JUDGMENT Hon’ble S.U. Khan, J.—Heard learned counsel for the parties at the admission stage. 2. This is plaintiffs’ second appeal arising out of O.S. No. 38 of 1986. The suit was decreed on 4.4.1998 by Additional Civil Judge-I, Senior Division, Bareilly and defendants were restrained from interfering in the peaceful possession and legal rights of the plaintiffs over the property in dispute. Against the said decree defendants filed Civil Appeal No. 102 of 1998, which was allowed., judgment and decree passed by the trial Court was set aside and suit was dismissed, hence this second appeal. 3. The case of the plaintiffs was that they had taken the property in dispute from Zamindar. Defendants admitted that plaintiffs’ father Nasir Bux had purchased the property (one bigha pakka) from Har Prasad the Zamindar through registered sale-deed dated 24.11.1911. Defendants further pleaded that plaintiffs’ father Nasir Bux sold half of the said property to Jumman, Mataru and Ghurran through registered sale-deed dated 28.2.1913 and rest half to Nagarpalika through registered sale-deed dated 18.7.1913. 4. Defendants further pleaded that on 18.7.1913, Jumman and others sold the portion which had been purchased by them to Nagarpalika. Name of Nagarpalika was entered in the municipal records. Nagarpalika thereafter sold the entire property in dispute to defendants’ father Hafeezul Hasan through registered sale-deed dated 10.2.1943. 5. The main argument of the plaintiffs was and is that original subsequent sale-deeds dated 28.2.1913, dated 18.7.1913 and the sale-deed dated 10.2.1943 were not filed and only their certified copies obtained from the office of sub-Registrar were filed hence they being secondary evidence were not admissible in evidence as loss of original was not proved. 6. Certified copies were admitted in evidence and they were also exhibited and marked as Ex.ka-2, ka-3, ka-5 and ka-6. Even the sale-deed of 24.11.1911 through which plaintiff’s father purchased the property from Zamindar was filed by the defendants (certified copy). It is strange that the trial Court placed reliance upon the certified copy of the sale-deed dated 24.11.1911 through which plaintiffs’ father had purchased the property but not on the subsequent sale-deeds supporting the defendants’ case. Plaintiffs in the plaint had not even given the date of sale-deed through which their father Nasir Bux purchased the property from Zamindar. Even the name of the Zamindar had not been given by them. When the certified copies were exhibited no objection was taken by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs in the plaint had not even given the date of sale-deed through which their father Nasir Bux purchased the property from Zamindar. Even the name of the Zamindar had not been given by them. When the certified copies were exhibited no objection was taken by the plaintiffs. It was only during the arguments before the trial Court that such objection was raised and trail Court accepted the said objection. 7. The lower appellate Court placing reliance upon Smt. Dayamathi Bai v. Sri K.M. Shaffi, AIR 2004 SC 4082 , rightly held that certified copies of registered documents more than 30 years old and exhibited could not be ignored from consideration on the ground that loss of the original had not been proved. In the said authority reliance was placed upon R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple and another, AIR 2003 SC 4548 . Paragraph Nos. 13 and 14 of 2004 authority are quoted below: “13. We do not find merit in this civil appeal. In the present case the objection was not that the certified copy of Ex.P1 is in itself inadmissible but that the mode of proof was irregular and insufficient. Objection as to the mode of proof falls within procedural law. Therefore, such objections could be waived. They have to be taken before the document is marked as an exhibit and admitted to the record (See: Order XIII Rule 3 of Code of Civil Procedure). This aspect has been brought out succinctly in the judgment of this Court in R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple and another, AIR 2003 SC 4548 , to which one of us, Bhan, J., was a party vide para 20: “20. The learned counsel for the defendant-respondent has relied on Roman Catholic Mission v. State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 1457 , in support of his submission that a document not admissible in evidence, though brought on record, has to be excluded from consideration. We do not have any dispute with the proposition of law so laid down in the abovesaid case. However, the present one is a case which calls for the correct position of law being made precise. Ordinarily, an objection to the admissibility of evidence should be taken when it is tendered and not subsequently. We do not have any dispute with the proposition of law so laid down in the abovesaid case. However, the present one is a case which