Shashi Kant Gupta, J.— This writ petition is directed against the order dated 11.3.2011 passed by the Additional District Judge, Special Judge (E.G. Act), Jhansi in RCA No. 3 of 2010 (Mamta Agnihotri Vs. Indrapal Shukla) setting aside the judgment and order dated 13.1.2010 passed by the Prescribed Authority/J.S.C.C., Jhansi in P. A. Case No. 13 of 2007, (Mamta Agnihotri Vs. Indrapal Shukla). 2. Brief facts of the case as set out in the writ petition are as follows; 3. An application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the UP Act No. 13 of 1972 (in short "Act") was filed for the release of the disputed premises from the possession of petitioner-tenant. It was stated therein that the respondent is a widow having two minor sons; petitioner is a tenant in her House No. 486 (new number 486/1) situated at Nanak Ganj, Sipri Bazar, Jhansi on a monthly rent of Rs. 300/- Since the respondent is not having any source of income, she wants to open a school for small children and give tuitions to the students, for which the tenanted accommodation is required. It was further pleaded in the release application that the petitioner-tenant has constructed his own house Nd. 190 at Nanak Ganj, Sipri Bazar, Jhansi. The tenant filed his written statement disputing and denying the allegations made in the release application and stated that the need of the petitioner-tenant was neither genuine nor bonafide. 3. After hearing to the learned counsel for the parties, the Prescribed Authority by judgment and order dated 13.1.2010 came to the conclusion that the alleged need of the respondent-landlady was not bonafide and the comparative hardship also tilts in favour of the petitioner-tenant and the application for release of the disputed premises was not maintainable in view of third proviso to Section 21 (1) of the Act. 4. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said judgment and order, the respondent-landlady filed an appeal. The said appeal was allowed by the judgment and order dated 11.3.2011. Hence, the present writ petition. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the findings recorded by the appellate court on the question of bonafide need and comparative hardship is based on a complete misreading of the case and misconception of the legal position relevant to the matter, and has not considered the evidence available on record in right perspective. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the findings recorded by the appellate court on the question of bonafide need and comparative hardship is based on a complete misreading of the case and misconception of the legal position relevant to the matter, and has not considered the evidence available on record in right perspective. It was further submitted that in view of the third proviso to Section 21 (1) of the Act a residential building cannot be used for commercial purposes. It was further submitted that the petitioner has got enough accommodation in her possession to run and open a school for small children and give a tuitions to the students. He further submitted that although the sale deed of the two plots were executed in favour of the petitioner but the house was constructed by the sons of the petitioner from their own funds, as such, Explanation 1 to Section 21 (1) of the Act is not applicable. 6. Per .contra, learned counsel for the Respondent-landlady supported the impugned order passed by the appellate court and stated that the order has been passed in accordance with law and the appellate court below was fully justified in holding the need of the landlady to be bonafide and genuine and the comparative hardship in her favour. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 8. Landlord and tenant relationship is not disputed by the parties.The application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act was filed by the Respondent-landlady, Smt. Mamta Agnihotri stating therein that the respondent-landlady is a widow lady having two minor sons; she possesses master degree in economics; she is not having any source of income; she wants to open a school for small children and give tuitions to the students for which the tenanted accommodation was required. The appellate court recorded a finding of fact holding the need of the respondent-landlady to be bonafide and genuine and found the comparative hardship in her favour. The appellate court also invoked the provision of 1st Explanation to Section 21 (1) of the Act since the petitioner has constructed his own house. 9. The contention of the learned counsel that the landlady can open a school in her own residential house is totally misconceived. The appellate court also invoked the provision of 1st Explanation to Section 21 (1) of the Act since the petitioner has constructed his own house. 9. The contention of the learned counsel that the landlady can open a school in her own residential house is totally misconceived. The appellate court has rightly I observed that the school is a public place where so many persons including students, their parents, persons conveying the children to and fro to their houses, maids, sweepers and teachers visit regularly. One cannot expect that in a building a family is j residing in one room and opposite to that room class is being run. A school in a residential house would deprive her of her right to preserve privacy. Therefore, in these circumstances, the landlady required a separate building for opening a school. 10. It has also come on record that the petitioner-tenant has purchased two plots vide sale deed dated 24.1.1983 admeasuring 1426 Sq. feet from Chhoteylal and another vide sale deed dated 13.3.1989 admeasuring 646 Sq. feet from Khachore alias Chhotelal and has constructed a house over it. This fact has not been disputed j by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 11. The only contention of the petitioner-tenant is that even though the plots were purchased by the petitioner, the construction was made by his two sons from their own funds, therefore, 1st Explanation to Section 21 (1) of the Act will not be applicable in the matter. The argument is totally misconceived. 