JUDGMENT The present respondent had filed suit for recovery of Rs. 5,200/- towards arrears of rent, damages and sought possession of the suit house. It is the case of the respondent/plaintiff that the present appellant/defendant was the tenant. The tenant was in arrears of rent. The plaintiff determined the tenancy vide notice which was served upon the defendant on 05th April, 1982. The suit came to be filed by the plaintiff on 3rd November, 1982. The Trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff. Aggrieved thereby the defendant filed an appeal. The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal confirming the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court. The defendant has assailed the said concurrent findings in the present second appeal. 2. The present second appeal has been admitted on 21.08.1990 on following substantial question of law which reads as under: "II. Admittedly when provisions of Hyderabad Rent Act came to be applicable to the area in which house is situated during the pendency of suit, courts below failed to take into consideration the wordings of Sub-section (1) of Sec. 15 of the Hyderabad Rent Act which bars eviction of appellant even in execution of decree of civil Court?" 3. Smt. Dube, the learned counsel for the appellant strenuously contends that, the CIDCO was brought within the Municipal limits of Aurangabad on 3rd December, 1982. The suit was filed on 3rd November, 1982. On 03.12.1982 as the CIDCO came within the municipal limits of Aurangabad, the provisions of Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction, Lease) Control Act 1954 (hereafter after referred as to the "Rent Act" for the sake of brevity) became applicable. The civil court did not have the jurisdiction to decide the said suit. The learned counsel relying on Sec. 1 of the Rent Act states that the said Act has come into force at once. The learned counsel further contends that no separate notification is required for applicability of the act. Even if the suit premises have been subsequently included within the municipal limits, by operation of statute the Rent Act becomes applicable. The learned counsel further contends that the Rent Act is a beneficial legislation meant for protection of tenants and it shall be applicable to the pending proceedings. Even if the suit premises have been subsequently included within the municipal limits, by operation of statute the Rent Act becomes applicable. The learned counsel further contends that the Rent Act is a beneficial legislation meant for protection of tenants and it shall be applicable to the pending proceedings. The learned counsel further refers to Sec. 15(1) of the Rent Act and submits that in view of said provision, even in execution of the decree or otherwise the tenant cannot be evicted except in accordance with provisions of Sec. 15 of the Rent Act. As tenant cannot be evicted except as per the provisions of Sec. 15, then the Civil Court could not get the jurisdiction to execute the decree. It is the only Rent Controller who can pass a decree of eviction, if the conditions as laid down in Sec. 15 are satisfied. The learned counsel relying on Sec. 31 of the Rent Act states that, even the lease determined earlier is not exempted from the operation of said Act. The learned counsel relying on Sec. 36 of the Rent Act further submits that the proceedings initiated under the Hyderabad Rent Control Order are only saved and not proceedings under the different statute. The learned counsel relies on the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Hyderabad High Court in a case of Govind Rao Vs. Bhagwan reported in AIR 1956 Hyderabad 17, so also on the judgment of the Apex Court in a case of Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills & Ginning Factory Vs. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha reported in 1961 AIR (SC) 1596. 4. Shri Lakhkar, the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff submits that the lease stood determined on 5th April, 1982, when the notice of determination of lease was served upon the defendant. Even the suit was instituted prior to the suit property being included in the Municipal limits. There was no separate notification stating that the Hyderabad Rent Act is applicable to the said premises. The learned counsel further submits that the law applicable to the parties would be the law in force on the date of the institution of the suit. For the said purpose, the learned counsel relies on the judgment of the Division Bench of Karnataka High Court in a case of A.V. Ibrahim and another Vs. Mandepanda Cariappa reported in AIR 1971 Kant. 298. For the said purpose, the learned counsel relies on the judgment of the Division Bench of Karnataka High Court in a case of A.V. Ibrahim and another Vs. Mandepanda Cariappa reported in AIR 1971 Kant. 298. The learned counsel submits that there is nothing in the Act which states that the proceedings pending under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act shall be dealt by and under the provisions of the Rent Act. If there is no such provision, then the suit would be governed by the general statute i.e. Transfer of Property Act. The learned counsel relies on the judgment of Apex Court in a case of Sardar Khan and others Vs. Syed Najmul Hasan and others in Appeal (Civil) No. 1107 of 2007 decided on 28th February, 2007 : [2007 ALL SCR 1759]. 5. With the assistance of learned counsel I have gone through the judgment and the provisions referred therein. Before I proceed to deal with the arguments canvassed by learned counsel for respective parties, it would be appropriate to refer to the relevant provisions relied by the parties. THE HYDERABAD HOUSES (RENT, EVICTION AND LEASE) CONTROL ACT 1954 l. (1) ......... (2) It shall come into force at once. 15. (1) A tenant shall not be evicted, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of this section. 36. (1) The Hyderabad Rent Control Order, 1353 Fasli is hereby repealed. THE HYDERABAD HOUSES (RENT, EVICTION AND LEASE) CONTROL ACT 1954 l. (1) ......... (2) It shall come into force at once. 15. (1) A tenant shall not be evicted, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of this section. 36. (1) The Hyderabad Rent Control Order, 1353 Fasli is hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding any decision or order of any Court to the contrary, (a) any order made or deemed or purporting to have been made any decision or direction given or deemed or purported to have been given, any notification issued or deemed or purporting to have been issued, any action or proceeding taken or deemed or purporting to have been taken, or anything done or deemed or purporting to have been done under the provisions of the said Order shall, so far as may be deemed to be made, given, issued, taken or done under the provisions of this Act; (b) any liability or penalty incurred or deemed or purporting to have been incurred, any punishment awarded or deemed or purporting to have been awarded, and any prosecution commenced or deemed or purporting to have been commenced under the provisions of the said Order shall be deemed to have been incurred, awarded, made or commenced under the corresponding provision of this Act; (c) any application made, appeal preferred or other proceeding instituted under the said Order and pending at the commencement of this Act shall be deemed to have been made, preferred or instituted under the corresponding provision of this Act and shall be disposed of as if this Act had been in force at the time when such application, appeal or proceeding was made, preferred or instituted. THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT 1 .... [106. Duration of certain leases in absence of written contract or local usage.