COMMON ORDER 1. All the writ petitions are filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking an order to issue a writ of certiorari, calling for the records in I.D. Nos. 77 of 2001, 642 of 2001, 643 of 2001, 644 of 2001 and 647 of 2001, dated 20.2.2004 on the file of the first respondent and quash the same. 2. The writ petitioners herein were claimants before the first respondent raising dispute for adjudication under clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub- section 2 (A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) between the management of Standard Chartered Bank and their workmen. The petitioners who are claimants before the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court raised the dispute against the second respondent / management and as per the award, the first respondent held that the petitioners herein are not entitled to any relief as claimed by them under the Industrial Disputes Act. Aggrieved by which, separate writ petitions have been filed by them, challenging the orders passed by the first respondent herein. 3. Mr. K. Sankaran, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that without proper application of judicial mind, based on the materials available on record, the impugned common award has been passed by the first respondent. It is further contended that the Court below has hot gone into the factual aspect, as to why Brayan D‘souza needed a visit to the Telex Room of the Standard Chartered Bank on the date of occurrence, what had been the transaction taken place between the injured complainant and others, prior to the occurrence, especially with Srinivasa Sha, an employee of the Bank, prior to the occurrence and also the allegation raised by the person injured in the occurrence. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, in all the writ petitions submitted that the purpose of the visit of the aforesaid Brayan D‘souza and Sylvester Jerry on the date of occurrence during office hours within the campus of the Bank, at the prohibited area was not stated by the management, however, they were threatening the Bank employees with rowdy elements and the aforesaid fact was silently sidetracked, ignored and ultimately suppressed by the respondents. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the first respondent has not discussed anything in the award about the actual occurrence, hence, the writ petitions have been filed challenging the common award of dismissing the claim of the petitioners. 4. It was further contended by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that the first respondent had failed to see that there was no corroboration to establish the time of the incident and also failed to discuss the contents of the complaint, admission of the alleged victims as inpatient and the first respondent has not considered the issue as to who was Sylvester Jerry and what business he had got with the standard chartered Bank in the prohibited area without signing the visitors book and according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the aforesaid facts would amply prove the goondaism act of the bank against its own employees with regard to the credit card collection-matters in the occurrence. 5. It is an admitted fact that in I.D. No. 77 of 2001, as per the Award, dated 20.2.2004 on the file of the Industrial Tribunal, the reference relating to the dispute is stated. In other words, the following Industrial Dispute has been raised by the writ petitioner in W.P. No. 23701 of 2005: “Whether the action of the management of Standard Chartered Bank, Chennai in dismissing Shri. D. Peter, sub-staff from service with affect from 21.7.1996 is justified ? If not, to what relief the workman is entitled ?” 6. It is seen from the available records that, similar disputes have been raised relating to the other petitioners before the Tribunal. The petitioners in all the writ petitions were employees in the standard chartered Bank in the year 1992. The second respondent/Management has only one union, by name Standard Chartered Bank Employees‘ Union and Federation. The petitioners have averred that the bank had introduced three voluntary retirement schemes in the year 1994, 1995 and 1996, but there was poor response for the scheme. Finding that the voluntary retirement scheme did not yield the desired results, the bank began to terrorise the workmen coupled with a plan to do away with the services of the leading functionaries of the union. Finding that the voluntary retirement scheme did not yield the desired results, the bank began to terrorise the workmen coupled with a plan to do away with the services of the leading functionaries of the union. In the circumstance, charge memos were served on the petitioners on 26.3.1996 alleging assault, riotous or disorderly or indecent behaviour exposed by them at the premises of the Bank and they have done acts prejudicial to the interest of the Bank. The petitioners/employees were suspended and pending departmental enquiry, suspension was revoked on 1.10.1996, however, the petitioners continued to work until their dismissal. Appeals were preferred by the petitioners and the same were dismissed. Then the petitioners raised industrial disputes before the conciliation officer and on its failure, the matters were referred to Government, which in turn referred this matter to the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court for adjudication. According to the petitioners, the Tribunal, the first respondent herein has committed major errors in passing the impugned common award of dismissing the claim of the petitioners herein. 