JUDGMENT Mr. Hemant Gupta, J.: - Challenge in the present appeal under Clause X of the Letters Patent is to an order passed by learned Single Judge of this Court on 07.03.2011, whereby the writ petition was allowed and the deposit made by the writ petitioner was directed to be accepted with liberty to recalculate the amount due and payable by the respondent. 2. The respondent (hereinafter referred to as ‘allottee’) was allotted commercial site i.e. SCO No.17, Sector 20-D, Chandigarh measuring 153.33 square yards in an open auction on 99 years lease hold basis on 10.03.1989. The total premium was Rs.10,91,000/-. The allotment letter was issued on payment of 25% of the premium amount and the balance 75% of the premium amount was payable along with interest at the rate of 7% in three equal annual installments apart from the fact that the allottee was to pay ground rent as well. The allottee failed to pay even the first installment for which a show cause notice dated 06.09.1990 (Annexure P-2) was issued. In pursuance of such notice, the allottee made a request on 19.10.1990 (Annexure P-3) that it is difficult for him to deposit such a huge amount and he be granted six months’ time to deposit the same. Such request was allowed enabling him to deposit the amount by 31.03.1991. Since the allottee failed to make the deposit, another show cause notice dated 09.04.1991 was served upon him to show cause as to why the lease of the site may not be cancelled. Reply to the said notice was submitted by Mr. S.K.Nanda, IAS, as General Power of Attorney of the allottee on 23.04.1991 requesting for extension of one year’s time to make the payment. However, the Assistant Estate Officer exercising the powers of the Estate Officer passed an order on 11.07.1991 (Annexure P-7) for cancellation of lease and forfeiture of 10% of the premium amount. The appeal against the said order was accepted by the learned Chief Administrator on 04.05.1992 subject to the condition that the outstanding amount be paid within six months from the date of dispatch of the order. It was on 18.11.1992, the allottee made a request for re-scheduling of the payment of second and third installment for the reason that he has limited source of income from agriculture. The allottee also sought six months time to make payments of second and third installments. It was on 18.11.1992, the allottee made a request for re-scheduling of the payment of second and third installment for the reason that he has limited source of income from agriculture. The allottee also sought six months time to make payments of second and third installments. The said request was treated as a revision by the learned Adviser. The Adviser accepted the prayer for re-scheduling and permitted the allottee to deposit the entire outstanding amount in two monthly installments. The operative part of the order dated 25.11.1992 reads as under: “…Consequently, I set aside the impugned order, restore the site to the petitioner subject to the condition that the petitioner shall deposit the entire outstanding amount in two monthly installments on or before 30.03.1993 with a forfeiture of 5% already reduced by the Chief Administrator vide his order dated 14th May, 1992 failing which the impugned order of the Estate Officer shall come into operation. As the prayer is made for re-scheduling the installments in respect of SCO No.16 & 17, Sector 20, Chandigarh, but appeal in respect of SCO No.16, Sector 20 is still pending before the Chief Administrator, accordingly, the present revision is decided only in respect of SCO No.17, Sector 20 and no relief can be given in respect of SCO No.16, Sector 20-D, Chandigarh.” 3. An application was moved by the allottee on 26.03.1993 for revision/modification of the order dated 25.11.1992 that he be granted three months time to pay the outstanding dues. Another application was filed to bring additional facts on record on 04.06.1993. The said applications were declined by the then Adviser on 07.07.1993 with the following observation: “4. The counsel for the petitioner argued that although the outstanding payment of Rs.3,77,975/- was to be made on 24.11.1992 yet the petitioner received a notice for payment of Rs.13,75,138/- which presumably includes the payment of 2nd and 3rd installment along with interest etc. This Hon’ble Court on 25.11.1992 was pleased to order for depositing the entire outstanding amount in two monthly installments on or before 30.03.1993. The petitioner could not arrange and manage to pay the entire outstanding amount before 30.03.1993 due to his old age, serious illness and other reasons and as such could not pay the outstanding amount. 5. The representation of the present petitioner is a review petition which is not maintainable before this Court and be dismissed as such. 6. The petitioner could not arrange and manage to pay the entire outstanding amount before 30.03.1993 due to his old age, serious illness and other reasons and as such could not pay the outstanding amount. 