ORDER 1. In all these writ petitions order dt. 11.11.2011 passed by the Collector is suo motu revision in case No. 97/10-11 is under challenge, hence, all the petitions have been tagged together and they are being decided by this common order. 2. The facts of the writ petitions are quite different, however, the question for consideration before the Court is that, whether the Collector was empowered to take the matter in suo motu revision and whether the original Bhumiswami of the lands had committed breach of section 165 (7-b) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 (hereinafter shall be referred as ‘Code of 1959’) and consequently the original lease, which were granted in the year 1972 could be cancelled. 3. Three persons namely Mukhtyar Singh, Saheb Singh and Vijay Singh were granted pattas vide order dt. 28.8.1972 passed by the Sub- Divisional Officer, Gwalior. The details of the lands, Survey Nos. situated at Patwari Halka No.47 Village Sirol are as under :- v-Øa- iV~Vkx`fgrk dk uke losZ ua- jdck 1- eq[kR;kjflag iq= gtkjh flag fu- 38 13 ch?kk gjnso dh Vky eqjkj] Xokfy;j 53 5 ch?kk 17 foLok 137 feu 2 ch?kk 156 4 ch?kk 17 foLok 157 3 ch?kk 12 foLok 2- lkgcflag iq= jktcgknqj flag 415 4 ch?kk 6 foLok fu- lksaMk dk dqvkW] Xokfy;j 421 feu 15 ch?kk 454 feu 9 ch?kk 18 foLok 3- fot;flag iq= xkssdqyflag fu- 50 feu 1 ch?kk gjnsoflag dh Vky] ?kkle.Mh 80 4 ch?kk 14 foLok eqjkj] Xokfy;j 253 7 ch?kk 15 foLok 4. One of the conditions of the lease was that if the lease holders follow the terms and conditions of the lease and they would convert 75% of the land as agricultural land and cultivate the same then they would be entitled to receive Bhumiswami rights in accordance with the definition of Bhumiswami as per M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. The Bhumiswami rights could be granted earlier also if the development in regard to agricultural land could be completed earlier. 5. Mukhtyar Singh was granted Bhumiswami rights of the land vide order dt. 1.7.1976. Similarly, Saheb Singh submitted an application in regard to grant of Bhumiswami right on 18.3.1978. A proclamation was issued and thereafter Tehsildar granted Bhumiswami right to him vide order dt. 6.7.1978 in regard to lands/details mentioned in the avode order. 5. Mukhtyar Singh was granted Bhumiswami rights of the land vide order dt. 1.7.1976. Similarly, Saheb Singh submitted an application in regard to grant of Bhumiswami right on 18.3.1978. A proclamation was issued and thereafter Tehsildar granted Bhumiswami right to him vide order dt. 6.7.1978 in regard to lands/details mentioned in the avode order. Similarly Vijay Singh submitted an application on 5.5.1976 for grant of Bhumiswami right and he was conferred Bhumiswami right vide order dt. 1.7.1976. Subsequently, these persons sold some portion of land to different persons. Vijay Singh sold some portion of land area 1.620 hectare vide sale deed 27.11.1990 to Sheela Devi. Similarly, Saheb Singh and Mukhtyar Singh also sold the lands to different persons. They subsequently resold the lands to other persons. 6. As per the record available in the case, following persons purchased the land. Vijay Singh sold some portion of land area 1.620 hectare vide sale deed 27.11.1990 to Sheela Devi. Similarly, Saheb Singh and Mukhtyar Singh also sold the lands to different persons. They subsequently resold the lands to other persons. 6. As per the record available in the case, following persons purchased the land. Their names were also mutated and they were recorded owners of the land :- Øa- uke HkwfeLokeh e; ofYn;r 1- vk/kqfud foUMdkWu izk-fy- Mk;jsDVj Jh v’kksd flag iq- jktsUnz flag fuoklh FkkVhiqj] eqjkj- 2- vk/kqfud x`g fuekZ.k lgdkjh lfefr e;kZ] }kjk v/;{k larks”k ‘kekZ iq= dk’khjke ‘kekZ fuoklh xka/kh jksM+] Xokfy;j- 3- eqds'k flag iq= vtesj flag tk-xw-Bk- fu xzke 4- HkxoUr iq= vtesj flag tk-xw-Bk- fu xzke 5- Jherh jek flag /keZiRuh vjfoUnz flag fu lEHkkghjko dkWykuh] eqjkj 6- HkwisUnz flag iq= cnu flag tk-xw-Bk- fu xzke 7- Jherh m”kk vxzoky iRuh jktsUnz flag fu- xk;=h fogkj 8- dq- jsuq iq=h vejukFk ‘kekZ tk-ok- fu- nkSjkj 9- jkevorkj flag iq- Hkxoku flag tk-xw-Bk- fu- xzke 10- Jherh m”kk vxzoky iRuh jktsUnz dqekj vxzoky fu- xk;=h foHkkx] BkVhiqj- 11- dq- uhrk jkor iq=h xEHkhj flag jkor uk-;k- lj- ekW Jherh ‘kdqUryk nsoh iRuh xEHkhj flag fu- f’kouxj fljkSy jksM- 12- _f”k dqekj JhokLro iq- jes’kpUnz JhokLro fu- 24 , Hkxoku dkyksuh