JUDGMENT Tapan Kumar Dutt, J. 1. This appeal has been heard on the dates mentioned above and today the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent has completed his submissions and the learned Advocate for the appellant has also given his reply. Hearing is concluded. 2. This Court now proceeds to pass the following judgment. 3. The facts of the case, briefly, are as follows: The appellant in the present appeal is the plaintiff in Ejectment Suit No. 1371 of 2000 which was placed before the learned 5th Bench, Presidency Small Causes Court at Calcutta and the said suit was filed against the defendant, Ram Prasad Chandra and brothers who is the respondent in the present appeal. It appears that the said defendant was represented by one Manik Lal Chandra and on the death of the said Manik Lal Chandra, his heirs and legal representatives have been representing the said defendant-respondent. The plaintiffs case was that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit property which comprises of three rooms, covered verandah and common bath and privy at premises No. 98/2A, Taltala Lane, Calcutta-700 014. It appears that originally the suit was filed by the present appellant and his mother, Smt. Maya Chatterjee. The plaintiffs father is Late Madhusudan Chatterjee. It further appears that the said Maya Chatterjee died during the pendency of the proceedings and the plaintiff being her son continued with the proceedings. The plaintiffs case is that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit property and the defendant, a firm, was constituted by Sri Ram Prasad Chandra and Manik Lal Chandra and the said firm was a tenant in respect of the suit property. The plaintiff prayed for eviction of the defendant from the suit property on the ground that the defendant is a defaulter in payment of rent, the defendant has sublet the suit property illegally to third parties and has caused nuisance and annoyance and has also changed the mode of user of the suit property. The plaintiff also alleged in the plaint that the plaintiff requires the suit premises for his own use and occupation and for the use and occupation of his family members. 4. The defendant-respondent contested the said suit by filing a written statement and also challenged the relationship of landlord and tenant in between the parties. The defendant-respondent denied the material allegations made in the plaint. 5. 4. The defendant-respondent contested the said suit by filing a written statement and also challenged the relationship of landlord and tenant in between the parties. The defendant-respondent denied the material allegations made in the plaint. 5. The learned Trial Court, after a contested hearing, by judgment and decree dated 7th October, 2005 decreed the said suit by granting a decree of eviction and recovery of khas possession in favour of the plaintiff-appellant and the defendant-respondent was directed to quit, vacate and deliver up peaceful vacant possession of the suit premises in favour of the plaintiff. It appears that commission was held in the said suit. The learned Trial Court found that ejectment notice issued to the defendant is legal, valid and sufficient. With regard to the ground of default in payment of rent, the learned Trial Court found that the defendant is entitled to protection under section 17(4) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. The learned Trial Court decreed the suit on the ground that the defendant had sublet the suit property illegally and also on the ground that the plaintiff required the suit premises for own use and occupation after having held that there was relationship of landlord and tenant in between the parties and the plaintiff has no other reasonably suitable accommodation elsewhere. 6. Challenging the said judgment and decree dated 7th October, 2005 passed by the learned Trial Court in Ejectment Suit No. 1371 of 2000, the defendant filed the Title Appeal No. 1 of 2006 which was placed before the learned 9th Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta. 7. The learned Lower Appellate Court by the impugned judgment and decree dated 21st August, 2006 allowed the said appeal by setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court. The learned Lower Appellate Court observed that the learned Lawyer appearing on behalf of the respondent in the said Title Appeal had argued the matter only on the point of subletting and reasonable requirement for own use and occupation. The learned Lower Appellate Court has observed that the plaintiff has miserably failed to prove the allegation of subletting. The learned Lower Appellate Court was also of the view that the plaintiff has failed to prove his ownership in the suit property and also that the plaintiff has failed to prove his reasonable requirement for his own use and occupation of the suit premises. The learned Lower Appellate Court was also of the view that the plaintiff has failed to prove his ownership in the suit property and also that the plaintiff has failed to prove his reasonable requirement for his own use and occupation of the suit premises. 