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2012 DIGILAW 1060 (PAT)

Jeenat Khatoon v. State of Bihar

2012-08-01

RAVI RANJAN

body2012
ORDER I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and respondents and have also perused the records of this case. 2. Petitioner seeks direction to the respondents to pay compensation for the death of her husband as he was electrocuted due to the negligence on the part of the respondents. 3. Facts of the case emanating from the writ petition are summarized as under: The deceased-husband of the petitioner, aged about 40 years, was a daily wage earner and was earning Rs. 70/- per day as agriculture labour. In addition thereto, he was also running a grocery shop from which he was earning Rs. 50/- per day. On the fateful day, i.e., 18.02.2006, when the deceased had gone to the southern side of the field of one Sushil Singh to attend natural call, the right leg of the deceased came in contact with the live wire of 11000 volt which was lying there and the body of the deceased was fumed into fire. Seeing the bizarre incident the local persons along with the Mukhia of the locality rushed to the place of occurrence but the deceased had already died. Body of the deceased was brought on the main road. Thereafter, the villagers had blocked the road demanding compensation and upon intervention and assurance given by the SDO, Bhagalpur the situation was restored to normalcy. On the fardbeyan of the son of the deceased U.D. Case No. 2/06 was registered and, thereafter, intimation regarding the occurrence was given to the concerned Magistrate under section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The fardbeyan as well as the report regarding the unnatural death have been appended as Annexures 1 and 1/1, respectively. The dead body of the deceased was sent for postmortem. The postmortem report, appended as Annexure 2, reveals that the cause of death was due to electrocution by high voltage electric current. Thereafter, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing this writ application. 4. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents taking a stand that the relief cannot be granted to the petitioner as the department is maintaining its transmission line in effective manner and, also, no complaint was ever made by anybody that the wire of 11000 volt was snapped and was lying in the field. 4. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents taking a stand that the relief cannot be granted to the petitioner as the department is maintaining its transmission line in effective manner and, also, no complaint was ever made by anybody that the wire of 11000 volt was snapped and was lying in the field. A stand has also been taken that the fardbeyan discloses that the right leg of the petitioner had come in contact with the wire whereas the postmortem report shows injury upon the entire body. It is also questioned as to when the place of occurrence was the field of one Sushil Singh why the inquest report was prepared on the main road of Baunsi. It has further been stated that it would be difficult to believe that a person of 40 years would not notice live wire lying on earth at 1.30 P.M., i.e., in broad day light and will come in contact with it. A stand has also been taken that unless negligence is proved on the part of the respondents, they would not be liable to pay any compensation. Further stand has been taken that in such case of accident the petitioner should have moved under section 161 of the Electricity Act, 2003 as upon such notice of accident the Electrical Inspector has to make inquiry and submit a report regarding any accident affecting the safety of public caused by or in connection with generation, transmission, distribution, supply or use of electricity. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents has placed strong reliance upon a decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SDO, GRID Corporation of Orissa Ltd. Vs. Timudu Oram [(2005) 6 Supreme Court Cases 156] to impress upon this Court that in the similar circumstances, it has been held that unless negligence is established no compensation would be payable. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, has submitted that the respondents are liable to maintain the transmission line for supply of the electricity and they should perform a periodical inspection which they have failed to do and as such, high voltage wire had snapped out and was lying on the ground. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, has submitted that the respondents are liable to maintain the transmission line for supply of the electricity and they should perform a periodical inspection which they have failed to do and as such, high voltage wire had snapped out and was lying on the ground. It has been submitted that the claim of the respondents that a prudent person would have noticed the live wire on the earth as the occurrence is said to have taken place at 1.30 P.M., can be termed to be ridiculous inasmuch as the fields are always full of grass and bushes which sufficiently provide a good camouflage to such narrow wire. Therefore, it has been urged that the respondents are only trying to shift their negligent act on the shoulders of the deceased himself. Learned counsel has further submitted that the authorities of the Bihar State Electricity Board, being the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution cannot be absolved from its negligent act of leaving a snapped high voltage wire of 11000 volt lying on the ground. It is submitted that the Courts, including the Apex Court, have held time without number that for such negligent act the authorities can be fastened with the liability and direction can be given for grant of compensation as the same would come within the ambit of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon certain decisions which stand mentioned in paragraph no. 15 of the writ petition. 