JUDGMENT : As per Sanjay Yadav, J.:- Short but subtle issue which crops up for consideration in this writ petition is as to whether under M.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 against an order passed by the nominee of the Registrar appointed under sub-section (1) of Section 66 to exercise all powers and jurisdiction on the behalf of Registrar an appeal would lie to Registrar or before the Additional Registrar or before the M.P. Co-operative Tribunal. 2. Relevant facts briefly are, petitioner No. 2 being aggrieved by dispensation of his service raised dispute under Section 55 (2) read with Section 66 of M.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 before Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bhopal, which was registered as Case No. 64 (55)-20/98. Registrar, Co-operative Societies, in exercise of his powers under sub-section (1) of Section 66 nominated Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bhopal to decide the dispute. The dispute was re-registered as Case No. 64 (55)-29/1998. Deputy Registrar vide his order dated 23-12-1999 allowed the claim of the petitioner No. 2, which in turn was put to challenge before Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies in an appeal. Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies despite of objection being raised regarding maintainability of appeal passed an interim order on 29-12-1999; whereby, operation of order dated 23-12-1999 was stayed. Thereagainst, petitioner preferred an appeal before M.P. State Co-operative Tribunal, Bhopal under Section 78 (2) of 1960 Act on the ground that since Joint Registrar was not having any jurisdiction to entertain an appeal, an interim order passed by him was non-est in the eyes of law. 3. The Tribunal placing reliance on the decisions in Roop Chanel Vs. Sidle of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1503 , Ramrao and another Vs. Narayan and another, AIR 1969 SC 724 , Kahas Bihar Das and others Vs. State of Orissa and others, AIR 1995 Orissa 23, Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bilaspur Vs. Narayan Prasad Mishra and another, 1972 MPLJ 997 , held that nominee of Registrar, since acts on behalf of Registrar, is his subordinate and subject to his control and since there is no separate provision in the Act providing for an appeal against the order of nominee the appeal would be tenable before Registrar or Joint Registrar under Section 78 (1) of the Act. It is this finding of the Co-operative Tribunal, which is being assailed vide this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 4. It is this finding of the Co-operative Tribunal, which is being assailed vide this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 4. Answer to the issue which crops up for consideration lies in the interpretation of Section 66 of I960 Act and more particularly its sub-section (3), which creates a legal fiction. Section 66 of I960 Act provides for :- "66. Settlement of dispute.- (1) The Registrar may, on receipt of the reference of dispute under Section 64 [or sub-section (2) of Section 55] decide the dispute himself, or transfer it for disposal to a nominee or board of nominees to be appointed by the Registrar. (2) When a dispute is transferred under sub-section (1) for disposal by a nominee or a board of nominees, the Registrar may at any time, for reasons to be recorded in writing, withdraw such dispute from such nominee or board of nominees and may decide the dispute himself or transfer it again to any other nominee or board of nominees appointed by him for decision. (3) The decision of a nominee or a board of nominees to whom any dispute is transferred for decision under this section shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be the decision of the Registrar." 5. The dispute which the legislature has empowered the Registrar to settle under sub-section (1) of the Act of 1960 cither relates to terms of employment, working conditions and disciplinary action taken by a Society against its employee/employees, i.e., disputes arising between the Society and its employee under Section 55 (2)] or the dispute touching the constitution, management or business, or the liquidation of the Society [under Section 64 (1)1. 6. Besides the powers conferred on the Registrar, Co-operative Societies to decide the above disputes, the legislature has further empowered the Registrar vide sub-section (1) of Section 66 to even transfer such dispute to be decided by a nominee or board of nominees to be appointed by him. 7. Furthermore, in the eventuality as find mention under sub-section (2) of Section 66 having not occurred, an order passed by the nominee or board of nominees, as per sub-section (3) of Section 66, would be deemed to be the decision by Registrar. 7. Furthermore, in the eventuality as find mention under sub-section (2) of Section 66 having not occurred, an order passed by the nominee or board of nominees, as per sub-section (3) of Section 66, would be deemed to be the decision by Registrar. What would it mean; whether a nominee in the teeth of the fiction created by sub-section (3) is reduced to a status of merely an 'agent' or a "little more than an agent" as has been construed by the Tribunal. 