8. Challenging the aforesaid impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned Lower Appellate Court, the plaintiff has filed the present second appeal. It appears that by order dated 10.11.2006 an Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court was pleased to admit the appeal for hearing on the following substantial questions of law: (a) Whether the learned court of appeal committed substantial error of law in reversing the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial judge on the question of reasonable requirement by not at all considering the extent of requirement pleaded and proved by the plaintiff by limiting the requirement only of mother-in-law and accommodation of clients? (b) Whether the learned Court of appeal below committed substantial error of law in not considering the requirement of the plaintiff for accommodating whole time clerk, drawing room and a garage? (c) Whether the learned Court of Appeal below committed substantial error of law in holding that the plaintiff failed to prove ownership of the property by totally misreading the evidence of the defendant wherein he admitted that the father of the plaintiff was the owner of the property by purchase and after the death of the father, plaintiffs mother and plaintiff acquired the property and subsequently, even the mother of the plaintiff died? 9. It will appear from the perusal of the aforesaid formulation of substantial questions of law that such the substantial questions of law relate to the issue regarding the plaintiffs reasonable requirement of the suit premises for own use and occupation. 10. At the time of hearing of the present appeal, the learned Advocate for the appellant raised a point of subletting and submitted that the learned Lower Appellate Court should have decreed the suit not only on the ground of reasonable requirement for own use and occupation but also on the ground of subletting. 11. After having heard the learned Advocate for the appellant on the question of subletting, this Court by Order dated 27.1.2012 found that there is no reason to formulate any substantial question of law on the issue of subletting in the present second appeal. 12. 11. After having heard the learned Advocate for the appellant on the question of subletting, this Court by Order dated 27.1.2012 found that there is no reason to formulate any substantial question of law on the issue of subletting in the present second appeal. 12. Accordingly, the learned Advocate for the appellant made his submissions on the ground of substantial questions of law already formulated by the Hon'ble Division Bench as noted above. 13. The learned Advocate for the appellant referred to Paragraph--4(b) of the plaint wherein the plaintiff has pleaded his requirement of one kitchen room on the ground floor as the plaintiff has no separate kitchen room and the plaintiff has to cook his food on the covered varandah in the first floor, one room for accommodating the whole time maid servant, one room for guests, one drawing-cum-sitting room, one study room, one "Thakur Ghar" and one store room. He has also submitted that the plaintiffs family comprises of plaintiff himself, plaintiffs wife and plaintiffs son (who is now aged about 14 years). This submission of the plaintiffs learned Advocate is supported by the pleadings in the plaint but he also submits that the plaintiffs widow mother-in-law is also residing with the plaintiff as she has no one to look after her in her old age. The submission made with regard to the mother-in-law of the plaintiff, it appears, has not been pleaded in the plaint. The said learned Advocate referred to the evidence of D.W. 1 who is Manik Lal Chandra i.e. the person who was one of the partners of the said firm. The said learned Advocate referred to the evidence of the said D.W. 1 wherein he stated that one Nabadweep Chandra Patra, the erstwhile owner of the suit holding, had transferred the entire premises including the suit premises to one Madhusudan Chatterjee (the deceased father of the plaintiff) in January, 1969. He also referred to that part of the D.W. 1's evidence wherein the said Manik Lal Chandra had stated that Madhusudan Chatterjee had filed an Ejectment Suit being Ejectment Suit No. 1233 of 1969 against the present defendant and the said Ejectment Suit was withdrawn and thereafter another Ejectment Suit being Ejectment Suit No. 546 of 1972 was filed by said Madhusudan Chatterjee against the present defendant and the learned Trial Court had decreed such suit. It further appears from the evidence of D.W. 1 that against the said decree, the defendant had preferred an appeal in this Court being F.A. No. 27 of 1975 and ultimately by consent of both the parties in the said appeal the defendant was directed to vacate one room on the northern side of the ground floor of the suit holding by way of partial eviction. It further appears from the evidence of D.W. 1 that the D.W. 1 has stated that said Madhusudan Chatterjee had died intestate leaving behind his widow Smt. Maya Chatterjee and his son, Sri Aloke Chatterjee, who originally had filed the instant suit. D.W. 1 has further stated in his evidence that during the pendency of the present suit, said Maya Chatterjee has died and as a result of which the family of the plaintiff consists of the plaintiff himself, his wife and his minor son. It further appears from the evidence of D.W. 1 that the plaintiff at present is in possession of one room, part of covered verandah on the ground floor, three bed rooms with bath, privy and covered verandah on the first floor and one room with asbestos shed on the roof of the suit building and the plaintiff being a practicising Advocate is using the ground floor room exclusively as his chamber. It further appears from the evidence of D.W. 1 that the D.W. 1 stated in his evidence that the rent bill was issued in the name of the defendant and the suit premises is being used for both residential as well as business purpose. 