-(1) In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months' notice; and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days' notice. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the period mentioned in sub-section (1) shall commence from the date of receipt of notice. (3) A notice under sub-section (1) shall not be deemed to be invalid merely because the period mentioned therein falls short of the period specified under that sub-section, where a suit or proceeding is filed after the expiry of the period mentioned in that subsection. (4) Every notice under sub-section (1) must be in writing, signed by or on behalf of the person giving it, and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party, or to one of his family or servants at his residence, or (if such tender or delivery is not practicable) affixed to a conspicuous part of the property.] 111. Determination of lease. -A lease of immoveable property determines – (a) ............... (b) ............... (h) on the expiration of a notice to determine the lease, or to quit, or of intention to quit, the property leased, duly given by one party to the other. 6. The facts undisputed or said to have been proved can be culled out as under:- The plaintiff is a landlord and owner of the suit house of which the defendant is the tenant. The tenancy was determined by the plaintiff vide notice which was served upon the defendant on 5th April, 1982. On 3rd November, 1982 the suit was instituted by the plaintiff for recovery of possession, arrears of rent and damages. On 3rd December, 1982 CIDCO area where the suit premise is situated was included within the municipal limits of Aurangabad. The Hyderabad Rent Act is applicable to the premises situated within the municipal limits of Aurangabad. The moot question is whether the present proceedings would be governed by the Rent Act or would be governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. 7. No doubt, the Hyderabad Rent Act is beneficial piece of legislation enacted with main object to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants and for regulation of lease of houses in certain areas. 8. It is abundantly clear that no separate notification is required for applicability of the act to the premises which are subsequently included within the municipal limits. 7. No doubt, the Hyderabad Rent Act is beneficial piece of legislation enacted with main object to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants and for regulation of lease of houses in certain areas. 8. It is abundantly clear that no separate notification is required for applicability of the act to the premises which are subsequently included within the municipal limits. In the present case, admittedly when the lease stood determined the Rent Act was not applicable to the suit premises. It was also not applicable when the present suit came to be filed between the parties. 9. Normally the proceedings are to be governed by law which is applicable at the time of filing of the suit, unless a subsequent statute which is made applicable states otherwise. Under the Hyderabad Rent Act, there is no provision which states that proceedings filed under the Transfer of Property Act would be governed by the Rent Act. 10. Even as per Sec. 36 of the Rent Act it is laid down that the proceedings filed under the Hyderabad Rent Control Order would be governed by the Hyderabad Rent Act. It does not say anything about the proceedings filed under the Transfer of Property Act. 11. In earlier Hyderabad Rent Control Order Sec. 8 which was somewhat analogous to Sec. 15 of the Rent Act reads as under "no tenant of a house shall be evicted from the house in execution of a decree or otherwise, whether before the enforcement of this order or after it except under an order mentioned in this paragraph". 12. Bare reading of the said paragraph itself shows that the said provision is made operative retrospectively. In the Rent Act 1954 the relevant provision Sec. 15 does not contain the wording whether before the enforcement of this order or after it meaning thereby that the said Act would be operative prospectively. 13. It is cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective, unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. Provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in absence of express enactment or necessary intendment. 13. It is cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective, unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. Provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in absence of express enactment or necessary intendment. Every statute which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws or creates a new obligation or imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect of transaction already passed must be presumed to be intended not to have retrospective effect. 14. The general rule of the common law is that a statute changing the law ought not, unless the intention appears with reasonable certainty to be understood as applying to the facts or events that have already occurred in such a way as to confer or impose or otherwise affect rights or liabilities which the law had defined by reference to the past events. 15. A statute which affects rights in existence is not readily construed to affect adjudication of pending proceedings in absence of anything in the enactment to show that it has to have retrospective operation, it cannot be so construed as to have the effect of altering the law applicable to a claim in litigation at the time when the act was passed. 16. Sec. 111 (h) of the Transfer of Property Act lays down that a lease of immovable property determines on the expiration of a notice to determine the lease, or to quit, or of intention to quit the property leased, duly given by one party to the other. On 05.04.1982, when the notice of determination of lease was served on the tenant, the lease stood determined. It is also not the case of the defendant that the defendant had become tenant by holding over. No such pleading appears, nor there is anything on record to show that after the lease was determined, the tenant has paid the rent and the same is accepted by the landlord. 17. On determination of lease the right stood crystallized in favour of the plaintiff to seek eviction as per the law prevailing then and the plaintiff did exercise the said right by filing a suit on 03.11.1982. Admittedly on the said date the Hyderabad Rent Control Act was not applicable to the said premises. 18. 17. On determination of lease the right stood crystallized in favour of the plaintiff to seek eviction as per the law prevailing then and the plaintiff did exercise the said right by filing a suit on 03.11.1982. Admittedly on the said date the Hyderabad Rent Control Act was not applicable to the said premises. 18. In view of the above, the substantial question as framed by this Court is answered accordingly. The second appeal is thus dismissed, however, with no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.