JUDGMENT Hon’ble Krishna Murari, J.—Heard Shri J.N. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri S.M.N. Abbas Abedi for respondent No. 1. 2. Respondent-workman moved an application under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short the Act) with a prayer to direct the petitioner-employer to make payment of Rs. 53,787.70/- alongwith interest as salary for the period 16.3.2000 to 3.1.2001, which was illegally not paid. Prescribed authority, Labour Court vide award dated 17.10.2011 allowed the claim of the respondent-workman. Aggrieved, the petitioner has approached this Court. 3. It is contended that without there being any adjudication with respect to entitlement of the workman for payment of salary during this period, the claim of the respondent-workman could not have been awarded in proceedings under Section 33-C (2) of the Act by the Prescribed authority, inasmuch as the said proceedings are in the nature of execution proceedings. Reliance in support of the contention has been placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of D. Krishnan and another v. Special Officer, Vellore Cooperative Sugar Mill and another, (2008) 7 SCC 22 . 4. The facts as they emerge out from the pleadings of the parties are that respondent-workman, who was working on the post of driver in the petitioner-corporation, was declared unfit on medical grounds to work as a driver. When the petitioner-employer did not allot him any light work, respondent-workman filed Writ Petition No. 18757 of 2000. vide order dated 21.4.2000, the corporation was directed to allow the workman to resume the duty and to allot him some light work. Even thereafter the petitioner-corporation instead of allotting him some light work, passed an order dated 5.5.2000 allocating him the duty to drive the bus from Meerut to Delhi and back treating it to be a light work. Respondent again approached this Court by seeking a review of the order dated 21.4.2000, which was allowed vide order dated 18.8.2000 and order dated 5.5.2000 passed by Regional Manager was quashed and the corporation was directed to assign lighter work to the respondent-workman other than that of the driver. Even thereafter, the order was not complied by the corporation, as a result, contempt proceedings were initiated, wherein notices were issued. Thereafter, vide order dated 1.1.2001, respondent-workman was allowed to resume duty as Chowkidar. Even thereafter, the order was not complied by the corporation, as a result, contempt proceedings were initiated, wherein notices were issued. Thereafter, vide order dated 1.1.2001, respondent-workman was allowed to resume duty as Chowkidar. Since the petitioner did not pay the salary from 16.3.2000 to 3.1.2001, respondent-workman moved an application under Section 3-C (2) of the Act claiming payment for the said period. Prescribed authority finding that though the respondent-workman continued in employment of the petitioner-corporation and despite orders passed by this Court, petitioner did not allow him to work on any post other than that of driver, he was entitled for payment of salary for the said period, inasmuch as the respondent-workman was not at fault. 5. It is undisputed that without there being a pre-determination or adjudication, proceedings under Section 33-C (2) of the Act, which are in the nature of execution, cannot be initiated. 6. The question which arises for consideration in this case is whether there was any dispute with regard to the entitlement of the respondent-workman for wages during this period? 7. Admittedly, this Court vide order dated 21.4.2000 directed the Corporation to assign some lighter work to the respondent, which was not followed and another order dated 5.5.2000 was passed directing the respondent-workman to resume the duties of driver and to run the bus from Meerut to Delhi. The said order was also quashed by this Court vide order dated 18.8.2000 and a categorical direction was issued that the workman may be assigned lighter work other than that of the driver. Even when this order was not complied with by the corporation, notices in the contempt proceedings were issued and then the petitioner-corporation directed the respondent-workman to resume the duties as Chowkidar on 1.1.2001. 8. The narration of the above facts clearly goes to show that respondent-workman was not allowed to work despite orders passed by this Court by the petitioner-corporation itself and, thus, it cannot be said that there was any dispute with respect to right to wages for the said period, which requires any adjudication. 9. 8. The narration of the above facts clearly goes to show that respondent-workman was not allowed to work despite orders passed by this Court by the petitioner-corporation itself and, thus, it cannot be said that there was any dispute with respect to right to wages for the said period, which requires any adjudication. 9. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. and another v. Brijpal Singh, 2005 SCC (L&S) 1081, has categorically held that right to money or benefit which is sought to be executed under Section 33-C (2) of the Act must be an existing one and must arise in course of and in relation to relationship between industrial workman and employer. 10. In the facts of the present case, there was an existing right vested in the respondent-workman for payment of wages which did not require any adjudication, hence, the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner has no force as well as the case of D. Krishnan and another (supra) relied upon by the petitioner in respect of his contention is not applicable and is clearly distinguishable on facts. 11. In view of above facts and discussions, there is no force in the writ petition and the same, accordingly, stands dismissed. ——————