JUDGMENT Hon'ble BHAGWATI, J.— Challenge in the instant intra court appeal is to the order dated 15th May, 1996, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petitioner of the appellant-petitioner. The intra-court appeal is said to have been filed after 9 years, 11 months and 14 days of the expiry of period of limitation, hence, an application under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act has also been filed together with the appeal imploring to condone the aforesaid delay. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner and carefully perused the relevant material on record. 3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts giving rise to this appeal, succinctly stated are that the appellant-petitioner Man Singh Puniya was having a Diploma in Civil Engineering and qualified for having been appointed on the post of Overseer. It is stated that the appellant was appointed as Overseer in the service of the Municipal Board, Nohar in the District of Sri Ganganagar on daily wages of Rs. 20/- per day. The appellant worked continuously on the said post of Overseer with effect from 20th June, 1983 to 31st December, 1985, but he was suddenly removed from the service by the respondent-Executive Officer, Municipal Board, Nohar sans assigning any reason. The respondent No. 3 issued Experience Certificate Ex. 1 also to the appellant, wherein it was tangibly recorded that he had worked with effect from 20th June, 1983 to 31st December, 1985 on daily wages and his work was found to be satisfactory. The appellant took his dispute to the Labour Officer-cum-Conciliation Officer, Nohar, where the administrator of Municipal Board, Nohar having filed the reply conceded to appoint him again as and when the post of Overseer would fall vacant, but respondent No. 3 despite there being a conciliation between them did not stick to his words. Ultimately, the appellant-petitioner filed a writ petition in the High Court, which stood dismissed on 15th May, 1996. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant canvassed that the appellant initially engaged Mr. G.S. Singhvi as his Advocate, but after some time he was elevated to the Bench and the appellant's file was taken over by Mr. Ajay Rastogi, then Advocate. Mr. Rastogi asked the appellant not to come on every date of hearing and he should attend the case only as and when called upon to do so, but he did not receive any information from him. Ajay Rastogi, then Advocate. Mr. Rastogi asked the appellant not to come on every date of hearing and he should attend the case only as and when called upon to do so, but he did not receive any information from him. In October, 2004, Mr. Sandeep Saxena, Advocate informed the appellant-petitioner that after elevation of Mr. Ajay Rastogi, Advocate to the Bench, he had received the file and thus, asked him to contract in his office. Mr. Saxena also reiterated the same thing that he should come in future as and when called upon to attend the case. Now was heard till April, 2006. Thereafter he contracted Shri J.R. Chaudhary, Advocate and requested to plead his case, whereupon Mr. Chaudhary endeavoured to find out the status of the case on 2nd May, 2006 and he was informed by the registry that his case had already been disposed of by the High Court way back on 15th May, 1996. He immediately applied for a certified copy of the order and soon thereafter filed the appeal. 5. Learned counsel further canvassed that the delay in filing the intra court appeal has been on account of the mistake of the Advocate, who did not inform him about the disposal of the case in time. There was no mistake on the part of the appellant-petitioner and on account of the mistake of the Advocate, the appellant should not be made to suffer. Hence, the delay should be condoned and appeal may be decided on merits. 6. Having carefully reflected over the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant and scanned the relevant material including the impugned order, it is revealed that even on 15th May, 1996 when the case was listed before the Single Bench, none appeared for the appellant-petitioner in the Court and the learned Single Judge decided the writ petition on merits in the absence of the appellant's counsel. The explanation furnished by the appellant in filing the intra-court appeal after an inordinate delay of 9 years, 11 months and 14 days does not seem to be reasonable and easily acceptable and if nothing was heard from his counsel, it was the duty of the appellant-petitioner to contact his counsel and find out the status of the case. The explanation furnished by the appellant in filing the intra-court appeal after an inordinate delay of 9 years, 11 months and 14 days does not seem to be reasonable and easily acceptable and if nothing was heard from his counsel, it was the duty of the appellant-petitioner to contact his counsel and find out the status of the case. It is appalling that the appellant-petitioner kept on sleeping for a long period of more than 9-1/2 years and suddenly awoke and when he contracted his Advocate Mr. Chaudhary, as has been stated in the application, he came to know that his writ petition had already been dismissed way back on 15th May, 1996. The appellant-petitioner is found to have utterly failed to make out a sufficient cause in filing the intra-court appeal after an inordinate delay of the aforesaid period. 7. A bird's eye view of some of the decisions of Hon'ble Apex Court throwing light on the issue of limitation needs to be taken into consideration. 8. In the case of Postmaster General and others vs. Living Media India Limited and Another reported in (2012) 3 Supreme Court Cases 563, special Leave to Appeal was filed after an inordinate delay of only 427 days of the expiry of period of limitation, but the Hon'ble Apex Court did not find any sufficient cause in filing the SLP after an inordinate delay and gainsaid to condone the delay of 427 days. 9. In the case of Postmaster General and others vs. Living Media India Limited (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court hammered the appellant-Government Department, who filed the Special Leave to Appeal after an inordinate delay of 427 days of the expiry of period of limitation and posed a burning question as to why should the delay be condoned mechanically because the Government or a wing of Government was a party before them? The Hon'ble Apex Court observed that the Government Department cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government. Since the Government Department miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reason sufficient to condone a huge delay, the Hon'ble Apex Court dismissed the appeal in limine merely on the ground of delay. The Hon'ble Apex Court relied upon some other judgments of its own court, which are cited hereto. 