7. Before coming to the other issues I would consider a technical issue which has been raised by the respondents. It has been stated by the respondents that the petitioner was obliged to give a notice to the Electrical Inspector as an inquiry is contemplated under section 161(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003 by the Electrical Inspector to enquire and report regarding such accident affecting the safety of public which has occasioned by or in connection with the generation, transmission, distribution, supply or use of electricity. This issue was examined by the Orissa High Court in Smt. Minakshi Patra Vs. Secretary, Irrigation and Power, Govt. of Orissa [AIR 1999 Orissa 137]. This issue was examined by the Orissa High Court in Smt. Minakshi Patra Vs. Secretary, Irrigation and Power, Govt. of Orissa [AIR 1999 Orissa 137]. Though, the lis in the aforesaid case was regarding application of law of limitation in filing a suit under section 1A of the Indian Fatal Accidents Act, however, the learned Single Judge of the Orissa High Court has also considered and held that from perusal of section 33 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 it is clear that the victim of an accident has nothing to do with the notice contemplated under such provision. The duty or responsibility of issuing notice, as contemplated under section 33, is on the person concerned with the matter of generation, transmission, distribution, supply or use of electricity or in connection with any part of electric supply line or other works. The statutory inquiry contemplated in section 33 has nothing to do with the cause of action of the victim or local representative of the victim to claim any damages. Since the provisions under section 161 of the Electricity Act, 2003 are pari materia with the section 33 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 which had been considered by the Orissa High Court in Smt. Minakshi Patra (supra) the principle laid down thereunder would also be applicable mutatis mutandis to the later statute. In Ramawati Kuer Vs. The State of Bihar and others (2004(4) Patna Law Journal Reports, 307) this Court has held that non-compliance of section 33 would not lead to a presumption that no accident had taken place. Thus, it is held that non compliance of giving notice to the authority under section 161 of the Electricity Act, 2003 would not be fatal for the petitioner as he was not required to do so rather it would be the responsibility of the concerned person, as per the provision, to give such notice to the Electrical Inspector. Even if it is assumed that the petitioner has not given any information to the authority, in view of the aforesaid decision of this Court, the non-compliance would not lead to presumption that no accident had taken place. That apart, since the accident had taken place on 18.02.2006 and the writ application has been filed after serving a notice upon the respondents in 2006, the respondents, thereafter, could well have taken steps under section 161 of the Electricity Act, 2003. That apart, since the accident had taken place on 18.02.2006 and the writ application has been filed after serving a notice upon the respondents in 2006, the respondents, thereafter, could well have taken steps under section 161 of the Electricity Act, 2003. However, from the statement made in the counter affidavit it does not appear that the respondents have tried even to make any inquiry regarding such occurrence. 8. Coming back to the main issue, in the opinion of this Court, the respondents cannot escape from the liability. The averment made in the counter affidavit does not disclose, as has been noticed above also, that the respondents or its officials or managers had made any attempt to enquire about the occurrence, even after filing of the writ application in the year 2006, to come to the conclusion that such occurrence had not taken place in the manner described by the petitioner or as had been described in fardbeyan and further that the occurrence was due to negligence on the part of the victim himself. The denial appears to have been made only for the sake of denial. They have not come up with the case after inquiry that either the wire was not snapped or it has been snapped because of the circumstances beyond their control, i.e., act of God. or unauthorized intervention of third party. On the other hand, the fardbeyan, the inquest report and the postmortem report establish that the husband of the petitioner had died due to electrocution. In fact, there is no statement by the respondents, after holding any enquiry, that live wire was not snapped and was not lying in the field of one