xka/kh jksM+] Xokfy;j- 13- lat; ‘kekZ iq- ,u-ds-‘kekZ- o Jherh lqtkrk ‘kekZ iRuh lat; ‘kekZ fu- 18 U;w lfjrk uxj niZ.k dkykuh BkVhiqj- 14- Jherh ‘kksHkk xqIrk iRuh lUrks”k dqekj xqIrk fu- 418 lqjs’k uxj eqjkj- 15- Jherh ehuk epkSjh larks”k ipkSjh fu- 15 jksfgr uxj frdksfu;k ikdZ lqjs’k uxj BkVhiqj- 16- Jherh f’k[kk ipkSjh iRuh euh”k dqekj fu- lqjs’k uxj BkVhiqj 17- Jherh fdju ‘kekZ iRuh izeksn dqekj ‘kekZ fu- f’kouxj] dqEgjiqjk eqjkj- 18- eukst ‘kekZ iq- jkenhu ‘kekZ Jherh lq”kek ‘kekZ iRuh eukst ‘kekZ fuoklh 1@13 cSfjd DokVZj xouZesUV dkyksuh BkVhiqj- 19- Jherh ehuk ‘kekZ iRuh fouksn dqekj fu- f’kouxj dqEgjiqjk Xokfy;j- 20- Jherh ljyk HknkSfj;k iRuh egs’k flag HknkSfj;k fu- fiUVks ikdZ xk;=h fogkj dkyksuh tMs:vk dyk- 21- Jherh :De.kh xksLokeh iRuh egs’k xksLokeh fuoklh ?kkle.Mh lqankek iqjh eqjkj- 22- Jherh jkedqekjh eRuh deys’k pan vxzoky fuoklh xyh u-1 vk;Z uxj eqjkj- 23- nsosUnz ‘kekZ iq- jes’k ‘kekZ fu- cjksyh rg- ekS- ftyk Xokfy;j- 24- Jherh fu”Bk folksfj;k iRuh iadt xqIrk fu- i`Foh uxj fljksy- 25- lkgc flag iq- jktcgknqj flag tk-B- fu- xzke lksMk dk dqvk Xokfy;j- 26- ohjsUnz flag iq- xEHkhj tk-xw-Bk- fu- xzke csgV- 27- mEesn iq- Nfojke flag tk-xw-Bk- fu- xzke- 28- Jherh ‘khyknsoh iRuh izgykn flag tk-xw-Bk- fu- xzke- 29- Jherh y{eh Hk.Mksfj;k iRuh X;kizlkn fu- dk’khiqj- 30- Jherh ‘khyknsoh iRuh dSyk’k jkts fu- lkgw dk iqjk dsUV- 31- v’kksd dqekj cjS;k iq- }kjdkizlkn fu- bZ- 65 bUnzxf.k uxj BkVhiqj- 32- lq/khj dqekj flag iq- le;flag fu- BkVhiqj- 33- lquhrk {kf=; iRuh osnizdk’k fu- ‘khryk Hkou ctfj;k] BkVhiqj- 34- foØe flag iq= ykyflag fu- Mcjk- 35- ljyknsoh iRuh jkds’k dqekj o uhye iRuh iznhi dqekj fu- xksobZ- 36- Jherh deyknsoh iRuh usrjke jktkSfj;k fu- dqEgjiqjk eqjkj- 37- ekaxhyky iq- y[kqvkjke fu- uohu dk iqjk rg- lcyx< eqjSuk- 38- Jherh f=os.kh iRuh ih-lh-;kno fu- lh&46 FkkVhiqj dkyksuh eqjkj- 39- Jherh lquhrk t;ar iRuh ftrsUnz dqekj fu- 6 x.kifr uxj t;iqj jktLFkku- 40- lqUrh nsoh iRuh ekaxhyky fu- uohu dk iqjk lcyx<- 41- leirh iRuh cnzhflag tk-xw-Bk- fu- xzke- 7. Tahsildar Morar submitted a report to the Collector in regard to cancellation of mutation in favour of Anita W/o Ranjeet Singh and Smt. Pinki W/o Pramod Singh Yadav. Lands to the aforesaid persons were sold by Saheb Singh. Thereafter, the Collector called the original record and observed that Bhumiswamis had committed violation of section 165 (7-b) of the Code of 1959 and consequently, registered the case in suo motu revision and a show cause notice was issued to original land allottees namely Saheb Singh, Mukhtyar Singh and Vijay Singh. It is mentioned in the show cause notice that the original lease holders had sold the land to different persons without obtaining permission from the Collector and violated the provisions of section 165 (7-b) of the Code of 1959. The notices were received unserved, thereafter a notification was published in daily news paper ‘Nav Bharat’ by the Collector. On behalf of Saheb Singh his power of attorney holder Mukhtyar Singh appeared before the Collector and the petitioners made their appearance before the Collector and submitted objections. 8. Petitioner - Adhunik Build Caun Private Ltd. of W.P. No.8417/2011 pleaded that the petitioner had purchased the land vide registered sale deed dt. 24.2.2009 and it had also got the possession of the land. Name of the petitioner was also mutated in the revenue record. 9. Prtitioner - C.P. Developors of W.P.No. 7877/2011 pleaded that it had purchased the land of area 4 bigha 6 biswa by a registered sale deed. Prior to that, a no objection certificate was also granted by the Nazul Officer - Collector District Gwalior on 10th April 2011. 10. Petitioner-Ashok Kumar Baraiya of W.P.No.7710/2011 pleaded that the original lease holder Vijay Singh sold the land in favour of Raj Kumar S/o Pooran Chand, thereafter Rajkumar sold the land in favour of Smt. Ramwati and Ramwati sold the land area 1110 sq. ft. in favour of the petitioner vide registered sale deed dt. 3.3.2010. 11. Petitioner - Adhunik Grih Nirman Sahkari Samiti Maryadit of W.P. No. 8414/2011 pleaded that the petitioner had purchased the land vide registered sale deed dt. 28.4.2008 from Smt. Poonam Gupta and a no objection certificate was also received from Nazul Officer on 21st June 2010. Poonam Gupta purchased the said land from M/s Rajoriya Construction and M/s Rajoria Construction purchased the said land from other land owner. 12. 