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2012 DIGILAW 1092 (GAU)

Deva Kanta Chetia v. State of Assam

2012-09-12

P.K.MUSAHARY

body2012
JUDGMENT P.K. Musahary, J. 1. This petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure praying for quashing the FIR dated 23.6.10 as well as the proceedings of Umrongso PS Case No. 14/2010 registered under Section 420/465/406/447/506 IPC. I have heard Mr. S. Shyam, learned counsel assisted by Mr. A. Dhar for the petitioner, Mr. B.S. Sinha, learned Addl. P.P., Assam, for the respondents No. 1, 4 & 5 and Mr. R. Dubey, learned counsel for the respondents No. 2 & 3. 2. The petitioner is one of the Directors of M/S Umrongso Cement Ltd (M/S UCL in short), a Company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 having its registered office at Khanapara, Narengi road, Guwahati and owns a cement plant located at Umrongso in the district of Dima Hasao (formerly known as North Cachar Hills) in the State of Assam. The said cement plant was a 'going concerned' until the year 1999 and due to insurgency problems prevalent in the district, the production activity had to be shut down. As a result, the unit became sick and was eventually declared so by an order dated 18.4.2000 passed under Section 3(1)(0) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions)Act, 1985 (SICA in short), issued by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR), New Delhi. As stated in the petition, a proceeding being BIFR Case No. 352/1999 was drawn up before the BIFR under the SICA and a scheme was sanctioned by the Board vide an order dated 31.10.2003 whereunder a Draft Modified Rehabilitation Scheme (DMRS) was submitted which is pending consideration before the BIFR. Thereafter, by an order dated 16.7.2003 passed in the above proceeding a Managing Committee with the CEO of the Company, Special Director of the BIFR and the representatives of the Financial Institutions, was constituted to review the operation of the sick company in all aspects and to closely monitor the revival of the company under the rehabilitation scheme. In the said order dated 16.7.2003, in paragraph 11.2(m) the BIFR directed the M/S UCL to adhere to the shareholding pattern as provided in the scheme and no alteration should be carried out except with BIFR's prior approval. 3. In the said order dated 16.7.2003, in paragraph 11.2(m) the BIFR directed the M/S UCL to adhere to the shareholding pattern as provided in the scheme and no alteration should be carried out except with BIFR's prior approval. 3. It is further stated in the petition that sometime in the early part of the year, 2008, the respondents No. 2 & 3, first informants made an offer to the petitioner(accused) to make 'strategic' investment in the sick company with the long term objective of acquiring stakes in M/S UCL and in terms of the said offer and upon due examination of the records of the company including its balance sheet for the previous year, the informants entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU in short) dated 27.3.2008 with the accused petitioner in his 'personal capacity'. 4. The respondents No. 2 & 3/informants lodged a written FIR dated 23.6.2010 with the Superintendent of Police, NC Hills district, Haflong, Assam against the petitioner alleging criminal acts like cheating, forgery, misappropriation, threat, criminal breach of trust and criminal trespass which was forwarded to Umrongso PS to register a case and take lawful action. Accordingly, Umrongso PS case No. 14/2010 was registered u/s 465/406/447/506 IPC. The respondents/informants filed the FIR against the petitioner in his personal as well as representative capacity representing the existing shareholders of the M/S UCL. In the FIR the informants having stated that on or about October, 2007 the accused petitioner Mr. Deva Kanta Chetia representing the then management and existing shareholders of the company approached them, made certain representations and induced them to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding. Relying upon such representations and believing the same to be true and correct they negotiated terms with the accused pursuant to which it was agreed between the parties that– A) the share of the said company held by the individuals aforesaid would be transferred in favour of the informants and/or to their nominees for a lump-sum of Rs. 4.25 crores and the possession of the said factory would be handed over to the informants on the following terms and conditions– i) the accused representing the existing share holders and existing management would hand over the management of the said company including possession of its factory to the informants by transferring all the shares of the existing shareholders to the informants and/or their nominees against lump-sum consideration of Rs. 4.25 crores. 