5. The representation of the present petitioner is a review petition which is not maintainable before this Court and be dismissed as such. 6. After hearing the parties and going through the record of the Estate Officer, I do find that ample opportunity has already been given by the Chief Administrator as well as by this Court to pay the outstanding amount, but the petitioner has failed to deposit the same. Besides this, the present petition is a review petition which is not maintainable before the undersigned especially when power to review is a creature of statute and it cannot be exercises unless statute so provides. Consequently, the present petition is dismissed as such being not maintainable.” 4. It is, thereafter, another petition was filed for revision/modification of the order dated 25.11.1992 (Annexure P-18) and for extension of time for payment of outstanding dues. The allottee made the following prayer: “Hence the Honourable Court is requested to modify its own orders dated 25.11.1992 and 07.07.1993 and restore the lease rights of SCO 17, Sector 20 to the petitioner. The Estate Officer, Chandigarh Administrator may also be directed to accept the two drafts returned by them. (Both the drafts TL/A 427214 and 427215 dated 05.05.1993 amounting to Rs.3,30,880/- and 3,50,512/-) (Total Rs.6,81,392/- are attached herewith in this application). However, in case of discrepancy, if any, in the amount calculated by the Estate Officer, Chandigarh Administration and the petitioner the difference in the amount will be deposited by the petitioner in the treasury within one month of the passing of the order of the Honourable Court or within any period to be stipulated by the Honourable Court. The delay of one months and 7 days for depositing the amount in the Treasury may kindly be condoned.” 5. The allottee had remitted amount due towards second and third installments vide demand draft dated 05.05.1993. The said drafts were returned on 06.07.1993 for the reason that the lease of the site stands cancelled. The delay of one months and 7 days for depositing the amount in the Treasury may kindly be condoned.” 5. The allottee had remitted amount due towards second and third installments vide demand draft dated 05.05.1993. The said drafts were returned on 06.07.1993 for the reason that the lease of the site stands cancelled. It is, thereafter, the learned Adviser dismissed the application on 21.12.1994, in the presence of his daughter-in-law namely Mrs.Umesh Nanda, IAS representing the allottee, for the reason that there is no power of review and, therefore, such an application is not maintainable. It was held to the following effect: “…Thus, according to all these authorities, judicial/quasi-judicial authorities can only review their earlier orders, if any, statute permits them to do so. In the case in hand, as discussed above, under the Capital of Punjab (Development & Regulation) Act, 1952 no right has been given to the defeated party to get the earlier orders passed by this Court reviewed. If that be so then such a party cannot maintain such an application in this Court. Therefore, after following these authorities, it is held that this review application is not maintainable. Accordingly, the same is dismissed.” 6. It is, thereafter, the allottee filed a writ petition before this Court, which has been allowed by the learned Single Judge for the reason that in the absence of any contrary indication, jurisdiction to grant extension of time is vested with the Authority. The learned Single Judge relying upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surinder Singh Vs. Central Government & others (1986) 4 SCC 667 and Chinnamarkathian @ Muthu Gounder & another Vs. Ayyavoo @ Periana Gounder & others (1982) 1 SCC 159 held to the following effect: “…As held in these cases, jurisdiction to grant time would include in absence of any contrary indication, jurisdiction to grant extension of time. No specific provision has been pointed out before me to urge that there is specific bar for granting extension of time. The Advisor had granted time to the petitioner for depositing the installments and, thus, it is clear that he had a jurisdiction to do so. What the petitioner had pleaded, was extension of time to deposit installment, which was declined on the ground that Advisor could not review this order. That view apparently may not be a correct view of law. What the petitioner had pleaded, was extension of time to deposit installment, which was declined on the ground that Advisor could not review this order. That view apparently may not be a correct view of law. Principle of equity would also come into play. Certain circumstances were taken into consideration for fixing a length of time. The Court or authority, thus, would retain to itself the jurisdiction to reexamine the alteration or modification of the circumstances, which may necessitate extension of time. Such jurisdiction certainly the Courts and authorities would enjoy in the absence of any negative provision.” 