Sushil Singh. In the absence of such denial it has to be accepted that the death had been caused due to negligence on part of the respondents as the respondents being State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India were duty bound to maintain the transmission line as they are responsible to look after it. It is part of their public duty to look after the safety of public while discharging the duty of supply of energy which does not appear to have been done by them. Thus, in my opinion, the action of the respondents is clearly in violation of the right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is part of their public duty to look after the safety of public while discharging the duty of supply of energy which does not appear to have been done by them. Thus, in my opinion, the action of the respondents is clearly in violation of the right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Reference is made in this regard to the decision of the Delhi High Court in Col. Dharamvir Kataria Vs. Union of India and others (AIR 1999 Delhi, 291). 9. That apart, even if it is assumed that the petitioner would not be capable of establishing the negligence of the respondents in a summary proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it would be appropriate to refer to a decision of a Single Bench of this Court in Ram Swaroop Yadav Vs. The Bihar State Electricity Board and others {2004(2) Patna Law Journal Reports, 525} placing reliance upon a decision of the Apex Court in Tamil Nadu Electricity Board Vs. Sumathi and others [(2000) 4 Supreme Court Cases, 543]. It has been held in the aforesaid case that though it is true that the right of the petitioner is not capable of being established in a summary proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, however, one has to bear in mind that the object of conferment of jurisdiction under the said Article is for enforcement and not establishment of right. There is a rule of discretion and not of exclusion of jurisdiction, hence a High Court in exercise of its power of judicial review is not incompetent to decide an issue of fact, which can be determined on the basis of the materials on record. 10. The aforesaid decision rendered by a Single Bench of this Court was challenged by the respondents by preferring L.P.A. No. 713 of 2004. While dismissing the appeal a Division Bench of this Court had questioned the requirement itself of filing an appeal against the aforesaid decision. The action of the Board was deprecated, however, certain directions were given to the Board by the Division Bench while disposing of the appeal which is reported in 2006(3) BBCJ, V-192 (Bihar State Electricity Board and another Vs. Ramswarup Yadav and others). The relevant passage containing the direction given by the Division Bench is reproduced as under:– “10. The action of the Board was deprecated, however, certain directions were given to the Board by the Division Bench while disposing of the appeal which is reported in 2006(3) BBCJ, V-192 (Bihar State Electricity Board and another Vs. Ramswarup Yadav and others). The relevant passage containing the direction given by the Division Bench is reproduced as under:– “10. But before closing the records, I would like to add a few words of advise for the Board. In causes of accidental electrocution of the present kind, the Board must take a more reasonable if not humane stand. I am fully conscious of the financial and other constraints faced by the Board. I am aware of the unfortunate reality that the Board is simply unable to maintain and operate its installations writ strict application of the statutory safeguards or subject to safety measures followed by the highly developed and industrialized countries. A case of accidental electrocution of the present kind is neither the first nor unfortunately the last that would take place. Accidents should not happen, but they do. In such cases, the Board does not help anyone, least of all itself by taking an ostrich like position and denying the occurrence itself. This Court would advise the Board to take a more realistic, positive and helpful stand in the matter. It should issue necessary directions and ensure that whenever any accidental electrocution/electrical mishap takes place, a team of its local functionaries/Field Officers visits the spot. The team should first ascertain the source of mishap, whether it was the fittings at any private/public premises (not concerning the Board) or it was any of the installations of the Board. It should collect all the relevant details and should take down the statements of the family members of the victim, the neighbours or any other independent witnesses who might have seen the occurrence. A report should then be submitted to the local area and it should finally come to the Board for taking a decision with regard to prevention of such occurrence in future, payment of reasonable compensation to the victim/his heirs and any other related matters. In case the matter comes to Court, the materials collected by the team visiting the spot, its report and the decision taken on its basis should be placed for the scrutiny of the Court.” 11. In case the matter comes to Court, the materials collected by the team visiting the spot, its report and the decision taken on its basis should be placed for the scrutiny of the Court.” 