I.A. ANSARI, J The appellants herein have preferred two different appeals under section 21(4) of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, ('the NIA Act'). The appellant, Mrs. Malasawmkimi, has approached this court, by way of Criminal Appeal No. 171/2011, aggrieved by the order, dated 9.9.2011, passed by the learned Special Judge, NIA, Guwahati, Assam, rejecting the appellant's prayer for bail in Misc. Case No.25/2011, arising out of NIA Case No.01/2009, under sections 120B/121/121A, IPC read with sections 16, 17, 18 and 20 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. On the other hand, the appellant, George Lawmthang, has preferred an appeal, which has given rise to Crl. Appeal No. 65/2012, aggrieved by the order, dated 23.9.2011, passed by the learned Special Judge, NIA, Guwahati, Assam, in Misc. (Bail) Case No. 30/2011, arising out of in NIA case 01/2009. 2. By this common judgment and order, we propose to dispose of both these appeals together inasmuch as both these appeals are closely inter-linked and, on the request, made by the learned counsel for the parties concerned, have been heard together. 3. We have accordingly heard Mr. D.K. Mishra, learned senior counsel, for the accused-appellants, and Mr. D. K. Das, learned Senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the National Investigation Agency. Background facts 4. The material facts, giving rise to the present appeals, may, in brief, be set out as under : (i) Some significant amendments had been made in the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, ('the UA(P) Act') by the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2008, the amendments having come into force on 31.12.2008, which introduced and defined certain terms, such as, terrorist act, terrorist gang, terrorist organization, unlawful association and unlawful activity and made, inter alia, punishable a 'terrorist act' under section 16 and, by section 17, while the UA(P) Act, as amended by the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2008, made raising of fund for terrorist act punishable, the UA(P) Act also provided punishment for conspiracy, act of abetment, etc., for commission of terrorist act or any act preparatory to the commission of terrorist act. This apart, the UA(P) Act made 'membership' of a terrorist gang or terrorist organization punishable offences and also provided punishment for those, who hold or held proceeds of terrorism. This apart, the UA(P) Act made 'membership' of a terrorist gang or terrorist organization punishable offences and also provided punishment for those, who hold or held proceeds of terrorism. The UA(P) Act made, under section 38, even 'association' by a person with a terrorist organization a punishable offence, if one associates with a terrorist organization with intention to further its activities or if he professes to be associated with a terrorist organization with intention to further its activities. (ii) The UA(P) Amendment Act, 2008, has also introduced section 43D and put restrictions, by the proviso to sub-section (5) of section 43D, on the court's power to grant bail by imposing condition that an accused shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the court, on perusal of the case diary, or on the report, made under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ('the Code'), is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true. Thus, the UA(P) Act, 1967, as the same stands today, puts serious fetters on the court's discretion to allow an accused to go on bail. (iii) Yet another development from the enactment of NIA Act, 2008, which came into force on 31.12.2008, is that the Central Government stands empowered to constitute a special agency to be called National Investigation Agency (in short, NIA) for investigation and prosecution of offences under the acts specified in the Schedule of the NIA Act. Section 11 also empowers the Central Government to constitute Special Courts and, it is out of the order, passed by such a Special Court rejecting bail of the present appellant, that this appeal has been preferred as provided by section 21(1) of the NIA Act read with section 21(4) thereof. (iv) Basistha P.S. Case No. 170/2009, under section 120B/121/121(A), IPC read with section 25(1B)(A) Arms Act, was, initially, registered against two accused persons, namely, Phojendra Hojai and Babulal Kemprai, on the ground that, on 1.4.2009, at about 4.00 p.m., when vehicle Nos. (iv) Basistha P.S. Case No. 170/2009, under section 120B/121/121(A), IPC read with section 25(1B)(A) Arms Act, was, initially, registered against two accused persons, namely, Phojendra Hojai and Babulal Kemprai, on the ground that, on 1.4.2009, at about 4.00 p.m., when vehicle Nos. AS-01-AH-1422 and AS-01-1-0609 were intercepted at 14th Mile G.S. Road, Guwahati, and searched, both the said accused, suspected to be cadres and linkmen of a banned organization, namely, DHD(J), were found in the vehicles, wherefrom a sum of rupees one crore, in cash, and two pistols were recovered, the money being meant for purchase of arms and ammunitions for the said banned organization. The accused were accordingly taken into custody and investigation was started by the Assam Police. On being produced before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup, Guwahati, the two accused aforementioned were remanded to police custody. (v) While investigation of Basistha Police Station Case No. 170/2009 aforementioned was pending with the State Police, the Central Government, in exercise of its power under section 6(5) read with section 8 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, directed, on 1.6.2009, investigation of the said case to be conducted by the NIA. In terms of the directions, so issued by the Central Government, the NIA registered a case under the NIA Act, the Case being NIA Case No. 1/2009. (vi) By a Gazette Notification, dated 9.7.2009, issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, in exercise of its powers under section 3 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, DHD(J), along with its factions, wings and front organizations, came to be declared as 'unlawful organization'. 5. The investigation in Basistha Police Station Case No. 170/2009, came to be subsequently registered as NIA. Case No.01/2009 and while investigation of this case had been in progress, Diyungmukh Police Station Case No.03/2009, under sections 120B/121/121A, IPC, came to be registered against, amongst others, Golan Daulagupu, and one Jibangshu Paul, now registered as NIA 2/2009. 6. In both the cases, namely, NIA Case No.01/2009 and NIA Case No.02/2009 aforementioned, NIA has already submitted charge sheets. While hearing on the framing of charges, in NIA Case No.01/2009, is already complete and the matter is pending for orders, the hearing, on the framing of charges, in NIA Case No.02/2009, has begun. Merit of the appeal 7. 6. In both the cases, namely, NIA Case No.01/2009 and NIA Case No.02/2009 aforementioned, NIA has already submitted charge sheets. While hearing on the framing of charges, in NIA Case No.01/2009, is already complete and the matter is pending for orders, the hearing, on the framing of charges, in NIA Case No.02/2009, has begun. Merit of the appeal 7. In the backdrop of what have been indicated above, let us, now, consider the merit of the present appeals. 8. While considering the present appeals, it needs to be borne in mind that, in the case at hand, it was required to be determined by the learned Special Court, as trial court, and is, now, required to be determined by this court, as an appellate court, whether there were reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations, made against the present appellant, were prima facie true or not. However, determination of the question as to whether there are reasonable grounds for believing or not would obviously invite the court to assign reasons so as to make it clear as to why this court has taken the view that no reasonable grounds to believe exist or as to why reasonable grounds to believe exist. In either way, therefore, the reasons are necessary to be assigned and this requirement invites and compels us to discuss, albeit as briefly as possible, the materials on record, which, to our mind, are relevant for the purpose of deciding these appeals and some of these materials even the learned counsel for the appellants has freely referred to. 9. Before, however, dealing with the present appeals, let us understand as to what the case of the prosecution, so far as the appellants are concerned, is. The prosecution's case, as set forth in the charge sheet, is reproduced below : "17. 29 The investigation at Kolkata revealed two aspects of fund transfers. First, regarding the channeling of funds for DHD(J) from Guwahati through Kolkata with the help of accused Jayanta Kumar Ghosh A-12, Debashish Bhattacharjee A-13 and Sandip Ghosh A-14 and Phojemdra Hojai A-1 and second regarding conversion of Rupees, thus, received to Dollars with the help of George Lawmthang A-10 and Malsawmkimi A-9. 17. 30 The find sent by Mohet Hojai from Guwahati for the DHD(J) were sent with the help of one Imdad Ali through Hundi (hawala). 17. 30 The find sent by Mohet Hojai from Guwahati for the DHD(J) were sent with the help of one Imdad Ali through Hundi (hawala). The person involved in this parallel banking transaction apart from Imdad Ali was hundi operator Rabi Agarwala. The funds were then received at Kolkata by accused Sandip Ghosh A-14, Debashish Bhattacharjee A-13 and Jayanta Kumar Ghosh A-12 and then handed over to Phojendra Hojai A-1. 17. 31 On three occasions in the years 2009, money was sent by Mohet Hojai A-3. All the money was received by the accused Jayanta Kumar Ghosh A-12 and his men Sandip Ghosh A-14 and Debashish Bhattacharjee A-13 from various places and handed over to Phojendra Hojai A-1 at his place of stay. The records of Madhumilan Guest House and Hotel Shalimar confirm the stay of Phojendra Hojai on various occasions. Accused Sandip Ghosh A-14 and Debashish Bhattachrjee A-13 delivered the hawala money to Phojendra Hojai at Kolkata four times. The first time money was brought in cash from Guwahati by Imdad Ali and Bapi and delivered at Madhumilan Guest House at Bara Bazaar. This happened after the Council was formed in January, 2008. Then money was delivered twice to the tune of Rs.1 crore through hawala. Money was collected from Marwaris whose addresses were given by Mohet Hojai A-3 and Imdad Ali. The system of identification with the help of the number of a note at the hands of recipient was followed. After these three deliveries at the time of Dipolal Hojai one consignment of more than 1 crore was delivered at Hotel Shalimaar to Phojendra Hojai A-1 in the beginning of the year 2009. Again the same system was followed. Money was again sent in the month of February 2009 and March 2009 at the time of Mohet Hojai A-3 as CEM. 17. 