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2012 DIGILAW 1115 (MAD)

T Sree Renga Raja v. Vice Chancellor

2012-02-29

K.RAVICHANDRA BAABU

body2012
JUDGMENT ( 1. ) THE writ petition has been filed challenging the order passed by the second respondent in Ref. No. AUT-T/ESST/2011 dated 15.11.2011 and further directing the respondents 1 and 2 to allow the petitioner to continue to function as Head of the Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Anna University of Technology of Trichirapalli, Trichirapalli. ( 2. ) THE case of the petitioner is that he passed M.E., in Power System and obtained Ph.D., in Electrical Engineering. He was appointed as Assistant Professor of Electrical and Electronic Engineering Department of Anna University of Technology, Trichirapalli on 20.8.2009 under regular basis. Prior to such appointment, the petitioner was working in the same department on contract basis from 2.7.2007 to 19.8.2009. During the course of this period, through proceedings dated 14.1.2008, the second respondent appointed the petitioner as Faculty in-charge of Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Anna University of Technology, Trichirapalli, until further orders, based on the order issued by the first respondent dated 11.1.2008. It is further stated by the petitioner that 3rd respondent, who is an Assistant Professor in the same department, as an Internal Examiner has not conducted the Laboratory Examination for 4th year students as per schedule. Since, the petitioner being the Head of the Department and had to conduct the University Examination in Power System Simulation Laboratory for 4th year B.E. students on 28.10.2011, most of the students made complaint against the 3rd respondent before the petitioner for not conducting the said laboratory examination on 28.10.2011. The petitioner in turn made a complaint to the second respondent against the 3rd respondent and requested for necessary action against him. Based on the complaint filed by the petitioner and others, an Enquiry Committee was constituted on 9.11.2011. It is further stated by the petitioner that though the committee was appointed and the same had enquired into the matter, so far no finding has been given nor any report is submitted by the said Enquiry Committee. In the meantime, even before the Enquiry Committee submits its report, the second respondent passed the impugned order on 15.11.2011 appointing the 3rd respondent as Head of the Department i/c of the Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering as Additional Charges until further orders and directed the petitioner to hand over the charges to the 3rd respondent. In the meantime, even before the Enquiry Committee submits its report, the second respondent passed the impugned order on 15.11.2011 appointing the 3rd respondent as Head of the Department i/c of the Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering as Additional Charges until further orders and directed the petitioner to hand over the charges to the 3rd respondent. Challenging the said or- der of the second respondent, the writ petition has been filed. ( 3. ) NOTICE of motion was ordered by this Court on 22.11.2011 and an order of status quo was also granted on 24.11.2011. ( 4. ) ON notice, the respondents 1 and 2 entered appearance and filed a counter affidavit along with vacate stay petition in M.P. (MD) No. 3 of 2011 to vacate the order of status quo granted on 24.11.2011. The 3rd respondent has also entered appearance and filed a counter affidavit. ( 5. ) THE respondents 1 and 2 in the counter affidavit contended that the petitioner was originally engaged on contract basis as Lecturer in EEE Department for a period of six months and again by extending the period by six months from 8.6.2007. The same was further renewed on 3.1.2008 for a further period of six months and thereafter, he was appointed on contract basis for a further period of two years from 6.8.2008. Subsequently, the petitioner was appointed as a regular Faculty in the cadre of Assistant Professor from the year 2009. As the said University was recently established and it would take considerable time to appoint regular faculty members, the Vice-Chancellor by taking into consideration of the interest of the University, deemed it appropriate to appoint the petitioner as Faculty in-charge of EEE Department in the year 2008, by an order dated 11.1.2008. It is stated by the respondents 1 and 2 that the said appointment is only a temporary measure taking into consideration of the interest of the students and therefore, it is not correct to say that the petitioner was appointed as Head of the Department on regular basis. ( 6. It is stated by the respondents 1 and 2 that the said appointment is only a temporary measure taking into consideration of the interest of the students and therefore, it is not correct to say that the petitioner was appointed as Head of the Department on regular basis. ( 6. ) IT is further contended by the respondents 1 and 2 that the Registrar of University received several complaints against the petitioner from the students by stating that approaching the petitioner was very difficult; the petitioner did not allow the students for industrial visits; students were made to wait for long time for getting his signature; the petitioner misuses his power to threaten the students. It is further stated by the respondents 1 and 2 that the petitioner failed to discharge his duties and did not conduct EE 104 Power Systems and Simulation Lab Examination, Scheduled on 28.10.2011. It is stated by the respondents 1 and 2 that the petitioner as the Head of the Department failed to act diligently in resolving the confusion caused due to a dispute between the 3rd respondent being the internal examiner and one Dr. Sutha, being the external examiner in respect of conducting the said examination. Instead of sorting out the problem, the petitioner had chosen to change the internal examiner