JUDGMENT 1.The order passed in this appeal shall also govern the disposal of connected Misc. Appeal Nos. 4563, 4564, 4566, 4568, 4569, 4570, 4571, 4572, 4573, 4574, 4575, 4576, 4577, 4578, 4579, 4580, 4581 and 4582 of the year 2011, since a common question is involved in all these appeals. In all these 19 appeals, the appellants are M/s. Diamond Cement and the respondents are West Central Railway, Jabalpur. 2. The appellant has preferred this appeal under Section 23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 assailing the judgment dated 18-8-2011 passed by learned Railway Claims Tribunal, Bhopal in O.A. No. 321/2007 dismissing the claim application of the appellant. 3. The factual aspect of the matter is no longer in dispute, rather admitted by learned Counsel for the parties. Undisputedly, M/s. Diamond Cements had dispatched 19 rakes of cement clinker from their siding known as DDSG to Asansol in the period from November, 2004 to June, 2005. All these rakes were booked and charged via Katni-Bilaspur for a distance of 1033 kms. Appellant later on came to know that these rakes were not carried to the destination by the booked route but by a shorter route. This shorter route is from DDSG to Asansol via Manikpur-Cheoki-Mugalsarai and distance is 995 kms. Having come to know the fact that the appellants' consignment was sent through a shorter route, they approached the Railway Administration vide letter dated 29-12-2006 to refund the difference of charges paid for the 19 rakes via longer route (1033 kms.) by which the rakes were booked and the charges applicable by the shorter route (995 kms.) by which the rakes were carried. 4. So far as the factual aspect is concerned, in the written statement filed by the Railway Administration they were not denied, however, a legal objection was taken that the appellants have failed to serve statutory notice claiming refund of excess freight within a period of six months as stipulated under Section 106 (3) of the Railways Act, 1989 (in short "the Railways Act"). 5. The learned Tribunal by the impugned judgment has dismissed all the claim applications of the appellant on the ground that since the notice was admittedly sent after statutory period of six months, therefore, they are not entitled for any claim and eventually dismissed all the applications by a common impugned judgment. 6. 5. The learned Tribunal by the impugned judgment has dismissed all the claim applications of the appellant on the ground that since the notice was admittedly sent after statutory period of six months, therefore, they are not entitled for any claim and eventually dismissed all the applications by a common impugned judgment. 6. In this manner, this appeal and connected appeals have been filed by the appellants. 7. The contention of Shri Rajesh Chand, learned Counsel for the appellant is that indeed, the learned Tribunal misdirected itself by taking into account "overcharge" as mentioned in sub-section (3) of Section 106 of the Railways Act. Learned Counsel submits that the case of the appellant is not of "overcharge" but it is a case of "differential freight" which is altogether different. By putting emphasis on the terminology "overcharge", learned Counsel has placed heavy reliance upon the decision of Supreme Court in Union of India and others Vs. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd. and another, AIR 2004 SC 3079 and Single Bench decision of this Court in Associated Cement Co. Ltd. Durg Vs. Union of India, 1998 (1) MPLJ 33 and contended that since the present case of the appellant is altogether different and is' not a case of "overcharge" therefore, learned Claims Tribunal erred in dismissing the claim application. 8. On the other hand, Shri Govind Patel, learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that since admittedly the notice under Section 106 of the Act has been served upon the Railway Administration after six months, therefore, learned Tribunal did not err in dismissing the claim case holding it to be barred by time. In support of his contention, learned Counsel placed heavy reliance upon the decision of Supreme Court in Birla Cement Works Vs. G.M., Western Railways and another, AIR 1995 SC 1111 . 9. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties I am of the view that this appeal and connected appeals deserve to be allowed. 