JUDGMENT Ansari, J. 1. This is an appeal against the judgment and order, dated 21.12.2006, passed, in Sessions Case No. 14 (S-C) 2006, by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, (FTC), Sivasagar, convicting the accused-appellant under Section 302 IPC and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment for life and pay fine of Rs. 1, 000/- and, in default of payment of fine, suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of 6 (six) months. The case of the prosecution may, in brief, be described thus: On 02.10.2005, in the afternoon, accused Bimal Soren @ Dukani, came to the residential quarter of PW2 (Raju Hembram), at Ghorajan tea estate, with a knife used for pruning tea leaves, dragged out Lalita, sister of PW2, to the courtyard and gave her blows with the said knife. On being injured, Lalita fell down at the courtyard and died. Soon after killing Lalita, accused left the place of occurrence holding the weapon of offence in his hand. However, the occurrence of assault, on Lalita, was witnessed by PW5, wife of PW2. When PW2 was returning home after his work, at the tea factory, was over, PW5, wife of PW2, met the former on the road and told him what the accused had done, whereupon PW2 came running to his home and found Lalita lying in the courtyard with cut injuries on her body, her body being smeared with blood. PW2, then, lodged an Ejahar (Ext. 2) at Sapekhati Police Station. Treating the said Ejahar as First Information Report (in short, 'FIR'), Sapekhati Police Station Case No. 42/2005, under Section 302 IPC, was registered against the accused-appellant. 2. During the course of investigation, police visited the place of occurrence, held inquest over the said dead body, drew sketch map and got the said dead body subjected to post-mortem examination and, on the following day (i.e., 03.10.2005), in the afternoon, when the accused appeared, at the said police station, with a dao in his hand, the dao was seized vide seizure list (Ext. 4). On completion of investigation, police laid charge-sheet, under Section 302 IPC, against the accused-appellant. 3. To a charge framed, at the trial, under Section 302 IPC, the accused pleaded not guilty. 4. In support of their case, prosecution examined 10 (ten) witnesses. 4). On completion of investigation, police laid charge-sheet, under Section 302 IPC, against the accused-appellant. 3. To a charge framed, at the trial, under Section 302 IPC, the accused pleaded not guilty. 4. In support of their case, prosecution examined 10 (ten) witnesses. The accused was, then, examined under Section 313 Cr.PC and, in his examination aforementioned, the accused denied that he had committed the offence, which was alleged to have been committed by him, his case being that of denial and having been falsely implicated in the case. No evidence was adduced by the defence. 5. Having, however, found the accused guilty of the offence, which he stood charged with, the learned trial Court convicted him accordingly and passed sentence against him as mentioned above. Aggrieved by his conviction and the sentence, passed against him, the accused, as a convicted person, has preferred this appeal. 6. We have heard Mrs. B. Talukdar, learned amicus curiae, and Mr. K.A. Mazumdar, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Assam. 7. While considering the present appeal, we may point out, as already indicated above, that PW5 has been examined as the sole eye witness to the alleged occurrence. Her evidence is, therefore, of great importance. Her evidence shows that, on the day of the occurrence, Lalita was staying with them meaning thereby that Lalita was, at the time of the occurrence, at the house of PW2, who is husband of PW5, Lalita being elder sister of PW2. 8. As regards the occurrence, PW5 has deposed that, on the day of the occurrence, accused came to their house with a pointed weapon like knife, dragged Lalita out to the courtyard of their house and gave blows with the said weapon. It is in the evidence of PW5 that, on being injured, Lalita fell down at the courtyard and died. It is also in the evidence of PW5 that after assaulting Lalita, the accused left the place of occurrence holding the weapon in his hand. 9. In her cross-examination, PW5 has made it clear that she was outside the house, while Lalita was inside the house, there being three rooms in their house. In her cross-examination, PW5 has asserted that Bimal had hacked Lalita in her (PW5's) presence. 10. Nothing could be elicited from the cross-examination of PW5 to show that what she had deposed was untrue or false. In her cross-examination, PW5 has asserted that Bimal had hacked Lalita in her (PW5's) presence. 10. Nothing could be elicited from the cross-examination of PW5 to show that what she had deposed was untrue or false. This apart, the accused-appellant is younger brother of PW5. The defence has not alleged that PW5 or PW2 had any enmity with the accused-appellant. Apparently, there is no rational cause for PW5 to falsely implicate the accused-appellant. 