7. Before this Court, learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently argued that the right of appeal and revision is granted to an allottee in terms of the Statute i.e. the Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952. Such Statutory Authority derives its powers in terms of the statutory provisions and has no inherent jurisdiction either to review the order passed or under the garb of review to extend the time to perform an act contemplated by the Authority at one stage. It is contended that power to extend time is vested with the Civil Court in terms of Section 148 of the Civil Procedure Code (for short ‘the Code’). There is no analogous power conferred on the Statutory Authorities under the Act, therefore, the Authority could not extend time and this Court also could not issue a direction to set aside the order passed by the Statutory Authority. Reliance is placed upon Patel Narshi Thakershi Vs. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji (1971) 3 SCC 844 , M.D. Army Welfare Housing Organization Vs. Sumangal Services (P) Ltd. (2004) 9 SCC 619 & Kalabharati Advertising Vs. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania [2011(3) Law Herald (SC) 2138] : (2010) 9 SCC 437. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the allottee referred to the judgments, which were pressed before the learned Single Judge. 9. In Surinder Singh’s case (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the allottee, the order under challenge was an order passed by the Central Government granting extension of time to the appellant to deposit purchase price in terms of Section 33 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation Compensation) Act, 1954. 9. In Surinder Singh’s case (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the allottee, the order under challenge was an order passed by the Central Government granting extension of time to the appellant to deposit purchase price in terms of Section 33 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation Compensation) Act, 1954. Reliance on the said judgment is wholly misplaced, as in the aforesaid case, a delegate of the Central Government in terms of Section 33 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation Compensation) Act, 1954 exercised revisional jurisdiction and permitted the deposit of purchase price in its order dated 06.02.1970 while setting aside the order passed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner on 13.08.1969. Such delegate of the Central Government permitted extension of time till 28.02.1970. It was the said order, which was challenged initially before this Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has found that in terms of the order dated 06.02.1970, the deposit could be made up to 28.02.1970, but the deposit could not be made on the said date, as there was rush when the appellant went to the Bank, therefore, time for deposit was extended. The observation that extension of time did not amount to review of the order dated 06.02.1970 is in the context of the power exercised by a delegate of the Central Government under Section 33 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation Compensation) Act, 1954. Such provision is exhaustive, which empowers the Central Government to call for the records of any proceeding under this Act and pass such order in relation thereto as in its opinion the circumstances of the case require and as is not inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in this Act or the rules made there under. The jurisdiction under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation Compensation) Act, 1954 is much wider than the limited jurisdiction conferred on the Authority under the Act. However, the revisional power under the Act under Section 10(4) of the Act is restricted which only empowers the Authority to confirm, alter or rescind the decision of the Chief Administrator. The relevant provision reads as under: “10. However, the revisional power under the Act under Section 10(4) of the Act is restricted which only empowers the Authority to confirm, alter or rescind the decision of the Chief Administrator. The relevant provision reads as under: “10. Appeals and revision: xx xx xx (4) Where a person is aggrieved by any order of the Chief Administrator, deciding a case under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3), he may, within thirty days of the date of communication to him of such decision, make an application in writing to the Central Government for revision against the said decision; and the Central Government may confirm, alter or rescind the decision of the Chief Administrator.” 