JUDGMENT T. Nandakumar Singh, J. 1. The appellant-accused, Arjun Debnath S/O Lt. Lal Mohan Debnath of Dewanbari, Machhmara, P.S. Pecharthal, District North Tripura faced Sessions Trial case being No. S.T. (WT/A)54 of 2004 in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, West Tripura (Court No. 4) Agartala for the incident in the night between 17/18.9.2003 in the bath room near the conference hall of Rajdhani Hotel at 5th floor in which one Arun Khatowa was killed by cutting into pieces by the appellant-accused. In the session trial, the appellant-accused was charged for the offence punishable under Section 302/ 201 of the Indian Penal Code. After full length trial, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge vide the impugned judgment and order dated 13.11.2006 convicted the appellant-accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 and 201 of the IPC and sentenced to suffer life imprisonment. Being aggrieved, the appellant-accused filed the present appeal. Heard Mr. S. Sarkar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-accused and Mr. A. Ghosh, learned Addl. P.P. for the State respondent. 2. The case of the prosecution is clearly depicted in the impugned judgment dated 13.11.2006 passed, by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, West Tripura (Court No. 4) Agartala. However, for deciding this appeal the prosecution story, in a nutshell, is recapitulated. Shri Balai Biswas, P.W. -1, was the informant in the instant case and the case being East Agartala PS. Case No. 135 of 2003 under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC was registered. P.W. -1, Balai Biswas, deposed that his house is situated at about 50/60 hands after crossing the hanging bridge of Pratapgarh and his statement was recorded on 27.8.2004. He further deposed that about one year at about 8.30 a.m. when he was sleeping, his wife, Smt. Kiran Bala Biswas, P.W. -2 called him and stated that a man in cutting condition packed in two gunny bags is under the bridge. Soon after that, he went to the spot and found two gunny bags containing some portion of human body and also a portion of leg of human body near the river. In the said two gunny bags, there were some pieces of one body, such as head which was in disfigured condition. He orally lodged information to the Darugababu, at the spot, who recorded his original ezahar and he put his signature on the original ezahar which was recorded at his dictation (i.e. Ext. P/1). In the said two gunny bags, there were some pieces of one body, such as head which was in disfigured condition. He orally lodged information to the Darugababu, at the spot, who recorded his original ezahar and he put his signature on the original ezahar which was recorded at his dictation (i.e. Ext. P/1). The Darugababu also prepared inquest report over the unknown dead body on the spot and he also put his signature in the surathal report (Ext. P/2), Further the Darugababu also prepared seizure list for seizing the said two gunny bags in presence of the witnesses, 3. On receipt of the said original ezahar, P.S. Case being No. East Agartala P.S. Case No. 135 of 2003 under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC was registered and thereafter the Officer in-charge of the Police Station endorsed the case to P.W. -21, Shri Partha Sarathi Pal, (officer in-charge) of the Out Post of the East Agratala P.S., and thereafter machinery of the investigation was started. In the course of investigation, the appellant-accused, Arjun Debnath, was arrested from the Gouri Hotel at Teliamura. On 18.8.2003, the appellant-accused also made extrajudicial confession to the P.W. No. 17, Dilip Kumar Choudhury, P.W. 18, Shri Sujit Ghosh at Gouri Hotel at Teliamura that he had murdered the victim, Arun Khatowa in the bath room near the conference hall in the 5th floor of Rajdhani Hotel in the night between 17/18.8.2003 by cutting the victim into pieces and packed in four gunny bags. The weapon of the crime, i.e. 'Dao and Takkal' and also the two gunny bags containing pieces of the victim, Arun Khatowa were also recovered at the pointing of the appellant-accused. 4. Both the appellant-accused and the victim were the hotel boys of the Rajdhani hotel and they served food to the Doctors participating the party arranged by them in the night between 17/18.8.2003 in the conference hall of the Rajdhani hotel at 5th floor. There are two bath room (Toilets) i.e. one bath room for gents with English commode and another bath room with Indian toilet near the conference hall and after the party at the conference hall was over, the appellant-accused murdered the victim, Arun Kathowa inside the both room (Gents having English commode) near the said conference hall. 5. There are two bath room (Toilets) i.e. one bath room for gents with English commode and another bath room with Indian toilet near the conference hall and after the party at the conference hall was over, the appellant-accused murdered the victim, Arun Kathowa inside the both room (Gents having English commode) near the said conference hall. 5. The prosecution examined as many as 21 prosecution witnesses, but there was no eye witness (ocular witness) for the crime and the evidences for proving the prosecution case are only circumstantial evidences, two extra judicial confessions and also statement of the appellant-accused leading to the discovery of the two gunny bags containing pieces of the corpse of the victim, Arun Khatowa, the weapon of the crime and blood stained wearing apparels of the victim. 6. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice and criminal case is that if two views are possible on the evidence in the case, (1) pointing to the guilt of the accused and (2) another to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount duty of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may raise from acquittal of the guilt is not less than from the conviction of the innocence. The Apex Court in C. Chenga Reddy Vs. State of A.P. (1996) 10 SCC 193 held that: in a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be a conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further, the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence. 7. The Apex Court in the State of U.P. Vs. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, AIR 1992 SC 840 held that a great care must be taken in evaluating the circumstantial evidence and if the evidence relied on is reasonably capable of two influences-one in favour of the accused must be accepted. It is also pointed that circumstances relied upon must be found to have been fully established and cumulative of all the facts so established must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt. It is also pointed that circumstances relied upon must be found to have been fully established and cumulative of all the facts so established must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt. The Apex Court in the State of U.P. Vs. Satish: AIR 2005 SC 1000 convicted the accused to death sentence basing on the circumstantial evidence. The portion of the judgment of the Apex Court in the State of UP. Vs. Satish (supra) which spells out the prosecution case are quoted hereunder: 4. On 16.8.2001 the victim who was studying in Sarvodya Public School had gone to school and did not return at the usual time. On the next day morning her dead body was found in the Sugarcane field of one Moolchand around 6.00 a.m. She was lying in a dead condition and blood was oozing from her private parts and there was marks of pressing on her neck. Report was lodged at the nearly Police station and the dead body was sent for post mortem examination. Dr. R.K. Gupta (P.W. 7) conducted the post mortem around 2. p.m. on 17-8-2001 and opined that death was within the preceding 24 hours. 5. Three persons claimed to have seen the accused nearby the place of occurrence between 1.00 p.m. to 2.00 P.M. on the date of occurrence. Two of them, namely, Sanjeev Kumar Tyagi (P.W. 3) and Kulbhushan (P.W. 5) claimed to have seen the deceased being carried on a bicycle by the accused who was taking the bicycle with the deceased sitting on the handle thereof. Anil (P.W. -2) stated that he had seen the accused in perplexed state around 2.00 p.m. near the place from where the dead body of deceased was found. Investigation was undertaken. During such investigation, there was recovery of accused's underwear as also the undergarment the deceased was wearing. This recovery was treated to be under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the 'Evidence Act'). 19. The Apex Court in the State of U.P. Vs. Satis (supra) held that where time-gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were seen last alive and when the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime became impossible. Para 23 of the AIR is quoted hereunder: 23. Satis (supra) held that where time-gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were seen last alive and when the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime became impossible. Para 23 of the AIR is quoted hereunder: 23. The last seen theory comes into play where the time-gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were seen last alive and when the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible. It would be difficult in some cases to positively establish that the deceased was last seen with the accused when there is a long gap and possibility of other persons coming in between exists. In the absence of any other positive evidence to conclude that the accused and the deceased were last seen together, it would be hazardous to come to a conclusion of guilt in those cases. In this case there is positive evidence that the deceased and the accused were seen together by witnesses P.Ws.-3 and 5, in addition to the evidence of P.W. -2. 8. The paramount duty of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may rise from acquittal of guilt is not less than for the conviction of the innocence. The Supreme Court in Zahira Habullah & Ann Vs. State of Gujrat & Ors, reported in (2006) 3 SCC 374 through Mr. Justice Arijit Pasayat observed that "in a criminal case fate of the proceedings cannot always be left entirely in the hands of the parties, crime being public wrong in breach and violation of public rights and duties, which affects the whole community as a community and is harmful to society in general. Interest of society is not to be treated completely with disdain and as persona non grata. Interest of society is not to be treated completely with disdain and as persona non grata. If a Criminal Court is to be an effective instrument in dispensing justice, the Presiding Judge must cease to be a spectator a mere recording machine by becoming a participant in the trial evincing intelligence, active interest and elicit all relevant materials necessary for reaching the correct conclusion, to find out the truth, and administer justice with fairness and impartially both to the parties and to the community it serves. 9. Justice G.P. Mathur of the Supreme Court observed in Trimukh Maroti Kirkan Vs. State of Maharastra reported in 2007 Cri. L.J. 20 (SC) that if an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house and in such circumstances where the assailants have all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the time and in the circumstances of their choice, it will be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence to establish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle of circumstantial evidence is insisted upon by the Courts. A Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A Judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character which is almost impossible to be led or at any rate extremely difficult to be led. 10. P.W. 4, Shri Dilip Kumar Roy, deposed that Rajdhani hotel is situated at Banamalipur and the hotel is run by him in the name of his wife. The accused, Arjun Debnath is known to him and he was working in Rajdhani Hotel and he was working as hotel boy in the year 2003. Accused Debnath was a resident of Machmara, North District Tripura. The victim, Arun Khatowa, was also a hotel boy in the Rajdhani hotel. P.W. -11 Sankar Giri, P.W.