11. Bearing in mind what have been discussed above, when we turn to the evidence of the doctor (PW1), who had, admittedly, performed the post mortem examination on the dead body of Lalita, on 03.10.2005, we notice that, according to his evidence, he found as follows: External appearance: Stout female body, rigor mortis present. Wound No. 1: Incised wound on left side of face from 1/2 " lateral to midline extending up to occipital bone separating the left mandible of 7" X 2" X bone cut. (2) Incised would over left side of neck 41/2" X 11/2" X cervical vertebra 3-4 cut separating the structures, spinal cord, vessels, both carotids larynx. (3) Left arm including left haemmorous cut and separated at neck of hummurous level keeping medial structures of arm intact with skin and muscles only. (4) Incised would of 2" X 1/2" at left elbow and right forearm on devisal aspect. (5) Incised would over back 7" X 2" X vertebra cut at thoracle 3/4 vertebra level. (6) Incised would over back at No. 2 level of 2" X 1/2" bone deep. Thorax: Larynx and trachare 2 partis cut into lower margin of thyroid carilage. Hear chamber are empty. Vessels carotid vessels left parachutal artery cut into two parts. Spinal cord: Cervical 3, 4 vertebra cut and separated. Brain and spinal cord: Spinal cord cut at level of cervical 3-4 vertebra. 12. In his evidence, PW1 has deposed that all the injuries were ante mortem in nature and the death of the deceased was caused due to shock and harmorrhage, which resulted from the injuries sustained by the said deceased. 13. It is of immense importance to note that the defence declined to cross-examine PW1. Thus, the findings, given by the doctor (PW1) and his opinion, with regard to the nature of the injuries, which Lalita had sustained, and the cause of Lalita's death remained unchallenged by the defence. 13. It is of immense importance to note that the defence declined to cross-examine PW1. Thus, the findings, given by the doctor (PW1) and his opinion, with regard to the nature of the injuries, which Lalita had sustained, and the cause of Lalita's death remained unchallenged by the defence. We, too, do not notice anything inherently improbable and incorrect in findings of the doctor (PW1) or the opinion given by the doctor (PW1). We see, therefore, no reason to disbelieve and/or discard the evidence of PW1. Thus, the evidence of PW1 clearly shows that Lalita suffered multiple incised wounds on her person including her neck and occipital region, the injuries being ante mortem in nature, and her death was caused, because of the shock and haemorrhage, which resulted by the injuries sustained by her. 14. When the medical evidence on record is considered in the light of the evidence, given by PW5, we find that her evidence has been completely corroborated by the medical evidence on record. With the corroboration so received from the medical evidence on record, there is no reason for us not to place reliance on the evidence of PW5. 15. The above discussion of the evidence on record brings us to the evidence of PW2, younger brother of deceased Lalita, and husband of PW5 (Minati). According to this witness' evidence, on the day of the occurrence, when, on completing his works at the factory, he was returning home, his wife (PW5), told him, on the road, that the accused had hacked Lalita, who was a spinster, and, on hearing the same, he came running to his house and found Lalita lying in the courtyard with cut injuries on the neck and whole of her body smeared with blood. 16. In his cross-examination, PW2 has clarified that the day of the occurrence was Sunday, but, on Sundays, their factory remains open. PW2 has also clarified that he reached home, accompanied by his wife (PW5), meaning thereby that after the occurrence had taken place, as described by PW5, she (PW5) was on the road and she came back home with PW2. 17. Though PW2 has deposed, as indicated above, that his wife (PW5) had reported to him that the accused had hacked Lalita, we find that PW5 has not given any such evidence. 17. Though PW2 has deposed, as indicated above, that his wife (PW5) had reported to him that the accused had hacked Lalita, we find that PW5 has not given any such evidence. When PW5 does not tell that that she had reported the occurrence to her husband (PW2), can the evidence of PW2, that his wife (PW5) reported to him that the accused had hacked Lalita, be relied upon ? 18. While considering the question, posed above, it needs to be noted that, ordinarily, when PW5 has not deposed that she reported the occurrence to her husband (PW2), the evidence, given by PW2, that his wife (PW5) reported to him that Lalita had been hacked by the accused, would but be treated as hearsay. What is, however, of immense importance to note is that, in order to exclude a piece of evidence as hearsay, one has to bear in mind the distinction between the factum of information and truthfulness or veracity of such information. If, in a given case, the object is to merely establish that a statement was made by one person to another, it may not be hearsay; but if the object is to prove that what was started was true, then, it may become hearsay. Thus, when 'x', an eye witness of an occurrence of murder, comes to a police station and reports the occurrence to a police officer, the evidence given by the police officer, at the trial, in the absence of the evidence given by the informant, that he was given such an information is not hearsay if the object is merely to prove that such an information was, indeed, received by the police officer; but if the object is to prove that what the police officer had been reported was or was not true, then, the police officer's evidence as to what he was reported by 'x' would be hearsay unless 'x' appears as a witness at the trial and deposes not only that he had so reported the occurrence to the police officer, but also that what he had reported was true as he had witnessed the occurrence himself. (See Bisheswar Baori @ Khetrapal Vs. State of Assam, reported in 2002 (2) GLT 395). 19. In Subramaniam Vs. (See Bisheswar Baori @ Khetrapal Vs. State of Assam, reported in 2002 (2) GLT 395). 