10. The Railway Accidents Claims Tribunal has rejected the claim application holding the case of appellant to be of "overcharge". As stated hereinabove, the factual aspect is no more in dispute, admittedly, the consignment of cement was sent by 19 rakes from DDSG to Asansol via Manikpur-Cheoki-Mugalsarai route which is admittedly a shorter route having distance of 995 kms. 10. The Railway Accidents Claims Tribunal has rejected the claim application holding the case of appellant to be of "overcharge". As stated hereinabove, the factual aspect is no more in dispute, admittedly, the consignment of cement was sent by 19 rakes from DDSG to Asansol via Manikpur-Cheoki-Mugalsarai route which is admittedly a shorter route having distance of 995 kms. Admittedly, the consignment was booked for a longer route, namely, DDSG siding to Asansol via Katni-Bilaspur and the distance is 1033 kms. Thus, it is to be ascertained whether the claim of appellants is of "differential freight" or "overcharge". If the case of the appellant would come under "overcharge" then certainly he is out of Court because admittedly the statutory notice as required under Section 106 of the Act was sent after expiry of statutory period of six months. However, if the case of appellant comes within the ambit and scope of "differential freight" then certainly his claim has to be decided in his favour. 11. The term "overcharge" has not been defined in the Railways Act. It is well-settled in law that if a particular word is defined in that particular Act its meaning is to be derived from the definition clause. However, if the definition clause is silent on the said word then only the dictionary meaning is to be seen. The Supreme Court in West Coast Paper Mills Ltd. (supra), has thrown sufficient light upon the controversy as to what is the meaning of term "overcharge". It would be condign to quote relevant Para 18 from the said decision wherein this controversy has been resolved by His Lordship by placing reliance upon the decision of Gujarat High Court in M/s. Shah Raichand Amulakh (D) by his heir Vs. Union of India and others, 1971 (12) GLR 93, which reads as under:- "18. The term overcharge is not defined in the Act. In its dictionary meaning 'overcharge' means 'a charge of a sum more than as permitted by law' (The Lax Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 1997 Edition, Page 1389). The term came up for the consideration of the High Court of Gujarat in M/s. Shah Raichand Amulakh (D) by his heir Vs. Union of India and others, 1971 (12) GLR 93. Chief Justice P.N. Bhagwati (as His Lordship then was) interpreted the term by holding that 'overcharge' is not a term of art. The term came up for the consideration of the High Court of Gujarat in M/s. Shah Raichand Amulakh (D) by his heir Vs. Union of India and others, 1971 (12) GLR 93. Chief Justice P.N. Bhagwati (as His Lordship then was) interpreted the term by holding that 'overcharge' is not a term of art. It is an ordinary word of the English language, which according to its plain natural sense means any charge in excess of that prescribed or permitted by law. To be an overcharge, a sum of money must partake of the same character as the charge itself or must be of the same genus or class as a charge it cannot be any other kind of money such as money recovered where nothing is due. Overcharge is simply a charge in excess of that which is due according to law." 12. Earlier to this decision, learned Single Bench of this Court in Associated Cement Co. Ltd., Durg (supra), in Para 8 has thrown sufficient light over the term "overcharge" and it would be fruitful to quote Para 8 which reads, thus: -- "8. It is obvious that this section is mandatory in nature and, therefore, the claims of the appellant must fail if claim is for overcharge of freight. The service of notice under Section 78-B of the Act of 1890 is a must, before person can claim refund of 'overcharge' or compensation for loss, destruction or deterioration or non-delivery of animals or goods. Now, the word 'overcharge' has not been defined in the Act of 1890. Therefore, ordinary dictionary meaning of the word has to be applied. Overcharge means charge more than what is actual value of anything. Strictly speaking, overcharge means to charge more than what is due to a thing or a transaction. The appellant in this case says the value of freight should be measured by distance to which the goods were in fact, carried and not on the hypothetical basis that goods were to be carried in accordance with the supposed rationalisation scheme. The longer rationalised route was different than the actual shorter route as chalk is different from cheese. The longer route was costly to the appellant. The shorter was cheaper. The appellant was not charged more for the same thing. It was charged more for some thing different. The longer rationalised route was different than the actual shorter route as chalk is different from cheese. The longer route was costly to the appellant. The shorter was cheaper. The appellant was not charged more for the same thing. It was charged more for some thing different. Thus, the appellant was not charged more than the due charge for 1294 kilometers. It was charged for 1315 kilometers on a supposition that it was due. The extra charge was some thing undue, for this reason, the refund cannot be said for an 'overcharge'." 