-8 Pintu Das, Anshuman Pattaanayak, Subal Jana (P.W. -6), Rabindra Nam Giri and Pradip Deb were staff of the Rajdhani Hotel. Subal Jana, P.W. -6, was working as Head Cook in his hotel for the last 10/12 years. P.W. -7, Soumitra Paul, was the Manager of his hotel and he had been working as Manager from 2000. Subal Jana, P.W. -6, was working as Head Cook in his hotel for the last 10/12 years. P.W. -7, Soumitra Paul, was the Manager of his hotel and he had been working as Manager from 2000. The victim, Aran Khatowa, was engaged in his hotel through Pintu Das, P.W. -8, who was also a hotel boy in his hotel. The head cook, Subal Jana, P.W. -6 used to stay in his hotel and the other workers (except the Manager) stayed in rented house near the hotel Rajdhani, such rented house of those staff was arranged and the rent also paid by him and the Manager of the hotel, i.e. Shri Soumitra Paul, P.W. -7 went back to his house at night. 11. On 18.8.2003 at about 10.30 a.m. he went to the hotel as there was construction work for extension of the hotel and thereafter at about 11 a.m. he went to the hospital to see patient, who was in serious condition; his wife also requested him, for purchasing air ticket for shifting that patient to Kolkata, as his house was situated near the Indian Air lines office. At about 3 p.m. of 18.8.03 he again went to the hotel. The Manager, P.W. -7, Soumitra Paul, informed him that the hotel boy, Arun Khatowa (victim) was not found in the hotel and also that some money was with him which he (victim) did not pay to him (Manager). That money with the Arun Khatowa (victim) was the money paid by the Doctors, who had the party in the night of. 17.8.2003 in the conference hall of the hotel. The Manager, further, informed him that they went to 'Radha International' for searching and also the rented house of the victim to find out if he was there. But the victim was not there. The victim and the appellant-accused were at the hotel to serve food to the Doctors participating in that party on 17.8.2003 in the hotel. He further informed him that whereabouts of the appellant-accused was not known to them as the appellant-accused was not at his house. Then he asked the Manager, i.e. Soumitra Paul to report to the police about the whereabouts of the appellant-accused. 12. He further informed him that whereabouts of the appellant-accused was not known to them as the appellant-accused was not at his house. Then he asked the Manager, i.e. Soumitra Paul to report to the police about the whereabouts of the appellant-accused. 12. Thereafter, he went to the Indian Airlines Office for purchasing air ticket and after handing over the air ticket he went back to his hotel at about 5/5.30 p.m. and learnt from P.W. -11, Sankar Giri (his staff) that the appellant-accused fled away from the hotel. Thereafter, he went out with vehicle along with Sankar Giri, P.W. -11 for searching the appellant-accused to the house of the appellant-accused's aunt at Gorkha Basti and from his aunt he came to know that the appellant-accused did not visit at the house for 3/4 days. P.W. -11, Sankar Giri told him that he (Appellant-accused) first went to the rented house and left along with his suitcase. After returning to the hotel he informed the matter to the police at the Police Station to inquire about the appellant-accused who fled away from his hotel and in the night of 18.8.2003 police came to his hotel and interrogated some of his staff. On the next date, i.e. on 19.8.2003 he Went to his hotel at about 10.30-11 a.m.; and on the same day, i.e. 19.8.03 at about 1 p.m. police personnel along with the appellant-accused under arrest came to his hotel. When the police came to his hotel along with the appellant-accused, Arjun Debnath, all of his staff including Hotel Manager, P.W. -7 Soumitra Paul were at the hotel. He asked the appellant-accused whey he fled away from the hotel and also asked the whereabouts of the victim, Arun Khatowa. He stated that on the previous night, there was a party of the Doctors in the hotel and after the party was over, Subal Jana, P.W. -6 (Head Cook of the hotel) directed the appellant-accused and the victim, Arun Khatowa to do their work quickly and go back to the rented house after having food; to that the appellant-accused told Subal Jana, P.W. -6 "Uncle Subal. Jana, go and sleep. We, i.e. the appellant and the victim shall go back after completion of our work." After about 1/2 hour Subal Jana got a sound and asked the appellant-accused "what are you doing?" The: appellant-accused again replied, "Uncle, you go and sleep. Jana, go and sleep. We, i.e. the appellant and the victim shall go back after completion of our work." After about 1/2 hour Subal Jana got a sound and asked the appellant-accused "what are you doing?" The: appellant-accused again replied, "Uncle, you go and sleep. We (appellant-accused and victim) shall go after finishing the work;" The appellant-accused further stated that, in the meantime, he took a 'Boty dao' from the kitchen, kept it hidden in a place at the same floor. 13. The conference hall where the Doctors had their party is at the floor which is above the floor where the kitchen is situated. There is also bath room near the conference hall. The appellant-accused further told when the victim, Arun Khatowa, went to the bath room near the conference hall, the appellant-accused chopped off the neck of the victim by the said dao in the bath room. Thereafter, he went to the kitchen for a gunny bag which was used for keeping rice and 3 empty cement bags from the place where the construction work was going on. 14. It is the admitted case of the parties that at the relevant time there was construction work for extension of the Rajdhani hotel. The appellant-accused also said that he went to the kitchen for bringing 'Takkal' as he could not cut the body of the victim into pieces by Dao. He cut the body of the victim into pieces, i.e. Head, leg and hand etc. etc. Thereafter, all the pieces were packed in four gunny bags. The shirt and pant of the victim were kept concealed in the hotel. He further stated that thereafter in the same night he took the said four gunny bags, in his Hero Cycle, out of which two were hidden in Laxmi Narayan Bari Dighi and the other two were kept concealed under the handing bridge Pratapgarh. He also stated that when he chopped the neck of the victim, it would be about 1 a.m. of 18.8.2003, i.e. the night between 17/18.8.2003. After completion of the killing of the victim the "boty dao" and "takkal" were kept by him after washing in the kitchen. He also stated that he could show the 'Dao" and Takkal". At his pointing the said 'Dao' and 'Takkal' were seized by the police by preparing a seizure memo in the presence of the staff of his hotel. 15. He also stated that he could show the 'Dao" and Takkal". At his pointing the said 'Dao' and 'Takkal' were seized by the police by preparing a seizure memo in the presence of the staff of his hotel. 15. On being asked as to why the victim was killed by him, the appellant-accused replied that generally he used to come late; for his late coming the victim complained against him to the Manager. The Manager asked him also why he came late on 17.8.2003. For such complaint, the appellant-accused decided to kill the victim. The appellant-accused further stated that on the complaint made by the victim, the Manager used to rebuke him for his late coming. 16. The statements of the P.W.-4, Shri Dilip Kumar Roy, were corroborated by the statements of P.Ws. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 11. P.W.-6, Subal Jana (Head Cook) of the hotel, i.e. Rajdhani Hotel, (his statement was recorded on 28.8.2004) deposed that he worked in the said Rajdhani Hotel for the last 13/14 years as Head Cook. The owner of the hotel is Dilip Kumar Roy, P.W. 4. P.W. -7, Saumitra Paul is the Manager of the hotel. The appellant-accused, Arjun Debnath and victim, Arun Khatowa, are the hotel boys of the said hotel and he used to stay in the said hotel at the 4th tala (floor) besides the kitchen of the said hotel and other staff of the hotel used to stay in the rented house near Bochjong Chowmohani arranged by the owner, Shri Dilip Kumar Roy, P.W. -4. The victim started his work in the hotel from the first part of the year, 2001. The appellant-accused, Arjun Debnath, stated his work one year prior to the victim, Arun Khatowa. 17. In the month of August, 2003 there were other staff, namely Sankar Giri, P.W. -11, Ansuman Pattanayak, Rabindra Nath Giri, Pintu Das and Pratap Deb over and above the Manager. On 17.8.03 there was a party of the Doctors in the conference hall of the hotel at 5th floor. There were 2 (two) toilets-one toilet with English commode and basin for the Gents and another with Indian toilet. In the 5th Tala there is kitchen and just near the kitchen he used to stay. The Gents toilet near the Conference hall is just above the kitchen at the 4th Tala (floor). There were 2 (two) toilets-one toilet with English commode and basin for the Gents and another with Indian toilet. In the 5th Tala there is kitchen and just near the kitchen he used to stay. The Gents toilet near the Conference hall is just above the kitchen at the 4th Tala (floor). The stair case from the ground floor to 5th floor runs by the side of room where he stayed. On that day, i.e. party of the Doctors was held in the conference hall in the night of 17.8.2003. The appellant-accused and the victim served food in that party; 10/12 Doctors attended the said party. The party continued upto 11.30 p.m. and after the party was over, the Doctors left the hotel. The hotel Manager, Soumitra Paul, P.W. -7 left the hotel just before completion of the party and after the parry was over, he went to the kitchen for taking curd and he met the appellant-accused to whom he asked when the party would be over. In reply to/that query, the appellant-accused told that the party was over then. To the appellant-accused who came alone to the kitchen, he asked when your work would be finished. The appellant-accused replied, "Uncle you go and sleep". At that time the victim was in the 5th floor inside the conference hall for doing his work. Then he directed the appellant-accused to complete his work and go to sleep. Thereafter, when he went to sleep, he got sound as if somebody was coming in the kitchen. On hearing that sound, he inquired about the sound and came to know that the appellant-accused till the late night did not go back to the residence. The appellant-accused told that he would go after finishing his work. 18. On the next morning, i.e. 8.30 A.M. of 18.8.2003 he met the appellant-accused in the hotel, but he did not see the victim. Then he asked the appellant-accused where the victim, Arun Khatowa, was. He replied that in the previous night, after finishing his work, before him (appellant-accused), he (victim) left the hotel for his house and he categorically replied that the appellant-accused slept in a Sofa of the hotel in the night, i.e. in the night between 17/18.8.2003. On 18.8.2003 till noon they did not see the victim. He replied that in the previous night, after finishing his work, before him (appellant-accused), he (victim) left the hotel for his house and he categorically replied that the appellant-accused slept in a Sofa of the hotel in the night, i.e. in the night between 17/18.8.2003. On 18.8.2003 till noon they did not see the victim. Shri Subal Jana, P.W. -6 and other staff Sankar Giri, P.W. -11 searched for the victim and had visited Radha International Hotel and other places to find the victim. While they were searching for the whereabouts of the victim, they heard that one body under the hanging bridge, Pratagarh was recovered and the body was brought to IGM hospital morgue by the police. On getting the information he and Sankar Giri went there and requested the Sweeper of the said Hospital's morgue to allow them to see the body. On seeing the pieces of the dead body, he could identify that it was the dead body of the victim, Arun Khatowa. One of the right foot-fingers of the victim was bent. The victim was also his close neighbour and he used to called him, "Uncle." 