7. It is not in dispute that the following industrial disputes have been raised by the other writ petitioners herein before the Tribunal, the first respondent herein : “Whether the action of the management of Standard Chartered Bank, Chennai in terminating the services of Sri. D. Koteswara Rao with effect from 21.7.1996 is legal and justified ? If not, to what relief the workman is entitled?” “Whether the action of the management of Standard Chartered Bank, Chennai in terminating the services of Sri. S. Kripakaran with effect from 21.7.1996 is legal and justified? If not, to what relief the said workman is entitled?” “Whether the action of the management of Standard Chartered Bank, Chennai in terminating the services of Sri. I. Magimai Doss with effect from 21.7.1996 is legal and justified? If not, to what relief the said workman is entitled?” “Whether the action of the management of Standard Chartered Bank, Chennai in terminating the services of Sri. G. Thirunavukkarasu, clerk from service with effect from 21.7.1996 is justified or not? If not, justified, to what relief the said workman is entitled?” 8. The writ petitioners have stated that on 26.3.1996 at about 3.00 p.m., two persons had entered into the Standard Chartered Bank main branch at Chennai, where one Srinivasa Sha was working. G. Thirunavukkarasu, clerk from service with effect from 21.7.1996 is justified or not? If not, justified, to what relief the said workman is entitled?” 8. The writ petitioners have stated that on 26.3.1996 at about 3.00 p.m., two persons had entered into the Standard Chartered Bank main branch at Chennai, where one Srinivasa Sha was working. The said two persons had not approached any officer of the Bank or superiors to meet the said Srinivasa Sha, however, they took law into their own hands and demanded the said Srinivasa Sha to settle some overdue balance, on his credit card instantaneously. Hence, other employees in the first floor gathered there and in the meantime the union leader was also called there. Since the persons did not wear badges as per the Rules of the Bank and they did not even exhibit their identity, hence, they were asked to leave the premises. It is alleged in the charge memo that the petitioners assaulted the said officer, who had stomach pain and also caused bleeding injury in his nose. According to the petitioners, the charges could have been found false from the medical report furnished by the second respondent/ Bank in the course of departmental enquiry. 9. The writ petitioners/employees, who were also petitioners before the Industrial Tribunal stated that they have not committed any mischief much less any assault or other acts of criminal in nature, as found by the first respondent herein and has prayed to allow the writ petitions, set aside the award passed by the Tribunal and also to direct the second respondent to reinstate the petitioners in the service of the bank with back wages and other attendant benefits. It is not in dispute that the petitioners were given charge memos for the alleged misconduct and unruly acts done by them on 26.3.1996. As stated earlier, one Brayan D‘Souza, an official of the credit card centre along with Sylvester Jerry, a collection agent met Srinivasa Sah, an employee in Telex Department at about 3.15 p.m. on the said date. At that time, the said Srinivasa Sah made telephone call to Dawood, General Secretary of the Standard Chartered Bank Employees‘ Union and upon arrival of Dawood and other employees, including the petitioners gathered around Brayan D‘Souza and Sylvester Jerry. At that time, the said Srinivasa Sah made telephone call to Dawood, General Secretary of the Standard Chartered Bank Employees‘ Union and upon arrival of Dawood and other employees, including the petitioners gathered around Brayan D‘Souza and Sylvester Jerry. Then the writ petitioners and others commenced pushing and jostling the said Brayan D‘Souza and Sylvester Jerry and progressively increased their violence against them by pushing and and jostling and they were pushed and threatened by the petitioners to the hall of the Bank, situated adjacent to Telex Department of the Bank building, then the petitioners beat both of them seriously and in the said incident, Brayan D‘Souza was hit all over his body and he was also kicked on his back and shoulder by the petitioners and as a result of which, Brayan D‘Souza fell down, but somehow he managed to get up with the help of Sylvester Jerry and ran to the second floor of the building, seeking for help. Even there, the petitioners followed them, grabbed him from all sides by his clothes and commenced hitting him at his face, head and all over his body. Brayan D‘Souza was hurt severely on his face, head and all over his body, till he fell down on the floor and on account of the same, Brayan D‘Souza had bleeding in his nose and was hurt painfully in his ear, leading to his hospitilisation from 26.3.1996 to 30.3.1996. 