4.25 crores. ii) out of the said sum of Rs. 4.25 crores, the accused representing the existing share holders and existing management (collectively referred to as the first party in the said agreement) would clear the entire dues of the banks/financial institutions, statutory liabilities, liability of the Assam State Electricity Board upto 15th May, 2008, which was identified as target date for formal handover and/or take over from the said company and its factory. iii) the informants, jointly referred to as second party, in the said agreement, was to provide funds upto maximum of Rs. 2.25 crores as per requirements for liquidation of liability of banks/financial institutions and other statutory liabilities by 15th May, 2008 being the date of formal handover/take over. iv) the informants, jointly referred to as second party to the said agreement as may be convenient before formal handover/take over to clear the dues of the banks/financial institutions and other liabilities. v) the balance amount of the agreed consideration was required to be paid by the informants in the manner as follows :– (i) a sum of Rs. 50,00,000/- on completion of renovation, reconnection of power and starting of plant or within two months from the date of a formal handover/take over which ever is earlier. (ii) a sum of Rs. 75,00,000/-within 3 months after starting of the production. (iii) Rs. 70,00,000/- within 6 months after starting of the production or after completion of whole process of management and transfer of share whichever is later. (B) As a token consideration to pay an amount of Rs. 5,00,000/- paid to the accused second party by a cheque dated 18.2.2008 (C) the entire payment and process of handover/take over would be completed within a maximum period of 12 months from the date of the agreement unless some unwanted or unmanageable things happens. 5. In the FIR under challenge, the informants have also stated that on request and/or demand of the accused petitioner they have paid him an amount of Rs. 54,87,000/- by way of cheques between 18th February, 2008 and 14th October, 2008, a sum of Rs. 68,01,300/- to ASEB to liquidate the liability of the said company on account of its factory, an amount of Rs. 41,25,000/- on 27.3.2008 to IDBI to liquidate the liabilities of the company, an amount of Rs. 23,88,000/- on 29.4.2008 & 30.4.2008 to IFCI. 54,87,000/- by way of cheques between 18th February, 2008 and 14th October, 2008, a sum of Rs. 68,01,300/- to ASEB to liquidate the liability of the said company on account of its factory, an amount of Rs. 41,25,000/- on 27.3.2008 to IDBI to liquidate the liabilities of the company, an amount of Rs. 23,88,000/- on 29.4.2008 & 30.4.2008 to IFCI. Thus the informants claimed to have made payment to the accused or on his request to his nominees or to the banks, as financial institutions and ASEB to liquidate the liabilities of the company aggregating a sum of Rs. 93,01,300/-. 6. The informants claimed that the possession and control of the factory of the company was handed over to them on 15.5.2008 being the date of formal take over and they have been in possession thereof since then. And over and above the aforesaid payments, the informants have claimed to have incurred an expenditure of Rs. 1.16 crores towards renovation and making the factory operational and thereby till 31.12.2009 they have born the revenue expenditure to the tune of Rs. 1,42,19,870/- in the plant and machinery of the company to make the factory production worthy. It has been alleged by the respondent informants that the accused petitioner D.K. Chetia after having induced him to enter into the said agreement made them pay a sum of Rs. 1,93,01,300/- and an additional amount of Rs. 1.16 crores which had grown upto the amount of Rs. 42,19,870/- on account of renovation and repair of the factory and making it ready for operation, even making illegal attempts to dispossess them of the factory premises which was already handed over on 15.5.2008 by the accused in terms of the MOU. Further, they alleged that the accused petitioner has been contemplating to alienate the factory of the company behind their back with malifide intention to deceive and misappropriate the huge investment made by the informants in terms of the MOU. 7. Mr. Shyam, learned counsel for the petitioner first of all submits that even if the allegations are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the petitioner. In this regard he relied on Ajay Mitra Vs. 7. Mr. Shyam, learned counsel for the petitioner first of all submits that even if the allegations are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the petitioner. In this regard he relied on Ajay Mitra Vs. State of M.P. & Ors., (2003) 2 SCC 11wherein it has been held that where complaint or FIR prima facie does not disclose commission of any cognizable offence against the accused, the same would be liable to be quashed. Secondly he submits that a bare perusal of the contents of the FIR and the pleadings in the present petition would establish the fact that the FIR squarely falls within the domain of civil dispute which are pending adjudication before the competent courts