19. After returning to the hotel he met the hotel Manager, P.W. -7 Saumitra Paul and also met the appellant-accused and informed them that police were coming to the hotel. On hearing this, the appellant-accused fled away from the hotel with his bi-cycle. Thereafter, he and other staff went to the place where the appellant-accused stayed, but he was not there. They got information from other inmates of the rented house that the appellant-accused had fled away by rickshaw with his suit case. Thereafter, they returned to the hotel and reported the matter to the owner of the hotel. The owner of the hotel informed the matter to the East Agratala Police Station on 18.8.2003. 20. The police arrested the appellant-accused from Gouri Hotel at Teliamora and brought him to Rajdhani hotel on 19.8.2003 at 1 p.m. At that time, the hotel owner, P.W. -4 and all other staff of the hotel and some public were also present in the hotel. On seeing the appellant accused, the owner of the hotel, Shri Dilip Kumar Roy, P.W. -4 asked him why he fled away from the hotel; to that the appellant-accused replied in presence of all the he had killed the victim. On seeing the appellant accused, the owner of the hotel, Shri Dilip Kumar Roy, P.W. -4 asked him why he fled away from the hotel; to that the appellant-accused replied in presence of all the he had killed the victim. He also described how he killed (already described by the P.W. 4 in his statement). P.W. 4, the owner of the hotel, again asked why he (appellant-accused) killed the victim. The appellant-accused replied that he killed the victim because he always complained to the Manager and the owner about his late coming and also on receipt of the said complaint the Manager and the owner used to scold him. 21. On 17.8.2003 also the victim came late to the hotel. After seeing him the Manager started to rebuke for his late coming. The appellant-accused further stated that in the same night, i.e. on 18.8.2003 when the victim was washing his mouth in the basin, the appellant-accused gave a dao blow on his neck. Then the victim tried to save himself. Again the appellant-accused gave another blow on his (victim) neck and as a result he (victim) fell down on the ground. Thereafter, he put on napkin, i.e. Gown used by the helper or/cook and cut into pieces the body of the victim and packed in four gunny bags collected from the kitchen and ground floor where the construction work for extension of the hotel was going on. He also stated clearly that he killed the victim in the said toilet of the Gents which is near the eastern side of the Conference Hall in the 5th floor of the hotel where there was a party of the Doctors on 17.8.2003 in the night. He further stated that he took the two gunny bags containing cut pieces of the body of the victim with his bicycle to the Laxmi Narayan Bari Digi. He also stated that he could show the pieces of the shirt and pant of the victim which he concealed in the hotel complex, i.e. on the ceiling of 5th Tala (floor) of the hotel. After killing of the victim, the weapon of the crime, i.e. "Boty dao' and Takkal" were kept after washing in the kitchen. On his pointing the said weapon of the crime, also wearing apparels, the two gunny bags containing pieces of the dead body which was left at Laxmi Narayan Bari Dighi were seized. After killing of the victim, the weapon of the crime, i.e. "Boty dao' and Takkal" were kept after washing in the kitchen. On his pointing the said weapon of the crime, also wearing apparels, the two gunny bags containing pieces of the dead body which was left at Laxmi Narayan Bari Dighi were seized. 22. In the cross examination of the P.Ws.-4 and 6, their statements in the chief could not be shaken. Nothing could come out from their statements in the cross examination contrary to their statements in the chief. There was no effective cross examination. P.W. -7, Soumitra Paul (his statement was recorded on 30.8.2004) deposed that he had been working in the Rajdhani hotel for about four and half years as Manager. The victim, Arun Khatowa, and also the appellant-accused were the hotel boys of Rajdhani hotel and Shri Subal Jana, P.W. -6, was the Head Cook of the hotel and Shri Sankar Giri, P.W. -11 was the Assistant Cook of the hotel. P.W. -4, Dilip Kumar Roy is the owner of the hotel. Shri Anshuman Pattanayak, Sankar Giri, P.W.-11, Pintu Das, P.W. -8, Rabindra Nath Giri and Pradip Deb are also staff of the hotel. 23. On 17.8.2003 there was a party of the Doctors in the Conference Hall at 5th floor of the hotel; for that party P.W. -6 Subal Jana was the Head Cook. The appellant-accused, Arjun Debnath and the victim, Arun Khatowa were the service Boys of the said party. The house of the appellant-accused is in Machamara and that of the victim is in Medinipore. On that day, the said party was over at about 11 p.m. On the same night he left the hotel at about 11 p.m. for his house. When he left the hotel, P.W. -6 Subal Jana, Victim (Arun Khatowa) and the appellant-accused were at the hotel for cleaning the utensils and the floor of the room, i.e. the floor of the conference hall. At the relevant time in Rajdhani Hotel extension work was going on. On the following day, i.e. on 18.8.03 he came to the hotel at about 10.30 A.M. and except the victim, Arun Khatowa, he had seen all the staff of the hotel. Then, he asked the appellant-accused about the whereabouts of the victim. In reply, he said that the victim left just after the party of the Doctors was over. On the following day, i.e. on 18.8.03 he came to the hotel at about 10.30 A.M. and except the victim, Arun Khatowa, he had seen all the staff of the hotel. Then, he asked the appellant-accused about the whereabouts of the victim. In reply, he said that the victim left just after the party of the Doctors was over. On that night, he received an amount of Rs. 2000/- from the organiser of the party as advance. The balance amount was received by the appellant-accused and the victim. So, on the next day, i.e. on 18.8.2003 he asked for the balance amount to the appellant-accused; to that he replied that the money was left with the victim. Then, Subal Jana, P.W. -6 and Sankar Giri, P.W. -11 were searching the whereabouts of the victim and thereafter they returned to the hotel at about 3 p.m. telling that they could not trace-out the whereabouts of the victim, hereafter, they heard that a human body was recovered under the hanging river Pratapgarh and the dead body was taken to IGM Hospital's morgue by the police. On getting the information, Subal Jana, P.W. -6 and Sankar Giri, P.W. -11 went to the hospital and they identified the dead body as the dead body of the victim. 24. The owner of the hotel, Shri Dilip Kumar Roy, P.W. -4 also informed the police for inquiring the whereabouts of the appellant-accused who fled away from the hotel. Thereafter Subal Jana, P.W. -6 and P.W. -11 Sankar Giri informed that the police are coming to the hotel. On 19.8.03 police brought the appellant-accused under arrest in the hotel at about 11 p.m. By that time, the owner of the hotel, Dilip Kumar Roy and all other staff and some public were present in the hotel. On seeing the appellant accused, the owner asked him why he fled away from the hotel; in reply to that the appellant-accused stated in presence of all that he had killed the victim and he also described how he killed (already described by the P.W. -4 Dilip Kumar Roy (owner) in his statement). The appellant further stated that he killed the victim because he (victim) always lodged complaint to P.W. -7 Manager and to the owner Shri Dilip Kumar Roy, P.W. -4 and on receipt of the complaint he was rebuked for his late coming. The appellant further stated that he killed the victim because he (victim) always lodged complaint to P.W. -7 Manager and to the owner Shri Dilip Kumar Roy, P.W. -4 and on receipt of the complaint he was rebuked for his late coming. For such complaint he decided to kill the victim. 25. On 17.8.2003 the appellant-accused came late to the hotel and after seeing him he was rebuked by the Manager and the owner of the hotel. He stated very clearly in the manner P.W. -4 described in his statement as to how he cut the victim into pieces. He also stated that in the night, i.e. on 17.8.2003 when the victim was washing his mouth in the basin of the Gents toilet near the conference hall in the 5th floor of the hotel where Doctors' party was held, the appellant-accused gave a dao blow on his neck, then the appellant-accused tried to save himself and then again the appellant-accused gave another blow on his (victim) neck as a result of which the victim fell down on the ground. Thereafter, he put on napkin, i.e. gown used by the helper and Cook and cut the dead body of the victim into pieces with the help of said 'dao' and 'takkal' and packed in four gunny bags-1 gunny bag collected from the kitchen and 3 empty cement bags collected from the ground floor where construction work of the extension of the hotel was going on. Then he concealed two bags in Laxmi Narayan Bari Dighi and other two bags under the hanging bridge Pratapgarh. He also stated that he could point out the place where the weapon of the crime, wearing apparels of the victim were concealed and two bags containing the cut pieces of the victim concealed in Laxmi Narayan Bari Dighi in their presence. At his pointing the police seized the incriminating weapon of the crime, wearing apparels of the victim from the Hotel and the said two bags containing cut pieces of the victim from Laxmi Narayan Bari Dighi in their presence. 26. At his pointing the police seized the incriminating weapon of the crime, wearing apparels of the victim from the Hotel and the said two bags containing cut pieces of the victim from Laxmi Narayan Bari Dighi in their presence. 26. P.Ws.-4, 6 and 7 stated that the appellant-accused stated in presence of title police who were at the hotel on 19.8.2003 that the appellant-accused could point out the place where the wearing apparels of the victim, the incriminating weapon of the crime and the said two gunny bags were kept concealed by him and at his pointing those material exhibits were seized by the police. P.W. 17 Shri Dilip Kumar Chowdhury, Manager of the Gouri Hotel at Teliamora stated that on 18.8.2003 he was the Manager of Gouri Hotel at Teliamora. Name of the hotel owner is Sujit Ghosh, P.W. -18. In the evening of 18.8.2003 police came to the hotel and at the time he and the owner of the hotel were present. The police told them that they are coming to search for the appellant-accused. The police personally searched all the rooms of the hotel and they found a boy in Room No. 6 of the hotel. On being asked, the boy replied that his name was Raju Sarkar. The police personnel again told him to speak the truth to tell his name. Thereafter, the boy told that his real name is Arun Debnath (appellant-accused) and he further stated that his house is situated at Machamara at North Tripura. The appellant-accused stated that after killing the hotel boy of Rajdhani hotel, i.e. the victim, he fled away from the hotel, i.e. Rajdhani hotel in the very evening of 18.8.2003. He tried to go to Gauhati, but he could not proceed to Gauhati for want of escort. The police personnel also seized the hotel Book Register of the Gouri Hotel wherein the appellant-accused had recorded his name wrongly as Raju Sarkar. The statement of the P.W. -17 was also corroborated by the statement of the P.W. -18 Shri Sujit Ghosh who runs the hotel, i.e. Gouri hotel. 