10. According to the respondents, for the aforesaid illegal activities, the second respondent issued charge memo to the petitioners, stating that the above mentioned unruly acts on the part of the petitioners/employees constitute gross misconduct and accordingly- the management called for their explanations. As the explanation submitted by the petitioners were found not satisfactory, the second respondent/management ordered domestic enquiry. In the domestic enquiry, five witnesses including the injured Brayan D‘Souza were examined and for the defence, the representative of the petitioners examined two employees of the Bank. As per the award, the Industrial Tribunal, first respondent herein has found that the Enquiry Officer, having followed principles of nature justice, considering the evidence available on record and held that the charges were proved against all the petitioners. Then the Disciplinary Authority, issued show cause notice to the petitioners stating as to why they should not be dismissed from service for their alleged misconduct. Accordingly, submissions were made by the petitioners. Then the Disciplinary Authority, issued show cause notice to the petitioners stating as to why they should not be dismissed from service for their alleged misconduct. Accordingly, submissions were made by the petitioners. Having perused the submissions, the Disciplinary Authority dismissed the petitioners from service of the second respondent bank. 11. It is not in dispute that Brayan D‘Souza was an official of the Credit card centre and Sylvester Jerry, a collection agent and both had met Srinivasa Sha, an employee of the Bank on the date of occurrence at 3.15 p.m. in connection with their official duty. Learned counsel for the second respondent submitted that even assuming without admitting that Brayan D‘Souza and Sylvester Jerry were outsiders, the petitioners could not have taken law into their own hands and committed the alleged offence, by attacking and causing injuries at the Bank premises. Brayan D‘Souza and Sylvester Jerry had obtained permission from the Collection Manager and also informed the Assistant Manager (Communication) on that day. As per the medical report, it has been made clear that Brayan D‘Souza had bleeding injuries and was hospitalized, he had problem in hearing through his left ear, on account of the attack made on him, which would clearly show that he was assaulted by the petitioners, as per the evidence adduced against him. Hence, the findings against the petitioners is based on evidence. 12. Learned counsel appearing for the second respondent submitted that the second respondent/management has proved the charges by letting oral and documentary evidence before the Enquiry Officer and the Enquiry Officer also after going through the evidence placed before him, gave his findings that the charges have been proved against the petitioners and it was also argued by the learned counsel for the second respondents that the punishment of dismissal is not excessive and disproportionate to the charges proved against them. With the above pleadings, the learned counsel appearing for the second respondent submitted his arguments to dismiss these writ petitions. 13. In order to enlighten the legal aspects involved in the writ petitions, the following decisions were cited by both the learned counsel. 1. Shri J.D. Jain v. Management of S.B of India 1982-I-LLJ-54 2. State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh 1982-I-LLJ-46 3. Ram Babu v. State of U.P., AIR 2010 SC 2143 : LNIND 2010 SC 365 4. Chairman cum M.D, Coal India Ld. 1. Shri J.D. Jain v. Management of S.B of India 1982-I-LLJ-54 2. State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh 1982-I-LLJ-46 3. Ram Babu v. State of U.P., AIR 2010 SC 2143 : LNIND 2010 SC 365 4. Chairman cum M.D, Coal India Ld. v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri (2009) 8 MLJ 460 (SC) 5. Rasiklal v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation AIR 1985 SC 504 : (1985) 2 SCC 35 : 1985-I-LLJ-527 6. Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Meerut, AIR 1984 SC 505 : (1984) 1 SCC 1 : 1984-I-LLJ-16 7. Mgmt of W.S. Industries (L) Ltd. v. K. Ramakrishnan 2009 (3) LLN 804 : LNIND 2009 MAD 2710 8. P. Palani v. P.O., Central Govt I.T-cum-L.C, 2008 (1) L.L.N 371 9. Elangotalan, A v. AGM, SBI 2007-III-LLJ-636 10. Chairman & M.D., Hindustan Teleprinters Ltd., Chennai v. M.Rajan Isaac, 2005 LI.C. 1814 : LNIND 2005 MAD 336 : 2005-II-LLJ-610 : (2005) 2 MLJ 119 14. In State of Haryana v. Ratan Singh (supra), the Hon‘ble Supreme Court by a Three Judge Bench has held as follows : “4. The “residium” rule to which counsel for the respondent referred, based upon certain passages from the American Jurisprudence does not go to that extent nor does the passage from the Halsbury insist on such rigid requirement. The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence not in s the sense of the technical rules governing regular Court proceedings but in a fair commonsense way as men of understanding and worldly wisdom will accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic Tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of any evidence in support of a finding is certainly available for the Court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the record. We find, in this case, that the evidence of Chamanlal, inspector of the Flying Squad, is some evidence which has relevance to the charge levelled against the respondent. Therefore, we are unable to hold that the order is invalid on that ground.” 15. We find, in this case, that the evidence of Chamanlal, inspector of the Flying Squad, is some evidence which has relevance to the charge levelled against the respondent. Therefore, we are unable to hold that the order is invalid on that ground.” 15. It has been categorically held in the decision that in a writ petition, challenging the correctness of the award passed by the Tribunal, this Court has to consider whether there is some evidence or no evidence to apply fair commonsense as per the understanding and worldly wisdom of a reasonable prudent men to set aside the impugned order. It s also made clear that sufficiency of evidence for the proof of the finding before domestic Tribunal is beyond the scrutiny in a writ petition. Holding the view, it was held in the decision that the evidence of Chamanlal, Inspector of flying squad, has some evidence, which has relevancy to the charge levelled against the respondent therein. 