and fora in a series of parallel proceedings and in that view of the matter, none of the allegations made in the FIR under challenge can be the basis of criminal investigation on the same set of disputed question of facts and law. Thirdly, he submits that the claim of possession of factory of the respondent/informants which forms the basis of the FIR in question itself being a disputed question of fact, which is a subject matter of adjudication in Arbitration Appeal No. 3/2010 pending before this Court, the present petitioner cannot be proceeded with on the basis of the FIR under challenge, so much so, the matter is subjudiced before this Court. Fourthly, it is submitted that no police case could be registered on the basis of the FIR in question inasmuch as the SICA in its order dated 16.7.2003 passed in BIFR Case No. 352/1999 categorically prohibited transfer of any shares and assets of the company. Last of all it is submitted that the FIR in question has been lodged by the respondents/informants after having failed to obtain favourable orders in the civil proceedings only to harass the petitioner. Relying upon Inder Mohan Goswami & Anr. Vs. State of Uttaranchal; (2007) 12 SCC 1 , Mr. Shyam submits that the criminal prosecution should not be used as an instrument for harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. Relying upon Inder Mohan Goswami & Anr. Vs. State of Uttaranchal; (2007) 12 SCC 1 , Mr. Shyam submits that the criminal prosecution should not be used as an instrument for harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. In the present case, according to him, inspite of their knowledge that the proceedings before the BIFR and arbitrator are still pending, the respondents/informants have filed the FIR demonstrating their ulterior motive to put pressure on the petitioners to come to their terms and if the proceeding is allowed to continue it would amount to abuse of the process of Court. 8. The FIR was lodged on 23.6.2010 and this petition has been filed on 11.10.2010 and this Court has not been apprised of the stage of investigation but it is more than certain that the investigation is not complete, so much so no charge sheet has been laid as yet. The petitioner has sought for threshold quashing of the FIR without allowing the Investigating Agency to proceed and complete the investigation. In such case the Court has to be cautious while passing an order for quashment of the FIR because of the settled law that the power under Section 482 CrPC should be sparingly exercised and that too in the rarest of rare cases. The case of State of Haryana Vs. Bhajanlal; (1992) Supp (1) SCC 335 has given illustration of categories of cases where the High Court can exercise its power under the aforesaid section of law. There are as many as 7 categories of such cases mentioned in paragraph 102. In the present case, in my considered view, the first category of cases as mentioned in Bhajanlal case (supra) would be relevant. For the purpose of convenience and ready reference it is reproduced below– Whether the allegations in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 9. On the basis of the FIR in question a case was registered under Section 420/406/447/506 IPC. The prime accusation is under Section 420 IPC and it is to be examined whether the ingredients of cheating u/s 415 IPC are available or disclosed in the FIR which is punishable under Section 420 IPC. 9. On the basis of the FIR in question a case was registered under Section 420/406/447/506 IPC. The prime accusation is under Section 420 IPC and it is to be examined whether the ingredients of cheating u/s 415 IPC are available or disclosed in the FIR which is punishable under Section 420 IPC. In the case of Inder Mohan Goswami (supra), cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Apex Court has analysed the relevant provisions of law in paragraphs 40, 41 and 42, which I deem fit and appropriate to reproduce for better appreciation– 40. Firstly, we shall deal with Section 420 IPC. Cheating is defined in Section 415 IPC and is punishable under Section 420 IPC. 415. Cheating - Whoever by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to 'cheat'. Explanation - A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section. 41. Section 415 thus requires– 1. Deception of any person. 2 (a) Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person– (i) to deliver any property to any person; or (ii) to consent that any person shall retain any property ; or (b) Intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act of omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property. 