11. It appears that the aforesaid direction of the Division Bench has not been followed. At one hand, the Board has come up with notification as contained in memo no. 891 dated 12.11.2005 and a guideline has been framed directing the junior engineer of the concerned area to immediately report to the Electrical Inspector regarding the matter and a sum of Rs. 25000/- be immediately sanctioned and paid to heirs of the deceased in case of incident involving loss of human life. Such ex gratia of Rs. 25000/- has been enhanced Rs. 1,00,000 vide memo no. 1452 dated 1.9.2008. Copies of the aforesaid documents were produced at the time of hearing of this case by the parties. However, on the other hand, in this case, in place of paying ex gratia to the petitioner, such adversarial stand has been taken by the respondents as described in the counter affidavit without holding any inquiry revealing that the occurrence had taken place in any other manner. This conduct of the respondents is unfortunate and undesirable. 12. In Parvati Devi and Others Vs. Commissioner of Police, Delhi and Ors. [(2000) 3 Supreme Court Cases 754] the Apex Court has held that since the death on account of electric shock is established from CFSL report from the Calcutta and once it is established that the death occurred on account of electrocution while walking on road, necessarily the authorities concerned must be held to be negligent, and, therefore, responsible for the death. Similarly, in M.P. Electricity Board Vs. Shail Kumar [ AIR 2002 SC 551 ] = [(2002) 2 Supreme Court Cases 162] it has been held by the Apex Court that if a person dies on electrocution of live wire lying on road then the liability to pay damage would be primarily upon the Electricity Board. The defence that electrocution was due to clandestine pilferage committed by stranger was found not available to the Board. However, it is made clear that in the present case no such stand has been taken by the respondents in the counter affidavit. The defence that electrocution was due to clandestine pilferage committed by stranger was found not available to the Board. However, it is made clear that in the present case no such stand has been taken by the respondents in the counter affidavit. In the aforesaid case a cyclist at night was electrocuted by live wire which was lying on the road and due to darkness the same could not noticed by him. The Apex Court has held that even assuming that all safety measure had been adopted by the concerned Electricity Department irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the managers of such undertakings, it would be liable to pay compensation in view of its “strict liability”. Hon’ble Supreme Court has explained that the basis of such liability is the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity. The liability cast on such person is known, in law, as “strict liability”. The relevant passages from the aforesaid decision are reproduced as under:– “8. Even assuming that all such measures have been adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life, is liable under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered by any other person, irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the managers of such undertakings. The basis of such liability is the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity. The liability cast on such persons known, in law, as “strict liability”. It differs from the liability which arises on account of the negligence or fault in this way i.e. the concept of negligence comprehends that the foreseeable harm could be avoided by taking reasonable precautions. If the defendant did all that which could be done for avoiding the harm he cannot be held liable when the action is based on any negligence attributed. But such consideration is not relevant in cases of strict liability where the defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he could have avoided the particular harm by taking precautions. 9. If the defendant did all that which could be done for avoiding the harm he cannot be held liable when the action is based on any negligence attributed. But such consideration is not relevant in cases of strict liability where the defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he could have avoided the particular harm by taking precautions. 9. The doctrine of strict liability has its origin in English common law when it was propounded in the celebrated case of Rylands V. Fletcher Blackburn, J., the author of the said rule had observed thus in the said decision: (All ER p. 7E-F) “(T)he true rule of law is that the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land, and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril, and, if he does not do so, he is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.” 10. There are seven exceptions formulated by means of case-law to the doctrine of strict liability. It is unnecessary to enumerate those exceptions barring one which is this: “Act of stranger i.e. if the escape was caused by the unforeseeable act of a stranger, the rule does not apply.” (Vide p.535, Winfield on Tort, 15th Edn.) 11. The rule of strict liability has been approved and followed in many subsequent decisions in England. A recent decision in recognition of the said doctrine is rendered by the House of Lords in Cambridge Water Co. Ltd. Vs. Eastern Counties Leather plc. The said principle gained approval in India, and decisions of the High Courts are a legion to that effect. