JUDGMENT Hon’ble Manoj Misra, J.—I have heard Sri Ashish Srivastava alongwith Sri Ravi Prakash, learned counsels for the appellant and Sri H.N. Pandey, learned counsel for the respondent and have perused the record. 2. This is a defendant’s appeal against the judgment and decree dated 17.12.1984 passed by the Special Judge/Additional District Judge, Aligarh in Civil Appeal No. 91 of 1982 arising out of Suit No. 55 of 1980 between Smt. Phoolwati (plaintiff) and Sri Mahavir and another (defendants). 3. The Original Suit No. 55 of 1980 was instituted by Phoolwati Devi (the plaintiff-respondent herein), who is now represented through her heir, for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in her peaceful possession over Bhumidhari Plot Nos. 44A @ 19 Biswa; 26 @ 15 Biswa, 3 Biswansi; and 44-B @ 3 Bigha, 4 Biswa that is, three plots having a total area of 4 Bigha, 12 Biswa, 3 Biswansi situated at village Nagla Nattha, Pargana Chandaus, Tehsil Khair, District Aligarh. In short the plaint case was that the plaintiff was bhumidhar in possession of the disputed land on the basis of a sale-deed dated 23.3.1974, which was executed by the 1st Additional Civil Judge, Aligarh in execution of a decree for specific performance passed in Original Suit No. 23 of 1971. It was claimed that the defendants, without right, title or interest, were seeking to dispossess her as well as to cut away her standing crop, hence, she was constrained to institute the suit. During the pendency of the suit, by way of amendment, she sought for damages to the tune of Rs. 3000/- for the loss to the standing crop caused by the defendants. 4. The defendants contested the suit by claiming that the sale-deed dated 23.3.1974 was a void and ineffective instrument, which conferred no right, title or interest on the plaintiff. It was claimed that the father of the defendants was bhumidhar of the land in suit and the bhumidhari rights were inherited by the defendants. It was claimed that though the Court had executed the sale-deed in execution of the decree for specific performance against the father of the defendants, but the sale-deed dated 23.3.1974 was void being hit by Section 157-A of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. It was claimed that the defendants were members of scheduled caste whereas the plaintiff was not. It was claimed that though the Court had executed the sale-deed in execution of the decree for specific performance against the father of the defendants, but the sale-deed dated 23.3.1974 was void being hit by Section 157-A of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. It was claimed that the defendants were members of scheduled caste whereas the plaintiff was not. Accordingly, prior permission for sale was required under Section 157-A, which was not obtained. It was further claimed that the defendants continued to remain in possession even after the execution of the sale-deed and that they were never dispossessed. The defendants also claimed that the sale-deed dated 23.3.1974 was cancelled by a decree dated 10.2.1978 passed in Original Suit No. 364 of 1977, which was instituted by the defendants. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed as many as five issues, which are as follows : (a) Whether the sale-deed dated 23.3.1974 is barred by Section 157-A of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R., Act. If so, its effect? (b) Whether the plaintiff is the owner in possession? (c) Whether the plaintiff has a right to maintain the suit after cancellation of the sale-deed? (d) To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled to? (e) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to Rs. 3,000/- as damages for loss of crop? 6. The trial Court, on issue No. 1, recorded a finding that the bar under Section 157-A of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R., Act applies only on voluntary sale and it did not apply to a sale conducted through Court. While holding as above, the trial Court placed reliance on judgment of this Court in the case of Ram Saran v. 1st Additional District Judge, Rampur, 1981 ALJ 794. On issue No. 3, the trial Court held that the ex parte decree in Original Suit No. 364 of 1977 was set aside, as evidenced by Exhibit No. 6, therefore, the plaintiff had a right to maintain the suit. On issue No. 2, the trial Court, relying upon Exhibit Nos. 1 and 2, came to the conclusion that the Additional Civil Judge had executed the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff, in execution of the decree passed in Original Suit No. 23 of 1971. On issue No. 2, the trial Court, relying upon Exhibit Nos. 1 and 2, came to the conclusion that the Additional Civil Judge had executed the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff, in execution of the decree passed in Original Suit No. 23 of 1971. From Exhibit No. 3 (Khasra) and from Exhibit No. 4 (Khatauni) the trial Court concluded that the name of the plaintiff was recorded in the revenue records pursuant to the execution of the sale-deed. Thereafter, by relying on the oral as well as documentary evidence, the trial Court found the plaintiff to be owner in possession of the land in suit and on the findings so recorded it decreed the suit for permanent injunction, although the relief for damages, for loss of crops, was denied. 