14. The learned Trial Court after discussing the materials on record came to the conclusion that there was relationship of landlord and tenant in between the plaintiff and the defendant and that the plaintiff has no other reasonably suitable accommodation elsewhere and the requirement of the rooms "as sought by the plaintiff" is genuine and bonafide. 15. The learned Lower Appellate Court considered the issue of subletting but ultimately came to the conclusion that the plaintiff has miserably failed to prove the allegation of subletting. This Court also did not find any substantial question of law to be formulated on the issue of subletting. 16. 15. The learned Lower Appellate Court considered the issue of subletting but ultimately came to the conclusion that the plaintiff has miserably failed to prove the allegation of subletting. This Court also did not find any substantial question of law to be formulated on the issue of subletting. 16. The learned Lower Appellate Court while considering the issue with regard to the reasonable requirement of the plaintiff for own use and occupation of the suit premises came to the finding that the plaintiff has failed to prove his absolute ownership in the suit premises and, therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to any decree on the ground of reasonable requirement of the suit premises for own use and occupation and the plaintiff has not filed a single scrap of paper to show that he is the owner of the suit premises. With regard to the requirement for accommodating the plaintiffs mother-in-law, the learned Lower Appellate Court held that since the said mother-in-law of the plaintiff has a son, she cannot be considered as a family member of the plaintiff for the purpose of evicting the defendant even though the widow mother-in-law is a near relationship of the plaintiff. According to the learned Lower Appellate Court, the requirement of a separate room for the widow mother-in-law of the plaintiff is a fanciful one when such mother-in-law has a house in the District Birbhum. With regard to the plaintiffs claim that he requires separate room for accommodating his clients who come from different parts of the country, the learned Lower Appellate Court observed that there are several renowned Lawyers and Doctors in the city of Calcutta who have a chamber and they accommodate their clients in that chamber and most of them have no separate rooms for their clients and, therefore, such requirement is neither bonafide nor reasonable. 17. The learned Lower Appellate Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff is not entitled to get any decree on the ground of reasonable requirement. The learned Advocate for the appellant submitted that the learned Lower Appellate Court, apart from the question of requirement of the plaintiff for his mother-in-law and for his clients, did not consider at all the said requirements of the plaintiff which were pleaded in the plaint as already mentioned above (paragraph-4(b) of the plaint). The learned Advocate for the appellant submitted that the learned Lower Appellate Court, apart from the question of requirement of the plaintiff for his mother-in-law and for his clients, did not consider at all the said requirements of the plaintiff which were pleaded in the plaint as already mentioned above (paragraph-4(b) of the plaint). The said learned Advocate has also submitted that the defendant had not even suggested to the witnesses on behalf of the plaintiff that the plaintiff is not the absolute owner of the suit property. He has submitted that in view of the fact that the defendant had clearly admitted the fact that the plaintiffs father was the original owner of the premises by virtue of purchase from the said Nabadweep Chandra Patra and in view of the admitted fact that said Manik Lal Chandra had stated that Madhusudan Chatterjee had died intestate leaving behind his widow and his son as his only heirs and legal representatives, there was no necessity for the plaintiff to show any further proof after such admission on the part of the defendant. He has referred to section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act. 18. The said learned Advocate submitted that the learned Trial Court had considered the question regarding the plaintiffs requirement of garage for keeping his car but the learned Lower Appellate Court did not consider this aspect of the matter. However, he also submitted that unfortunately in the pleadings i.e. in the plaint, the plaintiff did not plead the requirement with regard to his mother-in-law and the requirement of garage and also the requirement for the plaintiffs clients. 