16. In J.D. Jain v. Management of S.B. of India (supra), another Three Judge Bench of the Hon‘ble Apex Court has held that in a writ petition, seeking an order of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and for quashing the award of an Industrial Tribunal, the jurisdiction of the/High Court is limited and this Court can quash the award, inter alia, when the Tribunal has committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record or when the finding of facts of the Tribunal is perverse. It has further, ruled that in a departmental proceeding, guilt need not be established beyond reasonable doubt, proof of misconduct may be sufficient and held that the Tribunal had committed an error in holding that the finding of the domestic enquiry was based on “hearsay” evidence, as the law is well settled that strict rules of evidence are not applicable in a domestic enquiry. 17. In the referred case, what the Bank sought to establish in the domestic enquiry was that the customer had made a verbal complaint with regard to the withdrawal of excess money by the appellant herein, in the presence of other four employees. 17. In the referred case, what the Bank sought to establish in the domestic enquiry was that the customer had made a verbal complaint with regard to the withdrawal of excess money by the appellant herein, in the presence of other four employees. On the complaint of customer and the evidence of four witnesses, it was held as direct evidence, since the said complaint had been made by the customer in the presence of witnesses, which could not be held as hearsay evidence, as per the decision of the Hon‘ble Apex Court. 18. In Ram Babu v. State of U.P. (supra) the Hon‘ble Apex Court has held that in a case of dacoity punishable under Section 395 IPC, witnesses have identified the appellants/accused, not only in the test identification parade but also in the Court, hence the identification of the appellants therein was established by substantive evidence duly corroborated by test identification parade. Considering the evidence of all the important witnesses, it was held that the Apex Court could not enter into an elaborate examination of the evidence in a case where the findings of the facts recorded by the trial Court, where nothing was exceptional, hence, the action could not be justified and which has departure from the normal legal presumption, based on the available evidence and accordingly, the conviction was confirmed. 19. In Rasiklal v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, in AIR 1985 SC 504 , the Hon‘ble Apex Court has held as follows : “4. The High Court while dismissing the petition held that even if the allegation of misconduct does not constitute misconduct amongst those enumerated in the relevant service regulations yet the employer can attribute what would otherwise per se be a misconduct though not enumerated and punish him for the same. This proposition appears to us to be startling because even though either under the Certified Standing Orders or service regulations, it is necessary for the employer to prescribe what would be the misconduct so that the workman/employee knows the pitfall he should guard against. If after undergoing the elaborate exercise of enumerating misconduct, it is left to the unbridled discretion of the employer to dub any conduct as misconduct, the workman will be on tenterhooks and he will be punished by ex post facto determination by the employer. If after undergoing the elaborate exercise of enumerating misconduct, it is left to the unbridled discretion of the employer to dub any conduct as misconduct, the workman will be on tenterhooks and he will be punished by ex post facto determination by the employer. It is a well- settled canon of penal jurisprudence-removal or dismissal from service on account of the misconduct constitutes penalty in law-that the workmen sought to be charged for misconduct must have adequate advance notice of what Section or what conduct would constitute misconduct.” 20. It is well settled that in the absence of any Certified Standing Orders or service regulations, an act or omission cannot be construed as misconduct and it is not open to the employer to fish out some conduct as misconduct and punish the workman even though the alleged misconduct would not be comprehended in any of the enumerated misconduct. In the said case cited, the alleged misconduct was that the employee therein was shown to be guilty of the suppression of the material facts, hence, the Court had to decide whether the alleged act would attract the term of misconduct, as per the standing order or service regulation. However, in this case, the allegation raised against the petitioners herein is not only construed as misconduct, but also offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code. 21. The case records available would reveal the charge that on 26.3.1996 at 3.15 p.m, one Brayan D‘Souza, an officer of the credit card collection centre of the Bank, accompanied by one Sylvester Jerry, an employee of the collection agency, had been to the Bank, Armenian Street Branch of the Bank, wherein Srinivasa Sah was working. When the sdid Brayan D‘Souza had reminded Srinivasa Sah of the Telex Department about his overdue and outstanding amount, then Srinivasa Sah made a telephone call to some one and immediately, for about 20 employees, including the petitioners gathered around Bryan D‘Souza and Sylvester Jerry and the petitioners became very violent and the petitioners beat both Brayan D‘Souza and Sylvester Jerry. As they were pulled down, they ran to the second floor screaming for help. While they reached cabin of Seetaram Bhat, the petitioner and few others entered the cabin and once again started to beat them. As they were pulled down, they ran to the second floor screaming for help. While they reached cabin of Seetaram Bhat, the petitioner and few others entered the cabin and once again started to beat them. Subsequently, the Branch Manager of the Bank, S.Ramesh reached the Seetaram Bhat‘s cabin and took the injured persons to the first floor where D‘Souza identified the petitioners, who beat him. In view of the occurrence, on 3.4.1996, charge sheets were issued to the petitioners and on 24.4.1996, they gave explanation denying the charges, hence, Departmental enquiry was conducted. 