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2012 DIGILAW 1109 (BOM)

Vaibhav Raghunath Dalvi v. State of Maharashtra

2012-06-22

ABHAY M.THIPSAY

body2012
JUDGMENT :- Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties. 2. The applicant is the accused in Sessions Case No.70 of 2011, pending before the Sessions Court at Mumbai. The case is in respect of an offence punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and arises on the basis of a report lodged by the respondent no.3 herein. The applicant made an application for discharge before the Sessions Court but the Learned Assistant Sessions Judge rejected the said application. 3. The applicant being aggrieved by the said order of rejection of his discharge application has approached this Court in revision. 4. Mr. Pawaskar the learned counsel appearing for the applicant submitted that even if the allegations in the First Information Report (FIR) and the statements recorded during the investigation are taken at face value, they do not disclose the commission of any offence. According to him, age of the victim, as of 25 years, not being in dispute, it is clear that the victim was a consenting party to the sexual relations between the accused and her. Mr. Pawaskar, therefore, submitted that the applicant cannot be prosecuted on the allegations of having committed rape, when the victim was a consenting party to the sexual relations between her and the applicant, which spanned over for a period of about three years. 5. I have gone through the FIR and the statements recorded during the investigation, copies of which are annexed to the revision application. Indeed, the allegations leveled against the applicant, do not disclose any offence punishable under Section 376 of the IPC. The substance of the case of the victim is that the applicant was working as Manager in another office of the Company where the victim works; and that, in connection with work of the Company, the victim and the Applicant came in contact. On 18.10.2007, the applicant and the victim met in the applicant's chamber. That applicant, at that time, told the victim that his married life was not happy and that he had no physical relations with his wife and that he used to like and love the victim. By these representations, he induced the victim to keep physical relations with him. Thereafter, the applicant and victim frequently used to meet each other and the victim voluntarily kept sexual relations with the applicant. By these representations, he induced the victim to keep physical relations with him. Thereafter, the applicant and victim frequently used to meet each other and the victim voluntarily kept sexual relations with the applicant. When the family members of the victim started suspecting the victim's conduct because of her frequently coming home late, the victim was allegedly advised by the applicant to say that she was in love with some one else and was advised to present some person as her would be husband, before the family members. Accordingly, the victim told her family members that she was in love with one Nilesh Mahadev Deet and that she had already married him. 6. It also appears that the applicant took a flat on leave and license basis, for enabling the victim to reside separately, from her family. The victim started staying there. In the course of time, the sister of victim came to know about the whole affair, and when she informed about it to the applicant's wife and relatives of wife, there were disputes requiring the applicant to discontinue the relationship with the victim. 7. The FIR says that the victim was induced by the applicant, by giving false promises of marriage from time to time, to keep sexual relations with him and that the applicant, thus, cheated the victim. 8. The contention that no offence punishable under Section 376 of the IPC is disclosed, must be accepted. The reasoning of the Learned Assistant Sessions Judge in that regard, is improper and incorrect. Infact, the Learned Assistant Sessions Judge has merely recorded the contentions raised by the applicant, but has not dealt with them in the impugned order. The Learned Assistant Sessions Judge failed to consider as to whether an adult woman keeping sexual relations voluntarily with another, with whom she was in love, can allege that such person has committed rape on her, merely because later On she realized that the representations, promises and assurances given by such person to her were not true and that, that person had actually induced her to keep sexual relations with him on the basis of false representations, assurances and promises. In my opinion, in such a case, no accusation of an offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC can be leveled against such a person. After all, the woman would undoubtedly be a consenting party to such relationship. 9. In my opinion, in such a case, no accusation of an offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC can be leveled against such a person. After all, the woman would undoubtedly be a consenting party to such relationship. 9. It is not necessary to discuss this aspect any further, in as much as, on a perusal of the police report and accompanying documents, certainly no case for an offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC is made out. The applicant's prosecution on the said charge therefore needs to be quashed. 10. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the matter should not end here. It is because, taking the averments in the FIR and the statements recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure at face value, there appears to be a case for proceeding against the applicant with respect to an offence punishable under Section 417 of the IPC. 11. When this view viz. that prima facie there were sufficient grounds for proceeding against the applicant, with respect to the charge of an offence punishable under Section 417 of the IPC was expressed, Mr. Pawaskar, the learned counsel appearing for the applicant contended that it was not open for this court to take such a view. According to him, in the revisional jurisdiction, this court would be required to see whether the case of an offence punishable under Section 376 of the IPC was made out or not, and once this court comes to the conclusion that no such case was made out, the only course open for his court would be to quash the prosecution; aid it is not open for this court to direct the prosecution to be continued, with respect to some other offence, not specifically mentioned in the police report. It is not possible to accept this contention of Mr. Pawaskar. The revisional powers of this court are very wide. It is not possible to accept that even when the court forms an opinion, that though the offence alleged in the police report is not disclosed or made out, some other offence is disclosed on a reading of the same still the course open to the court would only be to quash the entire proceedings. That, the court should not direct the prosecution to continue in respect of the offence. That, the court should not direct the prosecution to continue in respect of the offence. which appears to have been committed by the accused, cannot be accepted. 