28.4.2008 from Smt. Poonam Gupta and a no objection certificate was also received from Nazul Officer on 21st June 2010. Poonam Gupta purchased the said land from M/s Rajoriya Construction and M/s Rajoria Construction purchased the said land from other land owner. 12. Petitioner - Ummed Singh of W.P. No. 7783/2011 pleaded that he purchased the land vide registered sale deed dt. 2.1.1980 from Vijay Singh. The Collector also granted no objection certificate to the petitioner. 13. Petitioner - Ambe Real Estate of W.P. No. 7782/2011 pleaded that the petitioner had purchased the land vide regestered sale deed dt. 15.10.2010 from Saheb Singh S/o Rajbahadur Singh. No. objection certificate was also granted to the petitioner by Nazul Officer. Earlier a Bhu Adhikar Rin Pustika was also issued to Saheb Singh. 14. Petitioners-Dilip Singh and 32 others of W.P. No. 8540/2011 pleaded that Vijay Singh sold the land to one Rajkumar S/o Pooranchand and he had sold the land in favour of Smt. Ramwati and thereafter Ramwati sold the land in favour of the petitioners of area about 1110 sq.ft. 15. All the petitioners pleaded that they are the bona fide purchasers of the land, which were sold by Mukhtyar Singh, Saheb Singh and Vijay Singh. In some of the cases, the lands were sold directly to the petitioners and in some of the cases, the land were sold to other persons and thereafter those persons resold the land to other persons and then it was again sold to the petitioners. 16. The petitioners raised an objection before the Collector that he had no power to take the matter in suo motu revision because the original lease holders were granted Bhumiswami rights in the year 1976 and 1978. Thereafter their names were mutated and they had sold the property to other persons and as per the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Ranveer Singh Vs. State of M.P. reported in 2010 RN 409 = 2010(3) JLJ 77 = 2010 (4) MPLJ 178 . Suo motu revision could not be entertained after a lapse of near about 40 years. State of M.P. reported in 2010 RN 409 = 2010(3) JLJ 77 = 2010 (4) MPLJ 178 . Suo motu revision could not be entertained after a lapse of near about 40 years. Petitioners also raised an objection that section 165 (7-b) of the Code of 1959 was introduced in the year 1980 and prior to the aforesaid amendment in the Code, the Bhumiswami rights were conferred on original lease holders, hence, the provisions of Section 165 (7-b) of the Code of 1959 would not be applicable to the original lease holders namely Mukhtyar Singh, Saheb Singh and Vijay Singh. It is further contended by the petitioners before the Collector that they are the bona fide purchasers and they had paid the sale consideration, hence, their sale is in accordance with law. 17. The Collector vide impugned order has held that because the original lease holders namely Mukhtyar Singh, Saheb Singh and Vijay singh sold the land without obtaining prior permission from the Collector in contravention of section 165 (7-b) of the Code of 1959, hence, they had committed the illegality, therefore, the transactions are null and void and consequently, set aside the pattas granted in favour of the original lease holders in the year 1972. The Collector further declared the lands as government lands and ordered recovery of possession of the lands. 18. The learned senior counsel as well as the other counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners have contended, that the order passed by the Collector is contrary to law and without jurisdiction. It is further submitted that the provisions of section 165 (7-b) of the Code of 1959 would not be applicable in the present case because the Bhumiswami rights were granted to the original lease holders prior to 1980. It is furthor submitted that the subsequent purchasers have not been made party by the Collector nor their rights have been discussed by the Collector. It is further submitted that the Collector has committed an error of law in cancelling the pattas, which were granted in the year 1972. It is further contended that power of suo motu revision could not be exercisod by the Collector after a period of near about 40 years, hence. the impugned order is bad in law. In support of the contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioners have relied upon the following judgments :- 1. Ranveer Singh Vs. It is further contended that power of suo motu revision could not be exercisod by the Collector after a period of near about 40 years, hence. the impugned order is bad in law. In support of the contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioners have relied upon the following judgments :- 1. Ranveer Singh Vs. State of M.P. - 2010 RN 409 = 2010(3) JLJ 77 = 2010 (4) MPLJ 178 2. Maa Kaila Devi Enterprises Vs. State of M.P. - 2010 RN 226 = 2012 (4) MPHT 263 3. Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks - 1998 (8) SCC 1 19. The learned Govt. Advocate has contended that in accordance with the provisions of section 165 (7-b) of the Code of 1959, a Bhumiswami could not sale the land, which was granted on lease by the government without prior permission of the Collector. Since in the present case, provisions of section 165 (7-b) of the Code of 1959 have not been followed, hence, the Collector has rightly passed the order. Learned Govt. Advocate further submitted that after the knowledge of the transaction, the Collector had taken the matter in suo motu revision, which is in accordance with law. He further submitted that no Bhumiswami has right to sale the land after coming into force section 165 (7-b) of the Code of 1959 without prior permission of the Collector, hence, no legal valid title accrued to the petitioners. Consequently, the petitioners have no right. It is further submitted that the petitioners have not added the original lease holders namely Mukhtyar Singh, Saheb Singh & Vijay Singh as party, hence, the petitions are not maintainable. It is also submitted by the Govt. Advocate that the petitioners have alternate remedy. In support of his contentions learned Govt. Advocate relied upon the following judgments:- 1. Mulayam Singh vs. Budhawa Chamar - 2002 RN 250 = 2002 (2) MPLJ 480. 2. Maa Kaila Devi Enterprises Vs. State of M.P. 2012 RN 226 = 2012 (4) MPHT 263. 20. An important question for consideration before this Court is that whether the original lease holders namely Mukhtyar Singh, Saheb Singh and Vijay Singh were required to follow the provisions of section 165 (7-b) of the Code of 1959, It is an admitted fact that all the three persons were granted lease vide order dt. 28.8.1972. Thereafter, Mukhtyar Singh was granted Bhumiswami rights vide order dt. 28.8.1972. Thereafter, Mukhtyar Singh was granted Bhumiswami rights vide order dt. 1.7.1976, Vijay Singh was also granted Bhjumiswami rights vide order dt. 1.7.1976. Saheb Singh was granted Bhumiswami rights vide order dt. 18.3.1978 in regard to land. 21. Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ramgopal Kanhaiyalal Vs. Chetu Batte reported in 1976 JLJ 278 = AIR 1976 M.P. 160 has held as under in regard to rights of Bhumiswami under the Code of 1959 :- “ 14. It must be remembered that a Bhumiswami has a title though he is not the “Swami” of the “Bhumi” which he holds, in the sense of absolute ownership, because as declared in section 257 of the Revenue Code, ownership of land vests in the State Government, yet, he is a Bhumiswami. He is not a mere lessee. His rights are higher and superior. They are akin to those of a proprietor in the Sense they are transferable and heritable, and he cannot be deprived of his possession, except by due process of law and under statutory provisions, and his rights cannot be curtailed except by legislation.” 22. From the aforesald judgment of the Full Bench, it is clear that Bhoomiswami has right to transfer the land. The rights are also heritable. The aforesaid judgment has been affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rohini Prasad Vs. Kasturchand reported in (2000) 3 SCC 668 . The Hon’ble Supreme Court further considered the aforesaid judgment in the case of Hukum Singh Vs. State of M.P. reported in (2005) 10 SCC 124 and further affirmed the judgment of the Full Bench in the case of Ramgopal (supra) specially in regard to rights of Bhumiswami. In the case of Hukum Singh (supra) Hon’ble the Supreme Court has observed as under :- 7. Paras 14 and 17 of the decision rendered by the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court read: (AIR p.164). “14. It must be remembered that a bhumiswami has a title though he is not the ‘swami’ of the ‘bhuumi’ which he holds, in the sense of absolute ownership, because as declared in section 257 of the Revenue Code, ownership of land vests in the State Government yet, he is a Bhumiswami. He is not a mere lessee. His rights are higher and superior. He is not a mere lessee. His rights are higher and superior. They are akin to those of a proprietor in the sense that they are transferable and heritable, and he cannot be deprived of his possession, except by due process of law and under statutory provisions, and his rights cannot be curtailed except by legislation. 