27. The police personnel also seized the hotel Book Register of the Gouri Hotel wherein the appellant-accused had recorded his name wrongly as Raju Sarkar. The statement of the P.W. -17 was also corroborated by the statement of the P.W. -18 Shri Sujit Ghosh who runs the hotel, i.e. Gouri hotel. 27. It is nobody's dispute that the victim met with the homicidal death, the cut pieces of one body in the said four gunny bags seized by the police were also of the corpse of the victim, and also the seizure of the incriminating weapon of the crime, wearing apparels of the victim and the seizure of the said four gunny bags were not disputed by the appellant-accused, but the defence case of the appellant-accused is that he is not the author of the crime. In other words, the only case of the appellant is the simple denial that he is the author of the crime. 28. From the statements of the P.Ws., the statement of the appellant-accused leading to the discovery and seizure of the wearing apparels of the victim, weapon of the crime and also the two gunny bags containing cut pieces of the victim and his extra judicial confession before the P.W. -4, P.W. -6, P.W. -7, P.W. -11, P.W. -17 and P.W. -18 that he killed the victim, it is the case of the prosecution that following facts and circumstances are established beyond reasonable doubt:- (A) The appellant-accused and the victim were serving as hotel boys in the Rajdhani hotel. In the night between 17/18.8.2003, there was a party of the Doctors in the Conference Hall at 5th floor of the Rajdhani hotel and for that party P.W. -6 Subal Jana was the Head Cook of the party and the appellant-accused and the victim were the hotel boys who served food to the Doctors participating in the party. (B) The said party of the Doctors was over at about 11/11.30 p.m. of 17.8.2003, and after the party was over Subal Jana, P.W. -6 had been requested by the appellant-accused to go to sleep and the appellant-accused also stated that he and the victim would leave the hotel after their work, i.e. cleaning of the utensils and floor of the Conference hall where the party of the Doctors was held. (C) The P.W. -6, Subal Jana, Head Cook of the hotel was retiring in his room by the side of the kitchen which is just below the conference room at the 5th floor of the hotel where the party of the Doctors was held, late in the night, i.e. between 17/18.8.2003, after the party was over, and also when Subal Jana was retiring in his room, there was nobody except the appellant-accused and the victim who were also hotel boys served food to the Doctors in the said party and they were cleaning the utensils and also the floor of the conference hall. The appellant-accused killed the victim inside the Gents toilet near the conference hall when the victim was washing his mouth with the 'dao' and after killing the victim, the appellant-accused cut corpse of the victim into many pieces with 'dao' and "Takkal. The incriminating weapon of the crime were also taken from the Kitchen of the hotel by the Appellant-accused. (D) At the time of the incident, i.e. in the month of August, 2003 extension work of the hotel was going on. The cut pieces of the corpse of the victim were packed in 4 (four) gunny bags (1 gunny bag for keeping rice from the kitchen and the 3 (three) empty cement bags from the work-site of the extension work of the hotel). The appellant-accused had taken the 4 (four) gunny bags -2 to Laxmi Narayan Bari Dighi and other 2 (two) bags under the hanging bridge Pratapgarh. The appellant-accused stated that the incriminating weapon of the crime, wearing apparels of the victim and the two gunny bags containing cut pieces of the corpse of the victim were kept concealed and he could point out the place where those were kept concealed, to the police. At his pointing the police had seized those incriminating weapon of the crime, wearing apparels of the victim and the said two gunny bags in the presence of the witnesses. (E) In the instant case, the appellant-accused made extra judicial confessions in presence of P.W. -4 Dilip Kumar Roy, P.W. -6 Subal Jana, P.W. -7 Saumitra Paul, P.W. -11 Sankar Giri, P.W.,-17 Dilip Kumar. Choudhury and P.W. -18 Sujit Ghosh-that he (appellant-accused) killed the victim. (E) In the instant case, the appellant-accused made extra judicial confessions in presence of P.W. -4 Dilip Kumar Roy, P.W. -6 Subal Jana, P.W. -7 Saumitra Paul, P.W. -11 Sankar Giri, P.W.,-17 Dilip Kumar. Choudhury and P.W. -18 Sujit Ghosh-that he (appellant-accused) killed the victim. In the present case;, further, there is no reason and circumstance to show that the said extrajudicial confessions of the appellant-accused had been made under undue influence, coercion and pressure of the said P.Ws. and also that the said P.Ws. before whom the appellant-accused made the extrajudicial confessions had enmity with the appellant-accused so that they might falsely state that there were the said extra judicial confessions of the appellant-accused. Over and above, in the instant case, the intending circumstance clearly proves that the appellant-accused made the said extrajudicial confessions voluntarily. 29. The requirements for utilizing the fact discovered under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act had been discussed by the Apex Court in Anter Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2004) 10 SCC 657 and held that the first condition necessary for bringing Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act into operation is the discovery of a fact, albeit a relevant fact, in consequence of the information discovered from a person accused of an offence. The second is that the discovery of such fact to be deposed to. The third is that at the time of receipt of the information the accused must be in police custody. The last but the most important condition is that only "so much of the information" as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered is admission. 30. Para Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the SCC in Anter Singh's case (supra) are quoted hereunder: 11. The scope and ambit of Section 27 of the Evidence Act were illuminatingly stated in Pulukuri Kottaya Vs. Emperor in the following words, which have become locus classicus: (AIR p. 70, para 10) (1) It is fallacious to treat the 'fact discovered' within the section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody that I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house' does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added 'with which I stabbed A' these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant. 12. The aforesaid position was again highlighted in Prabhoo Vs. State of U.P. 13. Although the interpretation and scope of Section 27 has been subject of several authoritative pronouncements, its application to concrete cases in the background events proved therein is not always free from difficulty. It will, therefore, be worthwhile at the outset, to have a short and swift glance at Section 27 and be reminded of its requirements. The section says: 27. Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved. 14. The expression 'provided that' together with the phrase "whether it amounts to a confession or not" shows that the section is in the nature of an exception to the preceding provisions particularly Sections 25 and 26. It is not necessary in this case to consider if this section qualifies, to any extent, Section 24, also. It will be seen that the first condition necessary for bringing this section into operation is the discovery of a fact, albeit a relevant fact, in consequence of the information received from a person accused of an offence. The second is that the discovery of such fact must be deposed to. The third is that at the time of the receipt of the information the accused must be in police custody. The second is that the discovery of such fact must be deposed to. The third is that at the time of the receipt of the information the accused must be in police custody. The last but the most important condition is that only "so much of the information" as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered is admissible. The rest of the information has to be excluded. The word "distinctly" means "directly", "indubitably", "strictly", "unmistakably". The word has been advisedly used to limit and define the scope of the provable information. The phrase "distinctly" relates" to the fact whereby discovered" and is the linchpin of the provision. This phrase refers to that part of the information supplied by the accused which is the direct and immediate cause of the discovery. The reason behind this partial lifting of the ban against confession and statements made to the police, is that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given by the accused, it affords some guarantee of truth of that part, and that part only, of the information which was the clear, immediate and proximate cause of the discovery. No such guarantee or assurance attaches to the rest of the statement which may be indirectly or remotely related to the fact discovered [Reference: Mohd. Inayatuallah vs. State of Maharashtra: (1976) 1 SCC 828 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 199: AIR 1976 SC 483 ]. 15. At one time it was held that the expression: "fact discovered" in the section is restricted to a physical or material fact which can be perceived by the senses, and that it does not include a mental fact, now it is fairly settled that the expression "fact discovered" includes not only the physical object produced, but also the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, as noted in Pulukuri Kottaya case: AIR 1947 PC 67: 74 1A 65:48 Cri LJ 533 and in Udai Bhan Vs. State of U.P.: AIR 1962 SC 1116 : (1962) 2 Cri LJ 251. 16. The various requirements of the section can be summed up as follows: (1) The fact of which evidence is sought to be given must be relevant to the issue. It must be borne in mind that the provision has nothing to do with the question of relevancy. 16. The various requirements of the section can be summed up as follows: (1) The fact of which evidence is sought to be given must be relevant to the issue. It must be borne in mind that the provision has nothing to do with the question of relevancy. The relevancy of the fact discovered must be established according to the prescription relating to relevancy of other evidence connecting it with the crime in order to make the fact discovered admissible. (2) The fact must have been discovered. (3) The discovery must have been in consequence of some information received from the accused and not by the accused's own act. (4) The person giving the information must be accused of any offence. (5) He must be in the custody of a police office. (6) The discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from an accused in custody must be deposed to. (7) Thereupon only that portion of the information which relates distinctly or strictly to the fact discovered can be proved. The rest is inadmissible. 