7. The defendants, aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court, filed Civil Appeal No. 91 of 1982, which was dismissed by the Special Judge /Additional District Judge, Aligarh vide his judgment and decree dated 17.12.1984. The appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial Court and adopted the reasoning of the trial Court. 8. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the Courts below, the present second appeal has been filed by the defendant-appellants. This appeal was admitted, and the following substantial question of law was framed for hearing of the appeal : “Whether the bar under Section 157-A of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act 1 of 1951 applies to the execution of a sale-deed by a Court in compliance of a decree for specific performance of an agreement of sale? If so, its effect.” 9. The counsel for the appellant submitted that the undisputed facts of the case are that the predecessor-in-interest of the defendant-appellants was a member of the scheduled caste whereas the plaintiff respondent was not a member of scheduled caste. On 26.12.1969 the predecessor in interest of the defendant-appellants entered into an agreement to sell the land in question with the plaintiff-respondent. The plaintiff-respondent had instituted Suit No. 23 of 1971 for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 26.12.1969, which was decreed on 14.12.1972. In execution of the decree, the Court executed sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff-respondent on 23.3.1974 without obtaining prior permission of the Collector. The plaintiff-respondent had instituted Suit No. 23 of 1971 for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 26.12.1969, which was decreed on 14.12.1972. In execution of the decree, the Court executed sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff-respondent on 23.3.1974 without obtaining prior permission of the Collector. Seeking cancellation of the sale-deed dated 23.3.1974 an original suit No. 364 of 1977 was instituted by the defendant-appellants, which was decreed ex parte on 10.2.1978. Later, on an application for setting aside the ex parte decree, on 5.1.1981, the ex parte decree was set aside, and since then proceedings of suit No. 364 of 1977 are lying stayed. 10. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that Section 157-A of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R., Act places a restriction to the effect that no bhumidhar belonging to a Scheduled Caste shall have a right to transfer any land by way of sale, gift, mortgage or lease to a person not belonging to a Scheduled Caste, except with the previous approval of the Collector. It was submitted that when a sale-deed is executed by Court, pursuant to a decree for specific performance, it is on behalf of judgment-debtor, therefore, any statutory bar that is applicable to a judgment-debtor would be equally applicable on the Court and, as such, the sale-deed executed by the Court would be hit by the provisions of Section 157-A of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act and, as such, would be void. In support of his contention, reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in the case of Dal Chand v. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Aligarh, 1981 RD 29. The relevant portion, on which reliance was placed, is being reproduced below : “From the above discussion, it emerged that the consensus of judicial opinion is that a decree for specific performance merely declares the right of the plaintiff vis-a-vis the agreement of sale and does not by itself create title in the plaintiff. In order to obtain title to the property the Court has further to get the sale-deed executed in execution of the decree either from the judgment-debtor himself and if he fails to do so then to execute the sale-deed itself as a statutory agent of the judgment-debtor. It is only when a sale-deed has been executed that the title to the property passes to the decree-holder. It is only when a sale-deed has been executed that the title to the property passes to the decree-holder. It also emerges from the above discussion that if there was any statutory bar in execution of the sale-deed by the judgment-debtor then the said bar would be equally applicable against the Court and the petitioner executing the sale-deed. Therefore it will have to be seen that the statutory bar is removed either by any of the parties taking steps or the Court itself doing it.” 11. Relying on the aforesaid decision, the counsel for the appellant submitted that since the sale-deed was void, there was no transfer of interest in the property, hence, the defendants, who were the successor-in-interest of the original bhumidhar, continued to remain owners and, as such, no injunction could be granted against a true owner. 12. Per contra, the counsel for the respondent submitted that the bar under Section 157-A of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act would not be applicable to a sale conducted by the Court pursuant to a decree for specific performance of a contract, as it applies only to voluntary sale by act of parties. He has placed reliance on two Single Judge decisions of this Court, namely, Ram Saran v. Ist Additional District Judge, Rampur (supra) and Harmal v. Special/A.D.J, Saharanpur, 1993 AWC 1. He further contended that Section 157-A of the U.P.Z.A.