17. We, therefore, hold that a Bhumiswami is not bound to avail himself of the speedy remedy provided in section 250 of the Code. It is open to him to take recourse to the summary remedy under section 250 or even without it straightway bring a suit in th civil court for declaration of his title and possession. Even if there has been a decision under section 250 by a Revenue Court, the party aggrieved may institute a civil suit to establish his title to the disputed land. We further hold that Nathu v. Dilbande Hussain was correctly decided. The civil Court can take cognizance of a suit. This is our answar to the questions referred to us.” 8. The view taken by the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court is affirmed by this Court in Rohini Prasad v. Kasturchand. This being the position, the first substantial question of law is wrongly decided by the High Court. Under the circumstances, the impugned order cannot be sustained. Consequently, the civil appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the High Court is set aside. The second appeal is remitted to the High Court for disposal afresh on merits accepting that the suit is maintainable, having rogard to the law laid down by the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Ramgopal as affirmed by this Court in Rohini Prasad.” 23. Section 165 of the Code of 1959 prescribes rights of transfer and it further holds that a Bhumiswami has a right to transfer the land and sub-section (7-b) of section 165 of the Code of 1959, which was inserted vide M.P. Act No. 15 of 1980, prescribes that a government lessee, who subsequently becomes Bhumiswami of such land, shall not transfer such land without the permission of a revenue officer not below the rank of Collector. The relevant section 165 (7-b) is as under :- “(7-b) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), a person who holds land from the State Government or a person who holds land in Bhumiswami rights under sub-section (3) of section 158 or whom right to occupy land is granted by the State Government or the Collector as a Government lessee and who subsequently becomes Bhumiswami of such land, shall not transfer such land without the permission of a revenue officer, not below the rank of a Collector, given for reasons to be recorded in writing.” Similarly, section 158 of the Code of 1959, which is in regard to Bhumiswami, prescribes that no person shall transfer land within a period of 10 years from the date of lease of allotment. The relevant section 158 (3) of the Code of 1959 is as under :- “(3) Every person - (i) who is holding land in Bhumiswami right by virtue of a lease granted to him by the State Government or the Collector or the Allotment Officer on or before the commencement of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code (Amendment) Act, 1992 from the date of such commencement, and (ii) to whom land is allotted in Bhumiswami right by the State Government or the Collector or the Allotment Officer after the commencement of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code (Amendment) Act, 1992 from the date of such allotment. Shall be deemed to be a Bhumiswami in respect of such land and shall be subject to all the rights and liabilities conferred and imposed upon a Bhumiswami by or under this Code. Provided that no such person shall transfer such land within a period to ten years from the date of lease of allotment. Explanation. - In this section, the expression “Ruler” and “Indian” State” shall have the same meaning as are assigned to these expressions in clauses (22) and (15) respectively by Article 336 of the Constitution of India.” This section was introduced on 28.10.1992 by amendment vide M.P.17 of 1992. 24. It is an admitted fact that prior to introduction of section 165 (7-b) of the Code of 1959, there was no bar in the Code of 1959 in regard to taking prior permission from a Revenue Officer not below the rank of Collector in the event of sale of land. 25. 