calls for the correct position of law being made precise. Ordinarily, an objection to the admissibility of evidence should be taken when it is tendered and not subsequently. The objections as to admissibility of documents in evidence may be classified into two classes: (i) an objection that the document which is sought to be proved is itself inadmissible in evidence; and (ii) where the objection does not dispute the admissibility of the document in evidence but is directed towards the mode of proof alleging the same to be irregular or insufficient. In the first case, merely because a document has been marked as “an exhibit”, an objection as to its admissibility is not excluded and is available to be raised even at a later stage or even in appeal or revision. In the latter case, the objection should be taken when the evidence is tendered and once the document has been admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit, the objection that it should not have been admitted in evidence or that the mode adopted for proving the document is irregular cannot be allowed to be raised at any stage subsequent to the marking of the document as an exhibit. The latter proposition is a rule of fair play. The crucial test is whether an objection, if taken at the appropriate point of time, would have enabled the party tendering the evidence to cure the defect and resort to such mode of proof as would be regular. The omission to object becomes fatal because by his failure the party entitled to object allows the party tendering the evidence to act on an assumption that the opposite party is not serious about the mode of proof. The omission to object becomes fatal because by his failure the party entitled to object allows the party tendering the evidence to act on an assumption that the opposite party is not serious about the mode of proof. On the other hand, a prompt objection does not prejudice the party tendering the evidence, for two reasons: firstly, it enables the Court to apply its mind and pronounce its decision on the question of admissibility then and there; and secondly, in the event of finding of the Court on the mode of proof sought to be adopted going against the party tendering the evidence, the opportunity of seeking indulgence of the Court for permitting a regular mode or method of proof and thereby removing the objection raised by the opposite party, is available to the party leading the evidence. Such practice and procedure is fair to both the parties. Out of the two types of objections, referred to hereinabove, in the latter case, failure to raise a prompt and timely objection amounts to waiver of the necessity for insisting on formal proof of a document, the document itself which is sought to be proved being admissible in evidence. In the first case, acquiescence would be no bar to raising the objection in a superior Court.” 14. To the same effect is the judgment of the Privy Council in the case of Gopal Das and another v. Sri Thakurji and others, AIR 1943 PC 83, in which it has been held that when the objection to the mode of proof is not taken, the party cannot lie by until the case comes before a Court of appeal and then complain for the first time of the mode of proof. That when the objection to be taken is not that the document is in itself inadmissible but that the mode of proof was irregular, it is essential that the objection should be taken at the trial before the document is marked as an exhibit and admitted to the record. Similarly, in Sarkar on Evidence, 15th Edition, page 1084, it has been stated that where copies of the documents are admitted without objection in the trial Court, no objection to their admissibility can be taken afterwards in the Court of appeal. Similarly, in Sarkar on Evidence, 15th Edition, page 1084, it has been stated that where copies of the documents are admitted without objection in the trial Court, no objection to their admissibility can be taken afterwards in the Court of appeal. When a party gives in evidence a certified copy, without proving the circumstances entitling him to give secondary evidence, objection must be taken at the time of admission and such objection will not be allowed at a later stage.” 8. I also discussed this aspect in detail in Taqdirunnisa v. A.D.J., 2006 (2) ARC 444 and referred to various authorities of different High Courts. 9. Lower appellate Court in this regard also placed reliance upon an authority of this Court in Kiran Singh v. Balvir Singh, 1994 (1) CCC 115 : 1993 AWC 1238. 10. As the certified copies of the sale-deed of 1913 and 1943 were quite admissible in evidence and had rightly been taken on record and as the said sale-deeds completely demolished the case of the plaintiffs hence I do not find any error in the judgment passed by the lower appellate Court. No question of law has wrongly been decided. Second Appeal is therefore dismissed under Order XLI Rule 11, C.P.C. ———————