Judgment : Heard Mrs. A. Agni, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Shri V. Palekar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 2. The above appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial questions of law by order dated 22.07.2004. “1. Whether the judgment and order of the Employees Insurance Court in as much as it overlooks the provisions of Section 1(6) of the Employees State Insurance Act and notification issued by the Government of Goa in the year 1977, thereby extending the provisions of the E.S.I.C. Act to Goa, is contrary to law? 2. What is effect of payment of contribution by the respondent for the year April 91-July 92 and January 94 – September, 94 under Section 39 read with regulation 31 of E. S. I. C. Act and regulation, qua the coverage of the establishment of the respondent under the E.S.I.C. Act? 3. Whether judgment of the E.I. Court is perverse and as against the muster roll showing the names of 10 employees including Shri George Machedo and Muriel Pereira it holds that the establishment was not employing 10 employees?” 3. During the course of the hearing of the above appeal, Mrs. Agni, learned counsel appearing for the appellant fairly presses only for the third substantial question of law referred to above. As such the other substantial questions of law are deleted as not pressed. 4. The brief facts of the case are that the respondent claims that they are a small scale industry involved in the process of manufacturing of ink and has been in the business from February, 1982. It is further the case of the respondent that they have never employed 10 or more persons in their establishment on any working day since its inception. According to the respondent, they are not covered under the provisions of the Employees State Insurance Act and as such, the order dated 30.06.1999 calling upon the respondent to pay the contribution for the period from April, 1988 to September, 1998 is not justified. As such, the respondent filed an application under Section 75 of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 before the E.S.I. Court to quash and set aside the said impugned order dated 30.06.1999. As such, the respondent filed an application under Section 75 of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 before the E.S.I. Court to quash and set aside the said impugned order dated 30.06.1999. The appellant filed their reply to the said application stating inter-alia that the appellant visited the premises of the respondent's factory and verified the records and found on the basis of the wage register that on 19.04.1988, there were 10 employees working in the establishment of the respondent. It is further their case that the respondent are covered and liable to pay the said amount. The appellant also disputed the contention of the respondent that they had not employed 10 employees on payment of wages. After framing issues and recording of evidence, learned E.S.I. Court by the impugned judgment dated 22.03.2004, allowed the said application filed by the respondent and consequently the impugned order dated 30.06.1999 passed by the appellant under Section 45-C of the said Act came to be quashed and set aside. Being aggrieved by the said judgment, the appeal preferred by the appellant was admitted on the aforesaid substantial questions of law. 5. Mrs. Agni, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has assailed the impugned judgment on the ground that on bare perusal of the wage register and the attendance register, it is manifestly clear that in April, 1988 there were 10 employees working for the respondent. The learned counsel has taken me through the wage register as well as the attendance register on record and pointed out that the contention of the respondent that one of the employees George Machedo was not working in the month of April, 1988 and in fact the wages have been duly paid to him for the said month. So also the learned counsel has also taken me through the wage register and pointed out that the next employee Muriel Pereira has also been in employment of the respondent for a period of 11 working days and wages have been paid on that count. The learned Counsel has thereafter taken me through the attendance register and pointed out that the said George Machedo was shown to be present even on the days when the said Muriel Pereira was also employed from 19.04.1988. The learned Counsel has thereafter taken me through the attendance register and pointed out that the said George Machedo was shown to be present even on the days when the said Muriel Pereira was also employed from 19.04.1988. The learned counsel as such submits that the contention of the respondent that the said employee George Machedo had resigned and in his place the said Muriel Pereira was engaged cannot be accepted as during the said period both the employees were working in the employment of the respondent and also paid wages. The learned counsel has thereafter taken me through the notification dated 21.06.1977 and brought to my notice that as per the schedule of the said notification wherein it is stipulated that whenever 10 or more persons are employed or were employed for wages on any day of the preceding 12 months in the establishment, they are covered to pay the contribution under the said Act. The learned counsel as such submits that on bare perusal of the wage register and the attendance register on record, it cannot be disputed that 10 employees were in fact working for the respondent on the specific dates in April, 1988. The learned Counsel has thereafter also taken me through the impugned judgment and pointed out that the learned Judge whilst appreciating the evidence on record has erroneously come to the conclusion that the said employee Muriel Pereira was in the establishment to substitute and take charge from the employee George Machedo. The learned Counsel further pointed out that in case such contention is to be accepted, the question of both of them working for the respondent on the day subsequent to 20.04.1988 would not arise. The learned counsel as such submits that the findings of the learned Judge on that count are perverse and consequently the question of holding that the respondent are not covered for the year 1988 cannot be sustained. 