24. It is an admitted fact that prior to introduction of section 165 (7-b) of the Code of 1959, there was no bar in the Code of 1959 in regard to taking prior permission from a Revenue Officer not below the rank of Collector in the event of sale of land. 25. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Zile Singh v. State of Haryana reported in (2004) 8 SCC 1 has held as under in regard to applicability of the Code as prospective or retrospective :- “13. It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prime facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have a retrospective operation. But the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair existing obligations. Unless there are words in the statute sufficient to show the intention of the legislature to affect existing rights, it is deemed to be prospective only - ‘nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis” - a new law ought to regulate what is to follow, not the past. (See Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 9th Edn., 2004 at p. 438). It is not necessary that an express provision be made to make a statute retrospective and the presumption against retrospectively may be rebutted by necessary implication especially in a case where the new law is made to cure an acknowledged evil for the benefit of the community as a whole (ibid.,p.440). 26. The Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of K.S. Paripoorman Vs. State of Kerala reported in AIR 1995 SC 1012 has held as under :- “44. A statute dealing with substantive rights differs from a stature which relates to procedure or evidence or is declaratory in nature inasmuch as while a statute dealing with substantive rights is prima facia prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective effect, a statute concerned mainly with matters of procedure or evidence or which is declaratory in nature has to be construed as retrospective unless there is a clear indication that such was not the intention of the Legislature. A statute is regarded as retrospective if it operates on cases or facts coming into existence before its commencement in the sense that it affects, even if for the future only, the character or consequences of transactions previously entered into or of other past conduct. By virtue of the presumption against retrospective applicability of laws dealing with substantive rights transactions are neither invalidated by reason of their failure to comply with formal requirements subsequently imposed, nor open to attack under powers of avoidance subsequently conferred. They are also not rendered valid by subsequent relaxations of the law, whether relating to form or to substance. Similarly, provisions in which a contrary intention does not appear neither impose new liabilities in respect of events taking place before their commencement, nor relieve persons from liabilities then existing, and the view that existing obligations were not intended to be affected has been taken in varying degrees even of provisions expressly prohibiting proceedings. [See Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol.44, Paras 921, 922, 925 and 926]. 45. These Principles are equally applicable to amendatory statutes. According to Crawford: “Amendatory statues are subject to the general principles relative to retroactive operation. Like original statutes, they will not be given retroactive construction, unless the language clearly makes such construction necessary. In other words, the amendment will usually take effect only from the date of its enactment and will have no application to prior transaction in the absence of an expressed intent or an intent clearly implied to the contrary. Indeed there is a presumption that an amendment shall operate prospectively. [See Crowford’s Statutory Construction PP. 622,[23]. 46. The dictum of Lord Denman, C.J. in The Queen v. St. Mary, Whitechapel (1848 (12) QB 120) (supra) that a statute which is in its direct operation prospective cannot property be called a retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from time antecedent to its passing, which has received the approval of this Court, does not mean that a statute which is otherwise retrospective in the sense that it takes away or impairs any vested right acquired under existing laws or creates a new obligation or imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past, will not be treated as retrospective. In Alexander v. Mercouris (1979 (3) All ER 305) (supra), Goff, LJ, after referring to the said observations of Lard Denman, C.J. has observed that a stature would not be operating prospectively if it crates new rights and duties arising out of past transaction. The question whether a particular statute operates prospectively only or has retrospective operation also will have to be determined on the basis of the effect it has on existing rights and obligations, whether it crates new obligations, or imposes new duties or levies new liabilities in relation to past transactions. For that purpose it is necessary to ascertain the intention of the Legislature as indicated in the statute itself.” 