19. In Subramaniam Vs. Public Prosecutor, reported in (1956) 1 WLR 965, the Privy Council, distinguishing the factum of statement from the factum of truth, observed and held that the state of mind of a man, charged with possessing ammunition contrary to certain regulations, could be proved by what had been told to him by certain terrorists into whose hands he had come. Referring to the observations, so made by the Privy Council in Subramaniam (supra), Lord Parker, Chief Justice, in Regina -vs- Wills (1960) 1 WLR 55, observed, Mr. de Silva, giving the advice of the Board, said: In ruling out peremptorily the evidence of conversation between the terrorists and the appellant, the trial judge was in error. Evidence of a statement made to a witness by a person, who is not himself called as a witness, may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible, when it is proposed to establish, by the evidence, not the truth of the statement, but the fact that it was made. The fact that the statement was made, quite apart from its truth, is frequently relevant in considering the mental state and conduct thereafter of the witness or of some other person in whose presence the statement was made. (Emphasis is added) In the opinion of this Court, that statement of the law is applicable to the present case. It is true that the Board were there considering the state of mind and conduct of the defendant at the time of the commission of the offence, but provided the evidence as to his state of mind and conduct is relevant, it matters not whether it was in regard to the conduct at the time of the commission of the offence or, as here, at a subsequent time, to explain his answers to the police and his conduct, when charged. Accordingly, that evidence, in the present case, was wrongly excluded. 20. Accordingly, that evidence, in the present case, was wrongly excluded. 20. In Sudip @ Tultul Choudhury, reported in 2010 (2) GLT 870, the question, which arose, was: When an informant or the person, who informs the Officer-in-Charge of a police station as regards commission of a cognizable offence, is not examined as a witness at the trial, because of the fact that his identity is not known, whether the evidence, given by the Officer-in-Charge of the police station concerned, as to what information he had received would or would not be hearsay ? 21. Pointing out the distinction between the factum of information and truthfulness or veracity of such information, a Division Bench of this Court, in Sudip @ Tultul Choudhury (supra), observed, at paragraph 19 and 20, as under: 19. Thus, the evidence, given in the present case, by PW12 (Investigating Officer) that he had received an information telephonically, at his police station, that Anil Gan of Central Road Extension had been murdered and that his dead body was lying, in his courtyard, is not wholly inadmissible in evidence in order to show as to what information PW12 had telephonically received, which prompted him to visit the place of occurrence, though the informant's identity had not been determined and the informant was not examined. By proving as to what had prompted the police machinery to move into motion, what the evidence of PW12 does is that it tells the Court as to what information he had received telephonically at his police station and why and how he happened to come to the place, where Anil Gan's dead-body was found lying. To the extent, therefore, as to what PW12 had been told on telephone or to the extent as to what information PW12 had telephonically received at his police station, the evidence, given by PW12, is not inadmissible evidence even though the caller remains unidentified till date. With the limited use of the evidence given by PW12, what is proved, in the absence of examination of the person, who had made the said telephone call, is the factum of information, namely, as to what information PW12 had telephonically received. It does not, however, prove that the information, which PW12 had received, was true. With the limited use of the evidence given by PW12, what is proved, in the absence of examination of the person, who had made the said telephone call, is the factum of information, namely, as to what information PW12 had telephonically received. It does not, however, prove that the information, which PW12 had received, was true. If the factum of truth of the information so given is required to be determined by the Court, then, the evidence given by PW12, as to what he had been told, telephonically, by the caller, would be hearsay and inadmissible evidence. The Court has to, therefore, remain alive at the trial as to when a statement, attributed to any person, who is not examined as a witness, can be brought on record as a factum of statement made and not as proof of the truth of the statement made. 20. Thus, the evidence, given by PW12, as to what he had been told by the telephone caller is, in the absence of the evidence of the caller, not inadmissible if the Court has to rely on the evidence of PW12 to hold that PW12 had received a telephone call to the effect that Anil Gan had been murdered. But the information, that Anil Gan had been murdered as aforesaid, is quite different from the question as to whether Anil Gan had, as a matter of fact, been murdered or not. When the information, so received by PW12, made the police machinery move into motion and in order to ascertain the truth and also to investigate as to who was the offender, when the police proceeded from the said police station, arrived at the place of occurrence, examined the dead body of Anil Gan and held inquest thereon, investigation into the case must be held to have already commenced. Any information given thereafter, whether in writing or orally, to PW12 by PW1, as regards the occurrence, was nothing, but his (PW1's) statement made to the police during investigation and such a