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Charan Lal Sahu Vs. Union of India and a Division Bench in Gujarat SRTC Vs. Ramanbhai Prabhatbai had flowed with approval the principle in Rylands Vs. Fletcher. By referring to the above two decisions a two-Judge Bench of this Court has reiterated the same principle in Kaushnuma Begum Vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. 12. Union of India and a Division Bench in Gujarat SRTC Vs. Ramanbhai Prabhatbai had flowed with approval the principle in Rylands Vs. Fletcher. By referring to the above two decisions a two-Judge Bench of this Court has reiterated the same principle in Kaushnuma Begum Vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. 12. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India this Court has gone even beyond the rule of strict liability by holding that (SCCp.421, Para31) Where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm is caused on anyone on account of the accident in the operation of such activity, the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate those who are affected by the accident; such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions to the principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands Vs. Fletcher .” 13. The claim in public law for compensation for deprivation of fundamental right to life and liberty was examined earlier by the Apex Court in D.K. Basu Vs. State of West Bengal {(1997) 1 Supreme Court Cases, 416}. Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in the aforesaid case also that such claim would be available based upon the principle of “Strict Liability” and would be in addition to the claim available in private law for damages for tortuous act of the public servants. Following the aforesaid decision, in the opinion of this Court, in the present case also, the Bihar State Electricity Board cannot escape from such “strict liability”. 14. In some of the recent decisions of this Court, such as, in case of death of a passerby having been gutted in fire due to bursting of transformer, compensation has been awarded. Similarly, a Single Bench of this Court in on 8th of November, 2011 in C.W.J.C. No. 12960 of 2006 (Lallan Prasad Singh Vs. The State of Bihar and others) reported in 2012(1) Patna Law Journal Reports, 728 as well as the decision of 2nd December, 2011 in C.W.J.C. No. 2436 of 2005(Vijay Singh and anr. Vs. The State of Bihar and ors), reported in 2012(2) Patna Law Journal Reports, 771, after considering the various decisions in this regard including the decision of the Apex Court as well as the decision cited on behalf of the respondents in SDO, GRID Corporation of Orissa Ltd. Vs. Vs. The State of Bihar and ors), reported in 2012(2) Patna Law Journal Reports, 771, after considering the various decisions in this regard including the decision of the Apex Court as well as the decision cited on behalf of the respondents in SDO, GRID Corporation of Orissa Ltd. Vs. Timudu Oram [(2005) 6 Supreme Court Cases 156] has granted compensation to the heirs of the deceased on account of death of the victims due to electrocution. 15. In the opinion of this Court, the case in hand is distinguishable on facts from the case considered by the Apex Court in SDO, GRID Corporation of Orissa Ltd. (supra). In that case batch of three appeals were being considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court for determination as to whether compensation should have been awarded by the High Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the first case, i.e., Civil Appeal No. 1726 of 1999, the SDO, Electrical Sub-Division, Ujalapur on 24.08.1977 had submitted a report in which the cause of death was mentioned to be due to illegal electrical connection taken through hook, whereas, in the present case, no such case has been made out by the respondents rather, as has been noticed above, no inquiry had been held at all by them so that they could even raise a dispute with regard to the manner of occurrence. Similarly, in Civil Appeal No. 4552 of 2005, prior to making a claim in the writ application, the respondent had filed a suit for compensation on account of death of the victim before the civil court and the suit was dismissed. Subsequently, after a delay of about 10 years, a writ petition was filed. Thus, their Lordships have held that the subsequent writ was not maintainable in view of the dismissal of the suit and the writ petition having been filed after lapse of 10 years without explaining the inordinate delay. However, in the present case, such issue is not involved. In the third appeal of the batch cases, i.e., Civil Appeal No. 4560 of 2005, the respondent Board had come up with the case that the deceased might have died due to electric shock but not due to fall of electric wire as none of the family members of the deceased had lodged any complaint before the police. In the third appeal of the batch cases, i.e., Civil Appeal No. 4560 of 2005, the respondent Board had come up with the case that the deceased might have died due to electric shock but not due to