27. Author Justice G.P. Singh in his book - Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 12th Edn., 2010 has observed in regard to retrospective operation of statutes dealing with substantive rights after considering various judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court and others, as under :- “(ii) Statutes dealing with substantive rights.- It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prime facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implicaton made to have retrospective opration [Keshvan v. State of Bombay, AIR 1951 SC 128 , P. 130, Janardan Reddy v. State, AIR 1951 SC 124 , p. 127, Mahadeolal Kanodia v. Administrator General of W.B. AIR 1960 SC 936 , P. 939, State of Bombai v. Vishnu Ramchandra, AIR 1961 SC 307 , Rafiquennessa (Mst.) v. Lal Bahadur Chandra, AIR 1964 SC 1511 , p. 1514. State to Madhya Pradesh v. Rameshwar Rathor. AIR 1990 SC 1849 , Zila Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 2004, SC 5100. p.5103]. But the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair existing obligations. Unless there are words in the statute sufficient to show the intention of the Legislature to affect existing rights, it is “deemed to be prospective only ‘nova constitutio futuris forman imponere debet non praeteritis. In the words of LORD BLANESBURG, “provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment. In the words of LORD BLANESBURG, “provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment. “Every statute, it has been said”, observed LPES, L.J., “which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or created a new obligation or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions already past, must, be presumed to be intended not to have a retrospective effect”. as a logical corollary of the general rule, that retrospective operation is not taken to be intended unless that intention is manifested by express words or necessary implication, there is a subordinate rule to the effect that a statute or a section in it is not to be construed so as to have larger retrospective operation than its language renders necessary. In other words close attention must be paid to the language of the statutory provision for determining the scope of the retrospectively intended by Parliament. But if the literal reading of the provision giving retrospectively produces absurdities and anomalies, a case not prima facie within the words may be taken to be covered, if the purpose of the provision indicates that the intention was to cover it. The inhibition against retrospective construction is not a rigid rule and must vary secundum materium. It has been said that “the basis of the rule is no more than simple fairness which ought to be the basis of every legal rule.” 28. There is no mention in section 165 (7-b) of the Code of 1959 to the effect that it would apply retrospectively. It is clear from the provisions of the section that it takes away the vested rights acquired by a Bhumiswami and it creates a new obligation or imposes a new duty in regard to taking prior permission from the Collector in the event of sale of the land, hence, the section could not be presumed to be retrospective in operation. The rights, which were granted to the original lease holders namely Mukhtyar Singh, Saheb Singh and Vijay Singh prior to 1980 as Bhumiswami could not be taken away by the provisions of the aforesaid Code. The rights, which were granted to the original lease holders namely Mukhtyar Singh, Saheb Singh and Vijay Singh prior to 1980 as Bhumiswami could not be taken away by the provisions of the aforesaid Code. A Bhumiswami had a vested right to sell the land and their rights are unfettered and unaffected by introduction of section 165 (7-b) of the Code of 1959. The same position is in regard to section 158 (3) of the Code of 1959 because it was introduced by way of amendment dt. 28.10.1992. 