Judgment : 1. These five Writ Petitions relate to the use of additional ramps, by the Didugu Sand and Boat Workers Co-operative Society Ltd., (hereinafter referred to as the "Society"), at Chevitikallu, Kunikinapadu and Popuru reaches, all three of them located in Krishna District (hereinafter called "the additional ramps"). 2. Facts, in brief, are that the Amaravathi sand reach is situated on the right flood bank of the Krishna River in Guntur District of Andhra Pradesh. A notification dated 05.03.2010 was issued for auction of leasehold rights to conduct sand quarry operations in respect of Amaravathi sand reach. The notification listed six ramps, i.e., (1) Vykunthapuram, (2) Amaravathi, (3) Dharanikota, (4) Didugu, (5) Malladi and (6) Munugodu, as the notified ramps to be utilized by the auction purchaser. In the auction, the Society was declared as the highest bidder for one year commencing from 01.04.2010. A lease agreement, as stipulated under Rule 9-I of the Rules, was entered into between the Society and the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur. The said lease agreement dated 31.03.2010 detailed the limits of the Amaravathi reach as the revenue limits of Amaravathi Mandal. The River Conservator-cum-Executive Engineer, Krishna Central Division, Vijayawada, vide letter dated 29.01.2010 addressed to the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur, permitted use of the aforementioned six ramps. Subsequently, vide proceedings dated 13.04.2010, the River Conservator informed the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur that he had no objection, and was according permission, for utilizing the existing ramps for transportation of sand which included the additional ramps located in Krishna District on the left flood bank of the Krishna river. 3. The Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur, vide letter dated 17.04.2010, informed the President of the Society that his office would intimate regarding permission for use of the additional three ramps only after getting approval from the District Level Sand Committee, Guntur. The Society and its President filed W.P. No.9503 of 2010 before this Court questioning the order of the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur dated 17.04.2010. The Society sought an interim direction to the respondents not to cause any obstruction for transportation of sand by them as per the permission granted by the River Conservator in proceedings dated 13.04.2010. The Society and its President filed W.P. No.9503 of 2010 before this Court questioning the order of the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur dated 17.04.2010. The Society sought an interim direction to the respondents not to cause any obstruction for transportation of sand by them as per the permission granted by the River Conservator in proceedings dated 13.04.2010. This Court passed an interim order on 26.04.2010 directing the Assistant Director to consider the Society's request without referring it to the District Level Sand Committee; take an appropriate decision in the light of the report of the River Conservator; and communicate the same to the Society within a period of one week. Thereafter the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur, vide proceedings dated 01.05.2010, informed the President of the Society that, in the light of the circumstances stated in the order, in obedience to the directions of the High Court and in the light of the powers conferred under Rule 9-N, the Society's request to utilize the three ramps situated towards the left bank sideof the Krishna River in Krishna District, which was permitted by the competent jurisdictional authority i.e., River Conservator-cum-Executive Engineer, K.C. Division, Vijayawada vide letter dated 13.04.2010, was considered. 4. On the representations submitted by the villagers of Popuru village, and the Sarpanch of the Kunikinapadu Gram Panchayat, the River Conservator submitted a report on 08.05.2010 informing the Collector, Krishna District that, on verification of the ramp locations and ground conditions, it was observed that there was a road laid in the river bed connecting the ramps which diverted the river stream force, and amounted to violation of the River Conservancy Act. He requested that necessary action be taken on the permission already given for utilizing the ramps for transportation of sand by the Society. The Collector, Krishna District observed that, while the sand reach was in Guntur District, the route for transport was through Krishna District; the public representatives in Krishna District had objected as the ramps would be used for illegal quarrying in the sand reaches in Krishna District; use of these ramps would result in damage of roads, pollution and other problems in Krishna District; and the local bodies would not be getting part of the seniorage fee. The River Conservator was instructed to withdraw the ramp permission until fool-proof mechanism for controlling illegal sand quarrying, and revenue sharing, was worked out by the District Level Committee. 5. The River Conservator, vide letter dated 01.06.2010, informed the Joint Collector-cum-Chairman, District Level Sand Committee, Krishna that the Vigilance and Enforcement authorities had inspected the sand bearing areas of Guntur, and had found six proclains which were handed over to the Tahsildar, Amaravathi. He opined that sand quarrying by the lease holder was in violation of the River Conservancy Act, and the permission of three additional ramps in Krishna District granted to the lessee was required to be withdrawn as the lease holder had violated the terms and conditions of the River Conservancy Act. The River Conservator opined that these issues were required to be projected in the District Level Sand Committee to avoid obstructions in the river bed preventing free flow of water as the issue involved was in the orbit of the High Court. 6. The River Conservator opined that these issues were required to be projected in the District Level Sand Committee to avoid obstructions in the river bed preventing free flow of water as the issue involved was in the orbit of the High Court. 6. In his subsequent report dated 15.06.2010, the River Conservator stated that the path leading from Popuru village, on the left flood bank of the Krishna river, was in existence since several years, and was being used by the previous lessees; the revenue limits of Popuru village and Amaravathi Mandal were adjacent to the river; the boundaries of both Popuru and Amaravathi were clearly demarcated by poles and flags; the Society was excavating sand within the limits of Amaravathi Mandal, and was transporting the quarried sand through Popuru reach; the track laid on the river was almost 2 KM from Amaravathi; this path was formed with silt bed sand mixed with river pebbles; this path was about two feet in height, above the neighbouring sand bed, in the initial 1.00 K.M, and was suitable for transporting sand; likewise the path on the east side of the ramp in Chivitikallu village was in existence for the past two years, and was being used by the previous lease holder; it was located almost at a distance of 2 KMs from the Amaravathi sand quarry; it was formed upto a length of two KM with silt and sand mixed with some debris; this path was around 2 feet in height above the neighbouring sand bed for the initial 1.50 KMs; it was suitable for transportation of sand, and satisfied the river topological system; this path breached automatically during heavy discharges into the river during floods; and the Society was not utilizing either the Chivitikallu ramp or the Kunikinapadu ramps. 7. The Principal Secretary to Government, Industries & Commerce department was suo-motu impleaded as a respondent by this Court on 24.11.2010, and was directed to examine the two contrary reports submitted by the River Conservator and file a detailed affidavit. 7. The Principal Secretary to Government, Industries & Commerce department was suo-motu impleaded as a respondent by this Court on 24.11.2010, and was directed to examine the two contrary reports submitted by the River Conservator and file a detailed affidavit. The Principal Secretary, in the exercise of the powers vested in the Government, under Rule 9-K(3) of the Andhra Pradesh Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966, (hereinafter called the Rules), clarified, vide memo No.9332/SPIU & SAND/2011-1 dated 20.06.2011, that the concerned Assistant Director of Mines and Geology competent to permit opening of new ramps under Rule 9-N was the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology having territorial jurisdiction over the ramps either existing or new; and he alone was competent to exercise discretion to issue permission in terms of Rule 9-N of the Rules. Consequent thereto the Principal Secretary called upon the Society, vide memo No.9337/SPIU & SAND/2011-2 dated 20.06.2011, to show cause within ten days why the Government, in exercise of its powers of suo motu revision under Rule 35-A, should not cancel the earlier order of the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur vide letter dated 01.05.2010 permitting the Society to use the additional ramps located on the left bank of the Krishna river falling in the limits of Krishna District which was within the territorial jurisdiction of the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Nandigama. By memo No.9337/SPIU & SAND/2011-3 dated 20.06.2011 the Principal Secretary requested the Director of Mines and Geology to consider if orders under Rule 11(2)(c) need to be issued at his level regulating quarrying operations of the Society, and to ensure that the Society did not transport sand through the three additional ramps located in Krishna District. 8. By proceedings No.28040/R802/2010 dated 20.06.2011 the Director of Mines and Geology, in the exercise of his powers under Rule 11(2)(c) of the Rules, ordered that the Society may be continued to be permitted to utilize the six ramps, and regulate transportation of the sand which was extracted from Reach No.8, Amaravathi Mandal Limits located on the right bank of the Krishna River falling under Guntur District. He further ordered that the Society should not utilize the three additional ramps located in Krishna District till a decision was taken by the Government on the show cause notice issued to the Society. 1. 9. He further ordered that the Society should not utilize the three additional ramps located in Krishna District till a decision was taken by the Government on the show cause notice issued to the Society. 1. 9. While grant of the additional three ramps in favour of the Society is under challenge in W.P. No.25583 of 2010, the Society filed W.P. No.1708 of 2011 questioning the action of the respondents in interfering with transportation of sand by them through the additional ramps. The Society filed W.P. No.17915 of 2011 questioning the memo issued by the Principal Secretary to the Government, (Industries and Commerce department) dated 20.06.2011 under Rule 9-K(3), and the consequential memo dated 20.06.2011 calling upon the petitioner to show cause why the order of the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology dated 01.05.2010 should not be cancelled. They filed W.P. No.17922 of 2011 questioning the memo issued by the Principal Secretary dated 20.06.2011 requesting the Director of Mines and Geology to consider if orders were required to be issued under Rule 11(2(c) thereby ensuring that the Society did not transport sand through the three additional ramps. They also filed W.P. No.17930 of 2011 questioning the proceedings of the Director of Mines and Geology dated 20.06.2011 whereby they were asked not to utilize the three additional ramps. 10. All these five writ petitions were heard together, and are now being disposed of by a common order. For convenience sake the contentions urged by counsel on either side are being dealt with under different heads. A. PRELIMINARY OBJECTION: 1. 11. Sri E. Manohar, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Society, would submit that, since similar matters are pending adjudication before a Division bench, this Court should also direct that these Writ Petitions be listed before the Division bench. 2. 12. It is necessary to note that W.P. No.25583 of 2010 was listed along with W.A. No.824 of 2010 (preferred against the judgment in W.P. No.12239 of 2010 dated 02.06.2010), W.P. No.14473 of 2010, W.P. No. 13182 of 2010, W.P. No.11943 of 2010 and W.P. No.11009 of 2010 before the Division Bench and, by order dated 23.11.2010, the Division Bench directed deletion of W.P. No.25583 of 2010 from the batch of cases and for listing the said Writ Petition before the single judge on 24.11.2010. .13. .13. W.P. No.25583 of 2010 and W.P.No.1708 of 2011 were heard by this Court in the last week of April, 2011 and, at the request of the Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Society, were posted after summer vacation. On 08.07.2011 it was brought to the notice of this Court that the Society had filed W.P. Nos.17915, 17922 and 17930 of 2011 and that interim orders had been passed therein. On being informed that vacate stay petitions had already been filed, the Registry was asked to place the matter before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for appropriate orders for listing of all the five Writ Petitions before the appropriate Bench. The Hon'ble the Chief Justice, by proceedings dated .27.07.2011, directed all the five Writ Petitions to be listed before this Court. 3. 