12. The question now remains is, whether there are grounds for proceeding against the applicant with respect to an offence punishable under Section 417 of the IPC. According to Mr. Pawaskar, the statements made by the victim in the FIR are not true and that they are not substantiated. I am afraid, the factual correctness or otherwise of the statements made in the FIR, cannot be gone into at this stage. The substance of the grievance of the victim is that because of the representations made by the applicant, she developed a feeling of love for him and was thus induced to keep sexual relations with him. The grievance is also that these representations were false and at that time, she did not realize it. 13. Mr. Pawaskar then contended that even if the allegations leveled by the victim are taken at face value, at the most, the case would be only of breach of promise to marry. According to him, it would not amount to any offence. 14. I have carefully considered the matter. 15. It is true that the demarcating line between a mere "breach of promise" and "cheating" would, sometimes, be quite thin. It all depends on the facts of each case. In this case, the applicant was holding much superior position than that of the victim in the organization. where they were working. The mother of the victim had died long back and her father had also died in the year 2005. The victim was residing with her maternal uncle. Her salary was merely Rs.1500/- per month. If these aspects are kept in mind, it is clear that it was quite easy for the applicant to induce her to keep sexual relations with him, by expressing his love / liking for her. 16. The crux of the matter would be the intention of the applicant, at the material time. If the intention was dishonest and the representations that he used to like the victim or that he was in love with her were false, and made with the object for somehow securing her consent for sexual relationship, then, it cannot be said that no case of an offence punishable under Section 417 of the IPC is made out. If the intention was dishonest and the representations that he used to like the victim or that he was in love with her were false, and made with the object for somehow securing her consent for sexual relationship, then, it cannot be said that no case of an offence punishable under Section 417 of the IPC is made out. On the other hand, if the victim also felt comfortable in the relationship and voluntarily accepted the same, knowing fully well, that the marriage between her and the applicant was an impossibility, then there would be no question of cheating. It is also possible that she also secured several benefits - physical, mental and perhaps financial- from such relationship, and therefore, had consented for such relationship, after considering all the aspects of the matter, and is now claiming that she was induced to keep such relationship. What is the truth of the matter can be decided only on the basis of evidence, as may be adduced during the trial. 17. It is well settled that at this stage the court is required to consider only whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the applicant and not whether there are sufficient grounds for convicting him. It is also well settled that whether the trial, if held, would ultimately result in the conviction of the accused, cannot be a consideration while deciding whether the proceedings should be permitted to continue Infact, it would be hazardous to make a guess in that regard. It is equally well settled that even if there appears to be some possibility of the allegation being untrue, the prosecution must be allowed to continue, if in the event of the allegations being true, the offence alleged can be established. Thus, though at the final stage, if there remains a doubt about the genuineness or truth of the allegations, the benefit of the same must go to an accused, at the initial stage, even if such doubt arises, the same cannot result in termination of the prosecution. 18. Here, whether or not, the applicant had a dishonest intention from the beginning, can be established, only on the basis of evidence. 18. Here, whether or not, the applicant had a dishonest intention from the beginning, can be established, only on the basis of evidence. At the cost of repetition, it may be observed, that if the entire allegations leveled against the applicant are considered, there appears to be a case for proceeding against him, with respect to an offence punishable under Section 417 of the IPC. 19. Under the circumstances, though I hold that no offence punishable under Section 376 of the IPC is disclosed from the police report and accompanying documents, still, there appear sufficient grounds for proceeding against the applicant, with respect to an offence punishable under Section 417 of the IPC. I am, therefore, not inclined to quash the proceedings against the applicant in entirety. It would be proper to direct the trial to be proceeded with, against the applicant, on the allegations of having committed an offence punishable under Section 417 of the IPC. 20. In the result, the Revision Application is partly allowed. 21. The impugned order is set aside. 22. The prosecution against the applicant, in so far as it relates to the charge of offence punishable under Section 376 of the IPC is quashed. However, it is directed that the trial shall proceed against the applicant on the charge of offence punishable under Section 417 of the IPC. 23. Needless to say, that the matter may, therefore, be sent back by the Sessions Court to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, who shall assign the same for trial to the Magistrate having jurisdiction over the matter. The Magistrate, to whom the case would be assigned for trial shall proceed with the same expeditiously and in accordance with law. 24. The Revision Application is disposed of in the aforesaid terms. Ordered accordingly.