29. Full Bench of this Court in the case of Renveer Singh Vs. State of M.P. - 2010 RN409 = 2010(3) JLJ 77 = 2010 (4) MPLJ 178 has held as under in regard to taking the matter in suo motu revision :- “36. Ex consequenti we hereby hold that in order to exercise suo motu power of revision envisaged under section 50 of the Code and looking to the scheme of Chapter V. it should bo exercised by the revisional authority within 180 days from the date of the knowledge of the illegality or impropriety of any order passed or as to the irregularity of the proceedings of any revenue officer subordinate to it and it will not be justifiable to stretch it for any length of period even for protection of the Government land or Public interest.” 30. Full Bench has considered various judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ranveer Singh (supra). From the aforesaid judgment of the Full Bench, it is clear that the Revenue Officer cannot exercise the suo motu power beyond the period of 180 days from the date of knowledge. In the impugned order, the Collector has not mentioned the fact when he came know about the violation of any provisions of the Code of 1959 by the lease holders. Hence, in my opinion, he had no power and authority to exercise the power of suo motu revision because earlier Collector had granted no objection certificate in regard to the same land. 31. Apart from this, there is no provision under section 165 (7-b) of the Code of 1959 to cancel the patta. This section only says that the Bhumiswami has no right to sell the land without prior permission of the Collector. 31. Apart from this, there is no provision under section 165 (7-b) of the Code of 1959 to cancel the patta. This section only says that the Bhumiswami has no right to sell the land without prior permission of the Collector. In the present case, the Collector has cancelled the pattas, which were granted in the year 1972 after a period of 40 years and number of persons had purchased the land as mentioned in the order, but they were not noticed by the Collector. 32. The learned Govt. Advocate relied on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court passed in the case of Mulayam Singh Vs. Budhawa Chamar reported in 2002 (2) MPLJ 480 , however, the facts of the aforesaid case are quite different. In the aforesaid case, the person was declared as Bhumiswami in the year 1982 as mentioned in para 4 of the said judgment but in the present case the persons were conferred Bhumiswami rights prior to 1980, hence, the judgment cited by the learned Govt. Advocate is not applicable in the present case. It is well settled principle of law that the judgment has to be applied in the particular facts of the case and little change in the facts could change the scenario. In this case, there was no occasion to consider the fact of insertion of section 165 (7-b) of the Code of 1959, which was introduced in 1980. Hence, in my opinion, the present case is not applicable. Even if the agrument advanced by the learned Government Advocate is accepted, then it would create chaos because suppose a person was granted Bhumiswami right in the year 1959, 1960 or 1965 and thereafter subsequently the transactions had taken place between numbers of persons, those transactions could also be hit by the provisions of section 165 (7-b) of the Code of 1959. 33. Another argument advanced by the learned Government Advocate that petitioners have not availed the alternative remedy has no force because for a writ of certiorari the alternative remedy is no bar. The order passed by the Collector is without jurisdiction. Hence, as per the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Whirlpool Corporation (supra), the petitions are maintainable. Consequently, all the petitions are allowed. The impugned orders dt. 11.11.2011 passed by the Collector in suo motu revision No. 97/10-11 and amendment order dt. The order passed by the Collector is without jurisdiction. Hence, as per the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Whirlpool Corporation (supra), the petitions are maintainable. Consequently, all the petitions are allowed. The impugned orders dt. 11.11.2011 passed by the Collector in suo motu revision No. 97/10-11 and amendment order dt. 11.11.2011 are hereby quashed. No. order as to costs.