case, the First Appellate Court was of the opinion that in view of Order 41 Rule 3-A of CPC, the application for condonation of delay is to be decided first, but on the request and consent of the learned counsel for the parties and looking to the peculiar facts of the appeal, the First Appellate Court heard and decided the appeal along with the application for condonation of the delay, however, the First Appellate Court has firstly decided and allowed the application for condonation of the delay, thereafter considered the merits of the appeal. The para 7 of the judgment of the First Appellate Court is relevant and reads as under:- 9. Therefore, looking to the peculiar facts of the case in hand, the aforesaid judgment cited by learned counsel for the appellants does not provide any help to him. 10. It transpires from the record of the Court below that appellants have filed mutation application before the Tahsildar, Lateri on the basis of judgment and decree dated 06.12.1985 which was numbered as Namantran Prakran No. 35/A-6/08-09. The notice was issued to the defendants. 10. It transpires from the record of the Court below that appellants have filed mutation application before the Tahsildar, Lateri on the basis of judgment and decree dated 06.12.1985 which was numbered as Namantran Prakran No. 35/A-6/08-09. The notice was issued to the defendants. On receiving the notice, they appeared before the Court on 10.07.2009, then they got knowledge of the judgment and decree dated 06.12.1985 passed by the Trial Court, thereafter, they obtained certified copy of the aforesaid judgment and decree on 16.07.2009 and then, filed the appeal. The First Appellate Court after considering the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, averments made in the application and documents on record has arrived at a conclusion that the limitation shall start from the date of knowledge of judgment and decree i.e. 10.07.2009 and not from the date of passing of the judgment and decree dated 06.12.1985. 11. Ordinarily ignorance about the existence of a right is not a ground for postponing the starting point of limitation for enforcement of the right but where the ignorance or want of knowledge is occasioned by fraud on the part of the person against whom the right is enforced that there is postponement of running of the period of limitation. In such cases, the limitation begins to run from the time when the applicant has discovered the fraud or the mistake. Therefore, the First Appellate Court has not committed any error in holding that limitation shall starts from the date of knowledge of judgment and decree i.e., 10.07.2009 and not from the date of passing the judgment and decree i.e. 06.12.1985. 12. In Zabiar (supra), this Court held that it is true that, as has been laid down by their Lordships in The State of West Bengal v. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality and others, ( AIR 1972 SC 749 ), the words 'sufficient cause' should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to a party. However, the burden of placing the necessary material on the basis of which the Court could decide as to whether no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide was imputable to the party was always on the said party. However, the burden of placing the necessary material on the basis of which the Court could decide as to whether no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide was imputable to the party was always on the said party. In State of M.P. (supra), this Court has reiterated that if the appellants have failed to make out sufficient cause for the delay in filing the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, then the application cannot be allowed, but in the case in hand, there is reasonable and plausible explanation putforth by the defendants for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 13. In view of the aforesaid, the First Appellate Court did not commit any error in condoning the delay in filing the appeal. 14. So far as, other contentions of the appellants is concerned, on going through the impugned judgment and decree of the Appellate Court, it is apparent that the judgment and decree of the Trial Court has been set-aside and remanded the case on the grounds that in the alleged written statement, there was no verification of the pleadings, therefore, the written statement cannot be said to be written statement in the eye of law and the pleadings without verification cannot be termed as pleadings and the guardian in the suit for minor defendant No. 3, Bhupendra Singh was not appointed under Order 32 Rule 3 of the CPC. In this regard, para 19 of the impugned judgment of the learned Appellate Court is relevant and reads as under:- 15. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Babulal Agrawal v. Jyoti Shrivastava and others, 2000 (1) MPLJ 102 observed that without verification of the pleadings in the written statement, it is not a written statement in the eye of law. 16. Admittedly, Bhupendra Singh, respondent No. 3 herein was the defendant No. 3 in the suit and his age was mentioned as seven years, but no guardian was appointed on his behalf by the Court and also the fact that the written statement was not verified. 17. In view of the aforesaid, other contentions of the learned counsel for the appellants is also without any substance. 18. 17. In view of the aforesaid, other contentions of the learned counsel for the appellants is also without any substance. 18. While considering the scope of an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(u) of CPC, the Supreme Court in the case of Jegannathan (supra) held that the appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(u) of CPC can only be heard on the grounds a second appeal is to be heard under Section 100 of CPC. For the reasons stated above, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed, however, it is observed that the findings and reasonings arrived at by this Court are only for the purpose of disposal of this appeal and, therefore, the Trial Court while deciding the matter shall not be influenced by the order passed by this Court. No order as to costs.