22. As per the enquiry report, it was held by the Enquiry Officer, that the charges were proved against the petitioners. The Enquiry Officer has made detailed discussions on the oral and documentary evidence and found that the charges were proved. As per the charge sheets, dated 3.4.1996 issued on the petitioners/employees, the allegation levelled against them were that they had committed gross misconduct, violating 19.5 (c) and 19.5 (J) of the bipartite settlement, dated 19.10.1996. 23. In 19.5 of the bipartite settlement, dated 19.10.1996, the term “Gross misconduct” has been defined, which reads as follows : “By the expression “gross misconduct” shall be meant any of the following acts and omissions on the part of an employee : (c) drunkenness or riotous or disorderly or indecent behaviour on the premises of the bank 19.5(j) reads as follows: doing any act prejudicial to the interest of the bank or gross negligence or negligence involving or likely to involve the bank in serious loss.” 24. The learned Presiding Officer of the Industrial Tribunal has held that principles of natural justice was not violated by the Management and it was established that the petitioners had assaulted two officials, while they were discharging their duty at the premises of the respondent Bank, that too inside the premises of the Bank, where large number of employees were working and it is held that if the Tribunal inclined to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority in the domestic enquiry, the employees might get a wrong signal and that would make an impression that they can assault either any employee or an officer and it would create only an industrial unrest and it would be difficult for enforcement of discipline by Bank impossible. The findings of the Tribunal that maintaining cordial relationship with the customers and other employees and officials of other institutions as paramount for the success of the Banking business, cannot be disputed. It has been established, after providing reasonable opportunity to the petitioners that they had assaulted an officer of the credit card collection centre, by name, Brayan D‘Souza and his assistant Sylvester Jerry in the Bank premises and caused bleeding injuries to the said officer, in a violent manner. In the said occurrence, the two persons had been driven from one place to another and to safeguard their life from the physical attack of the petitioners, they had to ran to various places, as per the evidence and findings of the Tribunal. 25. In the aforesaid circumstances, Ruling of the Three Judge Bench of the Hon‘ble Apex Court in J.D. Jain v. Management of S.B. of India (supra), is squarely applicable. Accordingly, challenging the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal under the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is limited‘. The award could be quashed only when the Tribunal has committed ‘any error of law apparent on the face of the record or when the findings of fact of the Tribunal is perverse. 26. In the instant case, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has not pointed out that the Tribunal has committed any error of law apparent on the face of the record. Accordingly, to be construed the finding of the Tribunal perverse, either the finding must be against the evidence or without any evidence. In the instant case, on a perusal of the enquiry report and the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal, it has been made clear that the finding is based only on the evidence available on record, hence, the same cannot be 27. Similarly, as ruled in State of Haryana v. Ratan Singh (supra) by a Three Judge Bench of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court, the Court, while dealing with writ jurisdiction, has to consider whether there was some evidence to establish the guilt or no evidence, in a domestic enquiry and strict rule of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act is not applicable. All materials, which are legally probative for prudent mind is permissible, which cannot be disputed that departmental authorities and the Industrial Tribunal must be careful in evaluating such material. All materials, which are legally probative for prudent mind is permissible, which cannot be disputed that departmental authorities and the Industrial Tribunal must be careful in evaluating such material. They should follow the principles of natural justice, where fair play is the basis. In the instant case, there is no violation of principles of natural justice and I could find no reason to hold that there was no fair play in deciding the dispute. 28. On the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I could find no error or infirmity in the impugned common award passed by the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Chennai, so as to warrant any interference by this Court under the writ jurisdiction, hence, the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. 29. In the result, all the writ petitions are dismissed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is also dismissed. There is no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.