14. The Chief Justice is the master of the roster. He has full power, authority and jurisdiction in the matter of allocation of business of the High Court which inheres in him in the very nature of things. (State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Shamrao Puranik (1982) 2 SCC 440 ). The Chief Justice enjoys a special status, and has jurisdiction to decide which case will be heard by which Bench. (State of U.P. v. Neeraj Chaubey (2010) 10 SCC 320). The Chief Justice of the High Court alone has the right and power to decide how benches of the High Court are to be constituted; which Judge is to sit alone and which cases he can and is required to hear as also which Judges shall constitute a Division Bench and what work those benches shall do. Judges of the High Court can sit alone or in Division Benches and do such work as may be allotted to them by an order of, or in accordance with the directions of, the Chief Justice. In the matter of constitution of benches, and making of the roster, he alone is vested with the necessary powers. (State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand (1998) 1 SCC 1) ; Divine Retreat Centre v. State of Kerala (2008) 3 SCC 542 ); Inder Mani v. Matheshwari Prasad (1996) 6 SCC 587 ) ; Yelamarthi Sarath Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh ( 2011(3) ALD 683 (DB). .15. (State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand (1998) 1 SCC 1) ; Divine Retreat Centre v. State of Kerala (2008) 3 SCC 542 ); Inder Mani v. Matheshwari Prasad (1996) 6 SCC 587 ) ; Yelamarthi Sarath Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh ( 2011(3) ALD 683 (DB). .15. As these Writ Petitions have been listed before this Court, pursuant to the orders of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice, I see no reason to accede to the request of the Learned Senior Counsel that these matters be listed for hearing before the Division bench before whom similar Writ Petitions are pending adjudication. .“B. DOES THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF MINES AND GEOLOGY, GUNTUR HAVE JURISDICTION UNDER THE A.P. MINOR MINERAL CONCESSION RULES, 1966 TO GRANT PERMISSION FOR USE OF THE EXISTING RAMPS LOCATED IN KRISHNA DISTRICT?” 4. 16. Sri E.Manohar, Learned Senior Counsel, would submit that the word "concerned" in Rule 9-N only meant the Assistant Director who executed a lease deed with the highest bidder in the auction and since, admittedly, it is the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur who executed the lease agreement in favour of the Society, it is he who is the competent authority under Rule 9-N to grant permission for use of the additional ramps even if they are located in Krishna District, and not the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Nandigama, Krishna District. 5. 17. On the other hand Learned Additional Advocate General would rely on G.O.Ms. No.31 dated 15.02.2003 to submit that the area of operation and territorial jurisdiction of officials were clearly demarcated therein; the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Nandigama, Krishna District is the concerned Assistant Director as these three additional ramps were located within his territorial jurisdiction in Krishna District; and the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur lacks jurisdiction, under Rule 9-N read with Rule 4(a) of the Rules, to permit use of additional ramps located in Krishna District. 6. 18. 6. 18. Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, Learned Senior Counsel, would submit that granting permission to use new ramps was different from granting permission for use of existing ramps as additional ramps; Poppuru, Chevitikallu and Kunikinapadu were existing notified ramps and not new ramps; Rule 9-N postulates that new ramps could be permitted for transportation of sand from the quarry, and the same should be within the leased area; if the construction placed by the Society on Rule 9-N is accepted it would mean that the MRO, Amaravathi in Guntur District could certify in respect of reaches and ramps notified in Krishna District also, and not the MRO, Chandarlapadu Mandal, Krishna District; such a construction could not be accepted as it would result in exercise of overlapping jurisdiction by officers; in this case the lease deed and plans were prepared, the leased area demarcated, and six ramps within Amaravathi Mandal limits were notified as the authorized ramps for the area leased in favour of the Society in Amaravathi Mandal limits; Poppuru, Chevitikallu and Kunikinapadu are independent notified sand reaches; the existing ramps located within the reach limits come under the territorial jurisdiction of the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Nandigama, Krishna District; the leasehold rights, in respect of the said reaches, are being granted to different lessees; and the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur assumed territorial jurisdiction, and granted permission to the Society to use existing ramps which were not under his control. .19. Rule 9-B to 9-Z of the Rules relate to quarrying of sand, a minor mineral. On a reading of sub-rules (B) to (Z) of Rule 9 as a whole, it is evident that the Rules regulate quarrying of sand District-wise; and the authorities in each District play an important role in dealing with various aspects of quarrying of sand in their District. Each District has several Mandals. 9-B(1) requires all sand bearing areas in the State to be leased out "Reach or Mandal-wise". Under Rule 9-B(5) a committee called the District Level .Committee is constituted for each District, where the sand bearing areas are located, to be headed by the Joint Collector of the District; and the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology of that District is the Member Convener of the District level Committee. Under Rule 9-B(5) a committee called the District Level .Committee is constituted for each District, where the sand bearing areas are located, to be headed by the Joint Collector of the District; and the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology of that District is the Member Convener of the District level Committee. Rule 9-B(6) confers powers on the District level committee to decide on issues relating to (i) identification of the reaches or mandals to be leased out for conduct of auction; (iii) to club/sub divide the reaches wherever necessary, and (iv)(d) loading and formation or laying of ramps or roads in the reach or mandal. Rule 9-D(1) requires a notice to be issued in Form S-1 when an area is to be leased out by sealed tender cum auction for quarrying of sand. Form S-1, annexed to the Rules, is the notice inviting sealed tenders and for public auction to lease out the right of quarrying for sand in the sources described in the schedule to the notice. The schedule to Form S-1 contains five columns. The second column relates to the description of the area (Reach/Mandal). It is thus evident that the source for quarrying of sand is divided reach/mandal-wise both of which fall within a District. 7. 20. Since the question which arises for consideration is whether Rule 9-N confers power on the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology of a particular District to permit use of existing ramps located in another District, it is necessary to examine the scope and ambit of Rule 9-N. 8. 21. Rule 9-N relates to the use of authorized ramps and requires the lessee to make use of authorized ramps and paths only for transportation of sand from the quarry, and not open any new ramps or paths. The said Rule, however, enables the concerned Assistant Director of Mines & Geology to permit new ramps only with the consent of the concerned Mandal Revenue Officer in case of government lands, and the River Conservator where the River Conservancy Act applies and in case of patta lands with the consent of the pattadar duly verifying the claims supported by certification issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer concerned. .22. Rule 9-N is in two parts. The first part again contains two limbs. .22. Rule 9-N is in two parts. The first part again contains two limbs. The first limb requires the lessee to make use of only the authorized ramps and paths for transportation of sand from the quarry and the second limb prohibits the lessee from opening any new ramps or paths. The second part of Rule 9-N also has two limbs. The first limb relates to permission for new ramps on government lands and the second relates to permission for new ramps in patta lands. In respect of government lands, the .concerned Assistant Director of Mines and Geology is conferred the power to grant permission for new ramps with the consent of the concerned Mandal Revenue Officer and the River Conservator where the River Conservancy Act applies. The concerned Assistant Director of Mines and Geology is empowered to grant permission for new ramps in patta lands only with the consent of the pattadar provided the claims are supported by certification issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer concerned. 9. 23. A ramp is an inclined plane/slope between two levels. Ordinarily after obtaining the consent of the River Conservator, and at the time of auction, the ramps/paths are notified. It is only through the authorised ramps is a lessee required to transport the sand quarried by him at the sand bearing areas or pit heads. In the present case the Society was permitted to use six authorized ramps all of them located in Gunutr District for transportation of the sand quarried at reach No.8, Amaravati. 10. 24. Section 9-I(2) requires the successful tenderer/bidder to execute a lease deed with the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology concerned in Form G-I. Form G-1 is the statutorily prescribed form of the sand lease agreement. Clause (xvii) thereunder requires the lessee to make use of authorized ramps and paths only for transportation of sand from the quarry, and not open any new ramps and paths without the permission of the authorities/pattadar concerned. 11. 25. While requiring the lessee to make use of only the authorized ramps for transportation of sand from the quarry, both Rule 9-N and clause (xvii) of Form G-I restrict opening of new ramps/paths. The word "open" in the context of Rule 9-N and clause (xvii) of Form G-I means to "begin". Likewise the word "new" in the said context means "fresh". The word "open" in the context of Rule 9-N and clause (xvii) of Form G-I means to "begin". Likewise the word "new" in the said context means "fresh". The three additional ramps in question at (1) Chevitikalu (2) Popuru and (3) Kunikinapadu are existing authorized ramps for other reaches, and are not new ramps. What Rule 9-N contemplates is not the use of existing ramps in other reaches, but the opening of new ramps by the lessee. In other words the lessee can begin laying a fresh slope or incline, for transportation of the sand quarried by him, only with the permission of the concerned Assistant Director of Mines and Geology. If the new ramps are to be laid or formed over government lands, Rule 9-N requires the lessee to obtain the consent of the concerned Mandal Revenue Officer and, in case the new slope or incline is to be laid on patta lands, the consent of the pattadar is required to be obtained. The stipulation of certification by the Mandal Revenue Officer concerned is only to enable him to ascertain and satisfy himself whether the area, where the slope or incline is to be laid or the new ramp is to be formed, is on government land or on patta land. It is only the Mandal Revenue Officer in charge of the area, where the new ramps are to be opened, who would be in a position to determine whether the ramps in question are sought to be laid on government lands or patta lands. Existing ramps, more so those which are notified/authorised ramps for other reaches, would not constitute "new" ramps. Neither Rule 9-N nor clause (xvii) of Form G-1 confer jurisdiction on the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology to permit use of existing ramps, more particularly those which are authorized ramps for other reaches, after a lease agreement is entered into in as much as these existing ramps can neither be said to have been "opened" by the lessee nor can they be held to be "new ramps". 1. 26. Rule 4(a) defines "Assistant Director" to mean the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology in charge of the District. 1. 26. Rule 4(a) defines "Assistant Director" to mean the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology in charge of the District. The words "Assistant Director concerned" are also used in Rule 9-B(5), 9-B(6), 9-E (i), (ii), (ix) and (xiii); Rule 9-F (1) and (2), 9-I (2) and (5), 9-J and Rule 9-N. Form G-1 annexed to the Rules also uses the words "Assistant Director concerned" in clause (IX) and (XII). Who the concerned Assistant Director is would vary depending on the conditions stipulated in different sub-rules of Rule 9. For instance Rule 9-I(2), which requires the successful tenderer/bidder to execute a lease deed with the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology concerned, would necessarily mean the Assistant Director in charge of the District where the sand bearing area, for which a lease is granted, is located. The very fact that sand bearing areas, for which the lease was granted in favour of the Society, are located in Amaravathi Mandal of Guntur District would mean that, in terms of Rule 9-I(2), it is the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur who is competent to execute the lease deed. Likewise reference under Rule 9-N, to the Assistant Director concerned who is empowered to permit opening of new ramps, can only be to the Assistant Director in charge of the District where the new ramp is to be located. Since the three additional ramps, (other than the six authorized six ramps located in Guntur District which the Society was originally permitted to use), are located in Krishna District, the words "Assistant Director concerned" in Rule 9-N can only mean the Assistant Director of Mines & Geology in charge of Krishna District. 27. If the construction placed by Sri E.Manohar, Learned Senior Counsel, on the word "Assistant Director concerned" is accepted, and it is held that it is only the Assistant Director who executed the lease agreement who is the concerned Assistant Director under all the aforementioned sub-rules of Rule -9, then Rule 4(a), which defines "Assistant Director" to mean the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology in charge of the District, would become redundant for the Assistant Director incharge of the District, where the leased area is located, would alone be the concerned Assistant Director competent to exercise powers under different sub-rules of Rule 9. Such a construction would not only be contrary to the plain language of Rule 4(a), but would also require the definition of "Assistant Director" in Rule 4(a) to be read as the Assistant Director in charge of the area in relation to which the quarry lease is granted. 2. 