statement stands on the same footing as does a statement of a witness under Section 161 Cr.PC. Such a statement is not substantive evidence nor can it be treated, or could have been treated, as FIR. 22. Such a statement is not substantive evidence nor can it be treated, or could have been treated, as FIR. 22. Thus, the evidence of PW2, too, in the present case, same as in the case of Sudip @ Tultul (supra), has to be divided into two parts, namely, factum of information and truthfulness or veracity of the information. The prosecution has clearly proved the factum of information inasmuch as the evidence of PW2, i.e., his wife (PW5), reported to him that the accused had hacked Lalita, stands well proved. Logically, therefore, there is no difficulty in concluding that PW2 was, indeed, reported by PW5, as deposed by PW2. Whether the information, so given by PW5, was or was not true remains undetermined and has to be, therefore, treated as hearsay inasmuch as PW5, as already indicated above, has, nowhere, deposed that she told her hand that the accused had hacked Lalita. 23. Situated thus, what is admissible from the evidence of PW2 is that he was, indeed, informed by PW5 that the accused had hacked Lalita to death. This evidence, however, cannot be treated as the evidence of truth; but, in the face of the fact that the evidence of PW5 is found by us to be believable, we see no reason to disbelieve PW5 merely because she did not claim, in her evidence, that she had reported the occurrence to her husband (PW2). 24. What may, now, be pointed out is that, in her evidence, PW5 has deposed that "Raju Hembram is my husband. He went out thereafter and informed the police." Taking a cue from the word, 'thereafter', appearing in the evidence of PW5, it has been pointed out by Mrs. Talukdar, learned amicus curiae, that PW2 was, in the light of the evidence of PW5, at his house at the time, when Lalita was allegedly hacked to death. 25. He went out thereafter and informed the police." Taking a cue from the word, 'thereafter', appearing in the evidence of PW5, it has been pointed out by Mrs. Talukdar, learned amicus curiae, that PW2 was, in the light of the evidence of PW5, at his house at the time, when Lalita was allegedly hacked to death. 25. While considering the above submission, made by the learned amicus curiae, it needs to be noted that, while cross-examining PW2, the defence never disputed his evidence that he was not present at home at the time, when his sister, Lalita, was put to death and that it was on the way to his house, from the garden factory, that he was informed by his wife about the death of his sister and that on being so informed, he came running home and found his sister, Lalita, lying dead in his courtyard. 26. In such circumstances, as indicated above, we do not find that the defence can be said to have been able to derive out any strength, in support of their case, from the expression, 'thereafter', which has appeared in the evidence of PW5 and, hence, the word, 'thereafter', appearing in the evidence of PW5, has to be interpreted to mean that on being informed by PW5 about the occurrence of Lalita having been hacked to death, (PW2) came running to his house, found Lalita lying dead in the courtyard and, then, went out of his house and informed the police. 27. So far as the seizure of the dao by the police is concerned, the learned amicus curiae has pointed out that since there is nothing in the evidence to show that the dao, which had been sized by the police, was put through any serological examination, the said dao could not have been held to be the weapon of offence. We find considerable force in this submission. Material Ext. 1 cannot, therefore, be confidently held as the weapon of offence. Notwithstanding, however, the fact that Material Ext. 1 cannot be said to have been proved as the weapon of offence, the failure of the prosecution to prove the weapon of offence does not, in any manner, dilute or weaken the unshaken and wholly reliable evidence of PW5. 28. Mrs. 1 cannot, therefore, be confidently held as the weapon of offence. Notwithstanding, however, the fact that Material Ext. 1 cannot be said to have been proved as the weapon of offence, the failure of the prosecution to prove the weapon of offence does not, in any manner, dilute or weaken the unshaken and wholly reliable evidence of PW5. 28. Mrs. Talukdar, learned amicus curiae, has also referred to the case of Prabin Gogoi vs. Ambika Gogoi, reported in (2004) 3 GLR 286, in support of her submission that the burden of proof always rests on the prosecution and even when the onus shifts to the accused, the standard of proof required is not as high as that on the prosecution and that defence can discharge its burden by probablising the defence plea. As a proposition of law, what the learned amicus curiae has submitted cannot be in dispute. In the case at hand, however, the burden was on the prosecution to prove its case and we find that the prosecution has proved its case beyond all reasonable doubt. 29. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, we do not notice that the finding of guilt, which the learned trial Court reached against the accused-appellant, suffers from any infirmity, legal or factual, and we see, therefore, no reason to interfere with the accused-appellant's conviction or the sentence passed against him. 30. Situated thus, we find no merit in this appeal. Thus, the appeal fails and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed. 31. Let the amicus curiae be paid a sum of Rs. 5,000/- (Rupees five thousand) only by the Registry for her valuable assistance rendered to the Court. Send back the LCR. Appeal dismissed