31. The Apex Court also discussed the pre-requisite for utilizing the fact discovered in consequence of information received from the accused under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act in State of (NCT of Delhi) Vs. Navjot Sandhu (2005) 11 SCC 600 . Para 121, 123, 132, 136 and 142 of the SCC of Navjot Sandhu (supra) are quoted hereunder: 121. The first requisite condition for utilizing Section 27 in support of the prosecution case is that the investigating police officer should depose that he discovered a fact in consequence of the information received from an accused person in police custody. Thus, there must be a discovery of fact not within the knowledge of police officer as a consequence of information or disclosure should be free from any element of compulsion. The next component of Section 27 relates to the nature and extent of information that can be proved. It is only so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered that can be proved and nothing more. It is explicitly clarified in the section that there is no taboo against receiving such information in evidence merely because it amounts to a confession. It is only so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered that can be proved and nothing more. It is explicitly clarified in the section that there is no taboo against receiving such information in evidence merely because it amounts to a confession. At the same time, the last clause makes it clear that it is not the confessional part that is admissible but it is only such information or part of it, which relates distinctly to the fact discovered by means of the information furnished. Thus, the information conveyed in the statement of the police ought to be dissected if necessary so as to admit only the information of the nature mentioned in the section. The rationale behind this provision Is that, if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of the information supplied, it affords some guarantee that the information is true and can therefore be safely allowed to be admitted in evidence as an incriminating factor against the accused Privy Council in Purukuri Kottaya Vs. Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 64: 48 Cri LJ 533:74 IA 65 (AIR p. 70, para 10). Clearly the extent of the information admissible must depend on the exact nature of the fact discovered And the information must distinctly relate to that fact. Elucidating the scope of this section, the Privy Council speaking through Sir John Beaumont said: (AIR p 70, para 10) Normally the section is brought into operation when a person in police custody produces from some place of concealment some object, such as dead body, a weapon, or ornaments, said to be connected with the crime of which the informant is accused (Emphasis supplied). We have emphasized the word "normally" because the illustrations given by the learned Judge are not exhaustive. The next point to be noted is that the Privy Council rejected the argument of the counsel appearing for the Crown that the fact discovered is the physical object produced and that any and every information which relates distinctly to that object can be proved. Upon this view, the information given by a person that the weapon produced is the one used by him in the commission of the murder will be admissible in its entirely. Upon this view, the information given by a person that the weapon produced is the one used by him in the commission of the murder will be admissible in its entirely. Such contention of the Crown's counsel was emphatically rejected with the following words: (AIR p. 70, para 10) If this be the effect of Section 27, little substance would remain in the ban imposed by the two preceding sections on confessions made to the police, or by persons in policy custody. The ban was presumably inspired by the fear of the legislature that a person under police influence might be induced to confess by the exercise of undue pressure. But if all that is required to lift the ban by the inclusion in the confession of Information relating to an object subsequently produced, it seems reasonable to suppose that the persuasive powers of the police will prove equal to the occasion, and that in practice the ban will lose its effect. Then, their Lordships proceeded to give a lucid expression of the expression "fact discovered" in the following passage, which is quoted time and again by this Court: (AIR p/70, para 10). In their Lordships' view it is fallacious to treat the 'fact discovered' within the section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody that 'I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of any house' does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been, used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added 'with which I stabbed A' these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant. (emphasis supplied) 123. But if to the statement the words be added 'with which I stabbed A' these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant. (emphasis supplied) 123. In para 11, their Lordships observed that they were in agreement with the view taken by the High Courts of Lahore and Bombay in Sukhan Vs. Emperor and Ganu Chandra Vs. Emperor. The contrary view taken by the Madras High Court in Athappa Goundan. In Athappa Goundan case was not accepted by the Privy Council, In Athapa Goudan case the High Court held that even that part of the confessional statement, which revealed the connection between the objects produced and the commission of murder was held to be admissible under Section 27 in its entirety. This approach was criticized by the Privy Council. To complete the sequence, we may refer to another decision of the Madras High Court in Emperor Vs. Ramanjua Ayyangar, In that case, the majority of learned Judges had disagreed with the view taken in Sukhan case that the expression "fact" in Section 27 should be restricted to material objects or something which can be exhibited as material object. It was held that the fact need not be self-probatory and the word "fact" as contemplated by Section 27 is not limited to "actual physical material object," Emphasis was laid on the wording "any fact." In this respect, the view taken in Sukhan case was dissented from. The minority view was that the discovery of a witness to the crime or the act of the accused in purchasing the incriminating material cannot be proved by invoking Section 27. We have referred to this decision in Ramanuja Ayyangar case for the reason that the expression "fact" was given a wider meaning in this case-which is the meaning now sought to be given by Mr. Gopal Subramanium. In Athappa Goundan case the connotation of the word "fact" i.e. whether it can be restricted to a material object was not specifically dealt with. The reason for referring to these two decisions of the Madras High Court rendered before Kottaya case becomes evident when we advert to the decision of this Court in Om Prakash a little later. 132. In Athappa Goundan case the connotation of the word "fact" i.e. whether it can be restricted to a material object was not specifically dealt with. The reason for referring to these two decisions of the Madras High Court rendered before Kottaya case becomes evident when we advert to the decision of this Court in Om Prakash a little later. 132. The following observations are also crucial: As explained by this Court as well as by the Privy Council, normally Section 27 is brought into operation where a person in police custody produces from some place of concealment some object said to be connected with the crime of which the informant is the accused. The concealment of the fact which is not known to the police is what is discovered by the information and lends assurance that the information was true. No witness with whom some material fact, such as the weapon of murder, stolen property or other incriminating article is not hidden, sold or kept and which is unknown to the police can be said to be discovered as a consequence of the information furnished by the accused. These examples however are only by way of illustration and are not exhaustive. What makes the information leading to the discovery of the witness admissible is the discovery from him of the thing sold to him or hidden or kept with him which the police did not know until the information was furnished to them by the accused. A witness cannot be said to be discovered if nothing is to be found or recovered from him as a consequence of the information furnished by the accused and the information which disclosed the identity of the witness will not be admissible. Then follows the statement of law: But even apart from the admissibility of the information under Section 27, the evidence of the Investigating Officer and the panchas that the accused had taken them to P.W. 11 and pointed him out and as corroborated by P.W. 11 himself would be admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act as conduct of the accused. 136. 136. We may add that in the case of Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka (1983) 2 SCC 330 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 447, A.P. Sen, J. Speaking for the Bench observed (See p. 337, para 7) that the word "fact" in Section 27 "means some concrete or material 'fact to which the information directly relates." Then His Lordship quoted the famous passage in Kottaya case. However, there was no elaboration. 142. There is more point which we would like to discuss i.e. whether pointing out a material object by the accused furnishing the information is a necessary concomitant of Section 27. We think that the answer should be in the negative. Though in most of the cases the person who makes the disclosure himself leads the police officer to the place where an object is concealed and points out the same to him, however, it is not essential that there should be such pointing out in order to make the information admissible under Section 27. It could very well be that on the basis of information furnished by the accused, the investigating officer may go to the spot in the company of other witnesses and recover the material object. By doing so, the investigating officer will be discovering a fact viz. the concealment of an incriminating article and the knowledge of the accused furnishing the information about it. In other words, where the information furnished by the person in custody is verified by the police officer by going to the spot mentioned by the informant and finds it to be correct, that amounts to discovery of fact within the meaning of Section 27. Of course, it is subject to the rider that the information so furnished by the immediate and proximate cause of discovery. If the police officer chooses not to take the informant accused to the spot, it will have no bearing on the point of admissibility under Section 27, though it may be one of the aspects that goes into evaluation of that particular piece of evidence. 32. The Apex Court in Modan Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (1978) 4 SCC 435 held that if the Investigating officer who recovered the material object is convincing the evidence as to recovery need not be rejected on the ground that seizure witness do not support the prosecution version. 