and conducted the practical examination at 1.30 p.m. on 28.10.2011 instead at 9.00 a.m. Therefore, the 3rd respondent had given a complaint against the petitioner and in turn the petitioner had also given a similar complaint against the 3rd respondent on 28.10.2008 and 31.10.2011 respectively. Similar complaints were received from the Skilled Assistant of EEE Lab. Therefore, a committee was constituted to enquire into issue, the said Enquiry Committee had commenced his enquiry on 11.11.2011 and partially completed the enquiry proceedings and in the meantime, for the purpose of maintaining the academic atmosphere of the University and to protect the interest of the students community, the first respondent deemed it fit and appropriate to appoint the 3rd respondent as Head of the Department i/c and consequently, the order impugned in this writ petition came to be passed on 15.11.2011 by appointing the 3rd respondent as Head of the Department i/c until further orders and the petitioner herein was directed to hand over the charge to the 3rd respondent. ( 7. ( 7. ) IT is further contended by the respondents 1 and 2 that the designation of "Faculty in-charge" or "Head of the Department" is not a promotional post and it is only an additional responsibilities established with an objective to ensure the coordination of the academic and administrative functions of the Department with the University in the interest of the students. No additional honorarium or monetary consideration is paid for the faculty appointed as "Head of Department" or "Faculty in-charge". The respondents 1 and 2 further contended that the appointment of the 3rd respondent does not vest with an adverse consequence and as such the petitioner cannot be an aggrieved person to approach this Court as non of his legal rights are infringed. It is further stated by respondents 1 and 2 that the decision taken to appoint the 3rd respondent as the Head of the Department i/c was taken only due to complaints received from the students of the Department against the petitioner. ( 8. ) IT is further stated by the respondents 1 and 2 that the 3rd respondent in pursuant to the order of appointment assumed the charges on the very same day i.e., 15.11.2011 and he is presently working as "Head of the Department". The petitioner instead of cooperating with the 3rd respondent based on the order of status-quo granted by this Court, locked the room of the Head of the Department with his personal lock and did not hand over the key to the security and he is also not present at the Department on 16.11.2011 onwards. ( 9. ) THE 3rd respondent in his counter affidavit has contended that the order impugned in this writ petition appointing the 3rd respondent as "Head of the Department if c" was made by the Vice-Chancellor in exercise of power conferred on him under Anna University Act. He has further contended that the decision to appoint him as Head of the Department i/c was taken due to the complaint from the students of the EEE Department against the petitioner. It is contended by the 3rd respondent that the post of Head of the Department is not a promotional post and same is only a honorary post. The 3rd respondent also stated that he assumed the charge on 15.11.2011 itself as per the order of appointment. It is contended by the 3rd respondent that the post of Head of the Department is not a promotional post and same is only a honorary post. The 3rd respondent also stated that he assumed the charge on 15.11.2011 itself as per the order of appointment. However, by taking advantage of the interim order of status-quo granted by this Court, the petitioner had given trouble to the 3rd respondent and he had also taken away the University file out side the University premises without getting the prior permission from the authority. ( 10. ) THE petitioner has filed a reply statement to the counter affidavit filed by the first and second respondents, wherein he has stated that no students have made any complaint against the petitioner and even if there was one, the same was not brought to the knowledge of the petitioner till this date. The petitioner has also explained the circumstances, under which, the practical examination was conducted on 28.10.2011 in the afternoon. The petitioner in his reply statement stated that he was on leave from 16.11.2011 to 24.11.2011 and acting as Head of Department from 25.11.2011 onwards based on the interim order passed by this Court. ( 11. ) HEARD the learned counsel for the respective parties. ( 12. ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the 3rd respondent is 9 years junior to the petitioner and comparative of the salary being paid to the petitioner and the 3rd respondent would show that he is far junior to the petitioner and therefore, not entitled to be appointed as Head of the Department. It is also argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the attendance register for the month of November 2011, would also show that the 3rd respondent was on deputation and if so, there was no possibility for appointing him as the Head of the Department. It is argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner had given a complaint against the 3rd respondent in not conducting the practical examination at the schedule time and date. Instead of taking action against the3rd respondent, the first and second respondents erroneously appointed the 3rd respondent in the place of the second respondent. It is argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner had given a complaint against the 3rd respondent in not conducting the practical examination at the schedule time and date. Instead of taking action against the3rd respondent, the first and second respondents erroneously appointed the 3rd respondent in the place of the second respondent. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that admittedly, an Enquiry Committee was constituted on 9.11.2011 based on the complaint of the petitioner and others and the said committee has also commenced its enquiry on 11.11.2011 and has not completed the enquiry as admitted by the respondent in their counter affidavit. While that being the position, in the absence of any finding by the enquiry committee or any report received from it, there was no necessity for passing the impugned order. ( 13. ) IT is further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that though the respondents claim that they followed Section 12(6) of Anna University Trichirappalli Act,2006, they failed to follow the Section 12(7) which contemplates a notice before the action to the individual. Admittedly, the petitioner was not given any show cause notice before passing the impugned order and when the petitioner is a senior most person in the department, he is entitled to continue as the Head of the Department. Further, it is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that since the merger order has been passed to merge all the Anna Universities all over the State, the petitioner will lose his opportunity to be considered for regular appointment as Head of the Department after such merger proceedings are completed, if the impugned order is allowed to continue. ( 14. ) IT is further argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that even assuming that it is an ad hoc appointment, still the petitioner is entitled to notice, as it has been admitted by the respondents 1 and 2 that the impugned order came to be passed only based on certain complaints against the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention that seniority is a civil right and the same should not be disturbed, cited a judgment in W.A. (MD) No. 649 of 2007 dated 23.2.2011 passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court. ( 15. The learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention that seniority is a civil right and the same should not be disturbed, cited a judgment in W.A. (MD) No. 649 of 2007 dated 23.2.2011 passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court. ( 15. ) PER contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents 1 and 2 contended that the under Section 12(6) of the said Act Vice Chancellor has got power to take action in any emergency which in the opinion of the Vice-Chancellor requires immediate action. Therefore, according to the learned counsel appearing for the respondents 1 and 2, the action taken by the Vice-Chancellor in exercise of power under Section 12(6) of the said Act is perfectly in order. ( 16. ) IT is also argued by the learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 that Section 50 of the said Act is applicable only in respect of regular appointment and therefore, the petitioner being an ad hoc appointment cannot take shelter under Section 50 of the Act. The learned counsel also argued that based on the circumstances explained at paragraph 7 in the counter affidavit, the impugned order came to be passed. As it is not a regular post and only an additional in-charge post the petitioner has no vested right over the same and consequently he cannot seek the relief as prayed for in the writ petition. ( 17. ) 1 HAVE considered the rival submissions made by the respective parties. ( 18. ) THE petitioner was originally appointed on contract basis between the period 2.7.2007 and 17.8.2009. He was appointed as Assistant Professor on regular basis on 17.8.2009 at the Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering of Anna University, Trichirappalli. But before such appointment and while he was working on contract basis, by a proceedings dated 14.1.2008, the second respondent had appointed the petitioner as Faculty In-charge of the said Department until further orders. In the said order of appointment dated 14.1.2008, the second respondent had referred the order of Vice-Chancellor, namely, the first respondent dated 11.1.2008. A reading of the order of appointment dated 14.1.2008 shows that the petitioner was appointed as in-charge of Head of the Department until further orders. In the said order of appointment dated 14.1.2008, the second respondent had referred the order of Vice-Chancellor, namely, the first respondent dated 11.1.2008. A reading of the order of appointment dated 14.1.2008 shows that the petitioner was appointed as in-charge of Head of the Department until further orders. Therefore, it is clear that the petitioner was not regularly appointed to the post of Head of the Department and on the other hand he was only appointed as in-charge of the said post that too until further orders. Further, the petitioner was appointed as an Assistant Professor on 17.8.2009 on regular basis subject to his completion of probation period satisfactorily. The impugned order challenged in this writ petition appointing the 3rd respondent as Head of the Department has also been made only as an additional charge to the said post, until further orders and both orders dated 14.1.2008 and 15.11.2011, appointing the petitioner and 3rd respondent respectively as Head of the Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering came to be passed based on the order of the Vice-Chancellor. No doubt that the Vice-Chancellor being the Head of the Institution has got power to act on an emergency and in order to maintain peaceful academic atmosphere in the University has got power to make such ad hoc appointments. ( 19. ) THE learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that when the appointment of the 3rd respondent was made by exercising the power under 12(6) of the said Act, then the authorities should have given notice to the petitioner as contemplated under the proviso to sub-section 6 of Section 12. ( 20. ) THOUGH the said proviso to Section12(6) would be applicable only to person, who are regularly appointed to the post and not to persons like the petitioner whose appointment was made temporarily, until further orders, still the petitioner is entitled to a notice