28. It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statutes that the words of a statute must be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and construed according to their grammatical meaning. (Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit v. State of Maharashtra ( 2001(4) SCC 534 ). The legislature may be safely presumed to have intended what the words plainly say. (Bhaiji v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Thandla 2003 (1) SCC 692 ). What is to be borne in mind is what has been said in the statute and what has not been said. A construction which requires, for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words, has to be avoided. (Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. Custodian of Vested Forests ( AIR 1990 SC 1747 ), Shyam Kishori Devi v. Patna Municipal Corpn ( AIR 1966 SC 1678 ), A. R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak (1984 (2) SCC 500), Dental Council of India v. Hari Prakash (2001)8 SCC 61 ), J. P. Bansal v. State of Rajasthan (2003)5 SCC 134 ); Unique Butyle Tube Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Uttar Pradesh Financial Corporation (2003)2 SCC 455 ) and State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh (2005)10 SCC 437 ). 29. Courts should not, ordinarily, add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there, especially when a literal reading thereof produces an intelligible result. (Delhi Financial Corpn v. Rajiv Anand (2004)11 SCC 625 ). There is a line, though thin, which separates adjudication from legislation. That line should not be crossed or erased. Courts expound the law, they do not legislate. (State of Kerala v. Mathai Verghese ( 1986 (4) SCC 746 ), Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal ( AIR 1992 SC 96 ). A Judge is not entitled to add something more than what is there in the Statute by way of a supposed intention of the legislature. (Union of India v. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd (2001)4SCC 139). The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. A Judge is not entitled to add something more than what is there in the Statute by way of a supposed intention of the legislature. (Union of India v. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd (2001)4SCC 139). The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. ((Maruti Wire Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. S.T.O., I.S.T. Circle, Mattancherry (2001)3 SCC 735 ), Govind Singh15). 2. 30. Courts have adhered to the principle that effort should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by the legislature and it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute, as being inapposite surplussage, if they can have a proper application in circumstances conceivable within the contemplation of the statute. (Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit7, Manohar Lal v. Vinesh Anand (2001) 5 SCC 407 ). When the legislative intent is found specific mention and expression in the provisions of the Act itself, the same cannot be whittled down or curtailed and rendered nugatory. (Bharathidasan University v. All India Council for Technical Education (2001)8 SCC 676 ). Effect should be given to all the provisions and a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a "dead letter" must be avoided. (Anwar Hasan Khan v. Mohd. Shafi (2001) 8 SCC 540 ). The duty of the Court is to give effect to the intention of the legislature, and that intention is to be gathered from the language employed having regard to the context in connection with which it is employed. The legislature is deemed to intend and mean what it says. The need for interpretation arises only when the words used in the Statute are, on their own terms, ambivalent and do not manifest the intention of the legislature. (ITC Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, New Delhi (2004)7 SCC 591 ). A Statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. (Raghunath Rai Bareja v. Punjab National Bank (2007) 2 SCC 230); Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers ( AIR 2003 SC 2434 ). Statutory language must always be given presumptively the most natural and ordinary meaning which is appropriate in the circumstances, (Chertsey Urban District Council v. Mixnam's Properties Ltd (1964) 2 All ER 627), and must be construed according to the rules of grammar. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers ( AIR 2003 SC 2434 ). Statutory language must always be given presumptively the most natural and ordinary meaning which is appropriate in the circumstances, (Chertsey Urban District Council v. Mixnam's Properties Ltd (1964) 2 All ER 627), and must be construed according to the rules of grammar. In construing a statutory provision, the first and foremost rule of construction is the literal construction. If the provision is unambiguous and, if from that provision, the legislative intent is clear, the Court need not call into aid other rules of construction of statutes. (Raghunath Rai Bareja25; Hiralal Ratanlal v. STO (1973) 1 SCC 216 ). A provision is not ambiguous merely because it contains a word which, in different contexts, is capable of different meanings. It would be hard to find anywhere a sentence of any length which does not contain such a word. A provision is ambiguous only if it contains a word or phrase which, in that particular context, is capable of having more than one meaning. (Kirkness (Inspector of Taxes) v. John Hudson & Co., Ltd. (1955) AC 696 (HL); M/s Ankamma Trading Company v. The Appellate Deputy Commissioner (CT) Guntur Judgment of the Division Bench in W.P. No.13470 of 2009 dated 11.02.2011). Any interpretation which results either in addition or deletion of words or as rendering any statutory rule redundant must be avoided. (Banarsi Debi v. ITO (1964) 7 SCR 539 ); Attorney-General v. Carlton Bank (1899)2 QB 158). 31. As noted hereinabove, while the left bank of Krishna river is located in Krishna District, the right bank of the river falls in Guntur District. While the River Conservator, in charge of the Krishna river, would be the same irrespective of whether the area in question is situated either in Guntur or in Krishna District, the Assistant Director and the M.R.O. concerned would vary depending on the relevant rule. Each District has several mandals, and the concerned M.R.O. would be the person in charge of a particular mandal. The M.R.O, Amaravathi Mandal cannot be the concerned M.R.O. under Rule 9N, as the three ramps in question are all located not only beyond the territorial limits of Amaravathi Mandal but even beyond the territorial limits of Guntur District wherein Amaravathi Mandal is located. The M.R.O, Amaravathi Mandal cannot be the concerned M.R.O. under Rule 9N, as the three ramps in question are all located not only beyond the territorial limits of Amaravathi Mandal but even beyond the territorial limits of Guntur District wherein Amaravathi Mandal is located. On a literal construction of Rule 9-N, the M.R.O of the Mandal in which the ramps are located would only be the M.R.O. concerned. .32. G.O.Ms. No.31, Industries and Commerce (M1) Department dated 15.02.2003 relates to restructuring of the department of Mines and Geology. Paragraph 5 of the said order stipulates that the territorial jurisdiction/revenue mandals of each office of the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology with its Headquarters, and also their respective regional offices, shall be as referred to in Annexure-II of the said G.O. Sl.No.4 of the statement in Annexure-II refers to the office of the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur-Iand his jurisdiction covers 40 Mandals in Guntur District including Amavarathi mandal where the Society is carrying on quarrying operations. Of the three additional ramps, Chevitiakllu and Kunikinapadu reaches are located in Kanchikacherla mandal and the third i.e., Poppuru reach is located within Chandarlapadu mandal limits. Both Kanchikacherla and Chandarlapadu mandals fall within the territorial jurisdiction of the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Krishna-II at Nandigama, Krishna District. Even if the words "new ramps" in Rule 9-N were presumed to bring within its ambit existing ramps also, the competent authority to grant permission under Rule 9-N, to use the three additional ramps located in Krishna District, would only be the Assistant .Director of Mines and Geology, Nandigama, Krishna District as there are two Assistant Directors for Krishna District and the additional ramps are located in mandals which fall within the jurisdiction of the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Nandigama. It is also evident that the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur lacks jurisdiction to grant permission for use of these additional three ramps. 2. 33. It is relevant to note that, by notification dated 07.03.2008, the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Nandigama invited tenders for grant of lease for quarrying of sand in the sources mentioned in the schedule to the notification. The said notification includes Chevitikalli and Poppuru reaches. 2. 33. It is relevant to note that, by notification dated 07.03.2008, the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Nandigama invited tenders for grant of lease for quarrying of sand in the sources mentioned in the schedule to the notification. The said notification includes Chevitikalli and Poppuru reaches. Subsequently, by proceedings dated 05.05.2009, the quarry lease for Chevitikallu was granted for excavation of ordinary sand from 01.04.2009 to 31.03.2011 in favour of one M/s Shanmukham and Company. These proceedings were also issued by the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Nandigama who also executed a lease deed with the said lessee on 05.05.2009. Clause 16 of the said lease deed requires the lessee only to use the authorized ramps at Chevitikallu. 3. 34. A notification was issued on 23.06.2009 by the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Nandigama in respect of Kunikinapadu reach for grant of lease for quarrying ordinary sand upto 31.03.2011. By proceedings dated 25.10.2010, the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Nandigama accorded sanction to Sri K. Venkata Rao to commence quarrying operations for excavation of ordinary sand from Kunikinapadu sand reach. A lease agreement was entered into on 25.10.2010, between the said lessee and the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Nandigama which also required the said lessee to only use authorized ramps. As a result of the impugned order dated 01.05.2010, (whereby the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur has granted permission for use of these additional ramps located in Krishna District), the Society has been permitted to use authorized ramps in respect of sand bearing areas located in Krishna District for which lease was granted in favour of others parties resulting in the lessees of these reaches being deprived of the exclusive use of the authorized ramps. The damage caused to the roads in the villages nearby these three ramps, on account of movement of heavy truck -loads of sand, could only have been assessed by the authorities in Krishna District, and not the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur. 4. 35. The damage caused to the roads in the villages nearby these three ramps, on account of movement of heavy truck -loads of sand, could only have been assessed by the authorities in Krishna District, and not the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur. 4. 35. The reports of the River Conservator dated 01.06.2010 and 15.06.2010 reveal that the Society is using a track, (formed by sand and silt of approximately 2 feet in height hitherto laid by others), on the Krishna river bed for a distance of 2 Kms across the river from Amaravathi in Guntur District to Krishna District, instead of going around the river. The proceedings of the Director of Mines & Geology dated 20.06.2011 reveal that between 300 to 400 truck loads of sand are being transported by the Society through the Poppuru reach. That inexplicable damage would be caused to the River, on the river bed being used as a track and on sand being transported through the additional ramps, has been lost sight of in this mindless pursuit of voluminous extraction of sand. By using the track on the river bed, instead of taking the circuitous route from Guntur to Krishna, the larger public interest, involved in protecting the River bed, has yielded to crass private commercial interests. 5. 36. Ensuring strict compliance with the regulatory provisions of the A.P. Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966, more particularly those relating to quarrying of sand in River beds, is in larger public interest. Excessive instream sand mining causes degradation of rivers. Instream mining lowers the stream bottom, which may lead to erosion of river banks. Depletion of sand in the streambed, and along coastal areas, causes the deepening of rivers and the enlargement of river mouths and coastal inlets. It may also lead to saline-water intrusion from the nearby sea. The effect of mining is compounded by the effect of sea level rise. Any volume of sand exported from streambeds and coastal areas is a loss to the system. Excessive instream sand mining is also a threat to bridges, river banks and nearby structures. Sand mining also affects the adjoining groundwater system and the uses that local people make of the river. Instream sand mining results in the destruction of aquatic and riparian habitat through large changes in the channel morphology. Impacts include bed degradation, bed coarsening, lowered water tables near the streambed, and channel instability. Sand mining also affects the adjoining groundwater system and the uses that local people make of the river. Instream sand mining results in the destruction of aquatic and riparian habitat through large changes in the channel morphology. Impacts include bed degradation, bed coarsening, lowered water tables near the streambed, and channel instability. Continued extraction may also cause the entire streambed to degrade to the depth of excavation. Sand mining generates extra vehicle traffic, which negatively impairs the environment. The statutory authorities under the A.P. Minor Mineral Concession Rules i.e., the River Conservator and the Assistant Director are required to keep larger public interest in mind while exercising their functions, and not sacrifice it at the altar of commercial greed. .37. The impugned proceedings of the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur .dated 01.05.2010, whereby permission was granted to the Society for use of the three additional ramps in Krishna District, is ultravires Rule 9-N, and is without jurisdiction. An order passed by an officer having no authority of law has no effect. It neither creates any right in favour of a party for whom such order is made nor does it impose any obligation on the opposite party against whom it was passed. If the Officer could not have passed the order, all actions taken in pursuance thereof, would be of no consequence. (M.V. Janardhan Reddy v. Vijaya Bank (2008) 7 SCC 738 ). Where an authority making the order lacks inherent jurisdiction, such order would be, null, non est and void ab initio as a defect in the jurisdiction of an authority goes to the root of the matter and strikes at its very authority to pass any order. (Deepak Agro Foods v. State of Rajasthan (2008) 7 SCC 748 ); Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan AIR 1954 SC 340 ). 