32. The Apex Court in Modan Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (1978) 4 SCC 435 held that if the Investigating officer who recovered the material object is convincing the evidence as to recovery need not be rejected on the ground that seizure witness do not support the prosecution version. We are of the considered view that the statement of the Investigating Officer, i.e. P.W. -21 and seizure witnesses about the discovery of the said material exhibits, are very convincing. Para 9 of the SCC in Modan Singh's case (supra) is quoted hereunder: 9. The only other material on which the prosecution can connect the appellant with the crime is the recovery of the fired cartridge, Ex. 9 and the seizure of the pistol Ex. S and the deposition of the ballistic expert, P.W. -9. It is found that the witnesses who have been examined for attesting the seizure have not supported the prosecution version. On behalf of the defence it was submitted that the seizure witnesses were men of status in the village and their not supporting the recovery would be fatal to the prosecution. We would rather not place any reliance on the witnesses who attested the seizure memo. If the evidence of the investigating officer who recovered the material objects is convincing, the evidence as to recovery need not be rejected on the ground that seizure witnesses do not support the prosecution version. According to the investigating officer, P.W. -12, he recovered a live cartridge lying on the ground towards the head of the cot wherein the dead body was found lying and an empty cartridge lying near the cot of that room. The recovery memo was marked Ex. P-14. The recovery of the pistol, Ex. 8 from the person of Modan Singh was on December 20, at the police station itself and the recovery memo is Ex. P-23. An empty cartridge, a live cartridge and a pistol case were recovered from the house of Madan Singh on 23rd and the seizure memo was prepared but the prosecution failed to lead evidence that the material objects were properly kept till they were sent to the expert on February 6, 1967 by a special messenger. The Investigating Officer would only say that the material objects were kept sealed up to December 14, 1966. The Investigating Officer would only say that the material objects were kept sealed up to December 14, 1966. The prosecution is silent as to in whose custody the material objects were till February 6, 1967. Added to all these infirmities, we find that the ballistic expert, P.W. -9 had in his report, Ex. P-25, stated as follows: The fired cartridge has been marked C/1 by me. It had been fired from the pistol under reference. The barrel of the pistol is loose for.303 bullets and hence, reliable markings on the test bullets could not be obtained. Therefore, the bullets mentioned above could not be identified in respect of the weapon under reference. In the evidence, no doubt, the ballistic expert stated that he fired test cartridges studied them and found that the markings on the test cartridges were similar to the marking in cartridge, Ex. 9. Though he had referred to his report, Ex. P-25, which has been extracted above, no question was put to the ballistic expert as to how he was able to fire test cartridges when in his statement he stated that the barrel of the pistol was loose and the bullets mentioned could not be identified in respect of the weapon under reference. It is strange that the witness was not asked to explain the statement in Ex. P-25; neither the trial Court nor the High Court has referred to this aspect. After reading carefully the evidence of P.W. -9, the ballistic expert and his report, we are far from satisfied that the prosecution has established that the cartridge, Ex. 9 was fired from Ex. 8. 33. The Apex Court in Suresh Chandra Bahri Vs. State of Bihar: AIR 1994 SC 2420 held that non recording; of the disclosure statement and non examination of the public witness as regards recovery would be of no consequence if the recovery itself, in the given case, is trustworthy. Para 71 of the AIR in Suresh Chandra Bahri's case (supra) read as under: 71. The two essential requirements for the application of Section 27 of the Evidence Act are that (1) the person giving information must be an accused of any offence, and (2) he must also be in police custody. Para 71 of the AIR in Suresh Chandra Bahri's case (supra) read as under: 71. The two essential requirements for the application of Section 27 of the Evidence Act are that (1) the person giving information must be an accused of any offence, and (2) he must also be in police custody. In the present case it cannot be disputed that although these essential requirements existed on the date when Gurbanchan Singh led P.W. 59 and others to the hillock where according to him he had thrown the dead body of Urshia but instead of the dead body the articles by which her body was wrapped were found. The provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act are based on the view that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given, some guarantee is afforded thereby that the information was true and consequently the said information can safely be allowed to be given in evidence because if such an information is further fortified and confirmed by the discovery of articles or the instrument of crime and which leads to the belief that the information about the confession made as to the articles of crime cannot be false. In the present case as discussed above the confessional statement of the disclosure made by the appellant Gurbachan Singh is confirmed by the recovery of the incriminating articles as said above and, therefore, there is reason to believe that the disclosure statement was true and the evidence led in that behalf is also worthy of credence. 34. This Court (Full Bench) in Rajiv Phukan & Anr. Vs. State of Assam: 2010 Cri. L.J. 338: 2009 (2) GLT 414 held that the disclosure statement of the appellant to be admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, is not statutorily required to be reduced in writing though prudence demands that such information should be reduced in writing in order to enable the Court to know exactly as to what the accused is allegedly to have stated and extent of which information by him is admissible. Therefore, it is the opinion of the Full Bench of this Court that the disclosure statement under Section 27 of the Act is not compulsorily required to be reduced in writing nor there is any statutory requirements for recording the disclosure statement in writing. Therefore, it is the opinion of the Full Bench of this Court that the disclosure statement under Section 27 of the Act is not compulsorily required to be reduced in writing nor there is any statutory requirements for recording the disclosure statement in writing. Para 52, 55 and 56 of the judgment in Rajib Phukan's case (supra) read as follows: 52. From the observations, so made, in Abdul Hafiz (supra), it becomes clear that though Section 27 does not make it mandatory to record the disclosure statement, the fact remains that when more than one accused is involved in a given case, the Investigating Officer, who records the statement, which leads to the discovery of the fact, must depose in the Court, as to which accused person, amongst the accused persons facing the trial, was the one, who had made the statement first and had, thereby, led to the discovery of the fact. 55. From the emphasized portion of the observations made above, in Bodhraj (2002 Cri LJ 4664) (supra), it becomes clear that though the information (which the prosecution relies upon to show that the accused gave the information, which led to the discovery of a fact), should be recorded and proved, but if it is not so recorded, the exact information must be adduced through evidence. Obviously, such evidence would mean oral evidence, or some other evidence in the form of audio visuals or tape. Nonetheless, what clearly transpires from the decision, in Bodhraj (supra), is that even when a statement, leading to discovery of fact, has not been reduced into writing, such a statement is still admissible in evidence, through the probative value thereof would depend on the facts and circumstances of a given case. 56. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, we conclude that a disclosure statement to be admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not statutorily required to be reduced into writing, though prudence demands that such an information should be reduced into writing in order to enable the Court to know exactly as to what the accused is allegedly to have stated and the extent to which the information given by him is admissible. The reference shall stand answered accordingly. 35. The reference shall stand answered accordingly. 35. For the foregoing discussion, keeping in view the law laid, down by the Apex Court regarding the requirements of admissibility of the disclosure statement under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, we are of the considered view that since the statements of the P.Ws. discussed above regarding recovery and seizure of the incriminating weapon of the crime, i.e. 'Dao' and 'Takkal', wearing apparels of the victim and the two gunny bags containing cut pieces of the corpse of the victim under the disclosure statement made by the appellant-accused and at his pointing are trustworthy, accordingly admissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. 36. Extra judicial confession, if through a voluntary, can be relied upon by the Court to convict the appellant/accused for the commission of the crime alleged. It is now well settled position, of law that, if extrajudicial confession was made before a person who has no reason to state falsely and to whom it is made in the circumstances which tends to support the statement, cannot be ignored and also that evidence in the form of extrajudicial confession made by 'the accused to witness cannot be always; termed to be a tainted evidence. Collaboration of such evidence is required only by way of abundant caution. [Ref: (1) Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh Vs. State of Vindhya Pradesh: AIR 1954 SC 322 and (2) Maghar Singh Vs. State of Punjab 1975 4 SCC 234 ]. The Apex Court in Kishorechand Vs. State of H.P. reported in (1991) 1 SCC 286 held that: Unambiguous extra judicial confession possesses high probative value force as it emanates from the person who committed the crime and is admissible in evidence provided it is free from suspicion and suggestion of any falsity. However, before relying on the extra judicial confession, the Court has to be satisfied with its voluntary and is not the result of inducement, threat or promise envisaged under Section 24 of the Evidence Act. 37. The Apex Court in Gura Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2001) 2 SCC 205 had discussed the evidentiary value of extrajudicial confession and requirements to be fulfilled for forming the extra judicial confession as the basis for conviction of the accused. 