6. On the other hand, Shri V. Palekar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent has supported the impugned judgment. The learned counsel further pointed out that even assuming on the basis of the material on record, the respondent had employed 10 employees in the year 1988, by itself does not mean that the respondent are covered for the subsequent period from April,1988 to September, 1998. The learned counsel further pointed out that even assuming on the basis of the material on record, the respondent had employed 10 employees in the year 1988, by itself does not mean that the respondent are covered for the subsequent period from April,1988 to September, 1998. The learned counsel has taken me through the order impugned before the E.S.I. Court and pointed out that the claim of the appellant was not only for the period of April,1988 but also for the subsequent period of September, 1998. The learned Counsel further pointed out that the respondent have in fact produced the wage register as well as the attendance register to substantiate their contention that even for the subsequent period for the year 1988 onwards up to 1998, the respondent had not engaged for wages 10 employees or above. The learned counsel has taken me through the impugned judgment and pointed out that the learned Judge whilst passing the impugned judgment has not gone to the aspect as to whether the respondent could be covered from the year 1988 onwards. The learned counsel as such submits that even assuming that the respondent are covered for the year 1988, the coverage with regard to the subsequent year 1989 onwards is to be reappreciated by the learned Judge after hearing the parties on the basis of the material on record. 7. I have duly considered the submissions of the learned Counsel and I have also gone through the impugned judgment and material on record. The order impugned before the E.S.I. Court was with regard to the claim of the appellant from April 1988 to September, 1998. But however whilst passing the impugned judgment, it was incumbent on the learned E.S.I. Court on the basis of the material on record to ascertain as to whether the respondent were covered for the year 1988 onwards. The learned Judge was not justified to come to the conclusion that the respondent were not covered for the year 1988. On bare perusal of the wage register as well as the attendance register on record, it is manifestly clear that for the days subsequent to 20.04.1988, 10 employees were in fact engaged by the respondent for the payment of wages. On bare perusal of the wage register as well as the attendance register on record, it is manifestly clear that for the days subsequent to 20.04.1988, 10 employees were in fact engaged by the respondent for the payment of wages. The findings of the learned Judge to the effect that the employee Muriel Pereira was working during the said period to take over the charge from the employee George Machedo cannot be accepted as both of them could not be present to work for nearly 11 days and received wages. Apart from that, the employee George Machedo was designated as a typist whereas the said Muriel Pereira was a Clerk. Considering the said aspect, I find that the learned Judge was not justified to come to the conclusion that the employee George Machedo should not be counted for the purpose of determining the number of employees working for the respondent in the year 1988. The said findings have been arrived at by the learned Judge by misreading the evidence on record and as such are perverse. To that extent the impugned judgment holding that the respondent are not covered for the year 1988 cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed and set aside. 8. With regard to the contention of Shri Palekar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent to the effect that the learned Judge has not considered as to whether 10 or more employees have been working for the period from the year 1989 and thereafter up to September, 1998, I find that on perusal of the impugned judgment, there is no discussion therein on that count. Mrs. Agni, learned counsel appearing for the appellant fairly accepts the said position and submits that the matter can be remanded on that count for a fresh adjudication after hearing the parties in accordance with law. Hence, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, I find that the substantial question of law framed by this Court is to be answered accordingly. The matter of coverage of the respondent subsequent to the year 1989 onwards shall be reconsidered by the learned Judge in accordance with law. 9. In view of the above, I pass the following : ORDER (i) The appeal is partly allowed. (ii) The impugned judgment dated 22.03.2004 is quashed and set aside to the extent referred to herein above. The matter of coverage of the respondent subsequent to the year 1989 onwards shall be reconsidered by the learned Judge in accordance with law. 9. In view of the above, I pass the following : ORDER (i) The appeal is partly allowed. (ii) The impugned judgment dated 22.03.2004 is quashed and set aside to the extent referred to herein above. (iii) The Employees Insurance Case No. 57/2000 is restored to the file of the learned District Judge, North Goa, Panaji. (iv) The learned District Judge is directed to decide the said case a fresh in the light of the observations made herein above. (v) The appeal stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs. (vi) The parties are directed to appear before the Employees Insurance Court, North Goa, Panaji, on 23.07.2012 at 10. 00 a.m.