Amreshwar Pratap Sahi, J.:— Heard learned counsel for the petitioner Sri Sanjeev Singh and Sri A.K. Singh for the respondent. A suit for specific performance was filed by the respondent-plaintiff which was decreed ex-parte on 23rd July, 1998. The decree was put into execution. During the execution proceedings, the petitioner-defendant contends that she came to know thereof through a notice (Suchna Patra). The knowledge therefore disclosed by the petitioner about the passing of the ex-parte decree is on an inspection made on 19th October, 2001 whereafter it is also admitted to the petitioner that she put in appearance in the execution proceedings on the very next day on 20.10.2001. Sri Sanjeev Singh submits that the petitioner had no knowledge of the status of the relief claimed and the facts about the suit as the file was not available, and after efforts she came to know about the contents of the proceedings only on 17th November, 2001. Accordingly, the application under Order 9 Rule 13 to set aside the ex-parte decree was moved on 20.11.2001. Sri Singh submits that this application was therefore well within time and even if the court found that it was beyond the time prescribed from the date of knowledge as held by the court below, then the court ought to have granted time to the petitioner to file a better affidavit to explain the delay. He therefore contends that the rejection of the application on a technical ground militates harshly against the petitioner and therefore this Court in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution should proceed to condone the said delay and allow the matter to proceed on merits after setting aside the impugned orders. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that in view of the provisions of Section 3 readwith Article 123 of the Indian Limitation Act the date of knowledge has to be either the date of the ex-parte decree or the date of knowledge of the said ex-parte decree. In the instant case admitting that the petitioner came to know of the ex-parte decree on 19th October, 2001, the application was admittedly moved before the expiry of the period of limitation i.e. after 32 days and as such the application had to be rejected in view of the provisions of Section 3 of the Indian Limitation Act. In the instant case admitting that the petitioner came to know of the ex-parte decree on 19th October, 2001, the application was admittedly moved before the expiry of the period of limitation i.e. after 32 days and as such the application had to be rejected in view of the provisions of Section 3 of the Indian Limitation Act. He has relied on the apex court decision in the case of Mahavir Singh Vs. Subhash and others, reported in 2008 (1) AWC 165 paragraphs 8 and 9. He further contends that the petitioner never took a plea of condonation of delay nor any affidavit was filed in support thereof. He further submits that no application was also moved nor any oral payer was made for grant of any time to remove any such defect. In the circumstances, there was no occasion for the courts below to have considered any plea of condoning the delay and the courts below have rightly construed the date of knowledge on 19th October, 2001. In rejoinder Sri Singh submits that the date of knowledge would be 17th November, 2001 and the interpratation of the courts below in relation to the knowledge having been received by the petitioner is an erroneous assumption of fact. He submits that the court should have granted a reasonable opportunity to explain the aforesaid aspect of limitation and he riles on a learned Single Judge decision of this Court in the case of Smt. Indrasani Devi Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Varanasi and others, reported in 1981 ALJ 637 to urge that this Court should condone the delay if any. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, the admitted facts are that the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree according to the petitioner was moved within time and no application for condonation of delay was made. It is also evident on record that no prayer was made for filing of any further affidavit in this respect. In such circumstances it was not obligatory on the court to have granted time to the petitioner to file any further affidavit when no such prayer had been made by the petitioner herself. The decision in the case of Smt. Indrasni Devi (supra), therefore, dose not come to the aid of the learned counsel for the petitioner as the same was a case where an attempt was made for getting the delay condoned. The decision in the case of Smt. Indrasni Devi (supra), therefore, dose not come to the aid of the learned counsel for the petitioner as the same was a case where an attempt was made for getting the delay condoned. In the instant case the clear stand of the petitioner is that the date of knowledge is 17th November, 2001 and not 19th October, 2001. In the opinion of the Court, this stand cannot be accepted, inasmuch as, the cause of action arose on the basis of the ex-parte decree put into execution in which the petitioner herself had made an inspection through a counsel and had also put in appearance on 19th October, 2001/20th October, 2001. Thus the petitioner had knowledge of the ex-parte decree on the said date itself. Accordingly, in view of the provisions of Article 123 of the Indian Limitation Act read with Section 3 of the said Act the date of knowledge having been established, the contention that the contents of the entire file of the suit came to the knowledge of the petitioner on 17.11.2001 cannot be a ground to construe the date of knowledge. Accordingly, in view of the decision of the apex court in the case of Mahavir Singh (supra) and the ratio therein, this court cannot in its exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, take a liberal view of the matter so as to condone the delay in this writ petition and allow the proceedings to continue. There is no merit in the writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. _____________