32 Vanlachhana A-8, the Arms delaer, had made in his disclosure memo that he was also doing business of exchange of dollars through Kolkata for Niranjan Hojain A-11. On the basis of the information and on basis of analysis of the CDR of Vanlalchhana A-8, it was found that two persons having a mobile number of Kolkata were in constant touch with Vanlalchhana A-8. In Mizoram a search was mounted for the lady person who was converting rupees to Dollars. The lady was found to have escaped to Kolkata. In Mizoram a search was mounted for the lady person who was converting rupees to Dollars. The lady was found to have escaped to Kolkata. The NIA team took the help of Kolkata Police and located and arrested Malsawmkimi A-9 @ Sawmi and George Lawmthang A-10 @ Thanga, the Mizos in Kolkata who converted Rupees to Dollars for the DHD(J) and other organizations. A sum of Rs. 18 lakhs were also recovered from their possession which was to be converted to dollars by Swami and Thanga. Accordingly, information was given to designated authority, i.e., IG NIA regarding the seizure as per provisions of section 25(5) of UA(P) Act through special messenger. They were interrogated at Kolkata and they disclosed that they used to collect money from two hotels at Kolkata for conversion to Dollars. An identification memo was prepared by the I.O. and the two hotels were identified at Hotel Shalimaar and Madhumilan Guest House, the same places where Phojednra Hojai A-1 used to stay. Vanlalchhana A-8, used to visit Nepal for handing money to Niranjan Hojai. The interrogation of Thanga revealed that he had done three transactions on the instructions of Malsawmkimi A-8. On all the three occasions they collected the money from the same person at Kolkata. Once it was Hotel Shalimar and twice it was at Madhumilan Guest House. All these disclosures corroborate the statements of Phojendra Hojai A-1, Jayanta Kumar Ghosh, A-12 and Sandip Ghosh A-12 regarding the exchange of money at Kolkata which was sent by Mohet Hojai A-11 of DHD(J). Later Phojendra Hojai A-1 was identified by Malsawmkimi A-9 and George Lawmthang A-10 as the same person whom they collected money on behalf of Vanlalchhana A-8, for conversion to Dollars. Arguments 10. It has been argued by Mr. Mishra, learned senior counsel for the appellants, that there is no admissible evidence against the appellants and none of the witnesses, examined by the NIA, has implicated the appellants in any manner, which may attract the penal provisions of even under the Indian Penal Code, let alone the UA(P) Act. Arguments 10. It has been argued by Mr. Mishra, learned senior counsel for the appellants, that there is no admissible evidence against the appellants and none of the witnesses, examined by the NIA, has implicated the appellants in any manner, which may attract the penal provisions of even under the Indian Penal Code, let alone the UA(P) Act. The learned senior counsel, while referring to the documentary evidence, on the strength of which NIA proposes to implicate the appellants, argued that D-169, which is the alleged confessional statement of the appellant, George Lawmthang, D-189 and D-196, which show that photographs of Phojendra Hojai had been identified by appellants and D-216 and D-218, which contain disclosure statements of the appellant, Ms. Malsawmkimi, relating to recovery of Rs. 10 lakhs and 5 lakhs in Kolkata, cannot be used for the purpose of arriving at a conclusion that appellants are involved in the offences with which they have been charged. Further argues Mr. Mishra that the documents, relied upon by the NIA, reveal that the appellants are petty workers, doing small business and they agreed to get INC (Indian National Currency) converted to US dollars for very little commission and not with any other motive and that the appellants had nothing to do with the activities of DHD(J) and/or with the act(s) of striking terrors. 11. Controverting the above submissions made by Mr. Mishra, Mr. D.K. Das, learned senior counsel for NIA, argues that the appellants were instrumental in converting Rupees into Dollars. The rupees, so converted into dollars, were, then, sent to Nepal and were utilized in purchasing of arms by accused Niranjan Hojai, Commander-in-Chief, DHD(J). Mr. Das has also argued that appellant, Ms. Malsawmkimi, was in constant touch with Phojendra Hojai and she knew about the activities of DHD(J) and facilitated, with the help of appellant, George Lawmthang, the conversion of rupees into dollars for the purpose of purchasing arms. A. Role played by the appellants -- Facts 12. The circumstances, briefly stated, which the NIA alleges, against the appellants, are as follows : • D-153 -- CDR (call data report) of the mobile of appellant, Ms. Malswamkimi, and the appellant, George Lawmthang • D-169 -- Confessional Statement of appellant George Lawmthang • D-188 -- Disclosure statement of appellant, Ms. Malswamkimi • D-189 -- Identification of Phojendra Hojai by the appellant, Ms. Malswamkimi, and the appellant, George Lawmthang • D-169 -- Confessional Statement of appellant George Lawmthang • D-188 -- Disclosure statement of appellant, Ms. Malswamkimi • D-189 -- Identification of Phojendra Hojai by the appellant, Ms. Malswamkimi • D-218 -- Disclosure statement of the appellant, Ms. Malswamkimi, on the basis of which Rs. 10 lakhs was recovered. 13. Now, let us examine whether the various circumstances, as alleged, point towards the involvement of the appellants in entering into conspiracy with the DHD(J). 14. The relevant extract of confessional statement, made by appellant, Goerge Lawmthang, read as follows : ".....In the month of April (so far as I remember) Malsawmkimi asked me whether I can exchange rupees with dollars. I told her that if I can I will inform her.....in the month of August 2008 in informed Malsawmkimi that I have now contact for exchanging rupees with US dollars. In the same month Malsawmkimi brought Rs. 15,00,000 to convert into US dollars. Next day I called Tapan and started convert the rupees. On first day I gave Rs. 5,00,000 for convert to US dollar. It took 3-4 days for exchange of the rupees. After completion of conversion I gave the commission @ 15 paise per US dollars. In the month of October 2008, (as far as I remember) Malsawmkimi came to Kolkata along with one Vantea and gave me Rs. 20,00,000 for conversion. Malswamkimi introduced me to Vantea. It took around 4-5 days for the conversion. In the same way I took commission. In the month of November, December 2008 Malsawmkimi called me to her hotel at Kolkata Hotel Centepoint. I met Malsawmkimi in the hotel. Malsawmkimi asked me accompany her to collect the money of vantea from Madhumilan Hotel. Thereafter I and Malsawmkimi went to Madhumilan hotel. We went inside a room of Madhumilan Hotel. Malsawmkimi collected Rs. 1,00,00,000 from a person in the hotel. I do not know the name of the person but can recognise him if produced before me. After ....1 crore Malsawmkimi came to my house, at Kolkata Malsawmkimi went to her hotel keeping the money. I took about 10 days to convert the 1 crore rupees into US dollars. Tapan......the conversion ....In the month of January 2009, Malsawmkimi again gave me Rs. 15,00,000 for conversion to US dollars. I in the same way done the conversion and took commission. I took about 10 days to convert the 1 crore rupees into US dollars. Tapan......the conversion ....In the month of January 2009, Malsawmkimi again gave me Rs. 15,00,000 for conversion to US dollars. I in the same way done the conversion and took commission. In the month of February and March 2009, Malsawmkimi again asked me to accompany her to Madhumilan hotel for collecting the money from Vantea. There we again went to the hotel and collected Rs. 2,00,00,000 from the same person who gave Rs. 1,00,00,000 earlier. I took around 20 days to convert Rs. 2,00,00,000 to US dollars. In the same way I gave the US dollars after conversion to Malsawmkimi. This time I saw Vantea in the hotel Center point with Malsawmkimi. Again in the month of March 2009 Malsawmkimi called me to her hotel to accompany her to collect the money of Vantea from Shalimar hotel. There Malsawmkimi collected Rs. 1,00,00,000 from the same person who gave.............crore ro US dollar. In the same way I gave the US dollar after keeping my commission. In the month of April 2009, May 2009, June 2009, July 2009 Malsawmkimi gave Rs. 15,00,000 each for conversion to US dollars accordingly I did the conversion with the help of Tapan. In the month of August 2009 (7-8-09) Malsawmkimi gave me Rs. 5,00,000 but she did not told me to convert the same. She asked me to keep the same and informed me that she will ask me later on what to do with the money. On 11.8.2009 the Lal Bazar police arrested me and seized the above Rs. 5,00,000 from me. 15. The confessional statement of appellant, George Lawmthang, shows that there were several occasions, when the appellant, Ms. Malsawmkimi, gave money to George Lawmthang for converting Indian rupees into US dollars. 16. The confession of appellant, George Lawmthang, implicating the appellant, Ms. Malsawmkimi, is also an incriminating circumstance against the appellant, Ms. Malsawmkimi. It may be noted here that we are not oblivious of the law that though the confessional statement of appellant, George Lawmthang, who is a co-accused, is a relevant fact and may also be used against the appellant, Ms. The confession of appellant, George Lawmthang, implicating the appellant, Ms. Malsawmkimi, is also an incriminating circumstance against the appellant, Ms. Malsawmkimi. It may be noted here that we are not oblivious of the law that though the confessional statement of appellant, George Lawmthang, who is a co-accused, is a relevant fact and may also be used against the appellant, Ms. Malsawmkimi, the said confessional statement of a co-accused, such as, the appellant, George Lawmthang, can be used for the purpose of strengthening the conclusion, which a court may, otherwise, on the basis of the other evidence on record, reach. If the material, other than confessional statement of a co-accused, can bring a court to the conclusion that the appellant, Ms. Malsawmkimi, was involved in the offence(s) alleged against her by the NIA, then, the said confessional statement can be used, for the purpose of strengthening the conclusion, which the court may, on the basis of the materials, other than confessional statement of the said accused, so reaches. There is, however, no impediment in using the confessional statement of the co-accused, namely, George Lawmthang, so far as the appellant, George Lawmthang, is concerned. What is, however, crucial to note, and we must point out, is that while considering an application for bail, neither the confession of an accused nor confession of a co-accused can be wholly ignored inasmuch as such a confession may become the basis for further investigation requiring further custody, judicial or otherwise, of an accused. Though confession of an accused, made to a police officer, may not be stricto sense evidence, such confession can nevertheless be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining whether an accused is entitled to bail or not, for, the confessional statement may lead to, as indicated hereinbefore, further investigation and so can necessary to the investigating agency for collecting materials against an accused so that the same can be used at the trial. 