ORAL ORDER By this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged that part of the order of the DIG, BMP which was passed on or about 09.06.1997, as contained in Annexure 1, to the extent it denies the petitioner back wages consequent to his reinstatement from dismissal. 2. It appears that petitioner was selected for appointment as a Constable in BMP 14 and was sent for one year training. Apparently while he was in training, he was summarily dismissed by order dated 17.10.1989. Petitioner filed an appeal before the DIG who, by his order dated 07.02.1990, remanded the matter for reconsideration. The order was not reconsidered but reaffirmed. Against this, the petitioner appears to have preferred a Memorial before the Inspector General, BMP who sent it to DIG, BMP, Central Zone for hearing and deciding the matter. By order dated 09.06.1997, the DIG passed the order, part of which is impugned. DIG clearly noted in the order that in the first three months of probation, a probationer could be terminated without show cause. In the present case, action was taken much after a year. What was the charge is not clear. Admittedly, no departmental proceeding at all was initiated nor any show cause asked. The dismissal order was, thus, neither in conformity with the statute nor in conformity with principles of natural justice. DIG, accordingly, set aside the order of dismissal and directed the petitioner to join. While doing so, he observed that the petitioner, who had been dismissed on 17.10.1989, would not be entitled to any remuneration for the period thereafter till the period he joins. It may be noted that subsequently by subsequent order, it is said that this period would be treated as extraordinary leave without pay in order to maintain continuity of service. Learned counsel for the petitioner challenges this part of the order by which petitioner has been deprived of his remuneration for the period he remained dismissed. It is submitted on behalf of petitioner firstly that this long period of dismissal was not because of his fault. He had filed an appeal immediately upon dismissal. It took the authorities almost seven years to decide the matter finally. The petitioner cannot be deprived of his wages for such a long period. It is submitted on behalf of petitioner firstly that this long period of dismissal was not because of his fault. He had filed an appeal immediately upon dismissal. It took the authorities almost seven years to decide the matter finally. The petitioner cannot be deprived of his wages for such a long period. Secondly, it is submitted that where the order of dismissal was palpably found to be wrong and moreso when it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction on the principle of no work no pay, an employee cannot be denied his wages because though the employee was willing to perform his duties, the employer had shut him out. In the counter affidavit and the supplementary counter affidavit all that is said is that the authorities were right in considering this to be a case of no work no pay. Accordingly, the order depriving petitioner of his remuneration was correct. 3. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, with their consent, the writ petition is being disposed of at this stage itself. 4. In my view, the contention of the petitioner must succeed. First, it must be noticed that the manner in which petitioner was dismissed was not only against the principles of natural justice but was in accordance with the procedure not known to law. Even the DIG could not make head or tail out of the charge. It is not in dispute that neither any proceeding was initiated nor any notice issued and straightway petitioner had been dismissed. Whatever the charge may be this summary dismissal is wholly impermissible under our Constitution. It is not a case in which Article 311 (2) of the Constitution has been invoked by the authorities to dispense with enquiry. Thus seen, the dismissal of petitioner was in defiance of all accepted norms. It is consequent to such action that the petitioner was kept out of employment. Thus, can it be said that petitioner was either unwilling or unable to perform his duties. To the contrary, petitioner had been pursuing his right to rejoin his duty all along. It is the authorities who were taking their time in deciding the matter. Having delayed the matter would it be right to now deny the petitioner of his wages in the facts aforesaid? 5. Having considered the matter, in my view, the petitioner cannot, in these circumstances, be denied his wages. It is the authorities who were taking their time in deciding the matter. Having delayed the matter would it be right to now deny the petitioner of his wages in the facts aforesaid? 5. Having considered the matter, in my view, the petitioner cannot, in these circumstances, be denied his wages. He was willing to work. He was pursuing his remedies. It was the authorities who were delaying in deciding the matter. It would be unfair in those circumstances to deny the petitioner his wages. 6. In this connection, I may first refer to what Chief Justice Chagla has said in the case of All India Groundnut Syndicate Limited -Versus- Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City, AIR 1954 Bombay 232 :- “But the most surprising contention is put forward by the Department that because their own officer failed to discharge his statutory duty, the assessee is deprived of his right which the law has given to him under sub-section (2) of S 24. In other words, the Department wants to benefit from and wants to take advantage of its own default. It is an elementary principle of law that no person - we take it that the Income-tax Department is included in that definition - can put forward his own default in defence to a right asserted by the other party. A person cannot say that the party claiming the right is deprived of that right because “I have committed a default and the right is lost because of that default.” 7. I would refer to the case of Nirmal Chandra Bhattacharjee & Others –Versus- Union of India & Others since reported in 1991 Supp 2 Supreme court Cases 363 wherein the Apex Court has held in paragraph 5 that the mistake or delay on the part of the department, therefore, should not be permitted to recoil on the appellants. 8. A more relevant judgment would be the case of Union of India & Others –Versus- K V Jankiraman & Others since reported in AIR 1991 Supreme Court 2010 where apart from other this specific question about deprival of pay for the period of dismissal was in issue. 8. A more relevant judgment would be the case of Union of India & Others –Versus- K V Jankiraman & Others since reported in AIR 1991 Supreme Court 2010 where apart from other this specific question about deprival of pay for the period of dismissal was in issue. The Apex Court held thus in paragraph 7:- “… … …The normal rule of “no work no pay” is not applicable to such cases where the employee although he is willing to work is kept away from work by the authorities for no fault of his. This is not a case where the employee remains away from work for his own reasons, although the work is offered to him. … … …” 9. I may also refer to a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Manorma Verma (Smt) –Versus- State of Bihar & Others, 1994 Supp (3) Supreme Court Cases 671 wherein the matter had gone to the Apex Court on the limited similar issue and this is what the Apex Court has said in paragraph 4 of the judgment:- “We do not see any justification for the High Court not allowing the appellant back wages after it came to the conclusion that the termination was illegal. Ordinarily, the consequential order of grant of back wages must follow, unless there are reasons on record which would justify a departure from the normal order. … … …” 10. Here, even the authorities themselves found that the order of dismissal was wholly illegal and unjustified. Even the charges could not be understood. No show cause was issued. Therefore, in such circumstances, in view of the principles as evident from the judgments aforesaid, I have no option but to hold that the petitioner is entitled to full back wages for the period aforesaid, thanks to the inordinate delay caused by the authorities themselves. The order impugned and subsequent orders depriving the petitioner of his full wages for the aforesaid period cannot be justified. The writ application is allowed with the direction to the authorities to pay full wages for the aforesaid period to the petitioner within a period of three months from the date of production of a copy of this order before IG, BMP, Bihar, Patna.