6. 38. Even though the impugned order of the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology is without jurisdiction it is still required to be set aside. An order, even if not made in good faith, is still capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity on its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders. (Pune Municipal Corpn. It bears no brand of invalidity on its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders. (Pune Municipal Corpn. v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 5 SCC 211 ); Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council (1956) All ER 855(HL). No order can be ignored unless a finding is recorded that it is illegal, void or not in consonance with law. The principle must be equally true even where the 'brand of invalidity' is plainly visible: for there also the order can effectively be resisted in law only by obtaining the decision of the court. (Pune Municipal Corpn.36). If an order is void or ultra vires it is enough for the court to declare it so and it collapses automatically. The aggrieved party can simply seek a declaration that it is void and not binding upon him. A declaration merely declares the existing state of affairs and does not 'quash' so as to produce a new state of affairs. (Pune Municipal Corpn.36; State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh (1991) 4 SCC 1 ). The impugned order of the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, dated 01.05.2010 is null and void and is declared as such. 7. 39. The relief sought for in W.P. No.25583 of 2010 is to declare the action of the respondents in permitting the Society to use the additional ramps at Chevitikallu, Kunikinapadu and Poppuru, which are located beyond the leased area, and their failure to withdraw the permissions granted vide proceedings No.DB/JTO-4/457 dated 13.04.2010 as arbitrary and illegal. As noted herein above by proceedings dated 13.04.2010 the River Conservator had expressed his no objection for grant of permission for use of these three additional ramps. This was followed by the proceedings dated 01.05.2010 whereby the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur informed the Society that their request for use of the three ramps situated in Krishna District was considered. As the proceedings dated 01.05.2010, whereby permission was granted for use of the three additional ramps, is without jurisdiction and has been declared as null and void, W.P. No.25583 of 2010 must be allowed. As the proceedings dated 01.05.2010, whereby permission was granted for use of the three additional ramps, is without jurisdiction and has been declared as null and void, W.P. No.25583 of 2010 must be allowed. “C. DO THE ORDER OF THE DIVISION BENCH IN W.V.M.P. No.2639 OF 2010 IN W.P. No.14473 OF 2010 DATED 22.07.2010, AND THE ORDER OF THE SINGLE JUDGE IN W.P. No.12239 OF 2010 CONSTITUTE BINDING PRECEDENTS?” 1. 40. Sri E. Manohar, Learned Senior Counsel, would submit that a Division Bench of this Court, in WVMP. No.2639 of 2010 in W.P. No.14473 of 2010 dated 22.07.2010, and a Learned Single Judge in W.P. No.12239 of 2010 dated 02.06.2010, had upheld the order granting permission for use of the additional ramps interpreting the scope of Rule 9-N as conferring jurisdiction on the Assistant Director who had entered into the lease agreement; the contention of the petitioner therein, that the Assistant Director, Guntur had no jurisdiction over ramps situated in Krishna District and it was the Assistant Director, Krishna who alone was competent to grant permission for these ramps, was rejected by this Court construing Rule 9-N; failure to refer to the definition of "Asst. Director" in Rule 4(a) of the Rules would not render the judgment, in W.P. No.12239 of 2010 dated 02.06.2010, per incuriam; and in any event the Government, being a party to the proceedings, was bound by the judgment. 2. 41. On the other hand the Learned Additional Advocate General would submit that no reasons are to be found in the judgment in W.P. No.12239 of 2010 dated 02.06.2010 as to how the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur could exercise powers under Rule 9-N to grant permission for usage of the additional ramps situated in Krishna District; Rule 4(a), which imposed territorial jurisdictional limits on the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology concerned, was also not brought to the notice of the Court; and the conclusion arrived at in the said judgment was without discussion, and did not constitute a binding precedent. 3. 42. 3. 42. Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, Learned Senior Counsel, would submit that W.P. No.12239 of 2010 came up for admission on 02.06.2010, and this Court dismissed the Writ Petition on the same day without a counter-affidavit being filed by the official respondents; this Court had no occasion to know the stand of the government on the construction of the aforesaid Rules; neither Rule 4(a), (which defines the territorial jurisdiction of the concerned Assistant Director of Mines and Geology), nor Rule 9-N, (which relates to grant of permission to open "new ramps"), was brought to the notice of the Court by the counsel therein; the said Rule was not interpreted by this Court in the said order/judgment; passing observations therein neither constitutes the ratio nor did it amount to laying down the law relating to jurisdiction/authority of the ADM&G, Guntur; and a general observation made, without interpreting the Rules, could not be treated as a precedent binding on a coordinate bench. Learned Senior counsel would submit that, in the present writ petition, the sole question was regarding the jurisdiction of the ADM&G, Guntur, and the clarification given by the Government in the impugned Memo; hence the scope and ambit and controversy in the two writ petitions were entirely different; and, for the first time, this Court is being called upon to interpret the said Rules, and determine which Assistant Director had territorial jurisdiction over the additional ramps. Learned Senior Counsel would place reliance on Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd., Chandighar v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandighar (1990) 3 SCC 682 ); Commissioner of Income-tax v. B.R. Constructions (1993) 202 ITR 222 (AP) (FB); State of Uttar Pradesh v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. (1991) 4 SCC 1 39); and State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra ( AIR 1968 SC 647 ). 4. 43. The order of the Division Bench, in WVMP. 2639 of 2010 in W.P. No.14473 of 2010 dated 22.7.2010, is an interlocutory order. Interim orders passed by Courts on certain conditions are not precedents for other cases which may be on similar facts (Empire Industries Limited v. Union of India ( AIR 1986 SC 662 ); M. Vijaya Kumar v. Milk Products Factory (1990(3) ALT 382). 2639 of 2010 in W.P. No.14473 of 2010 dated 22.7.2010, is an interlocutory order. Interim orders passed by Courts on certain conditions are not precedents for other cases which may be on similar facts (Empire Industries Limited v. Union of India ( AIR 1986 SC 662 ); M. Vijaya Kumar v. Milk Products Factory (1990(3) ALT 382). Even otherwise the Division Bench, in the said order, observed that the question whether the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Nandigama or the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur is the concerned authority to grant permission has to be gone into in the main Writ Petition. As W.P. No.14473 of 2010 is still pending before the Division Bench of this Court, reliance placed on an interlocutory order passed therein is of no avail. 5. 44. Before examining whether the order passed in W.P. No.12239 of 2010 dated 02.06.2010 constitutes a binding precedent, it is necessary to note certain well settled principles in this regard. A single judge of a High Court is bound by the judgment of another single judge and, a fortiori, judgments of benches consisting of more judges than one. So also, a Division Bench of a High Court is bound by judgments of another Division Bench and Full Bench. A single judge or benches of High Courts cannot differ from the earlier judgments of co-ordinate jurisdiction merely because they hold a different view on the question of law for the reason that certainty and uniformity in the administration of justice are of paramount importance. But, if the earlier judgment is erroneous or adherence to the rule of precedents results in manifest injustice, differing from the earlier judgment is permissible. When a Division Bench differs from the judgment of another Division Bench, it has to refer the case to a Full Bench. A single judge cannot differ from a decision of a Division Bench except when that decision or a judgment relied upon in that decision is overruled by a Full Bench or the Supreme Court, or when the law laid down by a Full Bench or the Supreme Court is inconsistent with the decision. (B.R. Constructions40). 6. 45. A single judge cannot differ from a decision of a Division Bench except when that decision or a judgment relied upon in that decision is overruled by a Full Bench or the Supreme Court, or when the law laid down by a Full Bench or the Supreme Court is inconsistent with the decision. (B.R. Constructions40). 6. 45. In State of Bihar v. Kalika Kuer (2003) 5 SCC 448 ) the Supreme Court observed:- "......Whatever has been held or observed in the case of Ramkrit Singh1 may not appear to be correct or may seem to be against the provisions of the Act but that would not be a valid ground to hold that the earlier judgment was rendered per incuriam or that decision would not be binding on the Bench of a coordinate jurisdiction. ....... ......An earlier decision may seem to be incorrect to a Bench of a coordinate jurisdiction considering the question later, on the ground that a possible aspect of the matter was not considered or not raised before the court or more aspects should have been gone into by the court deciding the matter earlier but it would not be a reason to say that the decision was rendered per incuriam and liable to be ignored. The earlier judgment may seem to be not correct yet it will have the binding effect on the later Bench of coordinate jurisdiction. Easy course of saying that earlier decision was rendered per incuriam is not permissible and the matter will have to be resolved only in two ways - either to follow the earlier decision or refer the matter to a larger Bench to examine the issue, in case it is felt that earlier decision is not correct on merits. ......" (emphasis supplied) 46. If the order in W.P. No.12239 of 2010 dated 02.06.2010 constitutes a binding precedent, this Court would be required to refer the matter to a Division Bench for resolution of the issue, even if it were to disagree with the view taken in the said judgment for it is well settled that when a bench of coordinate jurisdiction disagrees with another bench of coordinate jurisdiction, whether on the basis of "different arguments" or otherwise on a question of law, it is appropriate that the matter be referred to a larger Bench for resolution of the issue rather than leave two conflicting judgments to operate, creating confusion. It is not proper to sacrifice certainty of law. Judicial decorum, no less than legal propriety, forms the basis of judicial procedure and it must be respected at all costs. (Vijay Laxmi Sadho (Dr) v. Jagdish (2001) 2 SCC 247 ) When a single Judge is disinclined to follow the earlier binding decisions of other single Judges of the High Court the proper course is to refer the matter to a Division Bench for decision. (State of W.B. v. Falguni Dutta (1993) 3 SCC 288 ). 47. It must, however, not be lost sight of that a precedent ceases to be a binding precedent (i) if it is reversed or overruled by a higher court; (ii) when it is affirmed or reversed on a different ground; (iii) when it is inconsistent with the earlier decisions of the same rank; (iv) when it is sub silentio, and (v) when it is rendered per incuriam. (B.R. Constructions40). 'Incuria' literally means 'carelessness'. In practice per incuriam appears to mean per ignoratium. English courts have developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. The 'quotable in law' is avoided and ignored if it is rendered 'in ignoratium of a statute or other binding authority'. (Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd (1944) KB 718). This principle has been accepted, approved and adopted by the Supreme Court while interpreting Article 141 of the Constitution of India which embodies the doctrine of precedents as a matter of law. (Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd.,41). The Latin expression per incuriam means through inadvertence. A decision can be said generally to be given per incuriam when this Court has acted in ignorance of a previous decision of its own or when this Court has acted in ignorance of a decision of the Supreme Court. (Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corpn. Ltd.39). .48. If, however, the provisions of the Act were noticed and considered before the conclusion was arrived at, the judgment cannot be ignored as being per incuriam merely .on the ground that it has erroneously reached the conclusion. (B.R. Constructions40). The mere fact that the earlier Court misconstrued a statute, or ignored a rule of construction, is no ground for impugning the authority of the precedent. A precedent on the construction of a statute is as much binding as any other, and the fact that it was mistaken in its reasoning does not destroy its binding force. (B.R. Constructions40). The mere fact that the earlier Court misconstrued a statute, or ignored a rule of construction, is no ground for impugning the authority of the precedent. A precedent on the construction of a statute is as much binding as any other, and the fact that it was mistaken in its reasoning does not destroy its binding force. (B.R. Constructions40; Salmond on jurisprudence, Twelfth Edition, at page 151). Only because the conclusion arrived at, on construing the provisions of the Section, did not have the concurrence of the latter Bench, the earlier judgment cannot be called per incuriam. (B.R. Constructions40). The rule of per incuriam is of limited application, and is applicable only in the rarest of rare cases. When a learned single judge or a Division Bench doubts the correctness of an otherwise binding precedent, the appropriate course would be to refer the case to a Division Bench or Full Bench, as the case may be, for an authoritative pronouncement on the question involved. (B.R. Constructions40). 