37. The Apex Court in Gura Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2001) 2 SCC 205 had discussed the evidentiary value of extrajudicial confession and requirements to be fulfilled for forming the extra judicial confession as the basis for conviction of the accused. The portions of the Apex Court judgment in Gura Singh's case (supra) which spell out the prosecution story are quoted hereunder:- It is also necessary to note the relationship of the witnesses with the deceased and the appellant. Bhajan Singh, the unfortunate victim of the crime had two wives. The appellant is the son from the second wife Ms Har Kaur who was previously married to one Kapur Singh. Joginder Singh (P.W. 7) is the son and Niranjan Singh (P.W. 6) is the son-in-law from the first wife of the victim. Bhajan Singh, the deceased had a brother, namely, Rood Singh whose son is Jarnail Singh (P.W. 2). Bhajan Singh, the deceased was in possession of 105 bighas of land at Badopal (Rajasthan) where he used to live with the appellant. Joginder Singh (P.W. 7) was living in Punjab where he looked after 40 acres of the other land belonging to Bhajan Singh and his family. Some altercation is stated to have taken place between Bhajan Singh and the appellant some days before the occurrence regarding expenditure incurred by the accused in the marriage of his sister-in-law and installation of a hand pump. On the day of occurrence which led to the killing of the deceased, the conversation commenced on the same issue which was not taken kindly by the appellant who inflicted the kassi blow at 1 a.m. on 7.7.1976 resulting in the death of the deceased. On the next morning the appellant went to Jarnail Singh (P.W. 2) and confessed about the commission of the crime and the manner in which the injuries were caused resulting in the death of the deceased Bhajan Singh. In the company of Jarnail Singh (P.W. 5), Niranjan Singh (P.W. 6) and Joginder Singh (P.W. 7) making before them the extra judicial confession and requesting them to help him. Jarnail Singh (P.W. 2) and Billor Singh (P.W. 5) thereafter called Amar Singh, Panch,. Jarnail Singh lodged the first information report (Ext. p/2) at 12.30 p.m. at Police Station Karanpur which was at a distance of 8 kilometres from the place of occurrence. Jarnail Singh (P.W. 2) and Billor Singh (P.W. 5) thereafter called Amar Singh, Panch,. Jarnail Singh lodged the first information report (Ext. p/2) at 12.30 p.m. at Police Station Karanpur which was at a distance of 8 kilometres from the place of occurrence. The appellant was arrested on the same day. He made the disclosure statement (Exhibit P-21) consequent to which kassi, the weapon of offence (Exhibit P-19) was recovered. Again on 12.7.1976 the appellant made another disclosure statement in consequence of which a chadar (sheet) (Exhibit P-12) stained with blood was recovered vide (Exhibit P-22). The Apex Court in Guru Singh's case (supra) held that: Extra judicial confession, if true and voluntary, it can be relied upon by the Court to convict the accused for the commission of the crime alleged. Despite inherent weakness of extra judicial confession as an item of evidence, it cannot be ignored when shown that such confession was made before a person who has no reason to state falsely and to whom it is made in the circumstances which tend to support the statement. That the evidence in the form of extra judicial confession made by the accused to witnesses cannot be always termed to be a tainted evidence. Corroboration of such evidence is required only by way of abundant caution. If the Court believes the witness before whom the confession is made and is satisfied that the confession was true and voluntarily made, then the conviction can be founded on such evidence alone. It is not open to the Court trying the criminal case to start with a presumption that extra judicial confession is always a weak type of evidence. It would depend on the nature of the circumstances, the time when the confession is made and the credibility of the witnesses who speak for such a confession." 38. We have given our conscious application of mind to the statements of the P.Ws. discussed above regarding the extrajudicial confessions of the Appellant-accused that he had killed the victim and on such consideration in the intending circumstances of the prosecution case, it clear that there is no evidence or material to show that the appellant-accused had been forced or had the coercion or pressure to give the said extrajudicial confession. discussed above regarding the extrajudicial confessions of the Appellant-accused that he had killed the victim and on such consideration in the intending circumstances of the prosecution case, it clear that there is no evidence or material to show that the appellant-accused had been forced or had the coercion or pressure to give the said extrajudicial confession. Over and above, there is no material to show that the P.W. No. 4 Dilip Kumar Roy, P.W. -6 Subal Jana, P.W. -7 Saumitra Paul, P.W. -11 Sankar Giri, P.W. -17 Dilip Kumar Choudhury and P.W. -18 Sujit Ghosh before whom the appellant-accused made the extra judicial confessions had enmity with the appellant-accused and no material to show that the said witnesses had falsely stated that there was extra judicial confessions of the appellant-accused. It is also clear that the appellant-accused had made the said extra judicial confessions voluntarily without any inducement. 39. In Hanumant Govind Nargundkar & Anr Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in AIR 1952 SC 343 , wherein it was observed by the Apex Court thus: It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be in the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to have any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused." A reference may be made to a later decision in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, ( AIR 1984 SC 1622 ). Therein, while dealing with circumstantial evidence, it has been held that onus was; on the prosecution to prove that the chain is complete and the infirmity of lacuna in prosecution, cannot be cured by false defence or plea. The conditions precedent in the words of this Court, before conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence, must be fully established. Therein, while dealing with circumstantial evidence, it has been held that onus was; on the prosecution to prove that the chain is complete and the infirmity of lacuna in prosecution, cannot be cured by false defence or plea. The conditions precedent in the words of this Court, before conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence, must be fully established. They are: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned 'must' or 'should' and not 'may be (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 40. The Apex Court in C. Chenga Reddy & Ors. Vs. State of A.P., reported in (1996) 10 SCC 193 , wherein it has been observed by the Apex Court thus: In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence... 41. In Padala Veera Reddy Vs. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence... 41. In Padala Veera Reddy Vs. State of A.P. & Ors: AIR 1990 SC 79 , it was laid down by the Apex Court that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests: (1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused; (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused land such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence. 42. In State of U.P. Vs. Ashok Kumar Srivastava; 1992 Cri L.J. 1104, it was pointed out that great care must be taken in evaluating circumstantial evidence and if the evidence relied on is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. It was also pointed out that the circumstances relied upon must be found to have been fully established and the cumulative effect of all the facts so established must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt. 43. We have discussed and appreciated the statements of the P.Ws. in the above paras and also have given our anxious consideration of our mind to the said statements keeping in view the ratio laid down by the Apex Court as to how the evidence of circumstantial nature are to be considered and appreciated for considering if the prosecution case is proved to such an extent that there is no hypothesis except the hypothesis of killing of the victim by the appellant-accused. In other words, the chain of evidence is so complete that there is no reason for coming to a conclusion that the appellant-accused is innocent. In other words, the chain of evidence is so complete that there is no reason for coming to a conclusion that the appellant-accused is innocent. On such consideration, we are of the firm view that the circumstantial evidence produced by the prosecution or the statements of the P.Ws. discussed above is so complete that there is no other hypothesis except that the appellant-accused is the author of the crime. No doubt, under our criminal jurisprudence the prosecution has to prove his case beyond reasonable doubt, beyond reasonable doubt does not mean that the prosecution has to prove his case to the extent of absolute. 44. The learned Trial Court, i.e. Addl. Sessions Judge, West Tripura vide the impugned judgment dated 13.11.2006 had convicted the appellant-accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and also for the offence under Section 201 of the IPC and sentenced the appellant-accused to suffer life imprisonment and in addition thereof the appellant-accused had to undergo 2 (two) years imprisonment for the offence under Section 201 of the I.P.C. 45. In the judgment for convicting and sentencing the appellant-accused for life imprisonment and also two years imprisonment for the offence under Section 201 of the IPC nothing is mentioned for the minimum period of the life imprisonment to be suffered by the appellant-accused. No doubt, "life" denotes life of the human being unless contrary appears from the context under Section 45 of the I.P.C. Section 57 of the IPC provides that "in calculating the fraction of term of punishment, imprisonment for fife would be reckoned as equivalent to imprisonment for 20 years. Under Section 432 of the Cr. P.C. appropriate Government has the power to remit whole or any part of the punishment to which accused has been sentenced and further Section 433A of the Cr. P.C. imposes restriction on the appropriate Government in exercising power of remission or commutation in certain cases and under Section 433A of the Cr. PC the appropriate Government by exercising power of remission or commutation cannot release the person under life imprisonment unless he had served at least 14 years of imprisonment. 46. As early as in 1961 the Apex Court (Constitution Bench) in Gopal Vinayak Godse Vs. PC the appropriate Government by exercising power of remission or commutation cannot release the person under life imprisonment unless he had served at least 14 years of imprisonment. 46. As early as in 1961 the Apex Court (Constitution Bench) in Gopal Vinayak Godse Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors: AIR 1961 SC 600 held that there is no provisions of law while undergoing sentence for imprisonment, without formal remission by the appropriate Government can be automatically treated as the one for a definite period. Section 57 of the IPC does not say that transportation for right shall be deemed to be the transportation of twenty years for all purposes nor does the amended Section which substitutes the words, "imprisonment for life" for "transportation for life" enabled the drawing of any such all embracing fiction. No doubt under the Jail Manual or the Rules framed under the Prisons Act of the different states, there is a procedure enabling the appropriate Government to remit sentence of the person undergoing life imprisonment, that is only an enabling provision. That enabling provision is to be exercised taking into consideration of the judgment for conviction and sentence under which the prisoner is undergoing life imprisonment. Para 5 and 8 of the AIR in Gopal Vinayak Godse's case (supra) is quoted below: (5) If so, the next question is whether there is any provision of law whereunder a sentence for life imprisonment, without any formal remission by appropriate Government, can be automatically treated as one for a definite period. No such provision is found in the Indian Penal Code. Code of Criminal Procedure or the Prisons Act. Though the Government of India stated before the Judicial Committee in the case cited supra that having regard to Section 57 of the Indian Penal Code, 20 years' imprisonment was equivalent to a sentence of transportation for life, the Judicial Committee did not express its final opinion on that question. Code of Criminal Procedure or the Prisons