Sahera Khatoon (Mustt. ) v. Mafijuddin Ahmed (MD. )
2012-09-12
UTPALENDU BIKAS SAHA
body2012
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT U.B. Saha, J. 1. The instant revision petition is directed against the judgment and order dated 10.9.2004 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Barpeta in Misc. Case No. M.R. 261 of 2001 whereby and where-under the petition filed by the petitioner under Section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (for short hereinafter referred to as 'the Act, 1986') was dismissed on the ground that the said petition is barred by the provision of Sub-section (3) of Section 125 of the Cr P.C. Heard Mr. B. Hussain, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner. None appears for the respondent, even if the name of the learned Counsel for the respondent is shown in the cause list. 2. The brief facts needed to be discussed are as follows: The petitioner, Mustt Sahera Khatoon, admittedly a Muslim divorced wife of the respondent, filed a petition under Section 3 of the Act, 1986 on 27.8.2001 in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Barpeta claiming for reasonable maintenance of 'Iddat' period and unpaid 'Mahar' (Dower) money from her husband, being he threw her out of his house and also refused to pay the same after giving talaknama. 3. It is also stated in the petition that there were disputes between the petitioner and respondent time and again and sometimes that was also compromised, but ultimately, she was ousted from the house of the respondent husband by way of Talak. 4. The learned trial Court after taking the evidence of both the parties dismissed the petition filed by the petitioner on the ground of limitation as stated supra relying upon a decision of Karnataka High Court in B.G Shivananjappa Vs. Shantha @ Ushadevi & Anr., 2004 Cri. L J. 2455. Hence the revision petition. 5. Mr. Hussain, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner while urging for setting aside the impugned judgment would contend that the learned Court below failed to understand the ratio of the judgment in B.G Shivananjappa (supra). Not only that the said case has no application so far as the case in hand is concerned, as in that case, their Lordship considered the parameter of Subsection (3) of Section 125 of the Cr. P.c. and the petitioner in the instant case filed her application under Section 3 of the Act, 1986. 6.
Not only that the said case has no application so far as the case in hand is concerned, as in that case, their Lordship considered the parameter of Subsection (3) of Section 125 of the Cr. P.c. and the petitioner in the instant case filed her application under Section 3 of the Act, 1986. 6. He further submits that Section 3 of the Act, 1986 does not prescribe any period of limitation, rather according to the said provision, a Muslim divorced woman is entitled to maintenance from her former husband beyond the Iddat period till her remarriage. In the instant case, the petitioner had not gone for remarriage till filing of the petition under Section 3 of the Act, 1986. 7. His further submission is that the Section 3 of the Act, 1986 has also not prescribed any upper limit of quantum of maintenance like as Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. In support of his aforesaid contention that a Muslim divorced woman has the right to get maintenance even beyond the Iddat period from her former husband till her remarriage subject to she is not in a position to maintain herself, he relied upon a decision of this Court in Ainul Hoque Vs. Saminayasmine, 2005 (3) GLT 107 wherein this Court had taken note of Shah Banu case, 1985 (2) SCC 556 and the case of Denial Latifi & Anr. Vs. Union of India (2001) 7 SCC 740 and held that a divorced Muslim woman is entitled to maintenance beyond the period of iddat till her remarriage. 8. This Court has gone through the impugned judgment. It appears from the impugned judgment that the learned trial Court did not discuss anything regarding the prescription of Section 3 of the Act, 1986, rather the whole case was considered taking note of Sub-section (3) of Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. in the light of the decision of the Karnataka High Court as stated supra. 9. By this time it is settled that a Muslim divorced woman can take the benefit of Section 3 of the Act, 1986 or Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. Choice is left to a Muslim divorced woman herself. 10. As the Section 3 of the Act, 1986 does not prescribe any period of limitation to file an application by a Muslim divorced woman for maintenance.
10. As the Section 3 of the Act, 1986 does not prescribe any period of limitation to file an application by a Muslim divorced woman for maintenance. Thus, it can be easily said that a Muslim divorced woman is entitled to file an application under Section 3 of the Act, 1986 claiming maintenance from her former husband as provided in the said Act within a reasonable time as it is settled by this time when statute does not prescribe any period of limitation for filing a petition, in that case, the application should be filed within a reasonable time. What is to be reasonable time that will depend on the facts of case to case. In the instant case, as the petitioner is not till remarried and unable to maintain herself, there was no delay in filing the application for maintenance. More so, Subsection (3) of Section 125 of the Cr. P.C. has no application in a case filed under Section 3 and 4 of the Act, 1986, as those provisions started with non-obstante clause and basically for protecting the rights and welfare of the divorced Muslim woman till her remarriage when she is unable to maintain herself. A Court is also liable to pass an appropriate order subject to a Muslim divorced woman makes out a case for such order. 11. As the application of the petitioner was dismissed on the ground of limitation, which is not permissible under law, this Court is of further opinion that it would not be necessary to discuss the evidence adduced by the parties before the Court below. 12. Considering the entire facts and circumstances and in the interest of justice, the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Barpeta for deciding the case taking note of the provisions of Section 3 of the Act, 1986. 13. Upon receipt of the records, the learned trial Court shall issue notice to the parties for their appearance and decide the case in accordance with law. 14. This Court hope and trust that the trial Court will decide the case preferably within a period of six months from the date of appearance of the parties after receipt of the record. In the result, the revision petition is allowed. Send down the L.C. records immediately. Petition allowed