once the order impugned attaches any stigma. It is pertinent to note at this juncture that after appointing the petitioner regularly as Associate Professcr on 17.8.2009 the order dated 14.1.2003 was continued even after his appointment as Assistant Professor in regular vacancy. It is pertinent to note at this juncture that after appointing the petitioner regularly as Associate Professcr on 17.8.2009 the order dated 14.1.2003 was continued even after his appointment as Assistant Professor in regular vacancy. Therefore, though the petitioner was appointed as in-charge of the Head of the Department even before his regular appointment, as he has been allowed to continue even after such regular appointment to function as Head of the Department in-charge, the impugned order ought not to have been passed without hearing the petitioner. ( 21. ) THOUGH the reading of the order impugned in this writ petition does not show that it attaches any stigma on the petitioner, as it is admitted by the respondents 1 and 2 in their counter affidavit that impugned order came to be passed based on the complaint received against the petitioner, the said order cannot be treated as an order of simplicitor. Admittedly, in this case an enquiry committee was appointed to enquire into the allegation made against the petitioner as well as the 3rd respondent. It is also an admitted case of the respondents 1 and 2 that the enquiry committee has not completed the enquiry and submitted a report. While that being the position, the second respondent is not justified in passing the impugned order thereby removing the petitioner from the post of Head of the Department (in-charge) and appointing the 3rd respondent in the place of the petitioner. No doubt, it is true that both the appointments of the petitioner and the 3rd respondent are made only as a temporary measure that too until further orders. Even then when the respondents 1 and 2 have chosen to remove the petitioner and post the 3rd respondent as Head of the Department (in-charge), admittedly, based on certain complaints received against the petitioner, the same cannot be made without putting the petitioner on notice and giving him sufficient opportunity of hearing as it attaches stigma. In this case, though the petitioner was made as Head of the Department (in-charge) as early as on 14.1.2008 he was continuing in the said post for more than three years even after he was appointed as Assistant Professor of the said Department on regular basis by proceedings dated 20.8.2009. Therefore, for all purposes the petitioner was discharging his duties only as Head of the Department. Therefore, for all purposes the petitioner was discharging his duties only as Head of the Department. At this juncture, it is useful to refer the decision of the Hon'ble Full Bench of this Court in the matter of A. Savariar v. The Secretary, Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission, Chennai 2 and Another 2008 (4) CTC 753 : LNIND 2008 Mad 644: (2008) 7 MLJ 1256 . Where the term "in-charge of post" was considered and the Hon'ble Full Bench has held as follows: "Even the term 'in-charge of a post' means, over all control of the post 1 of the Company or of the Firm. That means, when one is posted as in-charges, he is having the overall control of that post which necessarily follows the execution of the powers and functions of the said post. Unless, contrary intention is expressed by the Government either by way of a statutory provision or by way of an executive instruction, an officer who holds the post in-charge has got the power to discharge the statutory functions and the responsibilities of the said post." ( 22. ) THEREFORE, from the above decision rendered by the Hon'ble Full Bench in respect of the term "in-charge of the post" it could be seen that the person posted as in-charge to a particular post is having overall control of that post unless contrary intention is expressed. ( 23. ) IN this case, when the petitioner was appointed through proceedings dated 14.1.2008 no contrary intention was expressed by the respondents 1 and 2 in the order of appointment and on the other hand, it was stated therein that the petitioner was appointed as Faculty in-charge of Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Anna University, Trichirappalli until further orders. While that being the position, it has to be construed that the petitioner for all practical purposes was discharging his function as Head of the Department, though he was appointed as in-charge. Consequently, he cannot be removed that too based on certain complaints against him without giving him an opportunity of hearing. ( 24. While that being the position, it has to be construed that the petitioner for all practical purposes was discharging his function as Head of the Department, though he was appointed as in-charge. Consequently, he cannot be removed that too based on certain complaints against him without giving him an opportunity of hearing. ( 24. ) AT this juncture, it is useful to refer the recent order passed by the learned single Judge of this Court in the matter of Divisional Railway Manager, Southern Railway v. Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal -cum -Labour Court, Chennai -2(2012) 1 CWC 195 : LNIND 2011 Mad 167, wherein, the learned Judge has discussed in detail with regard to orders of termination simplicitor and orders of termination attaching stigma. The learned Judge has also considered as to whether temporary employees are entitled to protection under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. The learned Judge has also discussed and found that even if the order appears to be innocuous and where there are materials to indicate that the order of dismissal is, in fact, an order of punishment, the Court could always lift the veil to find out as to whether the order is one of punishment. The relevant paragraphs 36 and 37 are reproduced hereunder: "5(5. As far as the grounds raised in both these writ petitions are concerned, common issues arise: (i) Whether in the case of temporary employee, protection under Article 311(2) is available and (ii) Whether the order of dismissal stigmatizes the employees that the order of dismissal itself is a foundation and not a motive. 