10. In Chinnamarkathian @ Muthu Gounder’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court found that granting of time for payment of arrears of rent and determining the length of time is a discretion vested in the Revenue Divisional Officer to be exercised judiciously in terms of Section 3 of the Madras (now Tamil Nadu) Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955. The Court proceeded to determine the question on the assumption that proceedings are judicial. The Court has relied upon Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was, on that basis, the appeals were allowed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. Before we consider the judgments referred to by the learned counsel for the appellants, we need to emphasize that the allottee is a purchaser of a commercial property in an open auction. Once he has given bid to purchase commercial property in public auction, the allottee is presumed to have means and intention to enjoy the possession of the same. He has also by his bid excluded the rest of the bidders from entering upon the premises say even by a single rupee and sought to deny timely payments to the public exchequer and engaged the appellant in relentless litigation causing waste of public time and money. Therefore, the assertions made ingratiatingly time and again that he has no source of income other than from meager agriculture pursuits and is an old person and therefore could not pay on time are alien to examine the claim of the allottee for the extension of time. The commercial interest has to be weighed keeping in view the larger pubic interest and that for delay and default of an allottee, no benefit accrues or ought to be granted to an allottee. 12. The commercial interest has to be weighed keeping in view the larger pubic interest and that for delay and default of an allottee, no benefit accrues or ought to be granted to an allottee. 12. The equitable considerations for extension of time of cancellation of lease or resumption of a residential plot would be materially different from cancellation of a lease of a commercial property. The residence is a basic necessity fundamental to decent human existence, whereas commercial property is purchased for profit motive either to make a living out of it or to exploit the same commercially by renting out the same. The allottee is a purchaser of a commercial property in an open auction knowing fully well that the balance premium amount has to be paid in three annual installments. Having purchased the commercial property in an open auction, then to raise a plea of lack of insufficient funds is wholly unjustified and untenable. If the allottee has no funds, he should not have ventured into the arena of purchase of commercial property. The terms of allotment have to be strictly adhered to as it is a commercial motive, which prompted the allottee to participate in an open auction. Therefore, he is bound to honour such commercial commitments in terms of the allotment letter. 13. In the present case, the allottee failed to deposit even the first installment, which led to cancellation of lease in July 1991. By that time, the second installment had fallen due on 12.02.1991. During the pendency of appeal before the Chief Administrator, the third installment has also fallen due on 12.02.1992. But the allottee failed to deposit any of the installments. The site was restored on the condition that the outstanding payment, which is inclusive of the second and third installments, be made within six months. 14. The implications of the order were known to the allottee, but still, he invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Adviser on 18.05.1992 after deposit of first installment. The Revisional Authority was pleased to modify the order and grant time to the allottee to deposit the amount in two monthly installments on or before 30.03.1993. Thereafter, the allottee again sought extension of time, which was declined at first on 07.07.1993 and then on 21.12.1994. The Revisional Authority was pleased to modify the order and grant time to the allottee to deposit the amount in two monthly installments on or before 30.03.1993. Thereafter, the allottee again sought extension of time, which was declined at first on 07.07.1993 and then on 21.12.1994. Still further, the allottee was granted indulgence by all the authorities under the Act, firstly by the Estate Officer, then by Chief Administrator and also by the Adviser. Still, the allottee had failed to deposit the amount within the time granted by each one of the authorities. After the Adviser has passed an order in terms of Section 10(4) of the Act, he becomes functus officio and thereafter has no right to pass any order in relation thereto. 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi’s case (supra) has held that power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. The Court held to the following effect: “4. The first question that we have to consider is whether Mr. Mankodi had competence to quash the order made by the Saurashtra Government on October 22, 1956. It must be remembered that Mr. Mankodi was functioning as the delegate of the State Government. The order passed by Mr. Mankodi, in law amounted to a review of the order made by Saurashtra Government. It is well settled that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. No provision in the Act was brought to notice from which it could be gathered that the Government had power to review its own order. If the Government had no power to review its own order, it is obvious that its delegate could not have reviewed its order. The question whether the Government’s order is correct or valid in law does not arise for consideration in these proceedings so long as that order is not set aside or declared void by a competent authority. Hence the same cannot be ignored. The Subordinate Tribunals have to carry out that order. For this reason alone the order of Mr. Mankodi was liable to be set aside.” 