17. The confession, made by the appellant, George Lawmthang, has to be, thus, read along with several other circumstances, prominent among them would be the disclosure statement of Vantea A-8, on the strength of which arms were recovered, the hawala transactions, by which money was transferred to Kolkata, the materials regarding extortion by DHD(J), embezzlement of development funds by the public servants and purchase of arms from international market. 18. 18. In the context of what have been indicated above, it would be appropriate to take note of the activities of DHD(J) with which the appellants are alleged to have entered into a conspiracy. B. Activities of DHD(J) 19. As regard the activities of DHD(J), the accusations, in the charge sheet, adequately, supported by statements of witnesses as contained in the case diary, reveal prima facie that the DHD(J) had allegedly done the following acts : • That DHD(J) is an association of armed miscreants, private contractors, public servants, arms dealer with accused Jewel Garlosa and Niranjan Hojai as the masterminds of the association. • That the DHD(J) had linkage with NSCN (IM) and NDFB, the two scheduled terrorist organizations. • DHD(J) targeted at major infrastructure projects in their area. Two Government projects were badly affected by the acts of terror and violence by DHD(J), the two projects being 'East West Corridor Project' and 'Broad Gauge Conversion Project between Lumding and Silchar'. • DHD(J) killed some of those labourers, who were involved in the project of conversion of extension of broad gauge line from Lumding to Badarpur. • DHD(J) indulged in collection of illegal tax by abduction. It also transpires from the materials that DHD(J) collects huge amount of money by unlawful means and the money, so procured, is utilized for, amongst others, purchase of arms and ammunitions. • DHD(J) indulged in several attacks on the security forces, the notable ones being the ambush on the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel, wherein seven men were killed, and the ambush on the Assam Police party, wherein six men lost their lives. • Direction given by Niranjan Hojai (A-11) to Shri Dipolal Hojai, CEM, NCHAC, to convene a meeting of all the Executive Members of the Council in the evening on 26th November, 2008. It was at the meeting that accused Niranjan Hojai directed Shri Dipolal Hojai to resign from the position as CEM by the very next day. He nominated Mohit Hojai (A-3) to be elected as the new CEM and also threatened Dipolal Hojai by saying "if you don't listen, you will have the same fate as Pumendu Langthasa,". Suspected DHD(J) militants had killed former Chief Executive Member of the North Cachar Hills Autonomous Council, Purnendu Langthasa, and former executive member of the Council, Nindu Langthasa, at Langlai Hasnu village, in the NC Hills district, in June 2007. Suspected DHD(J) militants had killed former Chief Executive Member of the North Cachar Hills Autonomous Council, Purnendu Langthasa, and former executive member of the Council, Nindu Langthasa, at Langlai Hasnu village, in the NC Hills district, in June 2007. • Forcing Dipolal Hojai to step down from the post of CEM paved the way for Mohit Hojai to become CEM so that the siphoning of development funds can be done at the diktats of Niranjan Hojai and Jewel Garlosa. 20. The facts, stated above, give rise to an impression, though prima facie, that there was an association of certain individuals, comprising of armed miscreants, public servants and private contractors, who were involved in collecting funds by means of extortion, abduction, etc., siphoning of development funds and utilizing all the funds, so collected, in making purchases of arms and ammunitions, apart from carrying out other subversive activities. The activities, pointed out above, raise inference, though prima facie in nature, that the DHD(J), as an association, went to the extent of manipulating the democratic election of Autonomous Council on gun point and dislodged a democratically elected CEM by issuing threat of murder. This apart, there are materials giving rise to a prima facie inference that the said association also, by their activities, affected infrastructural development, essential to the life of the community of the concerned area, and resorted to mass killing of labourers, who had not obeyed their diktats, and DHD(J), thus, in a way, running, or attempted to run, a parallel Government inasmuch as activities of DHD(J) were even collecting taxes without having any legal right or authority to do so and shaking thereby the very foundation of the constitutional scheme of governance in India. The actions of its activists, such as, Niranjan Hojai, Mohit Hojai, Phojendra Hojai and Jewel Garlosa do amount to, unless can be shown otherwise, at the trial, the offence of waging war against the State within the meaning of section 121, IPC and is punishable by death or imprisonment for life in terms of the penal provisions of sections 121 of IPC. 21. No wonder, therefore, that this court, in Criminal Appeal No.25/2010, observed, at para 121, as under : "121. 21. No wonder, therefore, that this court, in Criminal Appeal No.25/2010, observed, at para 121, as under : "121. Thus, until shown, otherwise, at the trial, the acts of the DHD(J) and its members must be inferred to amount to 'terrorist acts' within the meaning of section 15 of the UA(P) Act, particularly, because their acts are calculated, as the materials in the case diary reflect, to threaten the unity, integrity, security and sovereignty of India and they strike terror in the people, in general, and, at times, even in a given section of the people, such as, the labourers, by use of criminal force. Obviously, those, who help and aid the terrorist acts of the DHD(J) and its members, would be abettors of such offence(s). As the DHD(J) runs, or attempts to run, almost a parallel Government, thereby shaking the very foundation of the constitutional scheme of governance, in India, its actions and the actions of its activists, such as, Niranjan Hojai, Mohit Hojai and Jewel Garlosa do amount to, unless can be shown otherwise, at the trial, the offence of waging war against the State within the meaning of section 121, IPC and is punishable by death or imprisonment for life in terms of the penal provisions of sections 121 of IPC and, those, who help the DHD(J) and/or its activists in carrying out the activities of the DHD(J), would be, if not members of the DHD(J), be responsible as abettors of the offence of waging war against the State and their acts of abetment too would be punishable to the same extent as do the acts of the chief perpetrators of such offences. This apart, whoever commit a terrorist act is punishable by section 16 of the UA(P) Act, which falls under Chapter IV thereof. A person, who commits a terrorist act, cannot be allowed to go on bail, because of the proviso to section 43D(5)." (emphasis suplied) 22. Having found, on prima facie basis, that DHD(J) was involved in terrorist activities, anyone, who is prima facie found to have associated with DHD(J), can be said to have conspired with it provided, of course, that such association is covered within the meaning of section 18 of the UA(P)Act. 23. The relevant provisions, with respect to conspiracy, under the UA (P), Act, underwent some amendments in the year 2004 and in the year 2008. 23. The relevant provisions, with respect to conspiracy, under the UA (P), Act, underwent some amendments in the year 2004 and in the year 2008. The changes brought with respect to offence of conspiracy are as follows : C. Changes in the offence relating to conspiracy, etc., to commit Terrorist Act 24. Under the Act of 2004, section 18 read as under : "18. Punishment for conspiracy, etc. -- Whoever conspires or attempts to commit, or advocates, abets, advises or incites or knowingly facilitates the commission of, a terrorist act or any act preparatory to the commission of a terrorist act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine." 25. A reading of section 18 of the Act of 2004 makes it clear that not only conspiracy to commit terrorist act is made punishable, but attempting, advocating, abetting, advising, inciting the commission of a terrorist act is also made punishable. It also goes further by adding the term knowledge. Thus, it is not necessary that the person must intend to aid a terrorist act in order to be held liable for an offence under section 18 of the Act of 2004; it would be sufficient, for the purpose of attracting the penal provisions of section 18, if the prosecution is able to prove that an accused had the knowledge that his act or omission would facilitate the commission of a Terrorist Act. 26. Now, section 18, as it stood in the Act of 2004, has been modified, by the UA(P) Act, 2008, by substituting, in place of the words "incites or knowingly facilitates", the words "incites, directs or knowingly facilitates". This becomes clear, when we read section 18 as stands amended in the UA (P) Act, 2008. Section 18 is, therefore, reproduced below : "18. Punishment for conspiracy, etc. -- Whoever conspires or attempts to commit, or advocates, abets, advises or incites, directs or knowingly facilitates the commission of, a terrorist act or any act preparatory to the commission of a terrorist act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine." 27. A bare reading of section 18 shows that though punishment, under section 18, remains unchanged, section 18 makes not only the person, who conspires or attempts to commit or advocates, abets, advises commission of a terrorist act or of any act preparatory to the commission of the terrorist act, but also when the person concerned incites, directs or knowingly facilitates commission of a terrorist act or any act, preparatory to the commission of terrorist act, meaning thereby that the person would fall within the ambit of section 18 if he directs an act, which would facilitate not only commission of a terrorist act, but also an act, which is preparatory to the commission of a terrorist act. Thus, the scope of the nature of conspiracy has been widened by including those persons, who direct an act, which may be, otherwise, irrelevant, but is connected to either a terrorist act or an act, which is preparatory to the commission of terrorist act. To put it a little differently, the ambit of section 18 has been widened and if the materials on record gives rise to a reasonable ground to believe that an accused prima facie had the knowledge that his acts or omissions would facilitate a terrorist act, he would be liable for punishment under section 18. 