37. As already noted in the preceding paragraphs, where the order of termination is punitive in nature, for the purpose of invoking Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India, the status as a contract employee or a temporary employee is totally immaterial. To find out the character of the order of termination, it is always open to lift the veil to go beyond the terminology used in the order of dismissal to find out whether, in effect and substance, the order is stigma tic in nature and whether the order is the motive or foundation. The decisions of the Apex Court at to the effect that if the misconduct is a foundation of an order of termination, in the absence of compliance of Article 311 (2), the same would be bad in law. The decisions of the Apex Court at to the effect that if the misconduct is a foundation of an order of termination, in the absence of compliance of Article 311 (2), the same would be bad in law. Even if the order appears to be innocuous and where there are materials to indicate that the order of dismissal is, in fact, an order of punishment, the Court could always lift the veil to find out as to whether the order is one of punishment. When the foundation for an order of termination is not one on satisfactory performance, but the overt acts amounting to misconduct, the dismissed employee is entitled to the constitutional protection envisaged under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. If an order of termination refers to some proceedings which casts a shadow on the character of the employee as a mark of disgrace, disrepute or shame, the failure to follow the procedure beyond the preliminary enquiry certainly vitiates the order." ( 25. ) THEREFORE, from the reading of the above order passed by the learned single Judge it is clear that though the petitioner was appointed as re-charge of Head of the Department and his appointment was also purely temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to a notice before the impugned order is passed as it attaches stigma on the petitioner' s service. Admittedly, no notice was issued to the petitioner in this case. I have also recently considered a similar question in W.P. (MD) No. 1451 of 2007 dated 2.2.2012 in the matter of Chokkalingam v. Superintendent of Police, Madurai District, Madurai, it held as follows: "72. A perusal of the impugned order passed by the respondent undoubtedly drives this Court to come to a conclusion that the said order of dismissal is not an order of termination simplicitor but on the reason that a complaint was pending against the petitioner in Malur Police Station in crime No. 333 of 2006 under Sections 353 and 294(b) IPC and that the petitioner was arrested on 22.7.2006 and that the case was under investigation 13. It is also an admitted case that there was no notice given to the petitioner and no enquiry was conducted by the respondent before passing the impugned order. It is also an admitted case that there was no notice given to the petitioner and no enquiry was conducted by the respondent before passing the impugned order. The Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Hon'ble Court in various decisions rendered, have categorically held that when an order of termination was passed casting stigma, it is necessary for the authority to hold an enquiry. 14. At this juncture, it is useful to refer to the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jagadish Mitter v. Union of India AIR 1964 SC 449 , in paragraphs 7,8 and 9, wherein it has been held as follows: 7. The true legal position in regard to the scope and effect of the provisions of Article 311 in respect of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State on a temporary or probationary basis is now fairly well established. It is, however, necessary to state the said legal position briefly before dealing of with the merits of the dispute between the parties in the present appeal. 8. Having regard to the legislative history of the provisions contained in Article 311, the words "dismissed", "removed" and "reduced in rank" as used in Article 311(1), have attained the significance of terms of Article. As has been observed by Das, C J. in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, "both at the date of the commencement of the 1935 Act and of our Constitution the words 'dismissed', 'removed' and 'reduced in rank' as used in the service rules, were well understood as signifying or denoting the three major punishments which could be inflicted on government servants. The protection given by the rules to the Government servants against dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, which could not be enforced by action, was incorporated in sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 240 to give them a statutory protection by indicating a procedure which had to be followed before the punishments of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank could be imposed on them and which could be enforced in law. These protections have now been incorporated in Article 311 of our Constitution". It is thus clear that every order terminating the services of a public servant who is either a temporary servant, or a probationer, will not amount to dismissal or removal from service within the meaning of Article 311. These protections have now been incorporated in Article 311 of our Constitution". It is thus clear that every order terminating the services of a public servant who is either a temporary servant, or a probationer, will not amount to dismissal or removal from service within the meaning of Article 311. It is only when the termination of the public servant's services can be shown to have been ordered by way of punishment that it can be characterised either as dismissal or removal from service. 