16. The same principle was reiterated in Kalabharati Advertising case (supra), when the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “12. Hence the same cannot be ignored. The Subordinate Tribunals have to carry out that order. For this reason alone the order of Mr. Mankodi was liable to be set aside.” 16. The same principle was reiterated in Kalabharati Advertising case (supra), when the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “12. It is settled legal proposition that unless the statute/rules so permit, the review application is not maintainable in case of judicial/quasi-judicial orders. In the absence of any provision in the Act granting an express power of review, it is manifest that a review could not be made and the order in review, if passed, is ultra vires, illegal and without jurisdiction. (Vide Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar AIR 1965 SC 1457 and Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh AIR 1966 SC 641 .) 13. In Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyuman Singhji Arjunsinghji (1971) 3 SCC 844 , Major Chandra Bhan Singh v. Latafat Ullah Khan (1979) 1 SCC 321 , Kuntesh Gupta (Dr.) v. Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya (1987) 4 SCC 525 , State of Orissa v. Commr. of Land Records and Settlement (1998) 7 SCC 162 and Sunita Jain v. Pawan Kumar Jain [2008(2) Law Herald (SC) 850] : (2008) 2 SCC 705 , this Court held that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either expressly/specifically or by necessary implication and in the absence of any provision in the Act/Rules, review of an earlier order is impermissible as review is a creation of statute. Jurisdiction of review can be derived only from the statute and thus, any order of review in the absence of any statutory provision for the same is a nullity, being without jurisdiction. 17. The Court also held that in the absence of any statutory provision providing for review, entertaining an application for review or under the garb of clarification/modification/correction is not permissible. 18. On the analogy of power to review an order, an application for extension of time would also not be maintainable before the statutory authority, as it has the effect to alter the order, which has already attained finality after the authority has become functus officio. The Civil Court has power to extend or enlarge time in terms of Section 148 of the Code. The Civil Court has power to extend or enlarge time in terms of Section 148 of the Code. But in the absence of such analogous power on the statutory authority under the Act, such Authority will not have any power to extend period fixed in exercise of revisional jurisdiction at an earlier stage. 19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in MD, Army Welfare Housing Organization case (supra) was considering the question; whether an Arbitrator has jurisdiction to pass an interim order under the Arbitration Act, 1940 in the absence of any specific agreement in relation thereto. It was held that an Arbitral Tribunal is not a court of law. Its orders are not judicial orders. Its functions are not judicial functions. It cannot exercise its power ex debito justitiae. The Court concluded as under: “43. An Arbitral Tribunal is not a court of law. Its orders are not judicial orders. Its functions are not judicial functions. It cannot exercise its power ex debito justitiae. The jurisdiction of the arbitrator being confined to the four corners of the agreement, he can only pass such an order which may be the subject-matter of reference.” 20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment has referred to Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund Vs. Kartick Dass (1994) 4 SCC 225 , wherein it was held that the statutory authority, a Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum is not possessed of any inherent jurisdiction to grant ad interim injunction. It was held that the Statutory Authority can exercise such power, as is conferred by the Statute. It was held to the following effect: “44. A careful reading of the above discloses that there is no power under the Act to grant any interim relief of (sic or) even an ad interim relief. Only a final relief could be granted. If the jurisdiction of the Forum to grant relief is confined to the four clauses mentioned under Section 14, it passes our comprehension as to how an interim injunction could ever be granted disregarding even the balance of convenience.” 