28. In the present appeals, pertaining to bail order(s), it does not appear necessary to enquire whether there exists any direct evidence against the appellants or as to whether they intended to wage war against the Union of India and participated in terrorist activities. The words conspires or attempts to commit, or advocates, abets, advises or incites, directs or knowingly facilitates the commission of a terrorist act or any act preparatory to the commission of a terrorist act are sufficient to bring the case of the appellants within the ambit of section 18 of the UA(P) Act. The words conspires or attempts to commit, or advocates, abets, advises or incites, directs or knowingly facilitates the commission of a terrorist act or any act preparatory to the commission of a terrorist act are sufficient to bring the case of the appellants within the ambit of section 18 of the UA(P) Act. The disclosure statement of both the appellants, the confession of appellant, George Lawmthang, the identification of the photographs, in question, made by the appellants, are all circumstances relevant to the fact in issue as envisaged under sections 10, 27 and 30 of the Evidence Act and it would not be proper to appreciate the questions, as to their admissibility, in these appeals, particularly, when this court, sitting as a Court of Appeal, under section 21(4) of the NIA Act, is merely required to consider, on the basis of the materials on record, if the accused-appellants deserve to be enlarged on bail. 29. Suffice it would be, in this context, to quote certain observations, made by the Supreme Court, with respect to conspiracy, in the case of Union of India v. Jaspal Singh, (2003) 10 SCC 586 . The observations are as follows : "9. The submissions on behalf to the parties on either side on either the relevance, efficacy and reliability of the confessional statements of the 1st Accused or principles underlying sections 10 and 30 of the Indian Act 1872, next falls for consideration. No doubt, in law the confession of a co-accused cannot be treated as substantive evidence to convict, other than the maker of it, on the evidentiary value of it alone. But, it has often been reiterated that if on the basis of the consideration of other evidence on record the court is inclined to accept the other evidence, but not prepared to act on such evidence alone, the confession of a co-accused can be pressed into service to fortify its belief to act on it also. Once there are sufficient materials to reasonably believe that there was concert and connection between persons charged with a common design -- it is immaterial as to whether they were strangers to each other or ignored of the actual role of each of them or that they did not perform any one or more of such acts by joint efforts in unison. Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act envisaged that when more than one person are being tried jointly for the same offence and a confession made by one of such persons is found to affect the maker and some other of such persons and stand sufficiently proved, the court can take into consideration such confession as against such other person as well as against the person who made such confession......... 10. So far as the charge under section 120B, IPC, is concerned, it stands proved by showing that two or more persons have agreed to do or cause to do an illegal act or an act which is not illegal by illegal means and that some overt act was done by one of the accused in pursuance of the same. Where their common object or design is itself to do an unlawful act, the specification of such act itself which formed their common design would suffice and it would even be unnecessary or super flows to further substantiate the means adopted by all or any of them to achieve such object. All the more so, when their common object or design appear to be to commit series of such serious crimes and proof of any overt act in such cases also is a mere surplus age and that mere proof that they or some of them were concerned in the overt acts alleged would, per se, go a long way to establish that there existed such agreement among them. It is well known and as observed by this court in Baburao Bajirao Patil v. State of Maharashtra (1971) 3 SCC 432 , ".....indeed it is seldom -- if ever -- that direct evidence of conspiracies can be forthcoming. Conspiracy of the present type from its very nature must be conceived and hatched in complete secrecy, for otherwise the whole purpose would fail." This court further, after adverting to the decisions reported in Hari Charan Kurmi and Jogia Hajam v. State of Bihar : 1964 Crl. Conspiracy of the present type from its very nature must be conceived and hatched in complete secrecy, for otherwise the whole purpose would fail." This court further, after adverting to the decisions reported in Hari Charan Kurmi and Jogia Hajam v. State of Bihar : 1964 Crl. LJ 344 and Hanumant v. State of M.P. 1953 Crl LJ 129 heavily relied upon for the accused therein, observed as thereunder : "In a case of conspiracy in which only circumstantial evidence is forthcoming, when the broad features are proved by trustworthy evidence connecting all the links of a complete chain, then on isolated events the confessional statements of the co-accused lending assurance to the conclusions of the court can be considered as relevant material and the principle laid down in Haricharan Kurmi (supra) would not vitiate the proceedings." 11. This court, in Mohamad Usman Mohamad Hussain Maniyar and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra 1981 Crl. LJ 588, as follows : "It is true that there is no evidence of any express agreement between the appellants to do or cause to be done the illegal act. For an offence under section 120B the prosecution need not necessarily prove that the perpetrators expressly agreed to do or cause to be done the illegal act; the agreement may be proved by necessary implication. In this case, the fact that the appellants were possessing and selling explosive substances without a valid licence for a pretty long time leads to the inference that they agreed to do and/or cause to be done the said illegal act, for, without such an agreement the act could not have been done for such a long time." (emphasis is added) 30. What follows from the ratio, laid down in the case of Jaspal Singh (supra), is that in establishing a conspiracy, what is required is a connection between two or more persons to do an illegal act irrespective of the fact whether they know each other or are complete strangers. 31. The investigation has revealed that so far as the illegal raising of funds, by means of illegal tax collection, embezzlement of development funds, extortion, etc., are concerned, the funds, so collected, were transported to Kolkata by hawala channels or human couriers. 31. The investigation has revealed that so far as the illegal raising of funds, by means of illegal tax collection, embezzlement of development funds, extortion, etc., are concerned, the funds, so collected, were transported to Kolkata by hawala channels or human couriers. There are materials to raise a prima facie inference that the funds, sent by Mohet Hojai, from Guwahati for the DHD(J) were sent with the help of one Imdad Ali, one of the NIA witnesses, through Hundi (hawala). Another person, involved in this parallel banking transaction, apart from Imdad Ali, was hundi operator, Rabi Agarwala. The funds, as alleged, were received, at Kolkata, by accused Sandip Ghosh A-14, Debashish Bhattacharjee A-13 and Jayanta Kumar Ghosh A-12 and, then, handed over to Phojendra Hojai A-1. The records of Madhumilan Guest House and Hotel Shalimar, prima facie suggest, the stay of Phojendra Hojai on various occasions. Vanlalchhana @ Vantea A-8, the alleged Arms dealer, is said to have made a statement in his disclosure memo that he was also doing business of exchange of dollars through Kolkata for Niranjan Hojai A-11. 32. Coupled with the above, it is of paramount importance to note that on the basis of the information and on basis of analysis of the CDR of Vanlalchhana A-8, it was found that two persons, having mobile numbers of Kolkata, were in constant touch with Vanlalchhana A-8. These two persons were the two appellants before us, who, as alleged, converted Rupees to Dollars for the DHD(J). 33. The circumstances, available against the appellants, prima facie, establish that the act of conversion of rupees into dollars by the appellants were not a one-time affair; rather, it was done on several occasions. The conversion of rupees into dollars, through illegal channels, assumes immense importance in the present case, because had there been no conversion it would have been a stumbling block for the DHD(J) to purchase arms from international market and would, consequently, have crippled their terrorist activities. 34. The subtle feature of section 18 of the UA(P) Act, as discussed hereinbefore, is that it not only penalizes conspiracy to commit terrorist acts, but also those acts, which facilitate the commission of a terrorist act or even an act, which is preparatory to the commission of terrorist act. 34. The subtle feature of section 18 of the UA(P) Act, as discussed hereinbefore, is that it not only penalizes conspiracy to commit terrorist acts, but also those acts, which facilitate the commission of a terrorist act or even an act, which is preparatory to the commission of terrorist act. The circumstances, available against the appellants, point out clearly that they, by facilitating the conversion of rupees into dollars, committed acts, which furthered the activities of DHD(J), an association, which as observed hereinbefore, was engaged in terrorist acts. These materials, which appear to be prima facie true, cannot be overlooked, while deciding these appeals, whereby the two appellants seek setting aside of the order(s) of the learned Special Court refusing to grant bail to the appellants, because there exists a definite pattern in which money was collected by illegal means like extortion, defalcation of developments funds, etc, and sent to Kolkata by hawala operators, where the appellants assisted in conversion of the money collected, in INC, to US dollars. Since the international arms market do not easily deal with INC, it was necessary to get the INC converted into US dollars and it is here that the role of appellants became instrumental. The appellants assisted the conversion of INC into dollars and the dollars were sent to Niranjan