13. Thus, it is luminously clear like a noon day that 'overcharge' is not a term of art. It is an ordinary word of the English language, which according to its plain natural sense means any charge in excess of that prescribed or permitted by law. To be an overcharge, a sum of money must partake of the same character as the charge itself or must be of the same genus or class as a charge it cannot be any other kind of money such as money recovered where nothing is due. Overcharge is simply a charge in excess of that which is due according to law. At this juncture, it would be condign to go through the dictionary meaning as emphasised in Law of Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 4th Edition, 2010, Page 4869 wherein the term 'overcharge' has been explained as under: -- "Overcharge. A charge of a sum, more than is permitted by law. Put excessive charge into gun, electric appliance etc. 'Overcharge' is simply a charge in excess of that which is due according to law. Union of India Vs. West Coast Paper Mills Limited, (2004) 3 SCC 458 , 465, Para 19. 'Overcharge' means charge more than what is actual value of anything. Strictly speaking it means to charge more than what is due to a thing or a transaction. Associated Cement Co. Ltd. Vs. Union of India, AIR 1998 MP 241 to 243, Para 8. [Indian Railway Act (9 of 1890), Section 78-B]. The word 'overcharge' was not defined in the Railways Act and is to be construed in a wide sense. An overcharge would mean a charge which is more than the charge permitted by law. A claim for refund of overcharge was not maintainable in the absence of a notice under Section 77 of the Railways Act. Nabdram Govindram Vs. The word 'overcharge' was not defined in the Railways Act and is to be construed in a wide sense. An overcharge would mean a charge which is more than the charge permitted by law. A claim for refund of overcharge was not maintainable in the absence of a notice under Section 77 of the Railways Act. Nabdram Govindram Vs. Union of India, MLJ: QD (1956-1960) Vol. IV CI 1385 = (1959) Nag. LJ (Notes) 92. [Railways Act (9 of 1890), Section 77]." 14. At this stage, it would also be fruitful to refer to the dictionary meaning of term 'differential' as emphasised in Law of Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 4th Edition, 2010, Page 1994, which reads thus: -- "Differential. The difference between two values, such as prices or salaries. A dealer may add a differential to purchases, or deduct it from sales, of small quantities (odd lots) of stocks or shares, (investment)." The term 'freight' has been defined under Section 2 (17) of the Railways Act, which reads, thus: -- " ‘Freight' means, the charge levied for the carriage of goods including transshipment charges if any." 15. The fine distinction in the case is that the present case is not the case of "overcharge" but "differential freight" because the consignment has been sent by the Railway Administration by adopting a shorter route, namely, via Manikpur-Cheoki-Mugalsarai covering a distance of 995 kms. while admittedly the consignment was booked by the appellant for a longer distance via Katni-Bilaspur and therefore, according to me, the present case would come under the ambit and scope of differential freight and is not case of "overcharge". The decision of Supreme Court in Birla Cement Works (supra), placed reliance by the learned Counsel for the "respondent is not applicable in the present case, because in that case the consignment was booked for a shorter distance while it was sent for a longer distance on account of establishment of the broad gage and thus, the Railway carried the consignment through a longer route of 34 kms. and in those facts and circumstances, it was found that the case was of overcharge. However, in the present case, the consignment has been sent through a shorter route. Hence, according to me, learned Tribunal erred in law in dismissing the claim of the appellants. 16. For the reasons stated hereinabove, all the appeals are hereby allowed. and in those facts and circumstances, it was found that the case was of overcharge. However, in the present case, the consignment has been sent through a shorter route. Hence, according to me, learned Tribunal erred in law in dismissing the claim of the appellants. 16. For the reasons stated hereinabove, all the appeals are hereby allowed. The impugned judgment passed by the learned Railway Claims Tribunal is hereby set aside and the case is sent back to the learned Tribunal to pay the damages to the appellant in accordance with law. Looking to the facts and circumstances the parties are hereby directed to bear their own costs. Counsel fee according to Schedule, if pre-certified. Let a copy of this order be also kept in the record of connected Misc. Appeals.