21. The Authority under the Act does not exercise the jurisdiction ex debito justitiae i.e. it has no inherent power as of right to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. In State Bank of India Vs. The Authority under the Act does not exercise the jurisdiction ex debito justitiae i.e. it has no inherent power as of right to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. In State Bank of India Vs. S.N. Goyal (2008) 8 SCC 92 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court was considering the scope of powers of disciplinary authority. It held that there is distinction between powers exercised by the Civil Court and the Authorities under the Statute. It was held to the following effect: “25. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that the appointing authority became functus officio once it passed the order dated 18-1-1995 agreeing with the penalty proposed by the disciplinary authority and cannot thereafter revise/review/modify the said order. Reliance was placed on the English decision V.G.M. Holdings Ltd., Re (1941) 3 All ER 417, wherein it was held that once a Judge has made an order which has been passed and entered, he becomes functus officio and cannot thereafter vary the terms of his order and only a higher court, tribunal can vary it. What is significant is that decision does not say that the Judge becomes functus officio when he passes the order, but only when the order passed is “entered”. The term “entering judgment” in English law refers to the procedure in civil courts in which a judgment is formally recorded by the court after it has been given. 26. It is true that once an authority exercising quasi-judicial power takes a final decision, it cannot review its decision unless the relevant statute or rules permit such review. But the question is as to at what stage an authority becomes functus officio in regard to an order made by him. P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Advanced Law Lexicon (3rd Edn., Vol. 2, pp. 1946-47) gives the following illustrative definition of the term “functus officio”: “Thus a judge, when he has decided a question brought before him, is functus officio, and cannot review his own decision.” 27. Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Edn., p. 673) gives its meaning as follows: “Having fulfilled the function, discharged the office, or accomplished the purpose, and therefore of no further force or authority.” 28. …..Thus, where a judgment is reserved, mere dictation does not amount to pronouncement, but where the judgment is dictated in open court, that itself amounts to pronouncement. Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Edn., p. 673) gives its meaning as follows: “Having fulfilled the function, discharged the office, or accomplished the purpose, and therefore of no further force or authority.” 28. …..Thus, where a judgment is reserved, mere dictation does not amount to pronouncement, but where the judgment is dictated in open court, that itself amounts to pronouncement. But even after such pronouncement by open court dictation, the Judge can make corrections before signing and dating the judgment. Therefore, a Judge becomes functus officio when he pronounces, signs and dates the judgment (subject to Section 152 and power of review). The position is different with reference to quasi-judicial authorities. While some quasi-judicial tribunals fix a day for pronouncement and pronounce their orders on the day fixed, many quasi-judicial authorities do not pronounce their orders. Some publish or notify their orders. Some prepare and sign the orders and communicate the same to the party concerned. A quasi-judicial authority will become functus officio only when its order is pronounced, or published/notified or communicated (put in the course of transmission) to the party concerned. When an order is made in an office noting in a file but is not pronounced, published or communicated, nothing prevents the authority from correcting it or altering it for valid reasons. But once the order is pronounced or published or notified or communicated, the authority will become functus officio. The order dated 18.1.1995 made on an office note, was neither pronounced, nor published/notified nor communicated. Therefore, it cannot be said that the appointing authority became functus officio when it signed the note dated 18.1.1995.” 22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Bharat Bank Ltd. Delhi vs. The Employees of the Bharat Bank Limited Delhi and the Bharat Bank Employee’s Union, Delhi AIR 1950 Supreme Court 188 was seized of a question; as to whether an order/award passed by the Industrial Tribunal is an order amenable to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. While examining the said question, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mahajan in his majority opinion observed that before a person or persons can be said to constitute a Court, it must be held that they derive their powers from the State and are exercising the judicial powers of the State. It was held to the following effect: “23. While examining the said question, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mahajan in his majority opinion observed that before a person or persons can be said to constitute a Court, it must be held that they derive their powers from the State and are exercising the judicial powers of the State. It was held to the following