Hojai, Commander-in-Chief, DHD(J), at Nepal, who, according to the NIA, made further arrangements for purchasing arms. 35. Intention and knowledge being questions of fact, it would be wrong to say, in the face of aforesaid materials collected by NIA, that the appellants were only interested in profits and had nothing to do with the activities of DHD(J) inasmuch as the materials, prima facie, justify the conclusion, albeit tentatively, that the appellants committed acts with the knowledge that the money, being converted into US dollars, is ill-gotten and, therefore, their acts, can be, on a prima facie basis, and unless shown otherwise, termed as acts preparatory to the commission of a terrorist act sufficient to attract the penal provisions of section 18 of the UA (P) Act, falling under Chapter IV of the said Act. Since the learned trial court is yet to pass its necessary order(s) on the point of charges against the appellants, there appears no necessity to dwell any further on the applicability or otherwise of the other charges levelled against the appellants. Since the learned trial court is yet to pass its necessary order(s) on the point of charges against the appellants, there appears no necessity to dwell any further on the applicability or otherwise of the other charges levelled against the appellants. Limitations on granting bail for offences, which fall under Chapter IV and VI of UA (P) Act -- Position of law as already laid by this court: 36. What, now, needs to be noted is that this court has held, in Jayanta Kumar Ghosh v. State of Assam, 2010 (4) GLT 1, (2010) 6 GLR 727. that Special Court, constituted under the NIA Act, when considers a bail application, the consideration is really under section 437 of the Code, which is, ordinarily, meant for Judicial Magistrates, and the special power, which, otherwise, stands vested in a Sessions Court under section 439 of the Code, does not apply to a Special Court, though even a Court of Sessions may be notified as a Special Court by the Central Government in exercise of its powers under section 11. This apart, this court has held, in Jayanta Kumar Ghosh (supra), that besides the limitations, which section 437(1) imposes on the Magistrate's power to grant bail, in a case, where there appears reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, there is yet another limitation, which is imposed, on the power of the Special Court, by the proviso to sub-section (5) of section 43D of the UA(P)Act. 37. Let us, now, determine as to what limitations the Special Court ran, in the present case, in the matter of granting of bail to the accused-appellants. While considering this aspect, it needs to be noted that the appellants herein are accused of having committed offences under sections 120(B)/121/121(A), IPC read with sections 16, 17, 18 and 19 of the UA(P) Act. 38. Considering the fact that it is the proviso to section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act, which puts severe restrictions on the Special Court's power to grant bail, it is imperative to take note of what the proviso to section 43D(5) conveys. 38. Considering the fact that it is the proviso to section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act, which puts severe restrictions on the Special Court's power to grant bail, it is imperative to take note of what the proviso to section 43D(5) conveys. For the sake of clarity, sub-section (5) of section 43D, which is of utmost importance, is reproduced below : "(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under Chapter IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard on the application for such release : Provided that such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under section 173 of the Code is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true." (emphasis supplied) 39. A bare reading of sub-section (5) of section 43D shows that apart from the fact that sub-section (5) bars a Special Court from releasing an accused on bail without affording the Public Prosecutor an opportunity of being heard on the application seeking release of an accused on bail, the proviso to sub-section (5) of section 43D puts a complete embargo on the powers of the Special Court to release an accused on bail by laying down that if the court, on perusal of the case diary or the report made under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation, against such person, as regards commission of offence or offences under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI of the UA(P) Act, is prima facie true, such an accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond. 40. Thus, if the Special Court, on perusal of the case diary, forms an opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation, against an accused person, of the commission of offence or offences, under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI, is prima facie true, it will not remain within the powers of the court to grant bail in such a case. 41. 41. The above position of law is further made clear by sub-section (6) of section 43D, which lays down that the restrictions, on granting of bail specified in sub-section (5), are 'in addition to the restrictions under the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law for the time being in force on grating of bail'. 42. The logical conclusion would, therefore, be that in a case, investigated by the NIA, when the Special Court forms an opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, the Special Court would have no jurisdiction to grant bail to such an accused except as may be provided by law. In addition thereto, the Special Court shall also not be able to release an accused on bail if the court, on perusal of the case diary or the report made under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation, against such person, as regards commission of offence or offences, under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI of the UA(P) Act, is prima facie true. 43. In the backdrop of clauses (i) and (ii) of section 437(1) of the Code, when one reverts to section 43D(5), what surfaces is that the proviso to sub-section (5) of section 43D, (which lays down that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, no person accused of an offence, punishable under Chapter IV and VI of the NIA Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond if the court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under section 173, Cr.PC is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true), can be treated to be, and can, by legal fiction, be read, as clause (iii) of section 437(1) of the Code. Concept of proviso to section 43D(5) 44. Dealing with the concept of the proviso to section 43D(5), a Division Bench, in Jayanta Kumar Ghosh (supra), observed and held as to what the expression prima facie and the expression true, which appear in the proviso to section 43D(5), convey. The relevant observations, made in this regard, read as under : "63. Concept of proviso to section 43D(5) 44. Dealing with the concept of the proviso to section 43D(5), a Division Bench, in Jayanta Kumar Ghosh (supra), observed and held as to what the expression prima facie and the expression true, which appear in the proviso to section 43D(5), convey. The relevant observations, made in this regard, read as under : "63. Before proceeding further, it is also, to our mind, necessary to ascertain as to what the scope of the proviso to section 43D(5) is and when would this proviso be attracted. While dealing with this aspect of the appeal, it is necessary to bear in mind that the proviso to section 43D(5) states that such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under section 173 of the Code, is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is 'prima facie true'. The expression, 'prima facie true' is an expression, which does not, ordinarily, appear in penal statutes. 64. Let us, therefore, ascertain as to what the word 'prima facie' means. The word, prima facie, has been described in the Black's Law Dictionary as : "sufficient to establish fact or raise a presumption unless disproved or rebutted". Rebuttable presumption means an inference drawn from certain facts that establish a prima facie case, which may be overcome by the introduction of contrary evidence. Rebuttable resumption also means prima facie presumption or disputable presumption or conditional presumption. 65. The Concise Dictionary of Collins has denned, prima facie, as an adjective thus: "At first sight; as it seems at first". "And prima facie evidence is an evidence that is sufficient to establish a fact or to raise a presumption of the truth unless controverted". 66. Warton's Law Lexicon defines that a prima facie case does not mean a case proved to the hilt, but a case, which can be said to be established if the evidence, which is led in support of the same, are believed. 67. 66. Warton's Law Lexicon defines that a prima facie case does not mean a case proved to the hilt, but a case, which can be said to be established if the evidence, which is led in support of the same, are believed. 67. The Supreme Court, in Marlin Burn Ltd. v. R.N. Banerjee, 1958 SCR 514 at p. 530 ( AIR 1958 SC 79 at p. 85), observed, thus : "..........A prima facie case does not mean a case proved to the hilt, but a case, which can be said to be established if the evidence, which is led in support of the same, were believed. While determining whether a prima facie case had been made out, the relevant consideration is whether, on the evidence led, it was possible to arrive at the conclusion, in question, and not whether that was the only conclusion, which could be arrived at on that evidence." 68. The meaning of the word, 'prima facie', given in Marlin Burn Ltd. (supra), has been followed by the Supreme Court, in its later decision, in The Management of the Bangalore Woollen Cotton and Silk Mills Co. Ltd. v. B. Dasappa, M.T. represented by the Binny Mills Labour Association, AIR 1960 SCC 1352. 69. From the meaning, attributed to the word, 'prima facie', by various dictionaries, as indicated above, and the observations, made by the Supreme Court, in its decisions, in The Management of the Bangalore Woollen Cotton and Silk Mills (supra), what clearly follows is that prima facie is a Latin word, which means, 'At first sight or glance or on its face' and, in common law, it is referred to as 'the first piece of evidence of fact', i.e., considered true unless revoked or contradicted. 70. In the face of the above observations made by the Supreme Court, it may be construed that prima facie case would mean whether the inference drawn is a possible inference or not. 71. The word, 'true', according to Collins Dictionary, means something, which is not false, fictional or illusory, but factual and confirming with reality or exactly in tune. Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines True as: "Something, which is in accordance with fact or reality". 72. The word, 'true' has been defined, in World Book Dictionary, as "Agreeing with fact, not false". 73. Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines True as: "Something, which is in accordance with fact or reality". 72. The word, 'true' has been defined, in World Book Dictionary, as "Agreeing with fact, not false". 73. Thus, the expression, 'prima facie true', would mean that the court shall undertake an exercise to determine as to whether the accusations, made against the accused, are inherently improbable and/or wholly unbelievable. Ordinarily, while considering a complaint, made against an accused, the court assumes the contents of the complaint to be true and correct and, then, proceed to decide as to whether the allegations, made in the complaint, make out a case of commission of offence by the accused or not. No exercise is required to be undertaken by the court to determine the truthfulness or veracity of the accusations. However, when the word, 'prima facie', is coupled with the word, 'true', it implies that the court has to undertake an exercise of cross-checking the truthfulness of the allegations, made in the complaint, on the basis of the materials on record. If the court finds, on such analysis, that the accusations made are inherently improbable, or wholly unbelievable, it may be difficult to say that a case, which is prima facie true, has been made out. 74. The term 'true' would mean a proposition that the accusation brought against the accused person, on the face of the materials collected during investigation, is not false. The term false again would mean a proposition, the existence of which cannot be a reality. While arriving at a finding whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true or false, the court can only look into the materials collected during investigation; and, on its bare perusal, should come to a finding that the accusation is inherently improbable. However, while so arriving at a finding, the court does not have the liberty to come to a conclusion, which may virtually amount to an acquittal of the accused. 75. In the case of State of Gujarat v. Gadhvi Rambhai Nathabai, (1994) 5 SCC 111 , the Supreme Court while dealing with the principles governing the granting of bail under the TADA, observed : "8. 75. In the case of State of Gujarat v. Gadhvi Rambhai Nathabai, (1994) 5 SCC 111 , the Supreme Court while dealing with the principles governing the granting of bail under the TADA, observed : "8. It is true that for the purpose of grant of bail, the framers of the Act require the designated court to be satisfied that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the accused concerned was not guilty of such offence but this power cannot be exercised for grant of bail in a manner which amounts virtually to an order of acquittal, giving benefit of doubt to the accused person after weighing the evidence collected during the investigation or produced before the court. At that stage the designated court is expected to apply its mind as to whether accepting the allegations made on behalf of the prosecution on their face, there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused concerned was not guilty of the offence. At that stage the designated court is not required to weigh the material collected during the investigation." 76. In short, thus, on a bare reading of the materials, as may have been collected during investigation, if the Special Court finds that the materials, so collected, are sufficient to form, when assumed to be true, an opinion that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accusations, made against the accused, are prima facie true, the Special Court will be dis-empowered from releasing the accused on bail. At the stage of bail, no minute scrutiny or microscopic dis-section of the materials, collected during investigation, shall be undertaken by the Special Court. Credibility or otherwise of the materials collected would not be the subject-matter of scrutiny. What, at best, the Special Court can do, and shall do, is to examine if the accusations made, on the basis of the materials collected, are wholly improbable. When the materials are, on examination by the Special Court, are found to be not wholly improbable and the Special Court finds, on assuming such materials to be true, that the accusations, made against an accused, as regards commission of an offence under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI of the UA(P) Act, are prima facie true, such materials would be enough to attract the bar imposed by the proviso to section 43D(5). 77. 77. To put it a little differently, the Special Court is required to examine the materials, collected during investigation, assuming the same to be true and if, such materials, on such examination and consideration, are found to make out a case against the accused, the Special Court has to determine if there is any such thing in the materials, so collected, which would make the case, which has been made out against the accused, as a wholly improbable case. If the Special Court, on undertaking such an exercise, finds reasonable grounds to infer that the case, which has been made out against the accused, is not wholly improbable, the case would be treated as a case, which is sufficient for the Special Court to form an opinion that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accusations, made against the accused, are prima facie true. 78. The expression, 'reasonable ground', means something more than prima facie ground, which contemplates a substantially probable case for believing that the accused is guilty of the offence(s) alleged. Under section 437, Cr.PC, an accused is not to be released on bail if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence, which is punishable with death or imprisonment for life. Under section 437, Cr.PC, the burden is on the prosecution to show existence of reasonable ground for believing that the accused is guilty. Hence, the presumption of innocence, which always runs in favour of the accused, is displaced only on the prosecution showing existence of reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty -- see Union of India v. Thamissharasi, (1995) 4 SCC 190 , and Union of India v. Shiv Shankar Kesari, (2007) 7 SCC 798 . 79. Coupled with the above, the proviso to section 43D(5) does not require a positive satisfaction by the court that the case against the accused is true. What is required is a mere formation of opinion by the court on the basis of the materials placed before it. The formation of opinion cannot be irrational or arbitrary. Such formation of opinion cannot be based on surmises and conjectures; but must rest on the materials collected against the accused. What is required is a mere formation of opinion by the court on the basis of the materials placed before it. The formation of opinion cannot be irrational or arbitrary. Such formation of opinion cannot be based on surmises and conjectures; but must rest on the materials collected against the accused. Since the presumption of innocence runs in favour of the accused, it logically follows that if there are, in given circumstances, grounds for believing that the case, against the accused, is true, a case of commission of offence under Chapter IV or Chapter VI of the UA(P) Act, 1967, can be said to have been made out and when such a case is made out, it would be tantamount to saying that reasonable grounds exist for opining that the accusations are prima facie true. In such a case, the bar, imposed by the proviso to section 43-D(5) on the court's power to grant bail, gets attracted. 80. We may point out that section 20(8) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 ('the TADA Act') (since repealed), laid down that no person, accused of an offence punishable under the said Act, or any rule made thereunder, shall, if in custody, be released on bail, or on his own bond, unless, amongst others, the court is satisfied, where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence, while on bail. Section 20(9) of the Act made it clear that the limitation on granting of bail, specified in sub-section (8) of section 20, is in addition to the restrictions, which the Code of Criminal Procedure, or any other law, in force, imposes. 81. There are no corresponding provisions, in the NIA Act, as were present in section 20(8) and section 20(9) of the TADA Act. Notwithstanding, however, the fact that the provisions [as contained in sub-section (8) and/or sub-section (9) of section 20 of the TADA Act] no longer find place in the NIA Act, the fact remains that even under the scheme of the NIA Act, the Special Court, as already discussed above, is a 'court' other than the High Court and Court of Sessions. In such circumstances, the limitations, imposed by clauses (i) and (ii) of sub-section (1) of section 437, Cr.PC, are applicable to the Special Court too. In addition thereto, when a case falls within the ambit of the proviso to section 43D(5), there would be an additional bar, on the part of the Special Court, to release an accused on bail, the bar being that the Special Court shall not release the accused on bail or on his own bond if the court, on perusal of the case diary or the report made under section 173 of the Code, is of the opinion that there are 'reasonable grounds' for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true." (emphasis supplied) 45. Thus, we find that in the facts of the present case, the learned Special Court, having found that the allegations against the appellants were prima facie true, could not have granted bail to the appellants, because of the specific prohibition in matters of granting bail provided under the proviso to section 43D(5) of the UA (P) Act. 46. In view of the findings of the learned Special Court, whether it is open to the High Court, while sitting as appellate court, to disturb the finding arrived at by the Special Court and, if so, what is the scope of the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court under the NIA Act, is an important question, which, now, needs to be looked into. High Court's Appellate Jurisdiction under section 21(4) of the NIA Act vis-a-vis High Court's power under section 439 of the Code 47. In the light of the law, laid down in Redaul Hussain Khan and Ors. v. State of Assam and Ors., 2009 (3) GLT 855, (2010) 5 GLR 704. and Jayanta Kumar Ghosh (supra), let us, now, note the difference between High Court's appellate jurisdiction under section 21(4) of the NIA Act and the High Court's power under section 439 of the Code. 48. The scheme of the NIA Act, if analysed carefully, shows that accused has to apply for bail, if he so chooses, to the Special Court and if his prayer for bail is refused by the Special Court, then and then only, the accused