42. On a reading of the aforesaid section, it is manifest that in the definition there are two separate classes of acts which the person deceived may be induced to do. In the first class of acts he may be induced fraudulently or dishonestly to deliver property to any person. The second class of acts is the doing or omitting to do anything which the person deceived would not do or omit to do if he were not so deceived. In the first class of cases, the inducing must be fraudulent or dishonest. The second class of acts is the doing or omitting to do anything which the person deceived would not do or omit to do if he were not so deceived. In the first class of cases, the inducing must be fraudulent or dishonest. In the second class of acts, the inducing must be intentional but need not be fraudulent or dishonest. Therefore, it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to subsequently keep a promise, one cannot presume that he all along had a culpable intention to break the promise from the beginning. 10. Now coming to the case at hand the parties signed MOU dated 27.3.2008. The petitioner introduced himself as Director of M/S UCL representing its existing management and existing shareholders of the company and disclosed that he and other Directors had decided to resign from the Directorship and also to transfer their shareholdings as well as the shares of all existing shareholders in their company to the new management represented by the present respondents No. 2 and 3. He also declared in the MOU that they have decided that he and other Directors of the M/S UCL have decided to enter into an understanding for handing over/taking over the entire management as well as assets and liabilities of the company as a 'going concern'. In the MOU the petitioner did not disclose the relevant facts that have taken place before signing of the MOU. From the pleadings of the petitioner it is found that– i) the M/S UCL was a going concern till 1999 only. ii) The M/S UCL was declared as sick industry on 18.4.2000 under Section 3(1)(0) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (SICA in short) by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR in short) in case No. 352/1999 iii)A revival proposal was submitted in February, 2001 by the M/S UCL seeking extraordinary relief from the financial institutions but it was rejected as it was found beyond the RBI parameters. iv) Thereafter the BIFR on 9.7.2001 issued show cause notice on M/S UCL for change of management. iv) Thereafter the BIFR on 9.7.2001 issued show cause notice on M/S UCL for change of management. v) A revised proposal was submitted by the M/S UCL based on the OTS of institutional dues envisaging payment of 75% of the outstanding principal in 2 years. The said proposal was discussed in the joint meeting held on 21.11.2001 and the financial institutions (IFCI, IDBI & ICICI) accepted the OTS's proposal. However, the SBI was of the view that they would continue to charge interest at the existing rate of 16.5.% p.a. and they would consider charging interest at PLR on additional working capital, if needed, provided the Government of Assam granted reliefs and concessions as sought for by M/S UCL. vi) A Draft Revival Scheme (DRS in short) for the company was framed by the BIFR and circulated to all concerned under Section 18(3) (a) of the Act. Ultimately an order on 15.7.2003 directing amongst other, to constitute a managing committee, not to undertake any new project or expansion or make any investment etc without prior approval of the BIFR and above all categorically prohibiting transfer of share of the company. 11. On close perusal of the MOU one can find that there was a misrepresentation before the respondents No. 2 & 3 on the part of the petitioner by way of projecting the M/S UCL as a 'going concern' by suppressing the material facts mentioned above. Had the aforesaid facts were disclosed or made known, the respondents/informants would not have entered into such agreement with the accused petitioner. In my considered view, there is a prima facie case of fraudulent and dishonest inducement on the part of the accused petitioner in executing the MOU which the respondents/informants would not have signed. The above mentioned informations were intentionally held back by the accused petitioner from the respondents/informants. The dishonest intention writ large on the MOU itself inasmuch as the petitioner didn't let the respondents/informants know about the direction of the BIFR to constitute the managing committee and prohibition against transfer of any share of the company as far back as on 15.7.2003. No sane person, particularly a businessman whose prime motive is profit making, would not have agreed to take over a losing concern unless he is induced by misrepresentation with fraudulent and dishonest intention. 12. No sane person, particularly a businessman whose prime motive is profit making, would not have agreed to take over a losing concern unless he is induced by misrepresentation with fraudulent and dishonest intention. 