2. 49. Another exception to the rule of precedents, is the rule of sub-silentio. "A decision passes sub-silentio, when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the court or present to its mind." (Salmond on Jurisprudence 12th Edn., p. 153). A decision rendered 'without any argument, without reference to the crucial words of the rule and without any citation of the authority' is not a binding precedent. (Lancaster Motor Company (London) Ltd. v. Bremith Ltd (1941) 2 All ER 11). 'Precedents sub-silentio and without argument are of no moment'. A decision, which is neither founded on reasons nor it proceeds on a consideration of an issue, cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding effect. That which escapes in the judgment without any occasion is not the ratio decidendi. A decision is binding not because of its conclusions but in regard to its ratio, and the principles laid down therein'. Any declaration or conclusion arrived without application of mind or preceded without any reason cannot be deemed to be the declaration of law or authority of a general nature binding as a precedent. A decision is binding not because of its conclusions but in regard to its ratio, and the principles laid down therein'. Any declaration or conclusion arrived without application of mind or preceded without any reason cannot be deemed to be the declaration of law or authority of a general nature binding as a precedent. (Jaisri Sahu v. Rajdewan Dubey ( AIR 1962 SC 83 ); Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur (1989)1 SCC 101 ); B. Shama Rao v. Union Territory of Pondicherry ( AIR 1967 SC 1480 ); Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd.,41). Uniformity and consistency are undoubtedly the core of judicial discipline. But that which escapes in the judgment without any occasion is not the ratio decidendi. (Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd.,41; Gurnam Kaur51). 50. It is necessary, therefore, to examine the submission of Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, Learned Senior Counsel, that the order of this Court in W.P. No.12239 of 2010 dated 02.06.2010 is per incurium, and is a decision passed sub-silentio. W.P. No.12239 of 2010 was filed by an unsuccessful tenderer for grant of a quarry lease in respect of a sand reach situated in Amaravathi Mandal contending that, by permitting the Society in whose favour the lease had been granted to transport sand through the additional ramps situated in Krishna District, their interests were adversely affected. The petitioner contended that, as against the six ramps through which the Society was entitled to transport sand, the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur had granted permission for use of these additional ramps; and had they known that such a facility would be made available to a lessee after finalization of the tender process they would have offered more amounts. This Writ Petition was dismissed at the admission stage by order dated 02.06.2010 without either Rule Nisi being issued or a counter affidavit being filed by the official respondents. .51. It was brought to the notice of this Court, in W.P. No.12239 of 2010, that the additional ramps were situated in Krishna District, while the lease was granted in favour of the Society for quarrying sand in Amaravathi Mandal of Guntur District. Rule 4(a), which defines the "Assistant Director" to mean the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology incharge of the District, was not noticed in the said judgment. Rule 4(a), which defines the "Assistant Director" to mean the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology incharge of the District, was not noticed in the said judgment. The conclusion arrived at by this Court, that the Rules did not restrict the lessee to use the ramps only within a particular mandal or area, is not preceded by any reasons, and does not amount to a declaration of law or authority of a general nature constituting a binding precedent. The opinion expressed in the said judgment is without analyzing the statutory provisions, and is a mere direction of the Court. A decision is binding not because of its conclusions, but in regard to its ratio and the principles laid down therein'. Any declaration or conclusion arrived at without being preceded by any reason, cannot be deemed to be the declaration of law or authority of a general nature binding as a precedent. Restraint in dissenting or overruling is for sake of stability and uniformity but rigidity beyond reasonable limits is inimical to the growth of law. (Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd.,41; B. Shama Rao52). A mere direction of the Court without considering the legal position is not a precedent. (Vishnu Dutt Sharma v. Manju Sharma (2009) 6 SCC 379 ). The view, if any, expressed without analysing the statutory provision cannot be treated as a binding precedent. (N. Bhargavan Pillai v. State of Kerala (2004) 13 .SCC 217). 3. 52. Further the question whether the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur had jurisdiction to accord permission for the additional ramps, located not in Guntur District but in Krishna District, was not in issue in W.P. No.12239 of 2010. It is no doubt true that the Learned Judge, in his order dated W.P. No.12239 of 2010 dated 02.06.2010, held that he did not find any basis in the submission that the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur had no authority to permit the Society to use additional ramps outside Amaravathi Mandal; and neither the tender conditions nor the extant rules restricted the lessee to use ramps only in a particular Mandal or area. .53. As noted hereinabove, a conjoint reading of Rule 4(a) and Rule 9-N makes it amply clear that it is only the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology of the District, where the ramps are being opened, who can grant permission for use of new ramps. .53. As noted hereinabove, a conjoint reading of Rule 4(a) and Rule 9-N makes it amply clear that it is only the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology of the District, where the ramps are being opened, who can grant permission for use of new ramps. Rule 4(a) was not noticed in the aforesaid judgment. Passing observations in a judgment without any argument and without reason do not form part of the ratio; cannot be treated as having the weight of authority or as constituting a binding precedent; and are to be regarded as having been passed sub-silentio. Mere casual expressions carry no weight at all. Not every passing expression of a Judge, however eminent, can be treated as an ex cathedra statement, having the weight of authority (Gurnam Kaur51; Bengal Club Ltd. v. Susanta Kumar Chowdhury (AIR 2003 Calcutta 96). It is not everything said by a Judge, while giving judgment, that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio, and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in the judgment. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. A deliberate judicial decision arrived at after hearing an argument on a question which arises in the case, or is put in issue, would constitute a precedent. It is the rule deductible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of the case which constitutes its ratio decidendi. (Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi (1996) 6 SCC 44 ); State of Orissa v. Mohd. Illiyas (2006) 1 SCC 275 ); ICICI Bank v. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay (2005) 6 SCC 404 ); Sudhansu Sekhar Misra42; Quinn v. Leathem (1901) AC 495). What is binding is the ratio of the decision, and not any finding of fact. It .is the principle found out upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court, that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. (Director of Settlements, A.P. v. M.R. Apparao (2002) 4 SCC 638). It .is the principle found out upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court, that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. (Director of Settlements, A.P. v. M.R. Apparao (2002) 4 SCC 638). It is not a profitable task to extract a sentence here and there from a judgment and to build upon it. (Sudhansu Sekhar Misra42). There is always peril in treating the words of a judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment. It is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case. (Herrington v. British Railways Board (1972) 2 WLR 537). Observations, on matters not in issue in the case, are not meant to be and ought not to be regarded as laying down the law. (K. Veeraswami v. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 655). Observations of courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of a statute, and that too taken out of their context. The observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. Judges interpret the words of statutes. Their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. (Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd v. N.R. Vairamani ( 2004(8) SCC 579 ); The State of A.P. v. M/s Seven Hills Constructions (Full Bench Judgment in TRC Nos.274 of 2001 and batch dated 25.11.2011). 4. 54. If Rule 4(a) had been noticed and, on an analysis of the Rule, Rule 9-N was misconstrued or a rule of construction (for instance a "literal construction") was ignored, it would then not have been a ground for impugning the authority of the earlier judgment. It is only because Rule 4(a) was not noticed; the conclusion, that the Rules did not restrict the lessee to use ramps only within a particular mandal or area, was not preceded by an analysis of Rule 9-N; and no reasons were assigned; does the judgment in W.P. No.12239 of 2010 dated 02.06.2010 not constitute a binding precedent. 5. 55. It is only because Rule 4(a) was not noticed; the conclusion, that the Rules did not restrict the lessee to use ramps only within a particular mandal or area, was not preceded by an analysis of Rule 9-N; and no reasons were assigned; does the judgment in W.P. No.12239 of 2010 dated 02.06.2010 not constitute a binding precedent. 5. 55. The submission of Sri E.Manohar, Learned Senior Counsel, that the judgment in W.P. No.12239 of 2010 dated 02.06.2010 binds the Government since it was a party to the said Writ Petition, is of little consequence in view of the declaration by this Court, in the present batch of Writ Petitions, that the impugned order of the Assistant Director of Mines Geology, Guntur dated 01.05.2010, in according permission for use of the additional ramps, is without jurisdiction, null and void. Once an order is declared to be a nullity, it ceases to have any effect and all that the authorities concerned are required to do is to ensure that the three additional ramps in Krishna District are not used by the Society for transportation of the sand extracted from the Amaravati Reach in Guntur District. .56. The conclusion that the impugned order of the Assistant Director of Mines & Geology, Guntur dated 01.05.2010 is without jurisdiction, null and void would suffice to dispose of this batch of Writ Petitions. I consider it appropriate, however, to examine the contentions urged by Sri E. Manohar, Learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the Society, in the four Writ Petitions filed by it questioning the various orders passed by the Government and the Director of Mines & Geology. .“D. IS THE CLARIFICATORY MEMO CONFERRING JURISDICTION ON THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF MINES, KRISHNA ULTRA VIRES RULE-N?” 2. 57. .“D. IS THE CLARIFICATORY MEMO CONFERRING JURISDICTION ON THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF MINES, KRISHNA ULTRA VIRES RULE-N?” 2. 57. Sri E. Manohar, Learned Senior Counsel, would submit that the action of the Government in conferring powers on the Assistant Director, Krishna, who had no jurisdiction over the reach in Guntur District, is ultravires the Rules; neither do the ramps vest in the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Krishna nor has he any control over it; the River conservator has permitted use of the three additional ramps situated on the left flood bank of the Krishna River, in Krishna District; the territorial limits of Guntur District and Krishna District are not applicable to the River Conservator as he exercises power and jurisdiction over the entire Krishna River; the consent of the River conservator was obtained by the Assistant Director of Mines & Geology, Guntur for permitting transportation of sand, and for the lessee to use the additional/new ramps; the three additional ramps at Popuru, Chevitikallu and Kunikinapadu were not meant exclusively for transportation of sand by the respective lessees, and were meant for utilization by the public for their agricultural and other operations; Rule 9-K(3) does not enable the Government to issue a memo when the matter is covered by Rule 9-N; and the government's interpretation of the word "concerned" to mean the Assistant Director having territorial jurisdiction over the ramps was contrary to Rule 9-N. Learned Senior Counsel would rely on Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Bangalore v. Commissioner of Income tax, Karnataka (2000)5 SCC 365 ) and M.V. Sivaprasad v. Govt. of A.P ( 2010(2) ALT 777 ). 3. 