may prefer an appeal to the High Court in terms of section 21(4) against an order refusing to grant bail. In other words, without having applied for bail and the prayer for bail having been disallowed by the Special Court, a person, who is accused of having committed a scheduled offence covered by the scheme of the NIA Act, cannot directly apply for bail to the High Court under section 439(1) or prefer an appeal under section 21(4) of the NIA Act, against the Special Court's order rejecting his prayer for bail and seeking thereby an order of bail from the High Court. Similarly, if the Special Court grants bail, the State may prefer an appeal to the High Court, in terms of section 21(4), seeking cancellation of such bail. Hence, without applying for bail to the Special Court, an accused, who is arrested, cannot apply for bail to the High Court by taking recourse to section 439 of the Code. 49. An order refusing or granting bail, in a case under the Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act, 1987, too, was an appeallable order under section 34 thereof. Explaining the parameters of the powers of the High Court, while considering an appeal from an order granting bail and how it differed from an application for bail under section 439 of the Code, the Supreme Court, in State of Gujarat v. Salimbhai Abdulgaffar Shaikh and Ors., (2003) 8 SCC 50 , observed as under : "10. Sub-section (4) of section 34 of POTA provides for an appeal to the High Court against an order of the Special Court granting or refusing bail. Though the word "appeal" is used both in the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Code of Civil Procedure and in many other statutes but it has not been defined anywhere. Over a period of time, it has acquired a definite connotation and meaning which is as under : "A proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by bringing it to a higher authority, especially the submission of a lower court's decision to a higher court for review and possible reversal. An appeal, strictly so-called, is one in which the question is, whether the order of the court from which the appeal is brought was right on the material which the court had before it. An appeal is removal of the cause from an inferior to one of superior jurisdiction for the purposes of obtaining a review or retrial. An appeal, strictly so-called, is one in which the question is, whether the order of the court from which the appeal is brought was right on the material which the court had before it. An appeal is removal of the cause from an inferior to one of superior jurisdiction for the purposes of obtaining a review or retrial. An appeal, generally speaking, is a rehearing by a superior court on both law and fact. 11. Broadly speaking, therefore, an appeal is a proceeding taken to rectify an erroneous decision of a court by submitting the question to a higher court, and in view of the express language used in sub-section (1) of section 34 of POTA the appeal would lie both on facts and on law. Therefore, even an order granting bail can be examined on merits by the High Court without any kind of fetters on its powers and it can come to an independent conclusion whether the accused deserves to be released on bail on the merits of the case. The considerations which are generally relevant in the matter of cancellation of bail under sub-section (2) of section 439 of the Code will not come in the way of the High Court in setting aside an order of the Special Court granting bail. It is, therefore, evident that the provisions of POTA are in clear contradistinction with that of the Code of Criminal Procedure where no appeal is provided against an order granting bail. The appeal can lie only against an order of the Special Court and unless there is an order of the Special Court refusing bail, the accused will have no right to file an appeal before the High Court praying for grant of bail to them. Existence of an order of the Special Court is, therefore, a sine qua non for approaching the High Court." 50. Referring to the above observations, made in Salimbhai Abdulgaffar Shaikh (supra), this court, in Redaul Hussain Khan (supra), held as under : "98. In the light of the observations made above, it becomes clear that an appeal is a proceeding to rectify an erroneous decision of a court both on facts as well as on law. Referring to the above observations, made in Salimbhai Abdulgaffar Shaikh (supra), this court, in Redaul Hussain Khan (supra), held as under : "98. In the light of the observations made above, it becomes clear that an appeal is a proceeding to rectify an erroneous decision of a court both on facts as well as on law. An order, granting or refusing bail, could have been, in the light of the provisions of section 34(4), examined on merit by the High Court without any other fetters and while considering a question of cancellation of bail the general principles, governing section 439(2) of the Code, would not come in the way. The Apex Court, in Salimbhai Abdulgaffar Shaikh (supra), while laying down that the scheme for appeal, under the POTA, is in contradistinction to that of the Code, pointed out that an appeal can lie only against an order of the Special Court and unless there is an order of the Special Court refusing or granting bail, the accused cannot prefer appeal to the High Court seeking bail. What, further, follows from the above discussion is that even a High Court could not have invoked its power, under the section 439, to grant bail to a person, accused of an offence under the POTA. Consequently, in order to obtain release on bail, an accused person, arrested under the POTA, was required to, first, apply for bail to the Special Court, where the Special Court was constituted, or to the Court of Sessions, where the Special Court was not constituted, and, if his application for bail was rejected, then and then only he could have preferred an appeal against the order refusing bail. Similarly, even the State could have preferred an appeal if the Special Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, happened to grant bail to such an accused person in exercise of powers under section 437 of the Code. 99. Though it was contended, in Salimbhai Abdulgaffar Shaikh (supra) that TADA had not taken away the High Court's power under sectior 439, the Supreme Court, referring to Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon (supra), held that there was complete exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court, under the TADA, to entertain a bail application made under section 439 and that this view was reiterated in State of Punjab v. Kewal Singh, 1990 Supp SCC 147. The Apex Court concluded, at para 14, in Salimbhai Abdulgaffar Shaikh (supra), thus: 14. That apart, if the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents is accepted, it would mean that a person whose bail under POTA has been rejected by the Special Court will have two remedies and he can avail any one of them at his sweet will. He may move a bail application before the High Court under section 439, Cr.PC in the original or concurrent jurisdiction, which may be heard by a Single Judge or may prefer an appeal under sub-section (4) of section 34 of POTA which would be heard by a Bench of two Judges. To interpret a statutory provision in such a manner that a court can exercise both appellate and original jurisdiction in respect of the same matter will lead to an incongruous situation. The contention is, therefore, fallacious." 51. We, therefore, in the light of the discussions held by this court, in Redaul Hussain Khan and Ors. v. State of Assam and Ors., 2009 (3) GLT 855, agree with the views expressed therein that once the investigation, under the scheme of the NIA Act, is taken over by the NIA, it is the Special Court, which can authorize further detention of an arrested accused. When such an arrested accused applies for bail to the Special Court, the source of power to consider such an application for bail lies in section 437 and not section 439 of the Code. Even a High Court cannot invoke its powers, under section 439, to grant bail if it has been refused by the Special Court nor can the High Court, by resorting to its power under section 439, cancel bail if bail has been granted to such an accused by the Special Court. If the bail has been refused or granted by the Special Court, the aggrieved party may, however, prefer an appeal, in terms of section 21(4), to the High Court. Such an appeal has to be heard by a Division Bench of the High Court and in such an appeal, the merit of the order, granting or refusing bail, can be questioned." (emphasis supplied) 52. In the case of Redaul Hussain Khan (supra), this court has, on analyzing the scheme of the NIA Act, concluded, at paras 42, 43 and 44, as follows : "42. In the case of Redaul Hussain Khan (supra), this court has, on analyzing the scheme of the NIA Act, concluded, at paras 42, 43 and 44, as follows : "42. On a close reading of section 16 of the NIA Act, what becomes clear is that notwithstanding the fact that, according to section 16(3) of the NIA Act, a Special Court, for the purpose of trial of a scheduled offence, has all the powers of a Court of Sessions and shall try such offence 'as if it were a Court of Sessions', the Special Court does not become a Court of Sessions inasmuch as it is only the power of trial of a Court of Sessions that the Special Court, by virtue of section 16(3), entitled to exercise. In other words, the expression, 'as if it were a Court of Sessions', which occur in section 16(3), really reflects that it is only the procedure for trial of a Sessions case, which a Special Court can follow; but it is, otherwise, not a Court of Sessions. 43. I may pause here to point out that section 16(3) of the NIA Act states, "Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Special Court shall, for the purpose of trial of any offence, have all the powers of a Court of Sessions and shall try such offence as if it were a Court of Sessions so far as may be in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Code for the trial before a Court of Sessions." Similar provisions existed in section 14(3) of TADA. Both the provisions were, thus, pari materia. The Supreme Court had the occasion to interpret section 14(3) in Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon (supra). Referring to the expression.'as if it were', appearing in section 3 of the TADA, the Supreme Court pointed out, in Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon (supra), that though the Parliament has vested, by using the words 'as if it were', in the Designated Court, the status of a Court of Sessions, yet this legal fiction, contained in section 14(3), must be restricted to the procedure to be followed for trial of an offence under the TADA, i.e., trial must be in accordance with the procedure prescribed, by the Code, in respect of a trial before a Court of Sessions insofar as it is applicable. The relevant observations, made in this regard, which appear at para 18, read as under : "18. No doubt, the Legislature by the use of the words "as if it were" in section 14(3) of the Act vested a Designated Court with the status of a Court of Sessions. But, as contended for by Learned Counsel for the State Government, the legal fiction contained therein must be restricted to the procedure to be followed for the trial of an offence under the Act, i.e., such trial must be in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Code of the trial before a Court of Sessions, insofar as applicable." 