12. For ready reference the 1st Explanation to Section 21 (a) of the Act- is quoted i herein below; "In case of a residential building :- where the tenant or any member of his family (who has been normally residing with or is wholly dependent on him) j has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state or has got vacated after acquisition a residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area, no objection by the tenant against an application under this sub-section shall be entertained;" 13. The 1st Explanation to Section 21(1) clearly provides that where the tenant or any member of his family has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state or has got vacated after acquisition a residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area, no objection by the tenant against an application under this sub-section shall be entertained. 14. In view of the above mentioned facts, 1st Explanation to Section 21 (1) of the Act would apply with full force to the facts of the present case. 15. Lastly, it has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in view of the third proviso to Section 21 (1) of the Act a residential accommodation cannot be occupied for commercial purposes. This argument is also misconceived. 16. The apex court in the case of Unni Krishnan J. P. And Others Vs State Of Andhra Pradesh And Others, (1993) 1 SCC 658 has held that imparting education by establishing educational institutional is not a commercial activity and not covered by expression 'trade or business', 'profession' or even 'occupation'. 17. This Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Saxena (since deceased) and others Vs. Sheelendra Rai Vidyarathi, 2012 (1) ARC 403 has held as follows; "While dealing with the aforesaid points, the courts below have found that there is no evidence on record on the basis of which it can be inferred that purpose of "Shishu Vidyalaya" run by the landlord is commercial one. It may be stated here that every institution imparting education cannot be said to be a commercial establishment particularly when in Indian culture, running of school is also considered to be sacred and holy task like establishing a Dharmshala or a hospital. I am supported in my view by the decision of the Apex Court in Unni Krishnnan, J.P. And others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and others (1993(1) S.C.C.- 645, wherein in paragraph no. 197 and 198 of the judgment the Apex Court held thus : "197. We are certainly of the opinion that such activity can neither be a trade or business nor can it be a profession within the meaning of Art. 19(1)(g). Trade or business normally connotes an activity carried on with a profit motive. Education has never been commerce in this country. We are certainly of the opinion that such activity can neither be a trade or business nor can it be a profession within the meaning of Art. 19(1)(g). Trade or business normally connotes an activity carried on with a profit motive. Education has never been commerce in this country. Imparting of education has never been treated as trade or business in this country since time immemorial. It has been treated as religious duty. It has been treated as charitable activity but never as trade or business. We agree with Gajendragadkar, J. that" education in its true aspect is more a mission and a vocation rather than a profession or trade or business, however wide may be the denotation of the two latter words." "198. We are, therefore, of the opinion, adopting the line of reasoning in State of Bomay Vs. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala, that imparting education cannot be treated as a trade or business. Education cannot be allowed to be converted into commerce nor can the petitioner seek to obtain the said result by relying upon the wider meaning of "occupation"." 18. In the case of Purvanchal University Jaunpur & Another Vs. Shabana Khatoon & Others, [2010 CAR 194 (All) (DB)] a Division Bench of this Court has held that the educational institution does not conduct commercial activity. 19. A perusal of the record reveals that the lower appellate court has recorded a finding of fact holding the need of the landlady to be bonafide and genuine and found the comparative hardship in favour of the landlady. The said findings are based on the evidence available on record. The Lower Appellate Court has given cogent, convincing and satisfactory reason while passing the order in favour of the landlady. The finding recorded by it is neither perverse nor based on any extraneous or irrelevant consideration. It has on meticulous evaluation of evidence and material available on the record, found the need of the landlady to be bonafide and genuine. This court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can not substitute its own opinion for the opinion of the court below, unless it is found that the conclusion drawn by the lower court is erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law or based on inadmissible evidence or arrived at findings without evidence. 20. No other point has been pressed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 20. No other point has been pressed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 21. Thus, I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order passed by the lower appellate court. 22. In the result this petition is accordingly dismissed. 23. After the judgment was dictated, learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant urged that at least six months time may be granted to him for vacating the premises in question. The learned counsel for the landlady did not raise any objection to it. 24. As urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant, six months' time is granted to the petitioner-tenant to vacate the premises in dispute provided the petitioner-tenant give his undertaking in the form of an affidavit before the prescribed authority within one month from today specifically stating therein that he will handover the peaceful possession of the said accommodation to the landlady without inducting any third person within a period of six months from today and will pay the entire I arrears of rent including the current rent at the rate payable upto the date of delivery I of the vacant possession of the disputed premises within one month from today. 25. In the event of default of any of the aforesaid conditions, the landlady will be I at liberty to proceed to evict the petitioner-tenant, if necessary by coercive process with the aid of police force. Petition dismissed. _