12. In terms of the MOU the respondents/informants have made substantial payments as indicated in the FIR, mostly through cheques which were encashed and thereby they have performed their part of the agreement. The respondents/informants are to be allowed by the petitioner to enjoy peaceful possession of the factory but as alleged in the FIR the petitioner has been making several attempts by himself and through his men to take forceful possession of the factory premises of the company which was already handed over to informants on 15.5.2008. In the said allegations there are elements of offence under Section 447 and 506 IPC. The informants have not been able to furnish any material in support of the said allegations but in my considered view, it is a matter of investigation and the Investigating Agency is to be given free hand to investigate and find out the veracity and/or otherwise of the said allegations in the FIR. As already stated earlier that the investigation could not progress due to pendency of the present criminal proceeding under Section 482 CrPC and the further action in respect of the said PS case has been suspended by this Court on 4.11.2010, no feedback has been received from the Investigating Agency about the materials on the alleged offence under Section 447/506 IPC. In Bhajanlal's case (supra) in paragraph 31, the Apex Court observed that at the stage of registration of a crime or a case on the basis of the information disclosing a cognizable offence, the concerned police officer has to act as per provision under Section 154(1) CrPC but he cannot embark upon an enquiry as to whether the information laid by the informant is reliable and genuine or otherwise and refuse to register a case on the ground that the information is not reliable or credible. It is also observed that the Officer-In-charge of a police station is statutorily obliged to register a case and then to proceed with the investigation if he has reason to suspect commission of an offence. In the instant case, except the alleged offence under Section 465 and 506 IPC, all are cognizable offence. It is also observed that the Officer-In-charge of a police station is statutorily obliged to register a case and then to proceed with the investigation if he has reason to suspect commission of an offence. In the instant case, except the alleged offence under Section 465 and 506 IPC, all are cognizable offence. The offence under Section 465 and 506 IPC being non cognizable, the police has no power to undertake investigation without the order of the Magistrate. But the alleged offence under Section 420/406 and 447 IPC being cognizable offence, the police can investigate on its own without any order from the Magistrate. 13. Section 406 IPC provides punishment for criminal breach of trust. From the averments made in the FIR it appears that the informants themselves were in possession of the factory premises of the company and as such they had the dominion over the property and so there cannot be commission of criminal breach of trust by the petitioner within the meaning of Section 405 IPC. Prima facie, therefore, no case of criminal breach of trust has been made out against the petitioner and the petitioner cannot be made liable to punishment under Section 406 IPC. As regards the alleged offence under Section 447 IPC, the respondents/informants being in possession of the factory premises they must be able to prima facie satisfy the court that the accused petitioner made attempt/attempts to dispossess them by some foul means. The FIR is silent as to how and on what date and time and in what manner the accused petitioner tried to trespass into the factory premises with intention to dispossess them. This appears to be a vague allegation and it would not be legally permissible to proceed against the accused unless supporting materials are found. It is to be noted that all materials could not be furnished in the FIR. It is the duty of the Investigating Agency to investigate and collect the materials in support of the allegation and if no material is found to support a particular allegation, the accused may not be proceeded with under the said section. But that does not mean that on finding a particular allegation being vexatious, the Investigating Agency would not proceed against the accused person against other alleged offences which are prima facie founded. 14. But that does not mean that on finding a particular allegation being vexatious, the Investigating Agency would not proceed against the accused person against other alleged offences which are prima facie founded. 14. Here in the present case, allegations under Section 465 and 506 IPC are non cognizable and the other alleged offences under Section 420/406 and 447 IPC are cognizable offences. In the preceding discussion I have found prima facie case under Section 420 IPC against the accused petitioner. I have found no prima facie case against the accused petitioner under Section 406 IPC and the accused petitioner is not liable under the said section. For want of materials and feedback from the Investigating Agency, no opinion could be formed in regard to alleged offence under Section 447 IPC but I must say that the Investigating Agency should be given free-hand to investigate and collect materials for and against the petitioner. 