44. The above impression gets strengthened from the fact that section 16(1) provides that a Special Court may take cognizance of offence, without the accused being committed to it for trial, which, in turn, implies that a Special Court takes cognizance of an offence as a court of original jurisdiction and does not have the trappings of a Court of Sessions, which cannot, ordinarily, take, in the light of section 193 of the Code, cognizance of an offence, unless the case, in terms of section 209 of the Code, is committed to it, for, section 193 states that a Court of Sessions cannot take cognizance of an offence as a court of original jurisdiction except when the Code or the special law provides otherwise. Thus, a Court of Sessions could not have taken cognizance of an offence, under the NIA Act, without the case having been committed to it; but, as the NIA Act provides for taking cognizance of an offence by a Court of Sessions, without the case being committed to it, the Court of Sessions can take cognizance of offence, under the NIA Act, as the court of original jurisdiction. Such a deviation is possible even in respect of a specified offence under the Indian Penal Code. Such a deviation is possible even in respect of a specified offence under the Indian Penal Code. For instance, sub-section (2) of section 199 of the Code provides that when an offence, falling under Chapter XXI of the IPC, is alleged to have committed against a person, who, at the time of such commission, is the President of India, Vice-President of India, Governor of a State, the Administrator of a Union territory or a minister of the Union or of a State or of a Union territory, or any other public servant employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State in respect of his conduct in the discharge of his functions, a Court of Sessions may take cognizance of such an offence, without the case being committed to it, upon a complaint, in writing, made by the Public Prosecutor." 53. This court, in Redaul Hussain Khan (supra), also pointed out, at paras 65, 66 and 74, as under : "65. It is also well to remember that merely because of the fact that a Court of Sessions can function as a Special Court if Special Court is not constituted under a special law, it does not follow that the Court of Sessions, which exercises the powers of the Special Court, would become a Court of Sessions. In the given scheme of a 'special law', a Court of Sessions, as already pointed out in AR Antulay (supra), may become a court of original jurisdiction with no trappings of the court of Session. In such circumstances, merely because of the fact that a Sessions Judge exercises the jurisdiction of a Special Court, the Special Court would not be treated, or would not be deemed, to have become, a Court of Sessions. When the Special Court, in the case at hand, falls within the expression, 'a court other than the High Court or the Court of Sessions', which appears in section 437(1), it logically follows that a Special Court would run all the limitations, which are imposed by section 437 on the powers of a court, covered by section 437, in respect of granting of bail. Logically extended, this will mean that, amongst other limitations, as specified by sub-section (1) of section 437, a Special Court would not be able to release a person on bail if there appears a reasonable ground for believing that he has been guilty of offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life except when a case is covered by the proviso to section 437(1), which says that even such an accused person may be released, if the accused person is a woman or is sick or is infirm or if, for any other special reason, the Special Court considers it just and proper to release such a person. 66. Unlike, therefore, the powers, which a Court of Sessions enjoys, while considering a bail application, under section 439, the Special Court runs the limitations, which are imposed by section 437. Resultantly, therefore, a Special Court cannot enlarge a person on bail except to the extent as provided in section 437. Apart from the limitations imposed on the powers of a Special Court as are prescribed by section 437, even the special statute, which creates the Special Court, can impose additional limitations. No wonder, therefore, that the power to grant bail, in the case of NDPS, is much more restricted than what section 437 provides inasmuch as section 37 of the NDPS imposes further limitations, on the Special Court, in matters of granting bail and such limitations would apply to a Sessions Judge even if he acts as a Special Court under the NDPS Act, for, while exercising the powers of a Special Court, the Session Judge does not act or function as a Court of Session, but as a court of ordinary criminal jurisdiction. *** *** *** 74. Having held that the source of power of a Designated Court, under the TADA, to grant bail is traceable to section 437 inasmuch as the Designated Court falls within the expression 'a court other than the High Court or Court of Session', the Apex Court further clarified that the Designated Court's power to grant bail is not contained in section 20(8); rather, section 20(8) places only limitations on such power in addition to the limitations, which the Code has already imposed, on a Designated Court, by making it a court within the ambit of section 437. This was made explicit by section 20(9), which provided that the limitations on the granting of bail, specified in sub-section (8), are in addition to the limitations under the Code or any other law for the time being in force." 54. Apart from the fact that the conclusions, on the questions of law indicated above, reached in the case of Redaul Hussain Khan (supra), have not been disagreed with by a Division Bench of this court in Jayanta Kumar Ghosh (supra), we are, on a reconsideration of the whole scheme of the NIA Act read with the provisions for bail in the Code, agree with the above propositions of law, governing the powers of the Special Court, as regards the granting of bail, or refusal to grant bail, and hold that the above propositions of law are wholly correct. 55. Thus, the limitations, imposed by the proviso to section 43D (5), shall, to the extent that it is inconsistent with section 437, would supersede section 437 and if it is not inconsistent, then, it would be in addition to the limitations imposed by sisction 437. 56. The proviso to section 43D(5) imposes a limitation in addition to the limitations, which clauses (i) and (ii) of section 437 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, impose on the court's power to release an accused on bail. Thus, the proviso to section 43D(5) is an additional restriction on the court's power to grant bail. 57. We must also point out that when a case is registered and investigated, under the NIA Act, for commission of scheduled offences, the Special Court would be competent to deal with not only the scheduled offences, but also other offences under any law for the time being in force. Such a law would obviously include offences under the Indian Penal Code. We have also settled that the power of the Special Court, constituted under the NIA Act, to grant bail is covered by, and shall remain confined within, the ambits of section 437 of the Code and, as an appellate Court, the High Court's power, under section 21(4) of the NIA Act, would be co-extensive with the powers of the Special Court. We have further settled that the ban, imposed on the power of the court to release an accused, if a case falls within the proviso to section 43D(5), is, as already mentioned above, in addition to the limitations imposed on the powers of Special Court (same as magisterial courts) by clauses (i) and (ii) of section 437(1). 58. Our above conclusion that this court's power, while considering an appeal under section 21(4) of the NIA Act, would be co-extensive with the power of the Special Court and that the ban imposed on the power of the Special Court to release an accused on bail, which appears in the proviso to section 43D(5), if a case falls within the proviso to section 43D(5), is in addition to the limitations imposed on the powers of Special Court (same as magisterial courts) by clauses (i) and (ii) of section 437(1), stand upheld by the Supreme Court in its order, dated 25.8.2011, passed, in SLP (Criminal) No.S5063/2010), wherein, while allowing the appellant, Redaul Hussain Khan, to withdraw his appeal and giving him liberty to apply for bail to the Special Court afresh if there are any change in the circumstances or if fresh facts are placed before the court, the Supreme Court made it, however, clear thus, "We also make it clear that we are not interfering with the order of the High Court." (emphasis supplied) 59. In view of the law that there exists no extraordinary or special powers of the High Court to grant bail, sitting as an appellate court .under section 21(4) of NIA Act, and since the discussion on facts and relevant law, made hereinbefore, make it clear that circumstances, in the present case, justify, on a prima facie basis, an inference that the appellants conspired with the DHD(J), a terrorist gang, and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the allegations, levelled against the appellants, that the appellants had committed offences under Chapter IV of the NIA Act, are prima facie true the Special Court was well within its jurisdiction, in the present case, in not granting bail to the present appellants inasmuch as the learned Special Court stood disempowered by the proviso to section 43D(5) of the UAP Act, from allowing the appellants to go on bail. To put it a little differently, the learned Special Court did not commit any illegality in rejecting the present appellants' applications for bail and the accused-appellants' rejection of bail by the learned Special Court does not warrant any interference by the High Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. 60. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, we find no merit in these appeals. The appeals shall accordingly stand dismissed. 61. With the above observations and directions, these appeals shall stand disposed of. ____________