Act. Though the Government of India stated before the Judicial Committee in the case cited supra that having regard to Section 57 of the Indian Penal Code, 20 years' imprisonment was equivalent to a sentence of transportation for life, the Judicial Committee did not express its final opinion on that question. The Judicial Committee observed in that case thus at p. 10 (of Ind App): (at p. 67 of AIR): Assuming that the sentence is to be regarded as one of twenty years, and subject to remission for good conduct he had not earned remission sufficient to entitle him to discharge at the time of his application, and it was therefore rightly dismissed, but in saying this, their Lordships are not to be taken as meaning that a life sentence must in all cases be treated as one of not more than twenty years, or that the convict is necessarily entitled to remission. Section 51 of the Indian Penal Code has no real bearing on the question raised before us. For calculating fractions of terms of punishment the section provides that transportation for life shall be regarded as equivalent to imprisonment for twenty years. It does not say that transportation for life shall be deemed to be transportation or twenty years for all purposes; nor does the amended section which substitutes the words "imprisonment for life" for 'transportation for life" enable the drawing of any such all-embracing fiction. A sentence of transportation for life or imprisonment for life must prima facie be treated as transportation or imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the convicted person's natural life. (8) Briefly stated the legal position is this: Before Act XXVI of 1955 a sentence of transportation for life could be undergone by a prisoner for life in a designated prison in India. After the said Act, such a convict shall be dealt with in the same manner as one sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for the same term. Unless the said sentence is commuted the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure, a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment is bound in law to serve the life term in prison. Unless the said sentence is commuted the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure, a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment is bound in law to serve the life term in prison. The rules framed under the Prisons Act enable such a prisoner to earn remissions ordinary, special and State and the said remissions will be given credit towards his term of imprisonment. For the purpose of working out the remission the sentence of transportation for life is ordinarily equated with a definite period, but it is only for that particular purpose and not for any other purpose. As the sentence of transportation for life or its prison equivalent the life imprisonment is one of indefinite duration. The remissions so earned do not in practice help such a convict as it is not possible to predicate the time of his death. That is why the rules provide for a procedure to enable the appropriate Government to remit Criminal Procedure on a consideration of the relevant factors, including the period of remissions earned. The question of remission is exclusively within the province of the appropriate Government; and in this case it is admitted that, though the appropriate Government made certain remissions under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it did not remit the entire sentence. We, therefore, hold that the petitioner has not yet acquired any right to release. 47. The ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Gopal Vinayak Godse's case (supra) is also followed by the Apex Court: in Zahid Hussein & Ors. Vs. State of West Bengal & Anr.: (2001) 3 SCC 750 . Para 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the SCC in Zahid Hussein case (supra) read as follows: 4. This Court after examining the provisions of Article 161 of the Constitution. CrPC and IPC has consistently held that a sentence of imprisonment for life does not automatically expire at the end of 20 years of imprisonment including remission, as a sentence of imprisonment for life means a sentence for the entire life of the prisoner unless the appropriate Government chooses to exercise its discretion to remit either the whole or part of the sentence. (See Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra: AIR 1961 SC 600 . State of MP. Vs. (See Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra: AIR 1961 SC 600 . State of MP. Vs. Ratan Singh (1976) 3 SCC 470 , Sohan Lal v. Asha Ram: (1981) 1 SCC 106 and Bhagirath v. Delhi Admn: (1985) 2 SCC 580 .) 5. We extract below sub-rules (4) and (29) of Rule 591 of the Rules: (4) In considering the cases of prisoners submitted to it under sub-rules (1) and (2), the State Government shall take into consideration (i) the circumstances in each case, (ii) the character of the convict's crime, (iii) his conduct in prison, and (iv) the probability of his reverting to criminal habits or instigating others to commit crime. If the State Government is satisfied that the prisoner can be released without any danger to the society or to the public it may take steps for issue of orders for his release under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. (29) Every case in which a convict, who has not received the benefit of any of the foregoing Rules, is about to complete a period of 20 years of continued detention including remission earned, if any, shall be submitted three months before such completion by the Superintendent of the Jail in which the convict is for the time being detained, through the Inspector General, for orders of the State Government. If the convict's jail records during the last three years of his detention are found to be satisfactory the State Government may remit the remainder of his sentence. 6. These sub-rules do not provide for automatic release of a life convict after he has completed 20 years of the detention including remission. Under these sub-rules the only right which a life convict can be said to have acquired is a right to have his case put up by the prison authorities in time to the State Government for consideration for premature release and in doing so the Government would follow the guidelines mentioned in sub-rule (4). 8. The Explanation came for consideration by this Court in Laxman Naskar (Life Convict) v. State of W.B. (2000) 7 SCC 626 and this Court held that the said imprisonment of a life convict under Section 61, which shall be taken to be equivalent to the period of imprisonment for 20 years and a life convict would not be entitled to automatic release under this provision of law. We, therefore, find no substance in the submission made by Mr. Malik, the learned Senior counsel. 48. The Apex Court in Subash Chander Vs. Krishan Lal & Ors. (2001) 4 SCC 458 had also followed the ratio laid down in Gopal Vinayak Godse's case (supra) and the Zahid Hussein's case (supra) and held that imprisonment of the appellant-accused shall be imprisonment for rest of the life. Para 21 and 23 of the SCC in Subash Chander's case (supra) read as follows: 21. In State of MR v. Ratan Singh (1976) 3 SCC 470 : 1976 (Cri)428 this Court held that a sentence of imprisonment for life does not automatically expire at the end of 20 years, including the remissions, "A sentence of imprisonment for life means a sentence for the entire life of the prisoner unless the appropriate Government chooses to exercise its discretion to remit either the whole or apart of the sentence under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure", observed the Court (at SCC P. 477, para 9). To the same effect are the judgments in Sohan Lal, v. Asha Ram: (1981) 1 SCC 106 , Bhagirath v. Delhi Admn: (1985) 2 SCC 580 and the latest judgment in Zahid Hussein v. State of W.B. (2001) 3 SCC 750 . 23. However, in the peculiar circumstances of the case, apprehending imminent danger to the life of Subash Chander and his family in future, taking on record the statement made on behalf of Krishan Lal (A-1), we are inclined to hold that for him the imprisonment for life shall be the imprisonment in person for the rest of his life. He shall not be entitled to any commutation or premature release under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Prisoners Act. Jail Manual or any other statute and the rules made for the purposes of grant of commutation and remissions. In Subash Chander's case (supra) the Apex Court held that the appellant-accused shall not be entitled to any commutation or premature release under the Code of Criminal Procedure, Prisons Act, Jail Manual or any other statutes and rules made for the purpose or grant of commutation and limitation. 49. No doubt there are provisions under the Jail Manual of the State of Tripura and Code of Criminal Procedure for commutation and remission. 49. No doubt there are provisions under the Jail Manual of the State of Tripura and Code of Criminal Procedure for commutation and remission. We held that commutation or remission of the sentence should be exercised taking into consideration of the judgment for conviction and sentence under which the particular prisoner is undergoing imprisonment. In other words, power of the appropriate Government for commutation and remission of a sentence of a particular prisoner undergoing life imprisonment shall be subject to the judgment for conviction and sentence under which that prisoner is undergoing imprisonment. 50. In the present case, the appellant-accused committed murder of the victim in a very gruesome manner and so brutally and such commission of crime comes under category of rarest case of the rare. The appellant-accused, for the trifle matter, had decided to kill the victim, who was none other than his fellow colleague working in the same hotel. Like a devil he committed the crime with cold mind that he even coolly put on the gown used by the helper or the cook working in the Kitchen of the Rajdhani Hotel for cutting the corpse of the victim into pieces so as to avoid any blood-stain to him. Even after cutting the victim into pieces, he coolly packed the cut pieces into 4 gunny bags and carefully taken those bags in his bi-cycle for throwing out the packed gunny bags. Even after committing the heinous crime, he coolly returned for duty to the hotel as if he did not commit the said brutal murder. At the time of committing the crime., the appellant-accused was a young man aged about 24/25 with hot blood of a devil and some years will be required to mellow down his hot blood so as to avoid causing havoc to the society and also for avoiding repetition of such heinous crime and if imprisonment for life of the appellant accused is remitted to only 14 years, the appellant-accused would be young man of late forties when he is released from Jail. In these peculiar circumstances of this case, more particularly the gruesome crime committed by the appellant-accused, imprisonment for life of the appellant-accused should not be less than 25 years and he shall not be entitled to any commutation or premature release till he has completed 25 years of imprisonment under the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure, Prisons Act, Jail Manual or any other statutes or rules made for the purpose of commutation and remission. For the foregoing reasons and discussions, the appeal is dismissed with the above alterations and modifications of the impugned judgment and sentence dated 13.11.2006 passed by the learned trial Court, i.e. the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala. The learned trial Court has to take up immediate follow up action. Any bail bond and security bond, if any, shall stand cancelled. Appeal dismissed