Judgment : 1. Both these writ petitions take exception to the judgment and order passed in Regular Civil Appeal No. 341 of 1989 by the District Judge, Ahmednagar dated 2nd December, 1991 thereby confirming the judgment and order dated 20th February, 1989 passed by the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Ahmednagar in Regular Civil Suit No. 792 of 1983. 2. The present respondent i.e. original plaintiff filed Regular Civil Suit No. 792 of 1983 against Ganesh Waman Shevgaonkar for possession of three rooms on ground floor of House bearing CTS No. 5933, Municipal House No. 235. During the pendency of the suit, said Ganesh Waman Shevgaonkar expired and the petitioners herein who are the legal heirs of said Ganesh have filed written statement in the said suit, denying all the contentions of the original plaintiff. 3. The plaintiff claimed possession/eviction of the said 8 khans of the premises leased on the ground of (1) personal bonafide requirement, (2) default and (3) alternative accommodation acquired by the petitioners. The trial Court decreed the suit on the ground of personal bonafide requirement and that the petitioners have secured alternative accommodation. 4. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decreed dated 20th February, 1989 passed by the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Ahmednagar in Regular Civil Suit NO. 792 of 1983, the petitioners preferred an appeal and Civil Revision Application before the District Judge, Ahmednagar being R.C.A. No. 341 of 1989 and Civil Revision Application No. 2 of 1989. The said Civil Revision Application was in respect of rejecting the application of the petitioners for appointment of Commissioner. 5. The District Judge, Ahmednagar vide its common judgment dated 2nd December, 1991 dismissed the appeal being R.C.A. No. 341 of 1989 and the Civil Revision Application No. 2 of 1989. The learned District Judge while dismissing R.C.A. No. 341 of 1989 reversed the findings of the trial Court in respect of bonafide requirement, however, confirmed the decree of possession only on the ground of alternative accommodation. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order of the District Court, Ahmednagar, original plaintiff filed Writ Petition No. 1001 of 1992 and original tenants filed Writ Petition NO. 233 of 1992. 6. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners i.e. original tenants in Writ Petition NO. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order of the District Court, Ahmednagar, original plaintiff filed Writ Petition No. 1001 of 1992 and original tenants filed Writ Petition NO. 233 of 1992. 6. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners i.e. original tenants in Writ Petition NO. 233 of 1992 brings to the notice of this Court that, some of the petitioners are died and their legal heirs are not brought on record. The learned Counsel invited my attention to the grounds taken in the writ petition and submitted that, only Vishwas Ganesh Shevgaonkar purchased the premises and therefore, the Courts below were not right in passing the decree on the ground that, alternative accommodation has been acquired by the petitioners. Therefore, according to the learned Counsel for the petitioners, this petition deserves to be allowed. 7. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 1001 of 1992 submits that, the trial Court has rightly passed the decree on the ground of bonafide requirement and also on the ground of alternative accommodation acquired by the petitioners. The lower appellate Court has wrongly come to the 8 wp233.92conclusion that, the suit premises are not required for bonafide use. Therefore, relying upon the pleadings in the petition and the grounds taken therein, the Counsel for the petitioners would submit that, the petition may be allowed. 8. Both the Counsel appearing for the petitioners, in all fairness, have stated before this Court that, the suit premises are already demolished. It is also not in dispute that, the possession of the said premises is with the original plaintiff – landlord. 9. Upon hearing the Counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that, there are concurrent findings of facts recorded by the Courts below that, the alternative accommodation is acquired by the petitioners. On careful scrutiny of the material on record, the said findings are in consonance with the evidence brought on record. From careful perusal of the impugned judgment and order of the lower appellate Court, which is the last Court on facts, it is abundantly clear that, the lower appellate Court has in detail discussed about the aspect of acquiring alternative accommodation by the original tenants-petitioners herein. It is not necessary to reproduce herein the discussion by the lower appellate Court. From careful perusal of the impugned judgment and order of the lower appellate Court, which is the last Court on facts, it is abundantly clear that, the lower appellate Court has in detail discussed about the aspect of acquiring alternative accommodation by the original tenants-petitioners herein. It is not necessary to reproduce herein the discussion by the lower appellate Court. Suffice it to say that, the findings of facts recorded by the lower appellate Court that, the tenant has acquired suitable alternative accommodation as contemplated by Section 13(1)(1) of the Bombay Rents Act, are in consonance with the findings on record. Therefore, Writ Petition No. 233 of 1992 sans merit. Accordingly, same is dismissed. Rule is discharged. 10. Writ Petition No. 1001 of 1992 is filed by the original landlord-plaintiff. Since the Writ Petition No. 233 of 1992 is dismissed and in view of the subsequent facts that, already premises are demolished and are in possession of the original landlord – plaintiff, the issue raised by the original plaintiff looses its significance, since the decree passed by the Courts below is already executed. For the reasons aforesaid, Writ Petition No. 1001 of 1992 stands disposed of. 11. Rule stands discharged. Record and Proceedings, if any, be sent to the concerned Court, forthwith. Civil Applications stand disposed of accordingly.