10. Since the Government Department miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reason sufficient to condone a huge delay, the Hon'ble Apex Court dismissed the appeal in limine merely on the ground of delay. The Hon'ble Apex Court relied upon some other judgments of its own court, which are cited hereto. 10. In the case of CWT vs. Amateur Riders Club reported in 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 603, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed thus: "3....Having regard to the law of limitation which binds everybody, we cannot find any way of granting relief. It is true that the Government should not be treated as any other private litigant as, indeed, in the case of the former the decisions to present and prosecute appeals are not individual but are institutional decisions necessarily bogged down by the proverbial red tape. But there are limits to this also. Even with all this latitude, the explanation offered for the delay in this case merely serves to aggravate the attitude of indifference of the Revenue in protecting its common interests. The affidavit is again one of the stereotyped affidavits making it susceptible to the criticism that the Revenue does not seem to attach any importance to the need for promptitude even where it affects its own interest." 11. In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil vs. Jalgaon Medium Project reported in (2008) 17 SCC 448 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: "17. ....The evidence on record suggests neglect of its own right for long time in preferring appeals. The court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The Court helps those who are vigilant and 'do not slumber over their rights." 12. After referring various earlier decisions, taking very lenient view in condoning the delay, particularly on the part of the Government and Government undertaking, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under: "29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a life span for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy." 13. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy." 13. Similarly in the case of S.S. Balu and Another vs. State of Kerala and others reported in (2009) 2 Supreme Court Cases 479, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the delay defeats equity and relief can be denied on the ground of delay alone even though relief is granted to other similarly situated person who approached the court in time. The Hon'ble Apex Court further observed, "it is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, relief prayed for, may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates, who obtained the benefit of the judgment." 14. Adverting to the facts of the instant case, it is revealed that the cause shown in filing the instant appeal after 3488 days (say 9 years 11 months and 14 days) of the expiry of period of limitation and the application, does not seem to be plausible and acceptable. E Contra, the explanation furnished in filing the appeal after the said inordinate delay of 3488 days is not found to be based on any cogent and convincing ground. The delay has not been properly explained by the appellant, on the contrary, an effort to find the status of his writ petition, after more than 9-1/2 years, itself evinces that how indifferent and in-vigilant was he towards his writ petition, which he had filed in the High Court. 15. Salmond's in his jurisprudence is found to have rightly stated that the laws comes to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy. Learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner is found to have miserably failed to convi-nce us that there was any sufficient cause in filing the intra-court appeal after an inordinate delay of 3488 days of the expiry of period of limitation. Hence, the instant appeal deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay alone. 16. Learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner is found to have miserably failed to convi-nce us that there was any sufficient cause in filing the intra-court appeal after an inordinate delay of 3488 days of the expiry of period of limitation. Hence, the instant appeal deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay alone. 16. However, even if we look at the merits of the case, the learned Single Judge is found to have considered the claim and the counter claim of the parties to the writ petition and arrived at a finding that there was no reason to interfere as the appellant-petitioner had no legal right to continue on the post of Overseer. So far as the settlement between the appellant and the respondent No. 3 having taken before the Conciliation Officer is concerned, this settlement was conditional settlement and there was a clear stipulation therein that if the post of Overseer shall fall vacant on transfer of some regularly appointed Overseer, the appellant-petitioner would be adjusted on that post. It was made clear by the respondent No. 3 that as no post fell vacant, in that event, the appellant-petitioner could not be given the appointment. It is also not proved from the material on record that the appellant-petitioner had a legal right to continue on the post of Overseer. On the contrary, the learned Single Judge held that he had no right to continue on the post. Thus, on merits also, we do not find any case in favour of the appellant-petitioner. 17. The up-shot of the above discussion is that the appellant-petitioner utterly failed to show a sufficient cause in filing the intra-court appeal after an inordinate delay of 3488 days of the expiry of period of limitation. Hence, both, the application No. 1544 dated 2.6.2006 filed under Section 5 of Limitation Act as also the intra court appeal deserve to be dismissed and the same stand dismissed accordingly.