& L.R., Act was inserted with effect from 3.6.1981, whereas, the sale-deed was executed on 23.3.1974. Therefore, he submits, the substantial question framed for adjudication is purely of academic interest and its answer either way would not determine the rights of the parties to the suit. 13. Before considering the respective merit of the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, it would be useful to trace out the legislative history of the provision of Section 157-A of the U.P.Z.A.& L.R, Act. Section 157-A of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act was introduced in the Statute Book for the first time by U.P. Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1969 (UP Act No. IV of 1969), which was published in the U.P. Gazette, Extraordinary, dated 1st September, 1969. Section 157-A of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act was introduced in the Statute Book for the first time by U.P. Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1969 (UP Act No. IV of 1969), which was published in the U.P. Gazette, Extraordinary, dated 1st September, 1969. The prefatory note to the Bill, which was ultimately enacted as U.P. Act No. IV of 1969, with regard to Clauses 9 to 11 reads as under (sourced from 1969 LLT Part IV pages 19 to 24) : “Clauses 9 to 11 of the Bill (corresponding to Sections 5 to 7 of the U.P. Ordinance No. III of 1969), make provision for binding transfer by way of sale, gift, mortgage or lease or bequest of any land by a person belonging to Scheduled Tribe to a person not belonging to any such Tribe, without obtaining the previous approval of the Collector for the same. This provision has been considered necessary for their protection from exploitation.” Section 9 of U.P. Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1969, by which Section 157-A was inserted in U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951, reads as follows (sourced from 1969 LLT Part IV pages 19 to 24) : “9. Insertion of new Section 157-A.—After Section 157 of the principal Act, the ollowing section shall be inserted, namely : “157-A. Restrictions on transfer of land by members of Scheduled Tribes.—(1) Without prejudice to the restrictions contained in Sections 153 to 157, no bhumidhar, sirdar, or asami belonging to a Scheduled Tribe shall have the right to transfer by way of sale, gift, mortgage or lease any land to a person not belonging to a Scheduled Tribe except with the previous approval of the Collector. (2) On an application being given in that behalf in the prescribed manner, the Collector shall make such inquiries as may be prescribed. Explanation.—In this Chapter, the expression “Scheduled Tribe,” means a Scheduled Tribe specified in an order made by President under clause (1) of Article 342 of the Constitution.” Later, by U.P. Land Laws (Amendment), Act, 1974 (U.P. Act No. 34 of 1974), which was published in U.P. Gazette, Extraordinary dated 07th December, 1974, Section 157-A was further amended by Section 7 thereof. Section 7 of U.P. Act No. 34 of 1974 reads as under (sourced from 1975 LLT Part IV pages 1 to 4) : “Section7. Section 7 of U.P. Act No. 34 of 1974 reads as under (sourced from 1975 LLT Part IV pages 1 to 4) : “Section7. Amendment of Section 157-A.—In Section 157-A of the principal Act,— (i) in the marginal heading, for the words “Scheduled Tribes”, the words “Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes” shall be substituted; (ii) in sub-section (1), for the words “Scheduled Tribe”, wherever occurring, the words “Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe” shall be substituted; (iii) after sub-section (1), the following proviso thereto shall be inserted, namely: “Provided that a bhumidhar, sirdar or asami belonging to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe may, without such approval, transfer by way of mortgage without possession, his interest in any holding as security for a loan taken by way of financial assistance for agricultural purposes (as defined in Uttar Pradesh Agricultural Credit Act, 1973) from the State Government by way of Taqavi, or form a co-operative land development bank, or from the State Bank of India or from any other bank which is a Scheduled Bank within the meaning of clause (e) of Section 2 of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, or from the U.P. State Agro-Industrial Corporation Limited.” (iv) for the Explanation thereto, the following Explanation shall be substituted, namely: “Explanation.—In this Chapter, the expressions “Scheduled Castes” and “Scheduled Tribes” respectively mean the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes specified in relation to Uttar Pradesh under Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution.” Thereafter by U.P. Act No. 8 of 1977, which was published in the U.P. Gazette Extraordinary dated 24th July, 1977, and came into force with effect from January 28, 1977, Section 157-A was further amended by Section 15 thereof, which reads as under (sourced from 1977 LLT Part IV page 227 to 230) : “15. Amendment of Section 157-A.—In Section 157-A of the principal Act,— (a) the word “sirdar” where it occurs for the first time shall be omitted. (b) in the proviso, for the words “bhumidhar, sirdar or asami” the words “bhumidhar with transferable rights or asami” shall be substituted. Amendment of Section 157-A.—In Section 157-A of the principal Act,— (a) the word “sirdar” where it occurs for the first time shall be omitted. (b) in the proviso, for the words “bhumidhar, sirdar or asami” the words “bhumidhar with transferable rights or asami” shall be substituted. Finally, by U.P. Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1982, (U.P. Act No. 20 of 1982), which was published in U.P. Gazette Extraordinary dated 20th August, 1982, Section 157-A was substituted and Sections 157-B and 157-C were inserted by Sections 3 and 4 thereof, with effect from 3.6.1981, which reads as under (sourced from 1982 LLT Part IV pages 196 to 200) : “3. Substitution of Section 157-A.—For Section 157-A of the principal Act, the following section shall be substituted, namely : “157-A. Restrictions on transfer of land by members of Scheduled Castes.— (1) Without prejudice to the restrictions contained in Sections 153 to 157, no bhumidhar or asami belonging to a Scheduled Caste shall have the right to transfer any land by way of sale, gift, mortgage or lease to a person not belonging to a Scheduled Caste, except with the previous approval of the Collector: “Provided that no such approval shall be given by the Collector in case where the land held in Uttar Pradesh by the transferor on the date of application under this section is less than 1.26 hectares or where the area of land so held in Uttar Pradesh by the transferor on the said date is after such transfer, likely to be reduced to less than 1.26 hectares. (2) The Collector shall, on an application made in that behalf in the prescribed manner, make such inquiry as may be prescribed.” 4. Insertions—Sections 157-B and 157-C.—After Section 157-A of the principal Act, the following sections shall be inserted, namely: “157-B. Restrictions on transfer of land by members of Scheduled Tribe.—(1) Without prejudice to the restrictions contained in Sections 153 to 157, no bhumidhar or asami belonging to a Scheduled Tribe shall have the right to transfer any land by way of sale, gift, mortgage or lease to a person not belonging to a Scheduled Tribe. 157-C. Mortgage of holdings by members of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in certain circumstances.—Notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 157-A and 157-B, a bhumidhar or asami belonging to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe may mortgage without possession his holding or part thereof in the circumstances specified in sub-section (3) of Section 152. “Explanation.—In this Chapter, the expressions “Scheduled Castes” and “Scheduled Tribes” shall mean respectively the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes specified in relation to Uttar Pradesh under Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution.” 14. From the legislative history of Section 157-A of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R., Act, as traced out above, it becomes clear that in the year 1969 the restriction under Section 157-A applied only to members of “Scheduled Tribe”. The restriction on members of “Scheduled Caste” became applicable on publication of U.P. Land Laws (Amendment), Act, 1974, which was published in the Official Gazette on 07th December, 1974. Thereafter, with effect from 3.6.1981, Section 157-A was substituted so much so that Section 157-A related only to the members of Scheduled Caste whereas new Sections 157-B and 157-C were inserted. Section 157-B was with respect to restriction on transfer of land by members of Scheduled Tribe. 15. After having noticed the legislative history of Section 157-A of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, a question that now arises for consideration is whether the provisions of Section 157-A, including its amendments, would be retrospective so as to annul transactions that have taken place prior to its insertion/substitution/amendment in the Statute Book. 16. Section 5 of the U.P. General Clauses Act, 1904 provides that where any United Provinces Act is not expressed to come into operation on a particular day, then in the case of Uttar Pradesh Act made after the commencement of the Constitution it shall come into operation on the day on which the assent thereto of the Governor or the President, as the case may require, is first published in the Official Gazette. It further provides that unless the contrary is expressed, an Uttar Pradesh Act shall be construed as coming into operation immediately on the expiration of the day preceding its commencement. 17. In the instant case, I find that there was no restriction on transfers by a member of Scheduled Caste till the amendment of Section 157-A brought about by U.P. Act No. 34 of 1974. 17. In the instant case, I find that there was no restriction on transfers by a member of Scheduled Caste till the amendment of Section 157-A brought about by U.P. Act No. 34 of 1974. The U.P. Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1974 (U.P. Act No. 34 of 1974) does not provide for any particular day for its commencement. Accordingly, the U.P. Act No. 34 of 1974 would be deemed to have come into operation on the day that it was published in the Official Gazette. From 1975 LLT Part IV page 1, it appears that the said Act was published in U.P. Gazette, Extraordinary, on 07th December, 1974. Therefore the U.P. Act No. 34 of 1974 came into operation with effect from 07th December, 1974. Accordingly, prior to 07th December, 1974, Section 157-A did not have the words “Scheduled Caste” and it related to members of “Scheduled Tribe” only. 18. It is cardinal principle of construction that every Statute is prima facie prospective unless it is especially or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. Unless there are words in the Statute sufficient to show the intention of the Legislature to affect existing rights, it is deemed to be prospective only-’nova constitutio, futuris formam imponere debet, non praeteritis’ (A new law ought to regulate what is to follow, not the past). 