15. The crucial submission of the petitioner is that the complaint made in the FIR squarely falls within the domain of civil dispute and since there are already some civil proceedings pending the FIR in question cannot be the basis of criminal investigation on the same set of disputed question of facts and law. In this regard, the petitioner has furnished a list of cases as under– i) Misc. (Arb.) Case No. 289/2009 ; Jay Prakash Jaiswal & Anil Jania Vs. Deba Kanta Chetia in the Court of District Judge, Kamrup, Guwahati. ii) Miscellaneous Application No. 302/BC/2010 in case No. 352/1999; Umrongso Cement Ltd Vs. Anil Jania pending in the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR). New Delhi. iii) Appeal No. 70/2010 ; Jay Prakash Jaiswal & Anil Jania Vs. Umrongso Cement Ltd pending in the court of Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (AAIFR), New Delhi. iv) Arb. Appeal No. 3/2010 ; Jay Prakash Jaiswal & Anil Jania Vs. Deba Kanta Chetia pending in the Gauhati High Court, Guwahati. v) Arb. Petn. 6/2010 ; Jay Prakash Jaiswal & Anil Jania Vs. Deba Kanta Chetia pending in the court of Gauhati High Court, Guwahati. vi) SLP (Civil) No. 12115/2010; Umrongso Cement Ltd. Vs. Jay Prakash Jaiswal Anil Jania & Deba Kanta Chetia pending in the court of India, New Delhi. vii) Arb. Case No. 1/2012 ; Jay Prakash Jaiswal & Anil Jania Vs. Deba Kanta Chetia before the sole arbitrator Dr. Deba Kanta Chetia pending in the court of Gauhati High Court, Guwahati. vi) SLP (Civil) No. 12115/2010; Umrongso Cement Ltd. Vs. Jay Prakash Jaiswal Anil Jania & Deba Kanta Chetia pending in the court of India, New Delhi. vii) Arb. Case No. 1/2012 ; Jay Prakash Jaiswal & Anil Jania Vs. Deba Kanta Chetia before the sole arbitrator Dr. Hon'ble Justice Aftab H. Saikia, retired Chief Justice. 16. It is not denied that aforementioned cases were instituted and are still pending. But what is to be noted is that they are not civil suits in real sense. Those cases were instituted for appointment of arbitrator at various points of time and proceedings before the BIFR, AAIFR for revival of the sick industry i.e. M/S UCL which were declared as a sick industry under Section 3(1)(0) of the Sick Industrial Company (Special Provision) Act, 1985. The last arbitration case is at the initial stage. The terms of reference are not made available before this Court. In the case of Inder Mohan Goswami (supra) it is observed that in the fact and circumstances of the case, initiating criminal proceeding by the respondents against the appellant is clear abuse of the process of Court. In my considered view, the accused petitioner would gain nothing from the aforesaid case. First of all in the present case unlike in the above referred cases, there is no pending case purely in civil nature. Looking at the cause title of the above cases it would not be wrong to say that they are not civil suits in the strict sense. Secondly the Apex Court in Mohammed Ibrahim & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Anr.; reported in (2009) 8 SCC 751 held that criminal courts should ensure that proceedings before it are not used for settling scores or to pressurise parties to settle civil disputes but at the same time, it should be noted that several disputes of civil nature may also contain the ingredients of criminal offences and if so, will have to be tried as criminal offences, even if they also amount to civil disputes. Looking at the nature of allegation made in the FIR, I am rather convinced that although the dispute is mainly civil in nature it contains ingredients of criminal offences, particularly under Section 420 IPC and there is necessity of undertaking and completing the investigation by police. Looking at the nature of allegation made in the FIR, I am rather convinced that although the dispute is mainly civil in nature it contains ingredients of criminal offences, particularly under Section 420 IPC and there is necessity of undertaking and completing the investigation by police. The arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner that pendency of civil proceedings in the civil fora debars initiation of criminal proceeding against the accused is not acceptable. The law mandates that complaint has to be read as a whole and I have done so as discussed above. It is not the duty of the Court exercising power under Section 482 CrPC for quashing the proceeding, to meticulously analyse the case like the trial court. It is enough if the Court can find out prima facie case on the basis of averments and allegations made in the complaint or the FIR. For the discussions and reasonings recorded as above. I find that it is not a fit case for quashing the FIR and the criminal proceeding as sought for by the petitioner. This petition is without merit and it is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, I dismiss this petition. The Investigating Agency shall now proceed with the investigation and follow up action in accordance with law. Petition dismissed.