58. Learned Additional Advocate General would submit that the Memo dated 20.06.2011 is clarificatory in nature; the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur lacked inherent jurisdiction to permit the Society to use the additional ramps which were, admittedly, situated in Krishna District; the Government had issued clarificatory orders under Rule 9-K(3) emphasizing the point of territorial jurisdiction of the Assistant Director envisaged under Rule 4(a); the judgment in M.V. Sivaprasad66 is not applicable as the scope of Rule 9-N or the territorial jurisdiction of the concerned Assistant Director of Mines and Geology in terms of Rule 4(a) did not arise for consideration therein. 4. 59. 4. 59. Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, Learned Senior Counsel, would submit that the impugned memo does not confer, on the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Krishna, any jurisdiction over any reach in Guntur District; the River Conservator is concerned about the safety of the river, its course and river bed, and exercises power under the A.P. (Andhra Area) River Conservancy Act, 1884; he has jurisdiction over both the left and right banks of the Krishna river, and at the KC Canal area etc; the power to permit opening of new ramps is conferred on the concerned Assistant Director of Mines and Geology having territorial jurisdiction under the Rules, with the consent of River Conservator who is concerned only with the course of the river, and the safety of the river banks; the impugned memo has been issued by way of a clarification explaining the jurisdiction of the concerned authority as per the Rule itself; the petitioners do not have any right much less a vested right to use additional notified ramps situated in different reaches, beyond the leased area and outside the jurisdiction of the concerned authority; the petitioners have a right to use the six ramps within Amaravathi Mandal limits which the impugned order does not nullify; if the claim of the petitioners is accepted, the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur (the concerned authority) could grant permission to use new ramps in a notified reach situated in Kurnool or Nalgonda or Mahaboobnagar Districts; such an interpretation would result in chaos; and the impugned memo is in tune with Rule 4(a) and Rule 9-N read with Rule 9-K(3). .60. Rule 9-K(3) confers power on the Government to issue orders/clarifications, if any, not specifically mentioned in implementation of the Rules. In exercise of the powers conferred under Rule 9-K(3) the Principal Secretary to the Government, Industries and .Commerce Department, issued memo dated 20.06.2011 clarifying that the concerned Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, competent to permit opening of new ramps under Rule-N, is the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology having territorial jurisdiction over the ramps only; and, as such, the concerned Assistant Director of Mines and Geology having the territorial jurisdiction over the ramps, either existing or new, shall only be competent to exercise discretion to issue permission for additional ramps under Rule 9-N. 5. 61. 61. The twin limitations under Rule 9-K(3) for exercise of power by the government to issue orders/clarifications is (1) to implement the Rules and (2) with respect to matters not specifically mentioned in the Rules. (M.V. Siva Prasad66). It is necessary to examine whether the clarification is with respect to matters specifically mentioned in Rule 9-N or not for, if the clarification relates to a matter specifically mentioned in Rule 9-N, then the impugned memo would be ultra vires Rule 9-K(3). Rule 4(a) defines "Assistant Director" to mean the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology in charge of the District. As noted hereinabove, Rule 9-N enables the lessee to open new ramps after obtaining permission from the concerned Assistant Director of Mines and Geology. Neither Rule 4(a) nor Rule 9-N expressly stipulate who "the concerned Assistant Director" is. By way of the impugned Memo dated 20.06.2011, the Government clarified that it is the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, having territorial jurisdiction over the ramp only, who is the concerned Assistant Director of Mines and Geology competent to permit opening of new ramps under Rule 9-N. It cannot, therefore, be said that the clarificatory memo dated 20.06.2010 is with respect to matters specifically mentioned in Rule 9-N. Since the clarificatory memo dated 20.06.2011, clarifying who the competent Assistant Director of Mines and Geology is, has been issued by the Government only to implement the Rules it cannot be said to be ultravires Rule 9-K(3). 6. 62. In M.V. Siva Prasad66 the issue which arose for consideration was regarding exercise of power by the Government in granting extension of lease to the lessees after expiry of the lease period. Since Rule 9-L postulated that extension of lease should not be granted under any circumstances the Division Bench held that the Government could not exercise power under Rule 9-K(3) of the Rules to extend the lease period. Reliance placed on the judgment of the Division Bench in M.V. Siva Prasad66 is, therefore, misplaced. 7. 63. Since Rule 9-L postulated that extension of lease should not be granted under any circumstances the Division Bench held that the Government could not exercise power under Rule 9-K(3) of the Rules to extend the lease period. Reliance placed on the judgment of the Division Bench in M.V. Siva Prasad66 is, therefore, misplaced. 7. 63. In Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd.65, the Supreme Court held that while circulars or instructions are no doubt binding in law on the authorities under the Act, but when the Supreme Court or the High Court has declared the law on the question arising for consideration it will not be open to a Court to direct that a circular should be given effect to, and not the view expressed in a decision of the Supreme Court or the High Court. As the judgment of this Court in W.P. No.12239 of 2010 dated 02.06.2010 does not constitute a binding precedent and the order of the Assistant Director of Mines & Geology dated 01.05.2010 has been held, in the present batch of Writ Petitions, to be without jurisdiction, null and void, the said order dated 01.05.2010 is a nullity. I see no reason, therefore, to accept the submission that the clarificatory memo dated 20.06.2011 must be set aside on this ground. .64. Even otherwise setting at naught the clarificatory memo dated 20.06.2010 may well result in resurrection of the earlier order dated 01.05.2010. A writ court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, need not quash an order if it gives rise to another illegal order. (Shakur Basti Shamshan Bhumi Sudhar Samiti v. LT. Governor, National Capital Territory of Delhi (2007) 13 SCC 53 ); Raj Kumar Soni v. State of U.P., (2007) 10 SCC 635 ). If quashing of an order would restore an illegal order, discretion should not be exercised to interfere. (Ramesh Chandra Sankla v. Vikram Cement (2008) 14 SCC 58 ). .“E. IS THE IMPUGNED MEMO DATED 20-6-2010, ULTRA VIRES ARTICLE 166 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA:” .65. If quashing of an order would restore an illegal order, discretion should not be exercised to interfere. (Ramesh Chandra Sankla v. Vikram Cement (2008) 14 SCC 58 ). .“E. IS THE IMPUGNED MEMO DATED 20-6-2010, ULTRA VIRES ARTICLE 166 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA:” .65. Sri E. Manohar, Learned Senior Counsel, would submit that the impugned memo of the Government dated 20.06.2011 does not satisfy the requirements of an executive order of the Government as stipulated under Article 166 of the Constitution of India; under Rule 32(1)(d) of the A.P. Government Business Rules, in all cases where questions of policy and administrative importance arise, the file is required to be submitted to the Chief Minister by the Secretary through the Minister in-charge before issuing any order; though the impugned memo, issued under Rule 9-K(3), raises a question of policy the matter was not referred to the Chief Minister; Rule 55(1) and Rule 56(1)(a) of the business rules require drafts to be referred to the law department for its opinion and revision, before a notification or an order is issued; Rule 56(1)(a) requires all administrative departments to consult the Law department on the construction of .statutory Rules, orders and notifications, and any general legal principles arising out of any case; under Rule 56(2) every such reference shall be accompanied by an accurate statement of facts of the case, and the points on which the advise of the Law department is desired; and, in the present case, the matter was not referred to the Law department as envisaged by Rules 55 and 56. Learned Senior Counsel would rely on MRF Ltd v. Manohar Parrikar (2010) 11 SCC 374 ) to contend that failure to comply with the Business Rules would render the impugned memo issued by the Government void abinitio, and all actions consequent thereto a nullity. 8. 66. Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, Learned Senior Counsel, would submit that there are no pleadings in the writ petition regarding violation of Article 166 of the Constitution of India; without there being a challenge thereto, this Court should not permit the petitioners to raise such a contention; and any argument based on violation of Article 166 (3) was, therefore, liable to be rejected. It is no doubt true that foundational facts are required to be pleaded enabling the Court to scrutinise the nature and content of the right alleged to have been violated by the authority. (Raj Kumar Soni68). In the present batch of Writ Petitions, however, Counsel on either side have not strictly adhered to the pleadings, and documents which have not been filed earlier have been passed across the bar. I see no justification, therefore, not to examine these contentions. 9. 67. Learned Additional Advocate General would submit that the clarificatory memo dated 20.06.2011 was in accordance with the business Rules; the clarification given by the Government, removing the confusion regarding the territorial jurisdiction of the concerned Assistant Director, cannot be faulted as it was exercised well within the powers vested with the Government under the Rules; the procedure enunciated in the Business Rules, though not statutory in nature, had been largely followed and implemented before passing the impugned orders; the concerned Minister, in charge of the department, had approved the clarification issued by the Government; and, as such, there was no violation of the Business rules or of Article 166 of the Constitution of India. 10. 68. Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, Learned Senior Counsel, would submit that Article 166 is merely directory; the impugned order of the Government does not result in financial repercussions; failure to strictly comply with the business rules which are directory, and not mandatory, is of no consequence; and the judgment of the two Judge Bench in M.R.F Limited70 was subsequently clarified by a three judge Bench in Narmada Bachao Andolan v. State of Madhya Pradesh (Judgment in Civil Appeal No.3726 of 2011 dated 26.7.2011). 69. Every executive decision need not be formally expressed. But when the executive decision affects an outsider, or is required to be officially notified or to be communicated, it should normally be expressed in the form mentioned in Article 166(1) i.e. in the name of the Governor. Article 166(1) of the Constitution is confined to cases where the executive action is required to be expressed in the shape of a formal order or a notification or any other instrument. Article 166(1) of the Constitution does not lay down how an executive action of the Government of a State is to be performed. It only prescribes the mode in which such act is to be expressed. Article 166(1) of the Constitution does not lay down how an executive action of the Government of a State is to be performed. It only prescribes the mode in which such act is to be expressed. The manner of expression is ordinarily a matter of form, but whether a rigid compliance with a form is essential to the validity of an act or not depends upon the intention of the legislature. Article 166 of the Constitution, which purports to lay down the procedure for regulating business transacted by the Government of a State, should be read as a whole. It is in accordance with these rules that business has to be transacted. Whatever executive action is to be taken by way of an order or instrument, it shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor in whom the executive power of the State is vested, and it shall further be authenticated in the manner specified in the rules framed by the Governor. Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 166 are to be read together. While clause (1) relates to the mode of expression of an executive order or instrument, clause (2) lays down the way in which such order is to be authenticated, and when both these forms are complied with, an order or instrument would be immune from challenge in a court of law on the ground that it has not been made or executed by the Governor of the State. (Dattatraya Moreshwar v. State of Bombay ( 1952 SCR 612 ); J.K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Company Limited v. King Emperor (1947) FCR 141). .70. Non-compliance with the provisions of either clauses (1) and (2) of Article 166 would result in the order losing the protection which it would otherwise enjoy, had the proper mode for expression and authentication been adopted. It could be challenged in any Court of law even on the ground that it was not made by the Governor of the State and, in case of such challenge, the onus would be upon the State authorities to show affirmatively that the order was in fact made by the Governor in accordance with the rules framed under Article 166 of the Constitution. (Dattatraya Moreshwar72; J.K. Gas .Plant Manufacturing Company Limited73). 2. 71. When a civil servant takes a decision, he does not do it as a delegate of his Minister. (Dattatraya Moreshwar72; J.K. Gas .Plant Manufacturing Company Limited73). 2. 