fall of electric wire as none of the family members of the deceased had lodged any complaint before the police. However, in the present case, not only the fardbeyan was recorded by the police and U.D. case was instituted but it has been noticed and held by this Court as above that in the absence of any denial by the respondents on the basis of any inquiry having been held by them in this regard, the dispute would amount to have been raised only for the sake of raising the same. 16. Thus, in my considered opinion, the decision rendered in SDO, GRID Corporation of Orissa Ltd. (supra) would not be applicable in the present case. 17. Since the respondents have failed to make out any case that electrocution of the deceased was either due to the act of God or that the snapping of wire was due to clandestine pilferage committed by any stranger, in my view, in the absence of effective denial of the occurrence and also the manner of occurrence and in view of “strict liability” upon the respondents as per the decision of the Apex Court in M.P. Electricity Board (supra), the respondents would be liable to pay reasonable and adequate compensation to the petitioner. Even assuming that all the safety measures had been adopted by the respondent-Board, since it is engaged in undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life, it would be liable under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered by any person irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the managers of such undertaking. in view of its “strict liability”. 18. It is also held in the facts and circumstances of the case that in view of absence of any effective and specific denial by the authorities their negligence in performing their duty is apparent and, on that account also, the petitioner would be entitled for reasonable and adequate compensation. 19. However, next question would arise as to what would be or what should be the reasonable and adequate compensation. This Court in Ram Swaroop Yadav (supra) had examined the issue. 19. However, next question would arise as to what would be or what should be the reasonable and adequate compensation. This Court in Ram Swaroop Yadav (supra) had examined the issue. The relevant passage therefrom is quoted as under:– “14. Now, the question is as to how much compensation the petitioner shall be entitled. Compensations a device, which the law has contemplated to be paid to a person who had suffered the loss by a person whose act or omission had led to loss or the injury and justice demands that it should be equal in value. However, it is equally well settled that perfect compensation is hardly possible. Compensation awarded should be adequate and reasonable but should not be excessive or fanciful. There can be no exact or firm rule for measuring value of human life and the loss cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculation but has to be decided on the basis of broad facts and circumstances of each case. It should neither be punitive nor should it be a source of profit. In the facts of the present case, I am of opinion that a compensation of Rs.2 lakhs shall be just and proper. However, in case the petitioner believes that he is entitled for more compensation, nothing shall prevent him from bringing an appropriate action for that purpose. The respondents shall also be at liberty to make inquiry, ascertain the cause and pin point the person/persons responsible for snapping of the electrical wire and to recover the amount from him.” 20. In the case in hand, the petitioner claims that the deceased was an agriculture daily wage earner and was earning Rs. 70/- per day. That apart, he was running a grocery shop and from that he was earning Rs. 50/- per day, thus, the total income would be Rs. 120/-. It is true that no evidence has been produced to corroborates the aforesaid stand, however, the various notifications under Minimum Wages Act as well as the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1948 would be of great help and guidance even if they cannot be held to be strictly applicable in this case. 21. Upon consideration of the age of the victim (40 years) and the views expressed by this Court in Ram Swarup Yadav (supra), in the opinion of this Court, the compensation of Rs. 21. Upon consideration of the age of the victim (40 years) and the views expressed by this Court in Ram Swarup Yadav (supra), in the opinion of this Court, the compensation of Rs. 3,50,000/- (Rupees Three Lacs Fifty Thousand) would be just, proper and adequate. However, in case the petitioner believes that she is entitled for more compensation this order would not preclude her in moving the appropriate forum of competent jurisdiction in accordance with law for that purpose. 22. In view of unfair adversarial stand taken by the respondents in the counter affidavit, without holding any inquiry etc. and contrary to the notifications of the same Board, as discussed above, for grant of minimum ex gratia to the heir of the victim immediately after accident involving life of a person, by making a denial in the counter affidavit only for the sake of denial without any basis, they would also be liable to pay cost of litigation to the petitioner which is assessed at Rs. 5000/-(rupees five thousand). Accordingly, this application stands allowed.