8. The Tribunal seems to have lost sight of the aspect that the conferment of power in Registrar, Co-operative Societies to transfer the dispute to a nominee or hoard of nominees is by the legislature under Section 66 (1) and not by the State Government which enjoys certain powers under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of I960 Act, which stipulates that, the officers appointed under sub-section (I) of Section 3 to assist the Registrar shall within such areas as the State Government may specify, exercise such powers and perform such duties conferred and imposed on the Registrar by or under the Act, 1960 as the State Government, by special or general order direct. 9. Apparently, as borne out from Section 66 that a nominee or board of nominees to whom the dispute is transferred for its decision is not an appointee under Section 3 of the Act. In that event, the Tribunal would have been to some extent justified in holding such appointee as a subordinate of the Registrar. Or in case, a nominee is to be treated as an 'agent' or little more than that, the act of his must further be qualified by an express provision seeking ratification by Registrar. 10. The Scheme of Section 66, however, docs not suggest such course. The Tribunal, therefore, is not justified in assessing the exercise of power by Registrar of appointing a nominee as conferred by Section 66 (1), on the touchstone of the provisions contained under Section 3 of I960 Act. 11. As for legal fiction, the law is trite that it is within the competence of legislature to enact a deeming provision for the purpose of assuring existence of a fact which does not, really exist (please see : Justice G.P. Singh's Principles of Statutory Interpretations, 13th Edition 2012. Chapter 5, Synopsis 5 at page 381). 12. 11. As for legal fiction, the law is trite that it is within the competence of legislature to enact a deeming provision for the purpose of assuring existence of a fact which does not, really exist (please see : Justice G.P. Singh's Principles of Statutory Interpretations, 13th Edition 2012. Chapter 5, Synopsis 5 at page 381). 12. In the case at hand, a nominee by the Registrar to decide the dispute referred to, since is deemed to be a Registrar as per sub-section (3) of Section 66 of 1960 Act. treating him merely as an 'agent' or "little more than an agent" would tantamount to re-legislate, which is impermissible in a judicial review. 13. Thus, even when "outside the bounds of the legal fiction, the difference between the reality and the fiction may still persist in the provision of the same Act, which creating the fiction...." [Principles of Statutory Interpretation (supra), at page 392], the fiction when created is to be treated as real in the context such fiction is created, as aptly observed by Lord Asquith who slated in East End Dwelling Co. Lid. Vs. Finsbury Borough Council. (1951) 2 All ER 587 P. 589 [referred to as Note 22. Principles of Statutory Interpretations (supra), page 383] that "If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so also imagine as real the consequence and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, much inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it. The Statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs, it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitably corollaries of that state of affair". 14. We further observe from the order passed by the Tribunal that the decision relied upon by Tribunal pertains to different enactment interpreting provisions different than Section 66 of 1960 Act. The law is settled that "The dictum stated in every judgment should be applied with reference to the facts of the case as well as its cumulative impact. Similarly, a statute should be construed with reference to the context and its provisions to make a consistent enactment, i.e., ex vicarious act us" [Offshore Holdings Private Ltd. Vs. Bangalore Development Authority and others. (2011) 3 SCC 139 , Paragraph 85]. 15. Similarly, a statute should be construed with reference to the context and its provisions to make a consistent enactment, i.e., ex vicarious act us" [Offshore Holdings Private Ltd. Vs. Bangalore Development Authority and others. (2011) 3 SCC 139 , Paragraph 85]. 15. This being the state of law regarding legal fiction, the present case when examined from above point of view leaves no iota of doubt that the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies who decided the dispute under Section 55 (2) of 1960 Act as nominee of the Registrar has to be treated as Registrar, when his order is put to challenge in appeal, which as per clause (b) of sub-section (I) of Section 78 of 1960 Act lie before the Tribunal. 16. In view whereof an appeal before Joint Registrar being not tenable, the Tribunal was not justified in affirming the order by an authority having no jurisdiction. 17. In the result, the impugned order is quashed and the appeal pending before the Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies is held to be not tenable and. therefore, dismissed. The appellants, i.e.. respondents herein would be at liberty to move proper forum within thirty days from the date of communication of this order and if an appeal is filed within said period, the Tribunal shall entertain the same on merit without being influenced by the order passed herein. 18. The petition is allowed to the extent above. No costs.