71. When a civil servant takes a decision, he does not do it as a delegate of his Minister. He does it on behalf of the Government. These officers are the limbs of the Government and not its delegates. Where functions entrusted to a Minister are performed by an official employed in the Minister's department there is in law no delegation because constitutionally the act or decision of the official is that of the Minister. (A. Sanjevi Naidu etc., v. State of Madras ( AIR 1970 SC 1102 ). Generally speaking the provisions of a statute creating public duties are directory, and those conferring private rights are imperative. Strict compliance with the requirements of Article 166 gives an immunity to the order in that it cannot be challenged on the ground that it is not an order made by the Governor. If the requirements of Article 166 are not complied with, the resulting immunity cannot be claimed by the State. This, however, does not vitiate the order itself or render the executive action a nullity. (Dattatraya Moreshwar72; J.K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Co. (Rampur) Ltd73; Halsbury Laws of England Vol. I 3rd Edn.) 3. 72. The provisions of Art. 166 of the Constitution are only directory and not mandatory in character and, if they are not complied with, it can be established as a question of fact that the impugned order was issued in fact by the State Government. (R. Chitralekha v. State of Mysore ( AIR 1964 SC 1823 ). As clauses (1) and (2) of Article 166 are directory, non-compliance with the requirements therein does not result in the order being rendered invalid and, in order to determine whether there is compliance with these provisions, all that is necessary to be seen is whether there has been substantial compliance with those requirements. (P. Joseph John v. State of Travancore-Cochin (1955) 1 SCR 1011 ); Dattatraya Moreshwar72). 4. 73. The note file of the Government, which has been placed for the perusal of this Court, reveals that the Principal Secretary to the Government, Industries & Commerce department, had obtained approval of the Minister for Mines & Geology to the draft clarificatory memo proposed to be issued under Rule 9-K(3). 4. 73. The note file of the Government, which has been placed for the perusal of this Court, reveals that the Principal Secretary to the Government, Industries & Commerce department, had obtained approval of the Minister for Mines & Geology to the draft clarificatory memo proposed to be issued under Rule 9-K(3). It is only after orders were obtained from the Minister of Mines & Geology, who heads the said department, was the clarificatory memo dated 20.06.2011 issued. .74. It is only if the case involves questions of policy or of administrative importance is .the approval of the Chief Minister required to be obtained in terms of Rule 32(1)(d) of the A.P. Government Business Rules. It is, therefore, necessary to determine whether the clarificatory memo dated 20.06.2011 gives rise to a question of policy. Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition defines "policy" to mean the general principles by which a government is guided in its management of public affairs, or the legislature in its measures. A policy is typically described as a principle or rule to guide decisions and achieve rational outcome(s). Policy differs from rules or law. While law can compel or prohibit behavior, policy merely guides actions toward those that are most likely to achieve a desired outcome. "Policy" may also refer to the process of making important organizational decisions, including the identification of different alternatives such as programs or spending priorities, and choosing among them on the basis of the impact they will have. Policies can be understood as political, management, financial, and administrative mechanisms arranged to reach explicit goals. The Legislature and the Executive are the policy making arm of the Government. (A.P. Dalit Maha Sabha v. Government of A.P. ( 1999(6) ALD 63 (DB). 5. 75. The clarification given under Section 9-K(3) by the Principal Secretary to the Government, Industries and Commerce Department, after obtaining approval of the Minister for Mines & Geology, is only to clarify as to who is the concerned Assistant Director competent, in terms of Rule 9-N, to grant permission for opening of new ramps. No general principle independent of the Rules by which a Government is to be guided in its management of public affairs, or a principle or rule to guide decisions and achieve rational outcomes, arise under the said clarificatory memo dated 20.06.2011. The clarificatory memo dated 20.06.2011 does not give rise to any question of policy. 6. 76. No general principle independent of the Rules by which a Government is to be guided in its management of public affairs, or a principle or rule to guide decisions and achieve rational outcomes, arise under the said clarificatory memo dated 20.06.2011. The clarificatory memo dated 20.06.2011 does not give rise to any question of policy. 6. 76. Even otherwise Rule 32(1)(d) of the A.P. Government Business Rules requires only cases, where (1) questions of policy and (2) administrative importance arise, to be approved by the Chief Minister. It is only in cases where both questions of policy and administrative importance arise is the file required to be submitted for approval of the Chief Minister. The clarificatory memo is only in furtherance of the requirement of regulating quarrying operations of sand in terms of the Rules, and was issued in exercise of the statutory power conferred by Rule 9-K(3). It cannot, therefore, be said that questions of policy and administrative importance arise necessitating approval of the Chief Minister being obtained. 7. 77. As noted hereinabove, the provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution are only directory and not mandatory in character and, if certain business rules (which are themselves not statutory in nature) are not complied with, it would suffice if it is established as a question of fact that the impugned order is issued by the State Government. As noted hereinabove, the draft clarificatory memo under Rule 9-K(3) was approved by the Minster for Mines & Geology, and only thereafter was it issued on 20.06.2011 by the Principal Secretary to the Government. It is evident that the Government had, in fact, issued the said memo dated 20.06.2011. Non-compliance with Rule 56(1)(a) of the Business Rules which requires the administrative department to consult the Law Department, or Rule 56(2) which requires the advice of the Law Department to be obtained, would not result in the impugned clarificatory memo dated 20.06.2011 being rendered invalid as clauses (1) and (2) of Article 166 of the Constitution of India are merely directory and not mandatory. 8. 78. 8. 78. It is no doubt true that the Supreme Court, in MRF Limited70, had held that the Rules, framed under Article 166(3) of the Constitution, are in aid to fulfil the constitutional mandate embodied in Chapter II of Part VI of the Constitution; therefore the decision of the State Government must meet the requirement of these Rules also; the Business Rules framed under the provisions of Article 166(3) of the Constitution are mandatory, and must be strictly adhered to; any decision by the Government in breach of these Rules will be a nullity in the eye of the law; and as the impugned circular contravenes the requirements of Article 166 of the Constitution, it must be held to be null and void. 9. 79. The scope of Article 166 of the Constitution of India was considered by a later three judge bench of the Supreme Court in Narmada Bachao Andolan71. Following its earlier judgments in Sampat Prakash v. The State of Jammu & Kashmir ( AIR 1970 SC 1118 ); State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari ( AIR 1961 SC 221 ); State of U.P. v. Pradhan Sangh Kshettra Samiti ( AIR 1995 SC 1512 ); Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1974 SC 2192 ); State of Uttar Pradesh v. Om Prakash Gupta ( AIR 1970 SC 679 ); Dattatraya Moreshwar72 and the Constitution bench judgment in R. Chitralekha75, the Supreme Court held that the decisions made and actions taken by the minister or officer under the Rules of Business cannot be treated as exercise of delegated power in the real sense, but are deemed to be the actions of the President or the Governor, as the case may be, that are taken or done by them on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers; the Rules of Business operate even where a Statute does not authorize sub- delegation; the Rules of Business and the provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution of India are directory and are not mandatory; and an omission to make and authenticate an executive decision in the form mentioned in Article 166 of the Constitution did not make the decision itself illegal as the provisions are directory and not mandatory. .80. .80. The two judge bench judgment in MRF Ltd70, was also considered by the three judge bench in Narmada Bachao Andolan71, and it was held that the judgment in MRF Ltd70 was distinguishable since it was a case which dealt with the rules pertaining to financial implications for which there were no provisions in the Appropriation Act, and so the rules required mandatory compliance. Like in the case of Narmada Bachao Andolan71, in the case on hand also there is no issue of financial repercussions or implications. As the Rules of Business are directory in nature, and the impugned clarificatory memo dated 20.6.2011 were issued after it was approved by the minister concerned, the contention that the impugned memo falls foul of the requirements of Article 166 of the Constitution of India necessitates rejection. .“F. IS THE IMPUGNED CLARIFICATORY MEMO DATED 20.6.2010 RETROSPECTIVE IN OPERATION?” 2. 81. Sri E. Manohar, Learned Senior Counsel, would submit that a clarification cannot operate retrospectively to nullify the rights vested in, and accrued in favour of, the Society by virtue of Rule 9-N. On the other hand, Learned Addl. Advocate General would submit that the orders issued by the Director of Mines and Geology were prospective in nature; the Society was sought to be prevented from using the three additional ramps only from the date of the order; no loss was caused to the petitioner thereby as the original six ramps could still be used by them; and the clarificatory orders issued by the respondents would not effect the leasehold rights vested in the society by virtue of the lease agreement. Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, Learned Senior Counsel, would submit that the impugned memo acts in presenti, and does not take away any vested right of the petitioners. .82. The problem concerning retrospectivity of enactments depends on events occurring .over a period. If the enactment comes into force during a period it only operates on events occurring then. The presumption against retrospective legislation does not necessarily apply to an enactment merely because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. The fact that as from a future date tax is charged on a source of income which has been arranged or provided for before the date of imposition of the tax does not mean that a tax is retrospectively imposed. (Commrs. The fact that as from a future date tax is charged on a source of income which has been arranged or provided for before the date of imposition of the tax does not mean that a tax is retrospectively imposed. (Commrs. of Customs and Excise v. Thorn Electrical Industries Ltd (1975)1 WLR 1661), Dilip v. Mohd. Azizul Haq ( AIR 2000 SC 1976 ). .83. The clarification issued by the Government on 20.6.2011 was in exercise of its powers under Rule 9-K(3). It is only thereafter that the Director of Mines and Geology issued proceedings dated 20.6.2011 exercising his powers under Rule 11(2)(C) to direct the Society not to transport the quarried sand through the three additional ramps in Krishna District. It is not as if the petitioner was prevented from transporting sand from any date anterior to 20.6.2011 when the clarificatory memo under Rule 9-K(3) was issued. No right vests in the Society, on the basis of the proceedings of the Assistant Director of Mines & Geology dated 01.05.2010, more so as the said proceedings have now been declared to be without jurisdiction, null and void. The challenge to the validity of the clarificatory memo dated 20.06.2011 on the ground that it is retrospective in nature must, therefore, fail. .“G: IS THE LETTER ADDRESSED BY THE GOVERNMENT TO THE DIRECTOR ON 20-6-2011 ULTRA VIRES THE RULES:” .84. The challenge to the validity of the clarificatory memo dated 20.06.2011 on the ground that it is retrospective in nature must, therefore, fail. .“G: IS THE LETTER ADDRESSED BY THE GOVERNMENT TO THE DIRECTOR ON 20-6-2011 ULTRA VIRES THE RULES:” .84. Sri E.Manohar, Learned Senior Counsel, would submit that the memo of the Government dated 20.06.2011, directing the Director of Mines and Geology to exercise powers under Rule 11(2)(c), and in prohibiting the Society from transporting sand through the three additional ramps, is illegal and without jurisdiction; Rule 11(2)(c) deals with quarrying of sand, and not transportation of sand; the Government, being the appellate authority under Rule 35 and the Revisional authority under Rule 35-A, against the orders passed by the Director, cannot pass any such order; no power is vested either in the Government, or in the Director, to stop transportation of sand; Rule 11(2) (c), which deals with quarrying, cannot be used to prevent the society from transporting sand through these three ramps as permission was granted under Rule 9-N only after obtaining the consent of the River Conservator; and the order of the Government .directing stoppage till a decision was taken by it on the show cause notice issued by the Government to the Society does not fall within the ambit of Rule 11(2)(c). 3. 85. Learned Additional Advocate General would submit that the word "quarrying operations" has not been defined either under the Act or in the Rules framed thereunder; the words "quarrying operations" in Rule 11(2)(c) would mean and include quarrying of sand and its transportation; as such the authority, vested with the power to stop quarrying operations, was also the authority empowered to prohibit transportation of sand; and they could not claim infringement of their rights as the order of the Director of Mines and Geology was corrective in nature, and was issued in exercise of his powers under Rule 11(2)(c). 4. 86. 4. 86. Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, Learned Senior Counsel, would submit that the words "regulate quarrying operations" in Rule 11(2)(c) must be held to comprehend within its meaning, transportation of quarried minerals; using additional existing ramps situated in other reaches on the left bank of the River in Krishna District limits outside the jurisdiction of Guntur District, is illegal and contrary to the law in force; the Director had the power to regulate quarry operations; transportation of sand, illegally quarried by using heavy machinery, from unauthorized notified ramps amounted to violation of the law; and, as such, the Director had the power to regulate it; a narrow meaning could not be given to the power to regulate quarrying operations according to the law in force; the word "regulate" includes transportation of quarried sand; quarrying and transportation are integral to each other, and cannot be separated; and accepting the contention of the Society would mean that both the Assistant Directors of Mines and Geology, Guntur and Nandigama had territorial jurisdiction simultaneously over Poppuru, Chevitikallu and Kunikinapadu sand reaches and ramps, which was contrary to the plain language of Rule 4(a). .87. Rule 11(2)(c) of the Rules confers power on the Director to close any quarry or prohibit quarrying operations or reserve the land for being worked by any particular department of the Government or a local authority and to regulate quarrying operations according to the law in force. There are three limbs to the said Rule. The first limb empowers the Director to close any quarry or prohibit quarrying operations. Under the second limb, the Director is empowered to reserve the land for being worked by any particular department of the Government or the local authority. Under the third limb, the .Director is empowered to regulate quarrying operations according to the law in force. 5. 88. The word "quarry" means an open excavation for minerals including sand. The words "quarrying operations" in Rule 11(2)(c) cannot be restricted only to extraction of the mineral and must be given a wider meaning. Extraction of sand and its transportation would both fall within the ambit of "quarrying operations" which the Director is required to regulate in accordance with the law in force. It would bring within its fold utilization of ramps for transportation of the quarried sand also. Extraction of sand and its transportation would both fall within the ambit of "quarrying operations" which the Director is required to regulate in accordance with the law in force. It would bring within its fold utilization of ramps for transportation of the quarried sand also. The law in force requires, under Rule N, the lessee to use authorized ramps and not open new ramps without the permission of the Assistant Director of Mines & Geology concerned. Regulating quarrying operations according to the law in force would require the Director of Mines & Geology to ensure that unauthorized ramps are not used to transport the quarried sand. 6. 89. Even otherwise, regulating transportation of sand only though authorized ramps must be held to be a power impliedly conferred on the Director as such a power is essential for execution of his powers under Rule 11(2)(c) to regulate quarrying operations in accordance with law. Where an Act or a Rule confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution. (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, Eleventh Edition). An express grant of statutory power carries with it by necessary implication the authority to use all reasonable means to make such grant effective. Such powers must carry with them, by necessary implication, all powers and duties incidental and necessary to make the exercise of those powers fully effective. It is the duty of the Judges to apply the laws, not only to what appears to be regulated by their express dispositions but to all the cases where a just application of them may be made, and which appear to be comprehended within the consequences that may be gathered from it. (I.T. Officer v. Mohd. Kunhi ( AIR 1969 SC 430 ); Southland Statutory Construction, Third Edition, Articles 5401 and 5402; Domat's Civil Law, Cushing's Edition, Vol. 1 at page 88). 7. 90. Accepting the contention of the Society that the Director is empowered under Rule 11(2)(c) only to prohibit actual extraction of sand, and not to stop utilization of the ramps, would render the third limb of Rule 11(2)(c) i.e., "to regulate quarrying operations according to law in force" redundant, and to be treated as inapposite surpplasage. 7. 90. Accepting the contention of the Society that the Director is empowered under Rule 11(2)(c) only to prohibit actual extraction of sand, and not to stop utilization of the ramps, would render the third limb of Rule 11(2)(c) i.e., "to regulate quarrying operations according to law in force" redundant, and to be treated as inapposite surpplasage. As such a construction is impermissible, the Director of Mines & Geology must be held to have the power, under Rule 11(2)(c), to prevent any lessee from using the ramps for transportation of the quarried sand, if such use/utilization is contrary to Rule 9-N. It can neither be said that the Director is not empowered under Rule 11(2)(c) to prevent utilization of the three additional ramps nor that the Government is disabled from requesting him to examine whether he should exercise the powers vested in him under Rule 11(2)(c) of the Rules. “H: WAS THE ORDER OF THE DIRECTOR DATED 20.6.2011 ISSUED AT THE DICTATES OF THE GOVERNMENT?” 1. 91. Sri E. Manohar, Learned Senior Counsel, would submit that the proceedings of the Director dated 20.06.2011 is mechanical, and is at the dictates of the Government. On the other hand, Learned Additional Advocate General would submit that the proceedings issued by the Government to the Director of Mines and Geology is purely advisory in nature; it is the Director who, after applying his judicious mind, had issued the order restraining the Society from using the three additional ramps for transportation of sand; and, by virtue of the said orders, the Society could not be said to have suffered any loss. Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, Learned Senior Counsel, would submit that the memo issued by the Government merely conveyed the Government's request to the Director of Mines and Geology to examine the matter in the light of the clarificatory memo, and take further action; in view of the language used therein the said memo could not be treated as the command of the Government; the Director did not blindly take action; the impugned order clearly indicates that the Director had applied his mind, had independently examined factual aspects, considered representations from several parties, applied his mind to the facts of the matter and had given reasons for exercise of powers under Rule 11 (2)(c) to restrict usage of additional ramps illegally permitted by an authority who had no power or jurisdiction; the Director was not influenced by the order of the Government; and the contention that the order was passed mechanically is not tenable. .92. In its memo dated 20.06.2011, the Government noted that the District Collector, Krishna had requested them to instruct the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur to take necessary action for cancellation of the permission given to Poppuru ramp in favour of the Society. The Government requested the Director of Mines and .Geology that, in view of the above and in order to ensure that the grievances of the villagers of Chevitikallu and Poppuru and their public representatives are considered and examined in detail with a view to ensuring that further damage was not caused to the Krishna River in terms of implementation of River Conservancy Act, 1884, he should consider whether orders under Rule 11(2)(c) needed to be issued at his level regulating the quarrying operations of the Society, and ensure that the Society did not transport sand through the three additional ramps located on the left bank of the Krishna River in Krishna District till a decision was taken by the Government on the show cause notice issued to the Society on 20.06.2011. .93. In his proceedings dated 20.06.2011 the Director took note of the Government memo requesting him to examine the issue and take necessary steps in the matter. .93. In his proceedings dated 20.06.2011 the Director took note of the Government memo requesting him to examine the issue and take necessary steps in the matter. He further noted that there were several representations made by the villagers of Chevitikallu and Poppuru that the revenues legally eligible to them was being deprived, and that steps should be taken to put the leasehold rights of the sand reaches in the villages to auction at an early date. The Director also noted that several representations were received from the residents of Chevitikallu and Poppuru villages that the Society was operating nearly 300 to 400 lorries per day which was resulting in loss of peace and tranquility, and also loss of revenue to their villages apart from causing damage to their roads. He also noted that the District Collector, Krishna had informed the Government, vide letter dated 26.04.2011, that the Executive Engineer, K.C. Division had reported that he had inspected and noticed a massive ramp and substantial road formation activity in the river bed, affecting the Krishna River conservancy; the Society did not make any effort for removal of the katcha road across the river bed; they had not removed the pipes in the river bed; and this was in clear violation of the River Conservancy Act; and that the District Collector had requested the ADM&G Guntur to take necessary action for cancellation of the permission given to Poppuru ramp in favour of the Society. The Director further noted that there were six ramps which were permitted to be utilized for transportation of sand which was extracted from Reach No.8 of Amaravathi Mandal limits, and were located on the right bank of the Krishna River falling in Guntur District; the three additional ramps for which the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur had permitted utilization for transportation of sand, vide letter dated 01.05.2010, were located on the left bank of the Krishna River in Krishna District which was in violation of the Rules; and the Society could extract sand from .Reach No.8 of Amaravathi Mandal limits utilizing these six ramps located on the right bank of the Krishna river falling in Guntur District for transportation of sand. In view thereof, and in exercise of the powers vested in him under Rule 11(2)(c), the Director ordered that the Society may be continued to be permitted to utilize the six ramps and regulate transportation of sand which was extracted from Reach No.8, Amaravathi Mandal limits located in the Krishna River falling in Guntur District. The Director further ordered that the lessee Society should not utilize the three additional ramps, viz., Chevitikallu, Poppuru and Kunikinapadu located on the left bank of Krishna River in Krishna District which were permitted by him on 01.05.2010, till a decision was taken by the Government on the show cause notice issued to the Society. 2. 94. The memo issued by the Government on 20.06.2010 is a mere request to the Director to consider the issue whether he should exercise the powers vested in him under 11(2)(c) to ensure that the Society did not transport sand through the three additional ramps till a decision was taken by the Government. It is not a direction to the Director of Mines and Geology. Neither Rule 35 nor Rule 35-A have any application as the Government did not issue any direction to the Director to exercise his power in a particular manner, but had merely requested him to consider whether orders, under the relevant Rule, need to be issued at his level regulating quarry operations in respect of the three additional ramps. The impugned order is merely a request, and not a direction. .95. Further, the Director of Mines and Geology has passed a detailed order assigning reasons why he had decided to order the Society not to utilize the three additional ramps. The aforementioned reasons given in the proceedings of the Director clearly show that he had exercised his mind to the issues under consideration independently, and had not passed the order at the dictates of the Government. This contention urged on behalf of the Society also necessitates rejection. .“I: OTHER CONTENTIONS: .96. Sri E. Manohar, Learned Senior Counsel, would submit that the Government had sought the opinion of the Additional Advocate General which was in violation of note (1) of the A.P. Advocate General (Duties, Leave and Remuneration) order 1961 which required heads of departments to seek the opinion of the Advocate General. .“I: OTHER CONTENTIONS: .96. Sri E. Manohar, Learned Senior Counsel, would submit that the Government had sought the opinion of the Additional Advocate General which was in violation of note (1) of the A.P. Advocate General (Duties, Leave and Remuneration) order 1961 which required heads of departments to seek the opinion of the Advocate General. Both the Additional Advocate General and Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, Learned Senior, Counsel, .would submit that the 1961 Order was more in the nature of executive/administrative instructions, and did not have statutory force; and the Society was not justified in seeking to have a statutory order passed under Rule 9-K(3) set aside placing reliance on non-statutory administrative guidelines. 3. 97. It is wholly unnecessary for this Court to examine this contention in as much as it is not in dispute that the A.P. Advocate General (Duties, Leave and Remuneration) order 1961, as amended from time to time, is more in the nature of administrative instructions and has no statutory sanction. It is well settled that executive/administrative orders, which do not have statutory force, cannot be enforced in writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. (J. R. Raghupathy v. State of A.P. (AIR 1989 SC 1681); G J Fernandez v. State of Mysore ( AIR 1967 SC 1753 ); and Union of India v. S.L. Abbas (1993) 2 SC 2444). J. CONCLUSION: 98. As the proceedings of the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur, dated 01.05.2010 is without jurisdiction, null and void, W.P.No.25583 of 2010, wherein grant of permission to the Society to use the three additional ramps located in Krishna District is under challenge, is allowed. The other four Writ Petition Nos.1708, 17915, 17922 and 17930 of 2011 filed by the Society questioning various orders of the Government and the Director of Mines and Geology are dismissed. However, in the circumstances, without costs.