19. The Apex Court in the case of Dy. Collector and another v. S. Venkata Ramanaiah and another, (1995) 6 SCC 545 , was required to decide whether A. P. Scheduled Areas Land Transfer (Amendment) Regulation, 1959 (Regulation 1 of 1959) and the subsequent Regulation No. 2 of 1963 and Regulation No. 1 of 1970 have retrospective effect and can affect transfers made prior to the coming into force of the said Regulations. While holding that the provisions were not retrospective, the Apex Court, in paragraph Nos. 23 and 24 of the report, observed as follows : “23.........It is obvious that transactions which have taken place years back prior to the very parent Regulation No. I of 1959 seeing the light of the day, and which had created vested rights in favour of the transferees could not be adversely affected by the sweep of Section 3(1). 23 and 24 of the report, observed as follows : “23.........It is obvious that transactions which have taken place years back prior to the very parent Regulation No. I of 1959 seeing the light of the day, and which had created vested rights in favour of the transferees could not be adversely affected by the sweep of Section 3(1). It cannot be said to have any implied retrospective effect which would nullify and confiscate pre-existing vested rights in favour of the concerned transferees, transfers in whose favour had become final and binding and were not hit by the then existing provisions of any nullifying statutes. In this connection we may usefully refer to Francis Bennion’s Statutory Interpretation, Second Edition at page 214 wherein the learned author, in Section 97, deals with retrospective operation of Acts. The learned author has commented on this aspect as under: “The essential idea of a legal system is that current law should govern current activities. Elsewhere in this work a particular Act is likened to a floodlight switched on or off, and the general body of law to the circumambient air. Clumsy though these images are, they show the inappropriateness of retrospective laws. If we do something today, we feel that the law applying to it should be the law in force today, not tomorrow’s backward adjustment of it. Such, we believe, is the nature of law. Dislike of ex post facto law is enshrined in the United States Constitution and in the constitutions of many American states, which forbid it. The true principle is that lex prospicit non respicit (law looks forward not back). As Willes J said, retrospective legislation is `contrary to the general principle that legislation by which the conduct of mankind is to be regulated ought, when introduced for the first time, to deal with future acts, and ought not to change the character of past transactions carried on upon the faith of the then existing law.’ Retrospectivity is artificial, deeming a thing to be what it was not. Artificiality and make-believe are generally repugnant to law as the servant of human welfare. So it follows that the Courts apply the general presumption that an enactment is not intended to have retrospective effect. As always, the power of Parliament to produce such an effect where it wishes to do so is nevertheless undoubted. Artificiality and make-believe are generally repugnant to law as the servant of human welfare. So it follows that the Courts apply the general presumption that an enactment is not intended to have retrospective effect. As always, the power of Parliament to produce such an effect where it wishes to do so is nevertheless undoubted. The general presumption, which therefore applies only unless the contrary intention appears, is stated in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes in the following emphatic terms: ‘It is a fundamental rule of English law that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication.’ Maxwell’s statement has received frequent judicial approval. It is however too dogmatically framed, and describes as a rule what (for reasons stated in Code 180) is really no more than a presumption which, in the instant case, may be outweighed by other factors. Where, on a weighing of the factors, it seems that some retrospective effect was intended, the general presumption against retrospectivity indicates that this should be kept to as narrow a compass as will accord with the legislative intention.” 24. Mr. Bobde, learned counsel appearing for the respondents as amicus curiaec at our request, invited our attention to a decision of this Court in the case of R. Rajagopal Reddy (Dead) by LRs. and others v. Padmini Chandrasekharan (Dead) by LRs., 1995 (2) SCC 630 , wherein one of us (Majmudar, J.) speaking for a Three Judge Bench on the question of retrospective effect of a statutory provision observed as under : (SCC p. 645, paras 14 and 15) “... Even otherwise, it is now well-settled that where a statutory provision which is not expressly made retrospective by the legislature seeks to affect vested rights and corresponding obligations of parties, such provision cannot be said to have any retrospective effect by necessary implication. In Maxwell on the Interpretatin of Statutes, 12th Edn. (1969), the learned author has made the following observations based on various decisions of different Courts, specially in Re: Athlumney, (1898)2 Q.B. at pp. In Maxwell on the Interpretatin of Statutes, 12th Edn. (1969), the learned author has made the following observations based on various decisions of different Courts, specially in Re: Athlumney, (1898)2 Q.B. at pp. 551, 552 : ‘Perhaps no rule of construction is more firmly established than this-that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matters of procedure, unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. If the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only.’ The rule has, in fact, two aspects, for it, ‘involves another and subordinate rule, to the effect that a statute is not to be construed so as to have a greater retrospective operation than its language renders necessary.” In the case of Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry, AIR 1937 SC 540 at p.553, para 25) Chief Justice S.R. Das speaking for this Court has made the following pertinent observations in this connection : ‘The golden rule of construction is that, in the absence of anything in the enactment to show that it is to have retrospective operation, it cannot be so construed as to have the effect of altering the law applicable to a claim in litigation at the time when the Act was passed.’ Therefore, we agree with the submission of Mr Bobde, learned counsel for respondents, that the provisions of Section 3(1) of the Regulation are purely prospective in nature and do not affect past transactions of transfers effected between tribals and non-tribals or between non-tribals and non-tribals themselves in the Agency Tracts at a time when neither Regulation I of 1959 nor Regulation II of 1963 or Regulation I of 1970 was in force. Such past transactions remained untouched by the sweep of the aforesaid subsequently enacted Regulations.” 20. The principles enunciated above, were reiterated by a Constitution Bench decision of the Apex Court in the case of Shyam Sunder and others v. Ram Kumar and another, (2001) 8 SCC 24 . 21. Such past transactions remained untouched by the sweep of the aforesaid subsequently enacted Regulations.” 20. The principles enunciated above, were reiterated by a Constitution Bench decision of the Apex Court in the case of Shyam Sunder and others v. Ram Kumar and another, (2001) 8 SCC 24 . 21. Applying the aforesaid principles to assess whether the provisions of Section 157-A of the UPZA & LR Act affect past completed transfers, I do not find any provision that may suggest that Section 157-A of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act including its amendments would affect past completed transfers. Section 157-A, which was substituted by U.P. Act No. 20 of 1982, was made effective from 3.6.1981 whereas all the other previous amendments, except that was made by UP Act No. 8 of 1977, were prospective i.e. operative from the date of their publication in the official gazette. So far as the amendment brought by UP Act No. 8 of 1977 is concerned that was made operative with effect from 28.1.1977. 22. Coming to the facts of the present case, it is undisputed that the sale-deed was executed by the Court on 23.3.1974 pursuant to a decree passed in a suit for specific performance. It is also undisputed that the predecessor-in-interest of the defendant-appellants was not a member of Scheduled Tribe, but was a member of Scheduled Caste, on whom there was no restriction in the statute book for effecting transfer of land. Accordingly, on the date, when the sale-deed dated 23.3.1974 was executed by the Court, there being no restriction on transfer by a member of a Scheduled Caste, there could be no such restriction on the Court for executing sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff pursuant to a decree for specific performance. Thus, even if it is assumed that the statutory bar applies to a Court that executes a sale-deed pursuant to a decree for specific performance, that bar did not apply to the Court that executed sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff inasmuch as on 23.3.1974, that is, when the sale-deed was executed, there was no restriction in the statute book on transfer by a member of a Scheduled Caste. 23. 23. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the substantial question of law, as framed, for hearing of this appeal, is purely academic in nature and is not required to be decided for determining the rights of the parties to the suit. The judgment relied upon by the counsel for the appellant does not go to show that the provisions of Section 157-A of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R., Act would affect transfers carried out before insertion of the statutory bar. 24. In the instant appeal there is no challenge to the finding recorded by both the Courts below that the plaintiff is in possession of the land in suit and that her name is recorded in the revenue records. In this view of the matter, the plaintiff-respondent being owner in possession is entitled to decree of her suit for permanent prohibitory injunction as against the defendant-appellants. For the reasons noted above, I’m of the considered view that the Courts below were legally justified in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff and that the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below does not suffer from any legal infirmity. The appeal, therefore, lacks merit and is hereby dismissed with costs. ——————