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2012 DIGILAW 1071 (JHR)

Management of Steel Authority of India Limited, Unit Bokaro Steel Plant, Bokaro Steel City, Bokaro v. Their workmen

2012-07-26

APARESH KUMAR SINGH

body2012
JUDGMENT By Court Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The Award passed by respondent no.2, Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bokaro Steel City, Bokaro, dated 8th August, 2001 (pronounced on 28.01.2002) in Reference Case No. 21 of 1994, is under challenge, whereby he has held that initial entry of age of the workman made in the personal data form as 31 years is correct and the Management was not justified in superannuating him with effect from 30th September, 1991, as such he is entitled to continue in service thereafter till he attained the age of superannuation. 3. It is the case of the Management petitioner herein that in the year 1973 the workman entered into the service of Bokaro Steel Authority and stated his age to be 40 years at the relevant point of time, which was entered into his personal data form on the very same date showing as 21.09.1973 and the employee had also put his L.T.I on the said personal data form on the very same date. It is also submitted that the words 31 years' earlier written by him at Column No. 13 was scored out by recording 40 years as on 21.09.1973 and the same is in the handwriting of the employee himself . 4. In view of the aforesaid fact, his date of birth as on 21.09.1973 was treated to be final age of 40 years and accordingly after 18 years of service he was superannuated on reaching the age of 58 years i.e. with effect from 30th September, 1991, for which a notice of superannuation was issued on him dated 04.06.1991. It is further submitted that the petitioner received all his post retirement dues including provident fund and gratuity. Thereafter, he raised a dispute through the Union before the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Bokaro Steel City, Bokaro, alleging that he has been forcibly retired on 30th September, 1991, although his actual age at the time of entry in service was 31 years. Admittedly the employee had not produced any document as required under the standing orders no. 8(b)(i) of the company such as birth certificate, school leaving certificate, insurance policy and Horoscope. Admittedly the employee had not produced any document as required under the standing orders no. 8(b)(i) of the company such as birth certificate, school leaving certificate, insurance policy and Horoscope. The workman had also not complained about the age entered into his personal data form at the time of entry in service and only after his retirement has raised this dispute, which should not have been referred for industrial adjudication and even if referred should have been refused by the Industrial Tribunal. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents-Union supported the Award made in the aforesaid reference being Reference Case No. 21 of 1994 by submitting that the petitioner did not own the entry made in the personal data form showing his age as 40 years which appears to have been interpolated at a later point of time by scoring the entry the age of 31 years, which he had actually stated at the time of entry in service. It is further stated that the Medical Officer had also opined during examination at the relevant point of time that his age to be 31 years and the Management ought to have taken into account that the date of birth as recorded at the time of entry in service of the Management should be 31 years by which he ought to have been retired only in the year 2000 upon attaining the age of 58 years. However, it is submitted that the employee himself died on 23.08.1997 and his legal heirs were substituted in the Reference before the Industrial Tribunal and as such the employee or his dependent is entitled to monetary benefits arising out of the impugned Award in question since the employee had been premature retired in the year 1991 itself denying him 9 years of service. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully going through the records and impugned Award, it appears that the learned Industrial Tribunal has proceeded to decide the case largely relying upon the provisions contained in Standing Order no. 8(b)(i) of the Company, which is as under: “(I) The personnel Department of the Company will record the age of every employee at the time of his employment and the entry of the age shall be attested by the employee. 8(b)(i) of the Company, which is as under: “(I) The personnel Department of the Company will record the age of every employee at the time of his employment and the entry of the age shall be attested by the employee. Employee should for this purpose, produce any of the following documents in proof of their age: (i) Birth certificate. (ii)School Leaving Certificate. (iii) Insurance Policy. (iv) Horoscope provided the management in its discretion considers its sufficient to establish its genuineness and the age of the candidate. (II) A workman who is unable to produce documentary evidence of his age shall state his age and make a written declaration that the age as stated by him is correct. He shall be sent to the company's medical officer for examination whose opinion as the workman's age shall be final and binding on the workman. (III) The age of a workman as recorded with the company at the time of his employment shall not, thereafter, be questioned by him.” 7. After discussing the evidence on the point whether the employee had actually stated the age of 40 years at the time of entry in service or his date of birth was 31 years, the learned Tribunal has proceeded to draw inference that although the employee may have stated the age of 40 years at the time of entry in service, but since he had failed to produce any of the certificates as stipulated under standing Order No. 8(b) (i), declaration of the Medical Officer at the time of entry in service should have been treated as final and binding of the workman. However, the aforesaid finding appears to be contrary to the statements made by the employee himself when he entered into his service as he had put his L.T.I. on the personal data form, which showed his age as 40 years at the time of entry in service after scoring out the entry 31 years' in the personal data form. Moreover, the employee had also not produced any of the stipulated documents in support of his date of birth like birth certificate, school leaving certificate, insurance policy, Horoscope etc. at the time of entry in service. The workman, in question, also never questioned regarding the age at the time of entry in service as 40 years till he actually superannuated whereafter the Reference was made on his insistence. at the time of entry in service. The workman, in question, also never questioned regarding the age at the time of entry in service as 40 years till he actually superannuated whereafter the Reference was made on his insistence. The learned Tribunal has misdirected itself while arriving at a finding that contrary to the records contained in the personal data form at the time of entry in service as declared by the petitioner himself he should not have been superannuated after attaining the age of 58 years as on 30th September, 1991. Moreover, the employee being conscious of such entry in service record he never disputed the same and the law is well-settled in this regard that in a dispute relating to the date of birth as recorded at the time of entry in service should not be allowed to be agitated at the fag end of service or even after retirement as has been done in this case on the part of the employee. The employee had also accepted all his post retirement benefits after his superannuation. 8. In view of the totality of the circumstances and the aforesaid reasons recorded hereinabvoe, I find that the impugned Award is not sustainable in law, as the learned Tribunal has acted in a manner which is contrary to the settled law on the subject and drawn a finding or inference which is not sustainable in law. Accordingly, the impugned Award is set aside and the writ petition is allowed.