9. It is also now settled that the protection of Article 311 can be invoked not only by permanent public servants, but also by public servants who are employed as temporary servants, or probationers, (vide Parshotam Lal Dhingra case (p. 858)), and so, there can be no difficulty in holding that if a temporary public servant or a probationer is served with an order by which his services are terminated, and the order unambiguously indicates that the said termination is the result of punishment sought to be imposed on him, he can legitimately invoke the protection of Article 311 and challenge the validity of the said termination on the ground that the mandatory provisions of Article 311(2) have not been complied with. In other words, a temporary public servant or a probationer cannot be dismissed or removed from service without affording him the protection guaranteed by Article 311(2)."15. In another decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Babulal v. State of Haryana AIR 1991 SC1310: (1991) 2 SCC 335 :1991-II-LLJ-327 in paragraph 8, it has been held as follows:"5. Moreover, from the sequences of facts of this case the inference is irresistible that the impugned order of termination of the service of the appellant is of penal nature having civil consequences. It is well settled by several decisions of this Court that though the order is innocuous on the face of it still then the Court if necessary, for the ends of fair play and justice can lift the veil and find out the real nature of the order and if it is found that the impugned order is penal in nature even though it is couched with the order of termination in accordance with the terms and conditions of the order of appointment, the order will be set aside. Reference may be made in this connection to the decision of this Court in Rajinder Kaur v. State of Punjab in which one of us is a party. It has been held that: (SCC HN) "The impugned order of discharge though stated to be made in accordance with the provisions of Rule 12.21 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, was really made on the basis of the misconduct as found on enquiry into the allegation behind her back. Though couched in innocuous terms, the order was merely a camouflage for an order of dismissal from service on the ground of misconduct. This order had been made without serving the appellant any charge-sheet, without asking for any explanation from her and without giving any opportunity to show cause against the purported order of dismissal from service and without giving any opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses examined. The order was thus, made in total contravention of the provisions of Article 311(2) and was therefore, liable to be quashed and set aside." 16. In another unreported judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in W.A. (MD) No. 240 of 2007, dated 24.9.2007, in paragraph 7, it has been held as follows:" 7. On the other hand, since the order of termination was passed casting stigma, it was necessary for the University to hold enquiry. That apart, the order which was purportedly passed by the Vice Chancellor had not been placed before the Syndicate within the stipulated time. 17. The categorical decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Jagadish Mitter v. Union of India (supra) makes it clear that the protection of Article 311 can be invoked not only by permanent public servants, but also by public servants, who are employed as temporary servants, or probationers. In the said decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also observed that a temporary public servant or a probationer cannot be dismissed or removed from service without affording him the protection guaranteed by Article 311 (2). 18. In this case, the impugned order passed is not an order of termination simplicitor. A perusal of the same undoubtedly show that it is an order attaching stigma on the petitioner's service. While that being the position the petitioner ought to have been given an opportunity of hearing and the respondent should have conducted an enquiry before passing the impugned order. A perusal of the same undoubtedly show that it is an order attaching stigma on the petitioner's service. While that being the position the petitioner ought to have been given an opportunity of hearing and the respondent should have conducted an enquiry before passing the impugned order. Admittedly, it is not done in this case. It is also stated by the respondent in the counter affidavit that the criminal case pending against the petitioner in S.C. No. 334 of 2006 has also ended in acquittal on 4.4.2008 i.e., subsequent to the filing of the writ petition." ( 26. ) THEREFORE, considering all the facts and circumstances of the above case and also relying on the orders passed by this Court on similar issue as discussed above, I have no hesitation in holding that the impugned order passed against the petitioner is unsustainable solely on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. Though the said impugned order was made without assigning any reason in it, in view of the admitted facts by the respondents themselves in their counter affidavits that the impugned order came to be passed based on the complaint against the petitioner, I hold that the impugned order is stigmatic in nature and consequently bad in law as there is no sufficient compliance of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. Consequently, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order passed by the second respondent is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the respondents 1 and 2 to afford an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and pass fresh orders on merits in accordance with law within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.