effect: “23. As pointed out in Halsbury’s Laws of England, the word “Court” originally meant the King’s Palace but subsequently acquired the meaning of (1) a place where justice was administered, and (2) the person or persons who administer it. In the Evidence Act, it is defined as including all Judges and Magistrates and all persons except arbitrators legally authorized to take evidence. This definition is by no means exhaustive and has been framed only for the purposes of the Act. There can be no doubt that to be a Court, the person or persons who constitute it must be entrusted with judicial functions that is of deciding litigated questions according to law. However, by agreement between parties arbitrators may be called upon to exercise judicial powers and to decide a dispute according to law but that would not make the arbitrators a Court. It appears to me that before a person or persons can be said to constitute a Court, it must be held that they derive their powers from the State and are exercising the judicial powers of the State. (… emphasis supplied) In R. v. London County Council, (1931) 2. K.B.215: (100 L.J.K.B.760), Saville L.J. gave the following meaning to the word “Court” or “judicial authority”: “It is not necessary that it should be a Court in the sense that this Court is a Court; it is enough if it is exercising, after hearing evidence, judicial functions in the sense that it has to decide on evidence between a proposal and an opposition; and it is not necessary to be strictly a Court; if it is a tribunal which has to decide rightly after hearing evidence and opposition”. As pointed out in picturesque language by Lord Sankey L.C. in Shell Co. of Australia vs. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1931) A.C. 275 : (100 L.J.P.C. 55), there are tribunals with many of the trappings of a Court which, nevertheless, are not Courts in the strict sense of exercising judicial power. As pointed out in picturesque language by Lord Sankey L.C. in Shell Co. of Australia vs. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1931) A.C. 275 : (100 L.J.P.C. 55), there are tribunals with many of the trappings of a Court which, nevertheless, are not Courts in the strict sense of exercising judicial power. It seems to me that such tribunals though they are not full fledged Courts, yet exercise quasi-judicial functions are within the ambit of the word “tribunal” in Article 136 of the Constitution…..” 23. In Ethiopian Airlines Vs. Ganesh Narain Saboo (2011) 8 SCC 539 , while examining the provisions of Code, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the ‘Court’ in CPC exclusively refers to Civil Court. Hence, other quasi-judicial bodies like consumer redressal bodies fall outside purview of term ‘Court’. It was held to the following effect: “66. Likewise, CPC itself does not claim to make Section 86 applicable to proceedings before the Consumer for a. Instead, CPC includes a saving clause, providing that “in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, nothing in (CPC) shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special... law... or any special form of procedure prescribed by or under any other law...”. In addition, Section 86 only applies to a ‘suit in any court”. This term should be understood differently than the term “court” discussed above because CPC refers exclusively to the civil courts. In particular, CPC specifically refers to the District Courts, the High Courts, and the Supreme Court and makes little if any reference to other, quasi-judicial for a like the consumer redressal bodies at issue here. This interpretation has been approved by the Supreme Court in Bhagwat Singh v. State of Rajsthan, AIR 1964 SC 444 .” 24. Therefore, the order passed by the Adviser to the Administrator exercising the powers of the Central Government is an order passed by a quasi-judicial authority exercising judicial powers, but such order is not by a Court governed by the provisions of the Code. The orders passed by the Statutory Authorities under the Act are regulated and controlled by the provisions of the Act and such authorities do not possess any inherent powers i.e. ex debito justitiae. The Authorities are bound to consider the rival contentions and pass orders, which are in terms of the Statute and in furtherance of the cause of the Statute. The Authorities are bound to consider the rival contentions and pass orders, which are in terms of the Statute and in furtherance of the cause of the Statute. Such quasi judicial authority, a creation of the Statute, cannot travel beyond the Statute to confer a benefit after it has become functus officio and has ceased to exercise jurisdiction or authority to re-decide otherwise it would be conferring power ad infinitum where none exists. It is the foundation of jurisprudence that litigation must come to an end at the last logical terminus enjoined by law. 25. In view of the above, we find that the order passed by the learned Single Judge is not sustainable in law. The same is accordingly set aside. As a consequence thereof, the writ petition is dismissed.