19. Be that as it may, it appears that the alleged requirement for the plaintiff's mother-in-law and the alleged requirement for the plaintiffs clients were argued before the learned Lower Appellate Court and the same was discussed by the learned Lower Appellate Court. 20. 19. Be that as it may, it appears that the alleged requirement for the plaintiff's mother-in-law and the alleged requirement for the plaintiffs clients were argued before the learned Lower Appellate Court and the same was discussed by the learned Lower Appellate Court. 20. The learned Advocate for the appellant cited a decision reported at 2008 (4) CHN 162 (National Film Development Corporation Ltd. vs. Shantilal Bakliwal) and referred to paragraph-17 of the said reports wherefrom it appears that the Hon'ble Court was pleased to hold that in a suit for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement, it is the duty of the landlord to prove ownership and at the same time, a duty is cast upon the Court dealing with such a suit to arrive at a specific conclusion in this regard. It further appears that reference was made to Order 41 Rule 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the said reports which provides that where the evidence upon record is sufficient to enable the learned Appellate Court to pronounce the judgment, the learned Appellate Court may, after resettling the issues, if necessary, finally determine the suit, notwithstanding that the judgment of the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferrecy, has proceeded wholly upon such ground other than that on which the learned Appellate Court proceeds. 21. The learned Advocate cited another decision reported at 2005 (3) ICC 788 (Netai Chandra Paul & anr. vs. Dilip Kumar Saha). In paragraph-56 of the said reports, the learned Court held that the minor son of the plaintiff No. 1 in the said reports who was a student of class - V certainly requires one exclusive room for his study and, that apart, the son who will grow up day by day will require one bed room exclusively. In paragraph 57 of the said reports, the learned Court held that there must be one exclusive drawing room where distant relations, friends and other outsiders can be attended. In paragraph 58 of the said reports, the learned Court was pleased to consider the Supreme Court judgment wherein it was held that the landlord may convince the Court that the alternative residential accommodation though available can be still of no consequence as the same cannot be reasonably suitable to satisfy the felt need which the landlord might have succeeded in demonstrating objectively to exist. The Hon'ble Court was further pleased to observe that while considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court may keep in view the profession or vocation of the landlord and his family members, their style of living, their habits and the background wherefrom they come. In paragraph-62 of the said reports, the learned Court held that the requirement of one guest room is also a basic requirement. 22. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at 2001 (3) CLT 233 (Smt. Kabita Mukherjee vs. Ms. Padam Chand Banthia) and referred to paragraph 16 of the said reports wherein the Hon'ble Court was pleased to observe that increase of status is related with the improvement of profession and in the said reports, it also appears that the landlady also intended to keep her ailing brother for treatment. The Hon'ble Court in the said reports was also pleased to observe that the landlord is the best judge of his own requirement for residential or business purposes and had complete freedom in the matter. 23. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at AIR 2001 SC 803 (1) in support of his contention that the Court should not allow the requirement of the landlord to get frustrated owing to the lengthy longevity of the litigation and the Court should also tak int consideration the subsequent events. According to the said learned Advocate, the mother-in-law of the plaintiff has lost her son (such submission was not admitted by the learned Advocate for the respondent), and as such the said mother-in-law is required to be taken care of by her only daughter who is the plaintiffs wife. Of course, it is no where on records that the plaintiffs mother-in-law has lost her son but at the same time it is difficult to believe that a person will make a false statement with regard to the death of one of his near relations., Be that as it may, it is not necessary to dilate on this point any further. 24. The said learned Advocate for the appellant cited another decision reported at AIR 1988 SC 852 in support of his contention that the plaintiff being a professional lawyer can definitely use a part of his residential building for the purpose of his professional work. 25. 24. The said learned Advocate for the appellant cited another decision reported at AIR 1988 SC 852 in support of his contention that the plaintiff being a professional lawyer can definitely use a part of his residential building for the purpose of his professional work. 25. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at 1991 (1) CLJ 392 (Himanshu Bikash Das vs. Ramendra Mohan Dutta) and referred to paragraph 24 of the said reports in support of his contention that the Court should not act as the guardian of the landlord but should only consider whether the requirement of the landlord is reasonable or not. 26. The said learned Advocate for the appellant cited another decision reported at (2010)13 SCC 216 and referred to paragraph - 25 of the said reports in support of his contention that the issue of perversity itself is a substantial question of law. 27. The said learned Advocate for the appellant submitted that the learned Lower Appellate Court failed to consider the requirement of the plaintiff as pleaded in paragraph 4(b) of the plaint and in the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Lower Appellate Court should have come to the conclusion that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the suit property and the learned lower Appellate Court should have decreed the suit on the ground of reasonable requirement. 28. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the defendant-respondent submitted by citing a decision reported at 2011 (3) CLJ (SC) 125 (M/s. Shiv Cotex vs. Trigun Auto Plast Private Ltd. & Ors.) that the High Court in the second appeal should not interfere with the concurrent finding of fact by the Courts below without formulating any substantial question of law and such formulation of substantial question of law is a condition precedent for entertaining and deciding a second appeal. There cannot be any dispute with regard to such proposition of law laid down by the Hon'ble Court. But in the present case it is on record that an Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court has already formulated the substantial questions of law involved in this appeal as noted above. 29. There cannot be any dispute with regard to such proposition of law laid down by the Hon'ble Court. But in the present case it is on record that an Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court has already formulated the substantial questions of law involved in this appeal as noted above. 29. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at 2011 (3) CLJ (SC) 1 in support of his contention that unless there exists a substantial question of law, the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned Lower Appellate Court cannot be set aside. There is also no dispute with regard to such principle of law. The question is whether in the present case the appellant has been able to establish that there exists and/or exist substantial question and/or substantial questions of law in the present appeal. 30. The learned Advocate for the respondent raised a point that the heirs of Ram Prasad Chandra who was a partner in the defendant firm have not been impleaded as parties in the suit and, therefore, the suit is bad for non-joinder of parties. He referred to a decision reported at AIR 1991 SC 933 (Smt. Isabella Johnson vs. M.A. Susai) wherein the Hon'ble Court was pleased to hold that there cannot be any estoppel on a pure question of law. It appears from the judgment dated 17.2.1978 delivered by a Division Bench of this Court in F.A. No. 27 of 1995 that the Hon'ble Court held that the said Madhusudan Chatterjee was right in giving the notice of the suit to the present defendant firm and the defendant-firm continued the business in the name of the firm and has accepted the rent receipts in the name of the defendant firm. The Hon'ble Court in the said case has already held that the present defendant is a firm in respect of the premises in question. The said judgment dated 17.2.1978 has been marked as an exhibit and is appearing on the records. The D.W. 1 as already noted above, has also stated in his evidence that the rent bills in respect of the suit premises have been raised in the name of the defendant firm. 31. In such circumstances, the defendant respondent is estoppel from raising such point in the present proceedings at the second appellate stage. The D.W. 1 as already noted above, has also stated in his evidence that the rent bills in respect of the suit premises have been raised in the name of the defendant firm. 31. In such circumstances, the defendant respondent is estoppel from raising such point in the present proceedings at the second appellate stage. This is not a pure question of law as it has been decided on facts as to who the real tenant is. Accordingly, the principle that there can be no estoppel on a pure question of law, cannot be of any assistance to the defendant-respondent. 32. The said learned Advocate for the respondent submitted that a party cannot be allowed to adduce evidence beyond his pleadings. According to him, as the plaintiff has not pleaded with regard to the alleged requirement for his clients' stay in the suit holding, the alleged requirement of his mother-in-law and the alleged requirement of a garage, no evidence on the part of the plaintiff on such ground can be entertained by a Court. The said learned Advocate also submitted that for the purpose of having a garage in the suit holding additions, alterations and/or further constructions are necessary but the plaintiff has not shown any evidence as to whether he has the financial capacity to make such constructions. The said learned Advocate submitted that the plaintiff was required under the law to prove the absolute ownership in the suit premises in order to get a decree on the ground of reasonable requirement for own use and occupation but the plaintiff has failed to prove his ownership in the suit property and no document was produced in support of the claim of the ownership of the suit property. The said learned Advocate also submitted that there is no evidence to show that the plaintiff has succeeded to his father's property. 33. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at AIR 1974 SC 1596 in support of his contention that the High Court in the second appeal cannot re-appreciate the evidence and interfere with the findings of fact reached by the learned Lower Appellate Court since the learned Lower Appellate Court is final so far as the findings of facts are concerned. The said learned Advocate submitted that the learned Lower Appellate Court was not required to scan evidence of the plaintiffs alleged requirement since the plaintiff has failed to prove his ownership in the suit property. The said learned Advocate also submitted that no issue was framed by the learned Trial Court with regard to the ownership of the plaintiff in respect of the suit premises. The said learned Advocate cited a decision reported at 83 CWN 657 in support of his contention that as the plaintiffs predecessor i.e. the plaintiffs father, had in an earlier suit comprised such suit with the defendant and had allowed the defendant to continue in possession, the plaintiff cannot get a decree on the ground of reasonable requirement in the subsequent suit. The said learned Advocate submitted that the present second appeal should be dismissed. 34. There is no dispute that a party should not be permitted to adduce evidence beyond his pleadings but it cannot also be disputed that the Court is entitled to take into consideration subsequent facts. 35. There is no dispute in this case that the plaintiff is by profession a lawyer and the defendant has admitted that the plaintiff has his chamber in one of the rooms on the ground floor of the suit holding. Even if this Court does not go into the question with regard to the plaintiffs alleged requirement for his mother-in-law, for his clients' room and for his garage, this Court is definitely entitled to consider whether the requirement of the plaintiff as pleaded in the plaint (in paragraph 4(b) of the plaint) is genuine or not. It appears that the learned Lower Appellate Court has not adverted to this aspect of the matter at all. The plaintiff has pleaded his requirement for kitchen room, one room for guest, one drawing-cum-sitting room, one study room, one "Thakur Ghar" and one store room and also one room for the plaintiffs whole-time maid servant. It cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that a kitchen room is not required by a person with reasonable means. The plaintiffs son who is now 14 years old definitely requires one room as his bed room as he cannot be expected to sleep in the same room with his parents. The claim of a study room by the plaintiff is also a genuine claim. 36. The plaintiffs son who is now 14 years old definitely requires one room as his bed room as he cannot be expected to sleep in the same room with his parents. The claim of a study room by the plaintiff is also a genuine claim. 36. This Court is of the view that the plaintiff has made a reasonable claim for a drawing-cum-sitting room, a "Thakur Ghar" and a store room. The plaintiff at present is in occupation of three bed rooms on the first floor. One of such rooms can be used by the plaintiff and his wife, another bed room can be used by the plaintiffs son and the third room on the first floor can be used as a store room. The room with asbestos shed on the second floor can be used as a "Thakur Ghar" but the plaintiff still remains with the requirement of a drawing-cum-sitting room, kitchen room, study room and a room which may be required for his maid servant. Even if the requirement of the room for the maid servant is not taken into account, the plaintiff would still genuinely require a drawing-cum-sitting room, kitchen room and study room. Such rooms can be made available only on the ground floor as the present possession of the respective parties have been made clear as would appear from the records. The learned Lower Appellate Court did not consider this aspect of the matter at all but proceeded to reject the prayer of the plaintiff on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to prove his absolute ownership in the suit property. 37. But it is made clear that the decree for eviction is being passed only on the ground of reasonable requirement of the plaintiff for own use and occupation of the suit premises. The plaintiff accordingly gets a decree eviction, for recovery of khas possession of the suit premises and the defendant-respondent is directed to quit and vacate and deliver up peaceful vacant possession of the suit premises in favour of the plaintiff within 90 days from the date of this judgment and, in default, the plaintiff will be at liberty to execute the decree in accordance with law. 38. The appeal is accordingly allowed. 39. However, there will be no order as to costs. 38. The appeal is accordingly allowed. 39. However, there will be no order as to costs. Urgent certified xerox copy of this judgment, if applied for, shall be given to the parties as expeditiously as possible on compliance of all necessary formalities. Appeal allowed